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THE
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,

AND

LITERARY MAGAZINE.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS ET PREVALEBIT."

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PREFACE.

To the literature of inquiry, culture, aspiration, and endeavour, the conductors of this Serial add now another—their thirty-second—contribution. Upwards of twenty years ago they commenced their labours, animated by the desire of stirring up and encouraging free thought and free speech, duly controlled by intelligence and reflectiveness; and, under the belief that the acquisition of habits of investigative thought would increase the usefulness and happiness of those who could be induced to discipline their minds, to seek, with single-hearted purpose, the way of truth, they have continued to fulfil the duties to which such aims and beliefs bound them. It is almost superfluous to say that they have no desire to propagate any pet opinions on morals, social life, politics, or religion, or to act as missionaries of any set creed except the supreme and all-pervading one,—seek the Truth on all matters and at all risks. They have but one faith in common, a faith in the inevitable victory of truth and goodness; one aim—to stimulate their readers to become thinkers, and one paramount desire—to excite and accustom men to the patient, impartial, and intelligent discussion of all questions of interest, difficulty, and importance.

Controversy appeared to them an educative agent, which had been allowed to run to waste, and they resolved to attempt to utilize it. It had been little more than a name for the strategy and finesse employed in the perpetual manoeuvrings of parties and sects. They became the advocates of unreserved discussion, and the initiators of educative controversy, and it has now acquired a fixed place in the logic of investigative thought, as a test to which all those opinions which excite the rivalry of parties ought to be honestly submitted. In this magazine the right to apply controversy to all matters upon which human thought can be employed has been systematically asserted and exerted; and in the present volume, by the aid of various contributors, moving in different ranks in society, they have been able to present some good specimens of suggestive and effective controversial writing in the department devoted to *Debates*; and in the *Topic* a few subjects of interest have been briefly but thoughtfully considered.

In another branch of their scheme the conductors have been successful in acquiring not only the reputation but the reality of success, in their endeavour to impart the results of academic culture and ennobling thought to all who aim at intellectual progress, improvement, and enjoyment; and in their attempt to induce to the persistent education of the mental faculties, as a duty incumbent upon each, independent altogether of the material advantages which such a culture may bring.

There are probably few writers in this country more capable of speaking with authority on the subjects on which they have chosen to address our readers than those who have aided us in the leading articles in this volume. Dr. Ingleby, himself a “many-sided” man,—mathematician and metaphy-

sician, lawyer and critic, scholar and essayist, biographer and poet, has sympathies alive to many forms of thought, and has probably a more accurate and systematic knowledge of the writings of De Quincey than any other student of his multifarious productions. Dr. Stirling is a thinker of complete culture, who has no living rival as an expositor of the fecund metaphysic of Germany; and few compeers in the might of controversial skill in matters pertaining to science, morals, criticism, and religious philosophy. We rejoice in their friendliness to our designs for the culture of thought, and congratulate our readers on the possession of the able papers which these gentlemen have contributed to these pages. Of the other contributions of the same class we may safely say they exhibit that rare expository skill and fertility of suggestiveness which have made their author a welcome guest-friend to many an eager student and toiling thinker. In this department, then, we may regard it as indisputable that we have not now to acknowledge any falling off—but quite the contrary—notwithstanding the waymarks of time, which speak of the “years which bring the philosophic mind.”

In the other departments of their labours the conductors may note the freshness, originality, and excellence of the contributions to the *Essayist*, the vigour and interest of *Toiling Upward*, and the variousness as well as instructiveness of the *Reviewer* and the *Inquirer*. On a careful perusal of the volume now put into the reader's hands, the conductors believe that it will be found to be at once instructive, pleasant, and profitable; and such as to warrant the favourable opinion, not of friends only, but of critics in general.

The path of the truth-seeker is usually an unpopular one, beset with difficulties, and not often rewarded with high encouragement or loud congratulations; but it offers the consolations which are never denied to a noble spirit and an earnest endeavour. The conductors have not found it necessary to have strong cravings for popularity, and have preferred dutifulness to enrichment.

They aimed at influence, and disregarded affluence; they have exercised self-denial as well as advised self-devotedness. They have laboured to gain high ends, but not with the greed of high gains as their end; and the constantly recurring sacrifices of ease, pleasure, capital, and mental effort which the sacred servitude in which they had involved themselves demanded, they have given with patient grudgelessness, though the unseen harvest of their efforts could neither be estimated nor enjoyed by them. They have themselves exercised the earnest persistency they have sought to excite in others, and they have endured their own share of the contradiction of fate and time and circumstance, against which they have essayed to embolden others.

The conductors have earned, they believe, a moral right to the confidence and favour of those who have watched their efforts and found good in their toil, and they think they are warranted in asking them to use such endeavours as they can or may to add to the number of those who are brought under the influence of educative impulse, thoughtful effort, and a noble trust in the ultimate triumph of truth, by inducing to enrol themselves among the subscribers of and the contributors to the *British Controversialist* and magazine of literature, thought, and self-culture.

THE
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Many-sided Minds.

THE LATE THOMAS DE QUINCEY,

THE ENGLISH OPIUM-HATER

(*Scholar, Philosopher, Theologian, Economist, Humorist,
Romancer, Historian, Biographer, and Critic.*)

BY C. M. INGLEBY, M.A., LL.D.

"O genius of good sense, keep any child of mine from ever sacrificing his intellectual health to such a life of showy emptiness, of pretence, of noise, and of words."—*De Quincey.*

THE REV. SYDNEY SMITH, one of the wittiest and wisest of his cloth, addressing an assembly of students, gave them this advice:—

"There is a piece of foppery which is to be cautiously guarded against, the foppery of universality—of knowing all sciences, and excelling in all arts, chemistry, algebra, mathematics, dancing, history, reasoning, riding, fencing, low Dutch, high Dutch, and natural philosophy! In short, the modern precept of education very often is, 'Take the Admirable Crichton for your model: I would have you ignorant of nothing.' Now my advice, on the contrary, is, to have the courage to be ignorant of a great number of things, in order that you may avoid the calamity of being ignorant of everything."

Very similar to this is the counsel of Hegel (quoted by Dr. J. H. Stirling, at the end of an admirable article contributed by him to the *Fortnightly Review*, October 1, 1867:—

"He who wills something great must, as Goethe says, know how to restrict himself. He who, on the other hand, wills all, wills in effect nothing, and brings it to nothing. There is a number of interesting things in the world: Spanish, poetry, chemistry, politics, music; this is all very interesting, and we cannot take it ill of any one who occupies himself with these. In order, however, as an individual in a prescribed position, to bring
1870.

something about, he must hold by what is definite, and not split up his strength in many directions.”*

Even Hegel was—perhaps not contentedly—ignorant of the physico-mathematics; and it is a remarkable instance of the large demand which philosophy makes upon human knowledge, that this ignorance was detrimental to his philosophy in its ultimate issues, and fatal to its reception in England.

Good as this advice is, it does not necessarily follow that its neglect is fatal to success in life. Kant, Hegel, Goethe, Alexander von Humboldt (to which roll might well be added the living Heilmoltz), and many other Germans, are proofs to the contrary:—all of whom not only achieved the most distinguished success in their several specialities, but rendered their names historical. With Englishmen and Frenchmen the case is somewhat different. The names of Frederick Schlegel, Brougham, Whewell, and Michelet, occur to me as instances of the sort of success attainable by those who have made the Admirable Crichton their model. A few of those who dare to attempt to know everything may, notwithstanding such unwise temerity, attain to considerable eminence; but their names are never found in the first rank. With men of less mental and bodily strength the attempt is simply fatal. The *physique* of Brougham and Whewell was of extraordinary tenacity, and their natural abilities were excellent, inasmuch that it is difficult to say to what perfection and power of intellect they might not have reached, had each devoted himself to the cultivation of a single set of faculties, or to the acquisition of a single branch of knowledge. Virgil’s advice to the vine-grower (in which he reiterates the counsel of Hesiod) may be figuratively applied to the student:—

“*Laudato ingentis rura,*

Exiguam colito:”

i. e., admire large vineyards, but cultivate a small one. Equivalent to the counsel of Sydney Smith, Hegel, Buffier, Hesiod, and Virgil, is the old proverb,—“Whatever is worth doing is worth doing well,” for few indeed have the mental endowments and physical endurance necessary to the attainment of great excellence in many distinct subjects of study. Since the establishment of the Classical Tripos at Cambridge, it has never once happened that the Senior Classic had been Senior Wrangler. The nearest approach to this occurred in the year 1835 (which was what is called a weak mathematical year), when Mr. Goulburn, the only and highly gifted son of the late ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, was Second Wrangler and Senior Classic; and he paid for this double honour with his life.

The application, however, of the above-quoted maxim varies with different orders of mental endowments. The subject of this

* Compare with the above the Second Proposition in Père Buffier’s “*Examen des Préjugés Vulgaires*,” “Que la science ne consiste point à savoir beaucoup” (That science does not consist in knowing much).

sketch was fond of subtilizing (as he and Tennyson call it), and his favourite distinctions were between imagination and fancy, between power and knowledge, and between genius and talent.

"Walking Stewart," says De Quincey, "was a man of very extraordinary genius;" but he was utterly devoid of talent, and, as a natural result, produced nothing. Many years ago, I knew a gentleman named James Arthur Davies, who might well have been called "the admirable Davies." He appeared to me to possess every conceivable talent, and, up to the limits of his brain-power, to have turned all his talents to account; but, as I surmise, for want of some touch of true genius, he produced nothing, and did not achieve even a moderate success in life.*

Now to the man of genius, with or without these special gifts, and to the man of many talents, with or without some touch of the Promethean fire, the foregoing protest against versatility in mental culture must not be taken too literally; for there are cases in which an exemption may be claimed. The subject of this paper was, in the best sense, a man of genius, and possessed all the talents requisite and sufficient for the accomplished philosopher. Metaphysics was his hobby, and the work which he constantly kept before him, as the one thing for him to do, was a treatise *De Emendatione Humani Intellectus*; yet that book was never written, perhaps not attempted. The bent and powers of his mind carried him to philosophy, and his early training had thoroughly fitted him for the study of any philosophical works in Latin, Greek, or German. He read Plato with appreciation, and subsequently applied himself to the mastery of Kant's *Critic of Pure Reason*. His various notices, both of Kant and of his philosophy, are hopelessly discrepant. In one place he brands Kant as a liar, and in another calls him "the most sincere, honourable, and truthful of human beings." At one time he imputes Atheism to Kant, and at another he conceded to him the character of a Christian; and his remarks on the philosophy are equally contradictory. The key to all this is easily found. De Quincey wrote flippantly and dogmatically on these subjects before he had acquired any real acquaintance with them

* After Davies' death his MSS. were placed at my disposal. They weighed almost exactly a hundredweight: and they may fairly be described as *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*. My first examination of them revealed such versatility of talent, painstaking industry, and wide erudition, that I was prepared for the discovery of some works of the highest value. Something like half of the MSS. were written in Latin, a language which Davies spoke fluently; but I also found in them a good sprinkling of Greek and Hebrew, as well as French, German, and Italian. Of the last language Davies had acquired the most perfect mastery; but he ordinarily conversed in English or French. My expectation was disappointed. The MSS. proved to be little more than digested collections. A few original pieces in which he appeared to have worked wholly on his own mental resources were but elaborate failures. I have arranged seven volumes of his Lectures and Treatises on Music for presentation to his and my college—Trinity College, Cambridge.

at first hand. Having once devoted himself to the study of the "*Critic*," his remarks are just and genial. Henceforth he proclaimed this book to be the Alpha and Omega of philosophy, and hurled great scorn at the troop of unhappy impostors who had hitherto encumbered with their help such English students as dreamed of cracking this huge cocoa-nut. And that was all: no help in that direction was ever vouchsafed by De Quincey himself.

We cannot be far wrong in attributing this unfortunate result to the fact that, instead of concentrating his faculties on some one subject, such as fiction, criticism, history, in any of which he might have taken the first rank, or on philosophy, the successful prosecution of which would have called into healthy action every faculty of his mind, he divided his forces, and lost the vantage of their co-operation. A glance at the tremendous index appended to the fifteenth volume of Messrs. Black's edition of his minor works is sufficient to show that philosophy necessarily shared the fate of all the other subjects which occupied his versatile mind, and about which he delighted to pour forth his voluble, but often most eloquent gossip.

Thomas Quincey, the father of the author, was a West Indian merchant, carrying on business in Market Street Lane, Manchester. All we know about him is, that he had four sons and four daughters: that, growing genteel, he declined the retail trade from the beginning of 1783, and that he died at Greenhays, Manchester, on July 11th, 1793. His son Thomas (the fourth child) was born at Greenhays, on August 15th, 1785. He was instructed in the rudiments of the classics by the Rev. Samuel Hall, Incumbent of St. Peter's. Three years after the death of his father, the widow removed with her family to Bath, and for the following three years "young Thomas" continued his education at the grammar school there, and at a private school in Wiltshire. He was then removed to the grammar school at Manchester, in the expectation of being able to obtain an exhibition for Oxford. Mr. Lawson, the head-master, placed him at once in the first class. The system pursued at this school was such that no boy of delicate health could conform to it without serious detriment to his constitution. To this cause De Quincey (as he called himself) attributed that fatal derangement of the stomach which first led to his having recourse to opium. Whatever may have been the effect of the school discipline on his bodily health, it is certain that to it he owed that mastery over Latin and Greek composition which, in early years, made him so great a name.

At the end of three years he would have been entitled to stand for an exhibition, and his pre-eminent classical attainments would have ensured his success; but his failing health, and the impatience and irritability resulting therefrom, rendered school restraints insufferable, so that in his eighteenth month he clandestinely left the town, and for two years abandoned himself to a wandering life, being found in Chester, North Wales, London, and other parts of

England. At length, on December 17th, 1803, he matriculated at Worcester College, Oxford; but, like Shelley, Landor, and the late Lord Derby (to which list we might add Coleridge [at Cambridge], and some other distinguished poets), he left without taking a degree. At this time he had acquired so extensive and accurate a knowledge of the classics that he would certainly have attained the distinction of a first class had he merely kept up his reading. His Greek scholarship is reputed to have been prodigious, and he himself professes that, before he went to Oxford, Attic Greek was to him almost as familiar a medium of conversation as his native tongue. The reason for his abandoning the university course lies in one fatal word—*Opium*. The excess to which he indulged in this delusive and pernicious drug, turned his life into a voluptuous dream. His habits were, in all respects, inconsistent with the ordinary life of his fellow-creatures, food, sleep, and study being resorted to according to the fit that was on him, and without the least regard to times and places. For such a man university discipline was simply torture.

It is most difficult to trace De Quincey's erratic course from the time he left Oxford. His "Confessions and Autobiographic Sketches" are chiefly personal revelations, designed, in all probability, to set forth their eccentric author as a psychological curiosity. They must be read *in extenso* to be appreciated, so that our space will not be occupied by any extracts from them. We find De Quincey residing at Grasmere in 1817, in which year, on February 15th, he married Miss Margaret Simpson, by whom he had several children. One of these, a daughter, is now living at Greenhays, St. Leonard's-on-Sea. De Quincey now enjoyed constant intercourse with the so-called *Lakers*, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey, Wilson, and others of that distinguished *colerie*.

He seems to have left Grasmere in 1819, and to have once more betaken himself to a shifting life. In 1822—1824 he was one of the chief contributors to the *London Magazine*, edited by John Scott. As soon as *Blackwood's Magazine* came under the influence of Professor John Wilson, De Quincey's services were put into requisition in its behalf; but he also contributed to *Tait's Magazine*, the *Edinburgh* and *North British Reviews*, the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and *Hogg's Weekly Instructor*. Later in life he wrote for the *Titan* and several other periodicals.

In 1843 his wanderings (which we believe never extended far beyond his native land) came to an end, and he settled, with his family, in the beautiful village of Lasswade, in the neighbourhood of Edinburgh, and became the *Coleridge of the North*, in both the characters of Talker and Opium-eater. He might be described as a sort of soliloquizing Plato. He did for Lasswade what Socrates did for Athens, Johnson for London, and Goethe for Weimar. There he constantly associated with Sir William S. Hamilton, Professor John Wilson, Samuel Browne, Professor J. P. Nichol (also an opium-eater), Professor J. F. Ferrier, Blackie, &c.

and, for a time, J. W. Semple, the erratic and learned translator of Kant. He died December 8th, 1859, and was buried in the Churchyard of St. Cuthbert, Edinburgh.

De Quincey's head was a splendid study for the phrenologist, presenting a wonderful combination of the reflective and perceptive types. His portrait, prefixed to either the first or the last volume of the English editions, represents a man advanced in life, the face pale and emaciated, and the dress slovenly. The face and head suggest a strange compound of opposite and usually incompatible qualities. There is infinite power and wealth in the massive cliff-like head, and the utmost weakness and poverty are expressed by the nose and mouth. How to interpret that weird, good-natured, and suffering expression of the decrepit face? It is truthful yet sinister, earnest yet satirical; the sinister and the satirical blending in a dream-like insipidity. The upper lip is treacherous, the lower jaw sensual; but the face is so drawn with suffering or age as to complicate or obliterate the usual landmarks of physiognomy.

De Quincey unquestionably belongs to the class of minds called by the Germans *mannichseitig*, or many-sided. He is, perhaps, best known to the world as an opium-eater, and therefore, despite all he said or could say in praise of opium, in a disreputable character. I will say no more on this infirmity or vice, whichever it may have been: it is best lost sight of altogether, or at least kept in the background. We will resolve henceforth not to know him in that character. From which of his many sides, then, shall we approach him? We have called him scholar, philosopher, theologian, economist, humorist, romancer, historian, biographer, and critic. He was all these, and more. Those who have read the fifteen volumes of his minor works agree, on the whole, to praise him as a stylist. Truly he must rank *very high* in this regard. Passages in his autobiographic sketches, his memoir of Charles Lamb, his monograph on the "Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth"* (not to specify *many* other *opuscula*), are unrivalled for simple and natural beauty. But it is his *matter* rather than his *style* that shall now engage our attention; and it is as a critic on the obscure problems of ancient records that we shall approach the study of his versatile and voluminous writings.

De Quincey, while resting his claim to the favour of posterity on that section of his writings which may be called *Dream Literature*, still set a high value on the results of his critical labours; in fact, he went so far as to assert that, till his advent as a critic, there was "no rational criticism on Greek literature; nor, indeed, to say the truth, much criticism which teaches anything, or solves anything,

* The "Cambridge Editors" of Shakspeare, in the edition of "Macbeth" which forms part of the "Clarendon Press Series" (p. 109), declare their opinion that the Porter's speech (Act ii., Sc. 3) "seems strangely out of place," &c. That opinion argues an ignorance on their part of De Quincey's criticism.† This goes far to justify the seeming incongruity, but does so indirectly.

upon any literature."—(Ed. A. and C. Black, vol. xiii., p. 59.) The critics, he held, "had one and all been deluded by the seeming force of certain foregone conclusions respecting the intellectual and moral status of the ancients."

It would be impossible to do justice to De Quincey's views on the entire subject within the limits at our disposal; and as it behoves us to follow our own counsel, and to do a little thoroughly rather than much superficially, we shall restrict our remarks to one single point of the general question, viz., *the Antagonism between Paganism and Christianity*.

De Quincey tells us that it was from his conversations with Wordsworth that he was led to draw the first and fundamental distinction in the functions of books, *literæ humaniores*,—the literature which confers power, and which alone deserves to be called literature—being contrasted with *literæ didacticæ*, the literature which confers knowledge. From this distinction emerge the only two possible modes of human culture, the one which *instructs* and the other which *informs*. By the one the faculties of the mind are fed and quickened; by the other the potential forms of *feeling* are actualized, and elevated into consciousness. Now it is with literature proper that criticism is mainly concerned.

In the third of the "Letters to a Young Man whose Education has been neglected" (vol. xiii., pp. 53—60), (which, by the way, were written some years before they were published,) De Quincey broaches this most interesting subject, but his allusion to it is tangential. In fact, he simply throws out this hint, "that the antique or Pagan literature is a polar antagonist to the modern or Christian literature; that each is an evolution from a distinct principle, . . . and that they are to be criticised from different stations and points of view." He adds that he attempted to develop this thought in a series of "reveries." To what *limbo* are they consigned? Little, it is to be feared, is the chance of their discovery; a remark which applies to some other writings of De Quincey, the titles of which are given in a note at the end of this paper.

The conclusions he arrived at will be found in four Essays, viz., "Christianity as an Organ of Political Movement," "The Pagan Oracles," "The Theban Sphinx," and one in "The Autobiographic Sketches."

The following extracts will furnish the reader with a convenient summary of the chief of those conclusions:—

"What is a Religion? To Christians it means, over and above a mode of worship, a dogmatic (that is, a doctrinal) system; a great body of doctrinal truths, moral and spiritual. But to the ancients (to the Greeks and Romans, for instance,) it meant nothing of the kind. A religion was simply a *cultus*; a mode of ritual worship, in which there might be two differences, viz.: 1. As to the particular deity who furnished the motive to the worship. 2. As to the ceremonial, or mode of conducting the worship. But in no case was there so much as a pretence of communicating any religious truths, far less any moral truths. The obstinate error rooted in

modern minds is that, doubtless, the moral instruction was bad, as being heathen; but that still it was as good as heathen opportunities allowed to be. No mistake can be greater. Moral instruction had no existence even in the plan or intention of the religious service. The Pagan priest, or flamen, never dreamed of any function like that of *teaching* as in any way connected with his office. He no more undertook to teach morals than to teach geography or cookery. He taught nothing. What he undertook was simply to *do*, viz.: to present authoritatively (that is, authorized and supported by some civil community, Corinth, or Athens, or Rome, which he represented,) the homage and gratitude of that community to the particular deity adored. As to morals, or just opinions upon the relations to man of the several divinities, all this was resigned to the teaching of nature, and for any polemic functions the teaching was resigned to the professional philosophers, academic, peripatetic, stoic, &c. By religion it was utterly ignored."—*Autobiographic Sketches, Works*, vol. xiv., p. 418.

"The reader must understand, upon our authority, *nostro periculo*, and in defiance of all the false translations spread through books, that the ancients (meaning the Greeks and Romans, before the time of Christianity) had no idea, not by the faintest vestige, of what, in the Scriptural system, is called *sin*; that neither one word nor the other has any such meaning in writers belonging to the pure classical period. When baptized into new meanings through their adoption by Christianity, these words, in common with many others, transmigrated into new and philosophical functions. But originally they tended towards no such acceptations, nor *could* have done so, being that the ancients had no avenue opened to them through which the profound idea of *sin* would have been even dimly intelligible. Plato, 400 years before Christ, or Cicero, more than 300 years later, was fully equal to the idea of *guilt* through all its gamut; but no more equal to the idea of *sin* than a sagacious hound to the idea of gravitation, or of central forces. It is the tremendous postulate upon which this idea reposes that constitutes the initial moment of that revelation which is common to Judaism and to Christianity. We have no intention of wandering into any discussion upon this question. It will suffice for the service of the occasion if we say that guilt, in all its modifications, implies only a defect or a wound in the individual. Sin, on the other hand, the most mysterious and the most sorrowful of all ideas, implies a taint, not in the individual but in the race—that is the distinction; or a taint in the individual, not through any local disease of his own, but through a scrofula equally diffused through the infinite family of man. We are not speaking controversially, either as teachers of theology or of philosophy; and we are careless of the particular construction by which the reader interprets to himself this profound idea. What we affirm is, that this idea was utterly and exquisitely inappreciable by Pagan Greece and Rome; that various translations from Pindar, from Aristophanes, and from the Greek tragedians, embodying at intervals this word *sin*, are more extravagant than would be the word *category*, or the *synthetic unity of consciousness*, introduced into the harangue of an Indian sachem amongst the Cherokees; and finally, that the very nearest approach to the abysmal idea which we Christians attach to the word *sin* (an approach but to that which never can be touched, a writing as of palmistry upon each man's hand, but a writing which "no man can read,") lies in the Pagan idea of *piacularity*, which is an idea thus far like hereditary sin, that it expresses an evil to which the

party affected has not consciously concurred; which is thus far not like hereditary sin, that it expresses an evil personal to the individual, and not extending itself to the race."—*The Theban Sphinx, Works*, vol. ix., p. 239.

Copernicus, finding that he could not read the heavens upon the time-honoured assumption of a firmament of stars revolving around a stationary earth, tried what would come of assuming the earth to be itself revolving in a firmament at rest. This happy expedient was imitated by Kant in the world of philosophy, and he tried the experiment of reversing Locke's hypothesis, and assuming that the *phenomena* revealed to the senses were conformed to the perceptive faculty of the observer. De Quincey was profoundly struck by the success of both experiments, and (perhaps without any conscious intention of doing so) applied the Copernican expedient to theology; and this he did in two ways, and for these two purposes: to explain the prerequisite of Christian regeneration, as embodied in the command *metanoeite*; and to explain the apparently irregular or retrograde movements of Christianity in generations long after the preaching of the Baptist.

De Quincey's remarkable speculations on this subject will be found in four volumes of his collected works, viz., vol. xiv., pp. 410—418; vol. xi., p. 234 *et seq.*; vol. vii., p. 165 *et seq.*; and vol. ix., pp. 339—341, from which last I have given one quotation. In the first of these four references we have his exposition of *μετάνοια* (alluded to in a footnote to vol. vi., p. 310, and vol. xi., p. 247). He says:—

"*Metanoeite* was the cry from the wilderness: wheel into a new centre your moral system; *geocentric* has that system been up to this hour—that is, having earth and the earthly for its starting point; henceforth make it *heliocentric*, i. e., with the sun, or the heavenly, for its principle of motion."

And this exposition is followed by a statement of the distinction between the ritual worship of Paganism and that of Christianity. At the second of those four references he essays the application of the Copernican expedient to defend Christianity from the assaults or objections of men like the poet Shelley and General Jacob; "minds of the highest order," who, not referring the movements of Christianity to its true centre, "have arraigned it as a curse to man, and have fought against it, even upon Christian impulses, impulses of benignity that could not have had a birth except in Christianity:" and he says at length that, though we may discern the fact that its apparently irregular or retrograde motions are really regular and progressive, yet that "no finite intellect will ever retrace the total curve upon which Christianity has moved, any more than eyes that are incarnate will ever see God."

The key to this position is the distinction between Paganism and Christianity, in their nature, their ends, and their effects.

De Quincey enforces the position, that Paganism was a mere *cultus*, or ritual worship, teaching nothing, and accomplishing (positively) nothing for the advance of man. This *cultus* was founded

on the assumption that man, *as a person*, was not in any reciprocal relation to the gods; that he was not in any sense the object of their soliloquy; and that he could not by any means make them actively or positively friendly to him. The utmost that was proposed by this *cultus* was, by costly sacrifices, to propitiate the gods, and, so far, to protect defenceless man from the selfish or passionate ravages of malignant beings invested with irresponsible power.

Christianity, on the contrary, afforded a ritual worship, which was in close connection with a system of ethics and philosophy. It was founded on the enlightened assumption that God was not only friendly to man, but had Himself incurred the most costly sacrifice for man's regeneration and promotion. Accordingly, the end of the Christian *cultus* was to bring him within a *positive* spiritual influence for his own good, making him better, wiser, and happier, both in fruition and in expectancy; making possible for him the possession of good, though also as a result of self-denial in this world, and the reversion of eternal good after death.

The elements of Christianity are stated by De Quincey to be—
 1. A *cultus*. 2. A new idea of God. 3. An idea of the relation of man to God, "breathing household laws." 4. A doctrinal part, ethical and mystical. Of these elements, Paganism had but the first. It was a *cultus*. Now a *cultus*, in the Christian system, has four parts: (a) an act of praise, (b) an act of thanksgiving, (c) an act of confession, (d) an act of prayer. Of these the first and the last *appear* present in Paganism. Pagans glorified and invoked their deities. But how? "You read of *preces*, of *apai*, &c., and you are desirous to believe the Pagan supplications were not *always* corrupt." But, "vainly you come before the altars with empty hands. 'But *my* hands are pure.' Pure, indeed! would reply the scoffing god; let me see what they contain." *Do ut des* (i.e., I give thee that thou mayest give me), or *quid pro quo*, was the maxim. *Do* or *quo* was either a costly gift or a banquet (*cæna*) dedicated to the god: to the oracle it was a gift; to the altar it was a feast. But neither advice nor aid (even from a tutelary deity) could be had gratis. Even the magnificent choric prayer to Onca and the rest, in the *Seven against Thebes*, is backed up by reminding them that the sacrifices had been paid. Such was Pagan prayer; and Pagan praise was often the exaggerated imputation of the grossest vices. But from this *cultus* thanksgiving and confession were absent by the nature of the case; for thanks could not be due where every advance was paid for beforehand; and what were the poor Pagans to confess? Their sins? How could that be? for, first, they did not regard their vices as sinful, else were their gods the gravest of sinners; and, not regarding them as sinful, how could they feel remorse for them. Penitence they had none. *Pœnitentia* meant regret, vexation. *Merôvosa* meant either second thoughts, or after-thought, as being too late to be of any avail. Neither *apapria* nor *peccatum* meant sin; the nearest approach to sin was *piacularity*. No personal transgression was contemplated, but simply an offence

against the idiosyncrasy of the god, and in such an offence the devotee was as often as not involved by the act of others, while he himself was wholly innocent of it. But not the less did the vengeance of the god fasten on him unless he could propitiate him; and such was precisely the case of Œdipus. On his devoted head were poured the vials of wrath for the committal of three unconscious crimes—regicide, parricide, and incest; not for slaying a man on the king's highway; not for marrying the king's widow; acts which he had done with his eyes open; but for crimes involved in these acts, but which were wholly hidden from his knowledge, he met with that pariah fate, which in its mysteriousness and its pathos is a likeness, and for its despair and misery is a contrast, to the fabled doom of our King Arthur. For this reason it is that De Quincey takes Œdipus as the type of the child of truth according to the Pagan scheme.

It must be allowed that, even if De Quincey's theory is a little too *prononcé*, it is pregnant with a truth which is of great value to the Christianity of our own day. It is incident to any religious development from a new centre that it should adopt and resuscitate the words that did duty for the religious system which it supplanted; and thus it must happen that in after ages a grave risk will be run of reflecting back on the words of ancient usage a sense and power which they did not then have. If this danger be not avoided, there is the consequent risk of mistaking the actual freshness and originality of the religious ideas of the latest development, and of arguing that all its peculiar doctrines are borrowed from the supplanted system. In this way it is that many are now, let us hope in ignorance, assailing the originality of the special characteristics of Christianity; and it was against this stupendous blunder that De Quincey devoted his best powers and his ripest learning.

But it must be confessed that these views as a whole are chargeable with inconsistency. The Baptist's *Metanoeite* was addressed to Jews: the mainstay of the theory that the Jewish sect of the Essenes was a secret society of early Christians is, that on any other assumption there must have been a Christianity before Christ. The drift of De Quincey's remarks on these questions seems to be that Judaism, in a less degree than Paganism, but still in a great degree, had a distinct centre of evolution, and that a change in the point of reference, and an intellectual and moral revolution, were demanded in the one as in the other. But when brought face to face with this fact, De Quincey wards off the inevitable conclusion by the following note:—"Once for all, to save the trouble of continual repetitions, understand Judaism to be commemorated jointly with Christianity—the dark root together with the golden fruitage—*whenever the nature of the case does not presume a contradistinction of the one to the other*" (vol. xi., p. 241). But the only question between Judaism and Christianity is just this—in what respect are they to be contradistinguished? in what respect was the "New Commandment" opposed to the old? And

the answer to this, if searching and true, must go far to reduce Judaism to a rank with which Christianity had nothing in common save the doctrines of monotheism and original sin.*

* In the course of De Quincey's works mention is occasionally made of other of his writings, which are not known to have been published. Such as "Suspiria de Profundis" (twenty to twenty-five sketches, of which "The Daughter of Lebanon" and (a) one other piece are all that have been published), mentioned in vol. i., preface, xiv. "De Emendatione Humani Intellectus," mentioned in vol. i., p. 254. "Prolegomena to all Future Systems of Political Economy" (possibly the same as "The Logic of Political Economy"), mentioned in vol. i., p. 256. "Reveries on the Evolution of Pagan and Christian Literatures," mentioned in vol. xiii., p. 60. And a work citing the "Antigone," mentioned in vol. xiii., p. 204.

Besides these, there are various papers by De Quincey scattered about our periodical literature, which have never yet been gathered in. Foremost is the admirable article on "Kant in his Miscellaneous Essays," published in *Blackwood's Magazine*, August, 1830, included, I believe, with some other papers unknown in England, in Messrs. Ticknor and Field's American edition of De Quincey's works. There is also the paper above mentioned to which (a) is prefixed, which I read in some English periodical circa 1850-1855. De Quincey mentions (vol. vi., p. 267) a paper by himself on "Freemasonry," published in a London journal about 1823 or 1824; and (vol. xiv., p. 71, note) another on "The Prevalence of Danish Names of Places in England," published in a provincial newspaper. These are possibly only a few of the monographs of this gifted and voluminous writer yet to be garnered. One is loath to lose a line which fell from that inspired penman. These references are to Black's reissue of Hogg's edition. Neither of the English editions, nor the American edition, nor the combination of all these, includes those of his works which had been published separately, viz., "The Logic of Political Economy," 1844; "Walladmor," &c. I believe I am guilty of no breach of confidence if I add that Mr T. Emley Young, of Fulloden House, Clapton, has long been engaged on a "Life of De Quincey." I know of no one fitter to execute this work.

CHRISTIANIZATION.—"The world for Christ,"—that is our motto. The world is Christ; He reared its lofty mountains, scooped out its beautiful valleys, gathered its world of waters into their place, and for ages He has been watching over it with the tenderness of a father over a child. He has dwelt upon it, sanctified it with deeds of holiest love, set up in it His cross of redemption, baptized it with His blood, and will have it again for His own, when the miseries and the woes of centuries shall be shaken off the bosom of the earth, and the light, lighting up the sky, shall fill all lands. The world seeking the cross, like a prodigal his home, shall come forth to the glories of eternal life, and shall rejoice with exceeding great joy in God's richest benedictions; then, like a prodigal, long wandering but come home at last, God shall take it to His bosom once more.—*W. Jones, Birmingham.*

Philosophy.

CAN HIGH EDUCATION COUNTERACT THE EAGERNESS OF THE SENSES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THERE can be no doubt at all that high education, "by employing the mind and developing the character, counteracts the eagerness of the senses." We read of Newton neglecting the rare indulgences which were open to him for the divine and precious delights of study. We know that men have foregone pleasures of every sort for the higher gratifications of intellectual culture. How many men in the ardour of high and bracing thought have secluded themselves from all the common and ordinary allurements of the world, and devoted themselves sedulously to the attainment of the joy which high education gives when it "unfurls the bannered victory of mind." The very senses become deadened, and cold, and pure, and unindued before the power of a great idea. Hot blood may course in the veins, and the senses may urge their imperious suits with the energy of sword and spur, but the might and obstinacy of the mind keep the mastery, and the spirit labours to noble ends. The senses are but the servants of the thinker. It is in the man who is all sensation that the blood runs riot, and the claims of the passions become irresistible; not in the heart of the lonely student pouring over his books, engaged in the high problems of science, or sounding the depths of philosophy.

We do not mean to affirm that the lives of all scholars are pure and untainted, that there is no access at any time of a craving for the indulgences the world supplies, but we do mean to say that the mind which is honestly and zealously absorbed in high thought, and in the task of leading out his mind and all its powers to the investigation and conquest of some field of knowledge, has not only less time, but also less inclination, for the debasing pursuits of sensualism. He who knows little must be more exposed to the temptations and allurements which beset the vacant mind, while the man who has absorbing engagements on lofty themes cannot but be less open to the assaults of the suggestions to evil with which the world abounds: for the one has his whole nature ready to be touched to vile pursuits, has no pre-engagements to restrain and restrict his yielding to the enchantments of the senses, while the other has a source of joy ready to flush his soul, and cleanse it from the enticement of the tempter. It is clear that the mere fact of education having widened the area of experience, must have caused the power of the impressions made on the senses to be less strongly felt. That which impresses an extended surface is less

intense than that which is concentrated; hence impressions made on the senses of a person whose capacity for experience has been widened by education must have less power than similar impressions made on a mind which has only the senses to be impressed, and nothing else to restrain or to distract the mind.

It is a fact, too, that occupation is by far the best human security against sin. To keep the mind alert on other topics, and to have the power of turning to some other form of delight, must have this advantage at least, that we have an opportunity of being amongst those—

“That live according to the sober laws,
And holy dictates of spare Temperance;”

for we have other and more delicate pleasures available than those of sense and sin. But the man who has no other occupation for his hours of ease, relaxation, and enjoyment than the merely animal nature he possesses supplies, must be more exposed than the educated man to yield to the allurements of vice and the sophistries of Pleasure, when she promises that—

“One sip of this
Will bathe the drooping spirits in delight
Beyond the bliss of dreams.”

It is true that in one sense education will refine and render the senses more delicate, and capable of keener delight, and rarer sorts of pleasure, but that is, if education be applied to them. The painter's educated eye sees more in the forms and colours of nature than we do; the sculptor from the pure colourless form derives more rapture than we can conceive; the poet in his “fine frenzy” beholds a brighter and gladsomer world than we know till he becomes the revealer of it. The mechanic acquires a greater dexterity of touch by culture, and the epicure can distinguish and divide between taste and taste more acutely and accurately than we can. The notes which float along the air in music fill the ear of the trained and cultured scholar of harmony with a much more subtle delicacy than we can fancy, but this surely is not matter of dispute, it cannot be that this is in question—else why are we not all skilled in arts, acute in perception, thrilled with similar power and subtlety? We conclude therefore that our idea is that which is meant, that the query is one having moral and philosophical bearings, and that it really signifies. Are educated men more likely to be more moral than their neighbours?

I am not here going to make a point which is quite open to me, namely, what is meant by “high education.” It cannot, we might argue, be intended by this phrase, that the education given should be debasing, but if education does not protect men against the eagerness of the senses, but rather inclines them to find indulgence pleasant, it must be debasing; that cannot be high education which not only does not elevate, but actually touches the balance to the lower side. I shall accept the phrase “high education” in the usual and obvious sense, as that sort of training which is given at school

and college, which enables a man to enjoy with some relish the graces of letters, and the activities and results of thought; and this, I maintain, aids men to be moral.

I need only in the meantime, as a support to my argument, to note that men have in general regarded education as a preservative against many evils, that it is always spoken of and written about as a something requisite for man's moral elevation. In fact, culture has come almost to signify not only education, but the refinement and moral amiability it produces. To this let me add but one other fact. Whenever any offence against society, or in opposition to the general duties of man to man is committed; whenever any one sinks into a sensualist, a drunkard, or a debauchee, it is considered an aggravation of the offence to say—and yet “he is a man of culture, a fine scholar, a person of a good education.”

It seems to be plain, then, that if we have understood the question properly, education has the tendency to make men conquerors over sense and the vices of sense, to fortify them against temptation by occupation, and to strengthen them for self-restraint. It overcomes the eagerness of the senses, by exciting a taste for higher and nobler pleasures, and by making a man less dependent on the senses for his pleasures.

B. L. K.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

PHILOSOPHICAL questions in general are very vague in their form; but the topic announced under the head of Philosophy for debate during the “present half” is surely more vague than ordinary. It is not to be doubted that the subject is not only arguable but important. The main difficulty seems to be to get a common starting point, where so many words, each requiring accurate definition, are employed. “High education,” for instance, is a phrase which is capable of being tortured into a great many meanings, according to the view taken of “education” itself, and of what may be denoted by “high.” “Counteract,” again, may signify things so opposite, as “countervail, or destroy the effect of,” or “form a just equivalent for.” “The Eagerness of the Senses” is a round about form, it may be, of saying “man's addiction to sensuality,” or, it may imply the much more harmless idea of man's “acuteness in using the ordinary powers of sensation with which he is endowed.” Altogether, while we do not see very well how it would be possible to express the same idea in other terms, we may safely affirm that a great number of different ideas may be formed about the topic of discussion, each having some justification in the vagueness of phrase with which the subject is stated. We shall endeavour to fix upon one which may be usefully debated, if fairly engaged in.

Before doing so, however, we may be allowed to lay before ourselves for guidance, and our readers for its suggestiveness, the following quotation:—

“In framing a definition, the principal question to be considered is

always a question of fact. The person who defines gives, or ought to give, not his own view of the subject which he defines, but the nearest approach that he can obtain to an account of what is passing in the minds of his neighbours. The art of constructing a definition consists in finding a sufficiently large and well-marked class of facts answering pretty correctly to a word in popular use, and in appropriating the word for the future to that class of facts apart from all others. It is thus obvious that, to construct a definition of common popular phrases, is a very different thing from enunciating a complete theory of the subject to which the definition refers.*

The above paragraph should put us on our guard against supposing that any very recondite and mysterious question is couched under the phraseology which stands at the top of this debate. I dare say the common matter-of-fact question would resolve itself into this—Does high, classical, literary, and intellectual training hinder men from falling into the vices which prevail among men?

The philosophical question before us would thus contain in itself such topics of practical morality as these—Does education tend to the diminishing of crime? Is education the best remedy against drunkenness? Does education control passion, and enable men more strongly than without it to resist the temptations to which human life is subject? Looked on as involving the grounds or reasons for answering these questions affirmatively or negatively, the philosophical considerations which may be brought before the mind may be very interesting and valuable. Taking the question in this light, I must confess that I am bound by the law of honesty to say that I do not think it will be found true as a fact of experience, or probable as a matter of theory, that "high education can counteract the eagerness of the senses."

The chief of our temptations probably come to us from or through the senses. We find joy in the gratifications they afford, and we readily yield ourselves to those indulgences to which they entice. When we give ourselves up too fondly and immoderately to the gratifications of the senses, we are said to be vicious; the eagerness of our senses has overbalanced our minds, and we prefer following our inclinations to giving devoted attention to duty; we are unwilling to ponder the path of our feet, to consider our ways and be wise, to restrain ourselves within the limits, sometimes of human, sometimes of divine law.

We note, in the first place, as affording ground for believing that high education cannot counteract the eagerness of the senses, that certain vices are almost wholly characteristic of the higher classes, those, therefore, who have had all the chances and advantages of high education. Nay, so much is this the fact that they have come to be known as the fashionable vices. It would perhaps be unwise, just at the present stage of the debate, to specify these in all their fulness. Those who know the vices which are popularly denomi-

* "Essays by a Barrister," p. 293; reprinted from the *Saturday Review*.

nated fashionable, will at once agree that high education has not tended to lessen the frequency of these. We may instance gaming and habitual drinking only as specimens. It is certain that, though drunkenness in all its grossness may not so largely prevail in the social life of the upper classes, the consumption of intoxicating drinks has not diminished. The habitual use of them has enabled the drinkers to disguise the fact better, and the constancy of habit has enabled them to bear, as it is called, their liquor more bravely, but education has not counteracted the eagerness of the senses for them, nor lessened their use.

There are other vices, which fashionable people gild and refine as to their concomitants, but in which they indulge as profusely as their uneducated fellows, who are compelled to take them under the rude form in which they are catalogued as the "brutal vices;" indeed it may fairly be alleged that the highly educated *roués* of society are the purveyors for the "brute masses" of those who are their victims, and the tempters of those who, in the eagerness of enticed senses, follow the better educated classes to do evil.

It is one thing to refine vice and palm it off in the guise of honourable life, and another to withdraw from it and abstain from its indulgence. It is a well-known fact that vices of several classes, and crimes of some heinousness, and sins of a most flagrant nature, are habitually indulged in by those who have had high education and the severest polish training could effect. But the spreading of a thin veneer of respectability over certain sins does not abolish them, or transform them into virtues. It is in their unpolished state that they "to be hated need but to be seen." The palliatory environments with which they are surrounded make them more deadly to the soul and more contaminating in their effects.

The prevalence of gluttony, epicurism, love of finery, sexual sins, and personal indulgence in the use of liquors, tobacco, snuff, &c., among the educated classes is undeniable evidence that education does not dull the appetite or stave the greed of sensuality that stirs the frame which has not been subjected to the governing restraint of conscientious motives and been brought under the sanctifying influences of a renewed nature.

High education, too, very frequently adds the charm of the association of old legendary mythology, gracefully expressive classical poetry, and the glitter of felicitous phrase round the indulgences of sense. Memories of Hebe, and Venus; and Bacchus, and Jove, quotations from Horace, Catullus, and Juvenal, incidents from the classical drama, and ideas derived from the statues of the olden or the paintings of the modern time. These, while they conceal the sinfulness under a cloak of seeming virtue, increase the eagerness of the senses for the Circean cup of pleasure, till indulgence, "unmoulding Reason's mintage character'd in the face," brings the polished and educated sinner down to the level of his less trained and humbler imitator. No, education does not counteract, it often intensifies, the eagerness of the senses. G. P.

National Education.

OUGHT EDUCATION TO BE SETTLED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LEAGUE OR THE UNION?

"The Education movement is going forward with a rapidity which justifies the most sanguine hopes; and the two great principles of the League—that Education should be compulsory, and that State Education should be undenominational—are striking root deeply into the mind of the nation. Having held the first opinion for many years, and the last always, I heartily rejoice at the progress both are making towards general recognition."—*J. S. Mill.*

THE LEAGUE.—I.

THE principles of the National Education League are plain, simple, and thoroughgoing. The *object* is to agitate for "the establishment of a system which shall secure the education of every child in the country;" and the *means* are briefly these:—that local authorities shall be compelled by Law to provide sufficient school accommodation for every child in each district; that the founding and maintaining of the said schools shall be provided for by local rates, supplemented by Government grants; that these schools shall be managed by the local authorities, and be under Government inspection—be unsectarian—be free to all—and children may be compelled, if necessary, to attend them. This scheme is practical, straightforward, and adapted to the times. The League asserts that education is as necessary to the proper vitality of man as food is. It affirms that here and there education may be had if it be taken out of a sectarian feeder; but in almost all cases it cannot now be had apart from the sectarian condiment. The League is of opinion that education pure and simple may be provided with as little sectarianism in it as there is sectarianism in a soup-kitchen or an hospital. Besides, it sees that sectarianism works fitfully, wastefully, and for the effecting of a purpose beside or beyond the main object. It is set in operation to gain converts, not to make scholars competent for the duties of this life.

In looking upon the educational machinery now in existence no one can fail to recognise its want of permanency, its dependence on the life of some good old Lady Bountiful, the yearning for notoriety of some young clergyman, or the zeal of some chapel deacons; that it is not originated with the distinct and definite design of preparing pupils for the work of life, but of biasing them towards a particular creed. That where sects are contentious, schools abound, and where a truce of God is held among the sects, or the adherents are only lukewarm, education languishes and fails. It expands,

not according to the requirements of a district, but in proportion to the energies of sects; it is founded on the free will of individuals, and is therefore liable to fluctuation instead of being established by law, and made permanent by the will of the nation. The education of the country has hitherto been provided by us as a charity or a bribe—a charity in support of which brazen-faced mendicancy has been practised by clergy, deacons, and tract distributors, and a bribe held out to secure the influence in one parish of the Church of England, in another of the Wesleyans, and in another of the Independents. Education is a right—a right which ought to be provided for in the arrangements of the State, and it ought not to be given as a charity, nor used as a bribe.

There is thus a great waste of educational effort—the competition of sects causing competitions of schools, two or three being set up where only one can be adequately supported, and the result being that while the teachers are nearly starved, the children are enticed into one or other school, not so much for the education to be got, as the favour, the clothes, or the parish relief, which is to be gained by going to one party in preference to another. Besides the waste in building expenditure and in teaching power, we have the waste of inspectorialism. Then in other places, where zeal is worn out, or the parties are so evenly pitted against each other that there is no chance of changing the percentages by the institution of schools, or where the poverty is so great that money cannot be raised to comply with the government regulations, schools are not to be found. There is neither completeness nor universality, a proper purpose, nor a trustworthy basis, for schools as they are now. Besides, the denominational system is a fallacious one. It implies that schools are for the inculcation of doctrines, and that education is only a half-way house to some religious body; whereas education is the means of making men useful and happy, profitable to themselves and beneficial to the State. Too often the school is looked upon as a foundation of, or an adjunct to, the church or chapel.

Why should churchism and pauperism be always branded on education? What relation is there between the Alphabet and the Articles, the Multiplication table and the Communion table, the copy-book and the Creed, the uses of slate pencil and the habit of church-going? Why should the perusal of the Abecedary be regarded as constituting a good claim on the clergy for charity, the learning of the art of writing be combined with the receipt of doreas-flannel, or the acceptance of instructions in geography be considered as a stepping-stone to the soup-kitchen. Now a great many of the present schools are kept up from motives no better or more enduring than these, that they shall be avenues to the church or chapel, and are nourished upon charity because it flatters the vanity of the squire, gives interest and occupation to his daughters, brings all the possible fruit-stealers, poachers, &c., under the eye of some one in the interest of the squire, and makes children spi-

for the wealthy. Perhaps in some instances the lady of a demeane wants tidy, demure parishioners, and the pick and choice of the parish, for servants, or has some ideas about the management of the dependents on her bounty, or some fuzziness of disposition, and she gets up a school for a while, and then, finding it an annoyance, or more a care than a joy, drops it again, or leaves it to struggle till it dies, its master or mistress a begrudged pensioner.

Instead of this we want education conducted on principle. We want it to be accepted by society as a privilege and a duty. We must have it made a public responsibility and a private necessity. The nation must gird up its loins to the great task of substituting schools for prisons and workhouses, and must stir itself up to restrain pauperism and crime by instruction such as shall make children fit for the duties of life, and induce them to perform what society requires of them when their turn comes to do their share of true labour in the earth.

Denominationalism does not reach the masses. It can get at the church-going and the respectable; it can get at those who hang on by the skirts of every society to take what can be got out of them; it can get hold of those who like to have the patronage or trade of those who live decently and go to chapel, but it does not reach the useless, the degraded, and the careless, it does not go down into the lower levels of life and "excavate the home-heathen." We want a system which will thoroughly alter all this, which shall press and impress the duties of life upon every one, which shall refuse to hand over the guidance of the young to pet schemers and pulpit agitators, which shall make it imperative on every parent of every child to see that he gains such schooling as may fit him for being of use in the world.

The League will secure this by compelling attendance. We compel men to pay taxes to provide for their families, to obey the laws, to abstain from the practice of many things enjoyable in themselves when we think they ought not to be indulged in, and to conform to certain regulations which are thought to be beneficial. We compel the cleansing of towns and the laying in of water, and we even, in some cases, compel to pay for museums and free-libraries. Why not compel to the attendance on that which, if attended to, would render all other compulsion unnecessary. If men were thoroughly educated they would be much better fitted to guide and train their families, to do their work, to appreciate cleanliness, to use libraries, and to benefit from museums. To compel attendance for education would be a great deal preferable to compelling attendance at law and police courts, and residence in prison.

Then, by the proclamation of free education, the League takes away all possibility of complaint on the score of compulsion. No one can plead that he cannot afford to give his children education. The League has arranged that every child shall not only be compelled to go, but have a perfect right to get to school. There can

therefore be no difficulty as to the concession of attendance. The doors will be open, and every one will be required to enter some one or other.

To secure this free education for all, the League insists that the schools shall no longer trust to the precarious bounty of the charitable, or the varying results of canvassing mendicancy. It insists that the schools shall be paid for by all and be open to all. Recognising the education of its members as a duty incumbent on society—it demands that society shall pay for it. Society had better far pay for education than for crime or pauperism. From these it gains no advantage, from that it would attain much. If there is good reason why it should save itself from crime by prisons, there is still more reason why it should do so by schools; and if it is necessary to provide workhouses for paupers, it would be still better to provide by schools to prevent people from sinking into the ranks of pauperism. To gain a national benefit—the benefit of improving the future workers and merchants of the country—it is right to make a national effort, and we believe that there is no better investment the nation could make for its own prosperity than the general education of the people. If we can afford to spend so much in war as we do, why should we hesitate to commence a holy war against ignorance, and spend our millions in making men useful, rather than in destroying them as food for powder?

It is certain that all the earnestness and energy of the Church, that all the zeal and efforts of voluntarism, that all the exertions (if any) made by the secularists, and that all the considerate help afforded to schools by the Government in their distribution of the public funds, have not been sufficient to bring more than a small portion of the children of the working classes under efficient education, and that in populous places especially, and even in country districts, ignorance much more abounds than many people could believe. There are 14,877 parishes in England and Wales. In these there are only 7,406 approved schools, and these do not educate so many as 60 per cent. of the population of the parishes in which they are situated. Here then we have more than half of the country deficient in school supplies, and many competent authorities affirm that there is certainly not a fifth part of the educatable population of the county—children between four and thirteen—who are under systematic training. Every writer or speaker on the subject admits that “in no place, in town or country, is the educational condition of the people in a proper or satisfactory system,” and we know almost every means short of compulsion, and a good deal short of compulsion too, have been employed to bring about a better state of things. Hence the League advocates and approves of compulsory measures.

Now only consider what an efficient agent this compulsory education would be. It would make it the interest of the parents to see that proper heed was given to preparation, every permitted time of laziness would be felt to be a period of loss, every intermission of study that could be avoided would be reck-

as a slice of wages gone. Instead of parents not caring that their children should neglect their lessons and disobey the injunctions of the teacher, every one would be made anxious to have progress made. What a change this would make in our schools; children diligently prepared with their tasks would make it pleasant to teach them, and they would find it a delight to be taught, while (by the way we may remark) it would be highly beneficial to the parent to be put in a position which made it advisable that he should see to the proper preparation of the school studies. We may make duty and interest coincide in this way; in the way we are pursuing, and which the Union proposes to perpetuate, interest and duty are set against each other—the interest of getting the earnings of the child against the duty of seeing that the child is properly educated. Let compulsory education be established, and parent, teacher, child, employer, would all work harmoniously and earnestly for the one purpose, the diffusion of education through the nation.

The Union proposal is one of compromise, not of principle, and compromises always fail to be satisfactory. What sort of an exchequer would Mr. Lowe have if he were not to make the taxation compulsory, but made it optional, or entered into a compromise as between his charges and the people's payments? The Union proposes to perpetuate what has already proved to be a failure. Denominationalism has been already trying and trying to solve this educational difficulty for us, but it is not doing it. It is crying out for more Government help, that is, more taxation, to enable it to boast of its triumphs. With nearly a million of money granted to it, it is scarcely keeping progress with the increase of population; and while the contributions of Government have increased from £20,000 in 1833 to £1,000,000 in 1869, what has denominationalism done? It has been—as indeed clerical schemes almost always are—like the daughter of the horse-leech, crying, "Give! give!" instead of coming forward and saying, "I'll give! I'll give!" If we are to get a proper education for the country we must reform it altogether, and join with the League for unsectarian, self-supported, locally managed, free in fee, and compulsorily-attended schools; then only shall we be a properly educated and duly qualified nation.

S. W. R.

THE UNION.—I.

EDUCATION is the *leading out* of all the faculties and powers of a human being to their proper ends, in the best manner, and to the production of the wisest results. Man is not a mere working and workable machine, which has only to be got up, at the least possible expense, to such a pitch of industrial power and skill as will make him a useful drudge and a good investment for capital, in the shape of wages. Man is a creature of many possibilities over and above his capacity for work, his value in the eyes of the political economist as a wealth producer, and of the manufacturing capitalist as a speculation out of which profit may be got. Against the base at-

tempt made in the present age to degrade man into a mere holder of a certain amount of exchangeable capital, called labour, which should be bought as cheaply as possible, and be so set in operation as to produce the largest possible profit, we feel bound to protest. Manufactures we do not object to, profitable investments we have no quarrel with; contracting for a constant supply of the motive power and skill existing in human muscular fibre is a legitimate enough bargain, but the usual commercial idea of man as an exquisite piece of machinery out of which profit may be got, does seem to us very objectionable. The National Educational League seems to us to wish to school men, to improve them as machinery; the National Education Union appears to wish to school men because they have high responsibilities and a lofty destiny; and this is the first reason which induces me to maintain that the system of education propounded by the Union is superior to that of the League.

The Union and the League have the same object so far. They both aim at "securing the primary education of every child in the country;" but they differ most materially in the means and the method of carrying out the object to which they are devoted.

The first difference we may notice is the *motive*. The League finds that uncultured workmen greatly interfere with the progress and profitableness of manufactures; hinder the commerce of this country from being so extensive and so expansive as its merchants would like, expose the trade of the land to close competition, and generally interfere with the steady prosecution of the great aim of the leaders of the industries of Britain—money-getting. So long as the trade and commerce of the country could be carried on by bone and sinew, the great contractors for labour cared for nothing but the brute-strength which formed portion of the machinery for their enrichment. They upset the whole balance of population, and when they had drafted into the large centres of commerce crowds of people from the country villages, they left them schoolless and churchless, and felt quite resigned to the brutal ignorance in which the people, thus left to their animal instincts, lived around the mills and potteries, the foundries and the forges, the warehouses and workshops in which they toiled like draught-animals to make their masters rich. Now that, in the race for riches, they have seen that intelligence among workmen is an appreciable gain, the master traders, fearing that their craft is in danger, are desirous of perfecting their machinery by increasing the skill and dexterity of the labourer; but they wish them to have as little sense of soul as is possible, lest they should come to think that there are higher purposes in life than enriching and being enriched, especially than being the drudging engines by which money-making is attainable. Great landed proprietors acknowledged, in some form or other, the humanity of their tenants and work-people; but the mighty manufacturers looked on men only as parties to a contract, as people who had labour to sell, and who must make what they can

of it, and, when they had paid the market rate, concluded that their duty was done when Saturday's wages were given. Robert Owen and some other benevolent men endeavoured to create a higher feeling among manufacturers and to introduce a nobler sense of responsibilities, but they failed; money could be made without the education of the people, and so long as that was possible they held on their old path, and did nothing to educate or elevate the working classes; but now that training is required, they wish to get all their workers educated, and that out of the taxes too.

We maintain then that the selfish motive from which the leaders of the League appear to be acting is a great argument against settling education on the principles of the League rather than the Union. The Union represents those who have made and are making sacrifices for the sake of educating the people. The parties interested in it are those who have higher views of the destiny of man than that he was to be a mere labouring animal. They think of man's immortal destiny, and they desire that he may know something more of his destiny upon the earth as a human being than that which is merely secular. They have a higher motive, and it is always advisable to act on the highest motives possible to us—the possession of a noble motive and a holy aim is in itself a valuable element in education.

The Union plan provides for what is absolutely necessary, a sound, religious education, over and above the demands of the League, in regard to primary education in reading, writing, and accounts. This is essential to anything like education. The human being is a religious creature; his nature, that is, the peculiar nature which distinguishes him from all other animals on the earth, cannot be cultured in him unless he is religiously educated. The duties of life are indeed religious duties, and no one can adequately perform them unless guided, prompted, and urged on by religious considerations.

I have to assert now that the principles of the Union are superior to those of the League in the means they suggest for "securing the primary education of every child," because the principle advocated by the Union is the utilization of all the presently existing schools, by increasing their efficacy and bringing them all into the service of the country; while the League proposes to cast off as worthless, useless, and, in fact, injurious, all these schools which have been in past times the only means of spreading the light of education. They offer new lamps for old ones, on the condition that you throw away the old as useless, and pay for the new ones without a grudge, and by compulsion.

Again, the Union acts upon the good, sound principle that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," as well as on the holier principle that "the Lord loveth a cheerful giver." Hence it is desirous of holding and keeping in the service of the country the numerous schools already built; hence it is not willing to cast

back the hand of munificence in which there is held £499,782, nor is it inclined to send away, with scorn for the meanness of the offering, the little children who bring in their hands to pay in part for their schooling, £430,279; nor is it willing to allow the £91,121 of endowments and bequests, which are available for education, to be transferred to other uses. The League proposes to be economical in throwing away all this money, which, if once cast aside, would be like water spilled upon the ground, that cannot be gathered up again.

I do not myself see any good reason for the League's demand for "the *establishment* of a system," when, as the Union more sensibly proposes, the judicious supplementing of the present system would be more easy, more economical, and speedily accomplished. Why should we waste the energies of teachers and the liberality of school patrons, or the endowments of our ancestors, and, ignoring these, set up a bran new and untried system of scholastic establishments, at the expense of the tax-payers? To begin a national system of education by an act of national extravagance and profusion does not seem to be highly judicious or greatly wise. When we look at the proposal, however, a little more narrowly, we see the prudence and worldly wisdom of the project. Existing schools are mostly under the management of men earnest in their belief that man is more than a tool-using animal, and that technical secular education is not all that is good for man and profitable to the State. They believe in religion and duty, and that while the body is more than meat and the life more than raiment, the soul of man requires to be taught not only to labour for the meat which perisheth, but for the bread of heaven. The Union would have the soul and the life consecrated to God, while the members of the League would immolate the life and the soul at the altar of Mammon.

Denominational education has been much and undeservedly traced in comparison with secular education. National education may be quite as thoroughly given under the denominational system as under the secular method; while denominationalism has special advantages of its own. It at least recognises something spiritual in man's nature, and professes to know and to teach the duties of life, but the secular system ignores all culture for life except such as may fit for this world and the needs of trade. Denominationalism is in earnest for higher things than the world can satisfy, while secularism has proved itself to be only in earnest from the lowest motives—the sense of the risk of pecuniary loss, or the prospect of pecuniary gain. This is made evident by the fact that the extension of education has formed no regular part of the programme of the Leaguers; they have made few or no steps towards helping on the noble cause at their own expense. They are willing to be liberal with other people's money to secure a better class of machinery for themselves. They will use the improved articles when others have provided it, and when they have worn out the nerves

and muscles of this superior article they will cast it off their hands to be taken up by the local boards again as a pauper. It will be brought up in pauperism, and it will be permitted to go to the Union when the League has got its ends served.

The League denies the necessity of teaching religion, and would extrude from the school all reference to God's law and all popular teaching in regard to the laws of moral conduct revealed in his Word. How the character of the pupils is to be educed, and how the teacher is to regulate the morals of his scholars without teaching which may be called religious, and which may therefore be fruitful in discussions and heart-burnings, in secular school committees, I am quite unable to comprehend. Denominationalists propose a conscience-clause, but the secularists do not so much as recognise a conscience. They propose to kill the conscience by inanition, while the advocates of religious teaching wish to protect its just rights and to provide for the recognition of the supremacy of conscience. How can a boy be told that lying is wrong, that it is an evil thing to steal, unless reference is made to the law of God, and the teaching is based on that? How can a child be told that help is ready in his efforts after goodness, through prayer and by the Holy Spirit, if God is not to be named and dogmas are not to be permitted in our national secular schools? To do so would be denominationalism, and the State is asked by the League to affirm solemnly before heaven and earth that education should be confined to the things of this world, to the mere secular concerns of humanity : and hence I cannot believe that the League is superior to the Union.

It was pertinently remarked at Newcastle by the Rev. A. R. Ashwell, M.A., Principal of the Durham Training College—"The religious bodies have worked hard and spent freely ; they have thousands of schools waiting to profit by Government assistance. What schools have the secularists founded? What schools have they waiting for assistance, and only awaiting a relaxation of Government rules to get that aid? Oh no! with them the State must do all, but they put their shoulder to the wheel, and did not spend their time and energy in vain invocations to Jupiter." Those who teach on the principles of the Union have provision made for 2,500,000 children ; 350,000 are said to be without the means of education. The League says, Begin anew, make a clean sweep of all the existing schools, or ignore them ; "let the dead past bury its dead," and let us have from Government sources, *i. e.*, grants and local assessments ; *i. e.*, taxes, £8,000,000 a year, to provide a worldly education for worldly purposes, to suit the aims of worldly men, who are worldly wise enough to ask others to pay to provide them with men-machines for mines, factories, potteries, mills, and workshops, whom they will consign, when they are worn out, to the poor-rates, as the proper source whence useless members of the State, worn out in making profits for them, should find an easy passage smoothed towards the grave.

What! have a world of worldlings, a society of trained and skilled men and women, who know nothing of life and its duties but what may fit them to be better producers of worldly wealth! Oh, surely a league of devils could wish no more thorough a transformation of earth than to find this greed of gain triumphant over all godly endeavour. If we want to have educated *men*, we must have an education for them which will give a chance to their higher nature. To weave round the soul a network of worldliness, from the cradle to the grave, will not be tolerated now. We must have a recognition of the spiritual element in man.

I have only now to remark that the Union, by accepting of and supplementing to the full extent that is necessary all existing efficient schools, is making a much more rational and moderate proposal than the League. The religious bodies of the country have been striving might and main to bring up the education to the level of the country's needs, but they have only been aided by Government in proportion to *their* generosity, not the *national* requirements. It is Government therefore, and not the denominationalists, who deserve blame. But most of all it is the secularists of the League, who have withheld the means which would have brought out the requisite Government aid to have educated the whole people.

The League advocates compulsory education, enforced by fine and imprisonment—they intend to constitute that very ignorance which they, in their worldliness, have initiated and perpetuated a crime. They say make your child fit to serve as an instrument for getting money, or you shall be regarded as a fit person for the persecuting energies of the commercial rulers of England. But the Union is willing to use suasion and persuasion, and is content to propose that only those who resolutely withhold education from their children, due opportunity being provided, shall suffer, and that by declaring that his own fault shall be his punishment, as he shall only profit by the labour of educated children.

Once more, I note that the local rating system advocated by the League would only perpetuate and extend the evils already suffered by the poor-law, and on the present system of education, for the poorer districts would be overburdened and the richer would be scarcely touched. That is, the country districts, whence trade drafts her recruits, would require to pay for the training of those from whose labours the wealthy towns engaged in manufactures would reap the profits—so enriching the rich by the impoverishment of the poor. I go in for the Union method of settlement, not for that of the League.

M. T.

History.

HAS THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY BEEN ON THE WHOLE JUST AND WISE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"There were times of old when sovereigns made progress through the land, and when, at the proclamation of their heralds, they caused to be scattered heaps of coin among the people. That may have been a goodly spectacle, but it is also a goodly spectacle, in the altered spirit and circumstances of our times, when a sovereign is enabled, through the wisdom of her Great Council assembled in Parliament, again to scatter blessings among the people in the shape of wise and prudent laws, which do not sap in any respect the foundations of duty, but which strike away the shackles from the arm of industry, which give new incentive and new reward to toil, and which win more and more for the throne, and for the institutions of the country, the gratitude, the confidence, and the love of an united people."

—*From the Speech of Mr. Gladstone on introducing the French Treaty.*

I TAKE it that the distinctive financial policy of the present century is that popularly known as Free Trade, and it is a subject of great satisfaction to know that it is so simple a matter to prove to demonstration that this great policy is a sound one, and therefore just, wise, and beneficial, both to our own people and to the peoples of other nations.

Indeed, the very term itself seems to contain within it the proof of its own justice, and it is extraordinary that we should be here discussing a matter which was proved and finally settled some thirty years ago. The question therefore occurs, "Why are we doing so?" and to this the answer is a very simple, and is entirely a party-political one. The Tories last year tried the cry of "No Popery," and on that they were tremendously beaten. Taking advantage of the existing distress and depression of trade, they have again taken up, as a last resource, the already exhausted cry of "Protection," pretending with their usual plausibility that they are doing so out of consideration for the people. They know that the French Treaty will expire this year, and that the question of its renewal will come on for discussion in Parliament, and they possess a faint hope that they may by that time so successfully have imbued the people with their wilful misrepresentations, that they may have the bare possibility of defeating the Government on this question. That the good sense of the nation will prevent the realization of these projects there is not the slightest doubt.

That there is a great deal of distress; and a great depression of trade, is unfortunately true, but that neither results from Free Trade will be hereafter abundantly proved. That one or two trades have been injured by this policy may very well be, and that consequently each trade asks for and would like protection for itself, is perhaps natural enough, but this cannot be taken into account against the policy which benefits the nation as a whole. This individual desire is nothing more nor less than an extension of the wish which may probably be entertained by several persons who may carry on the same trade in the same street, and each of whom would like the others to be extinguished, so that his individual business might be thereby benefited.

The present inquiry is confined to this century, but I may just remind the reader that the policy of Free Trade was originated, although not carried into effect, in the last century by the Commercial Treaty with France then negotiated by William Pitt.

I propose in the first instance to show that this Free Trade policy is sound in principle and theory, and then to prove from experience that it is sound in practice.

The old policy was, either to prohibit the introduction of any article of foreign manufacture or produce, or to levy such enormous duties upon them as effectually to prevent their introduction.

Speaking of the past policy, Adam Smith, in his celebrated work on the "Wealth of Nations," says:—

"The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in gold and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country which had no mines, only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value than it imported, it necessarily became the great object of political economy to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home consumption; and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestic industry. Its two great engines for enriching the country, therefore, were restraints upon importation, and encouragement to exportation.

"The restraints upon importation were of two kinds:—

"1st. Restraints upon the importation of such foreign goods for home consumption as could be produced at home, from whatever country they were imported.

"2nd. Restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds from those particular countries with which the balance of trade was supposed to be disadvantageous. Those different restraints consisted sometimes in high duties, and sometimes in absolute prohibitions.

"Exportation was encouraged, sometimes by drawbacks, sometimes by bounties, sometimes by advantageous treaties of commerce with foreign states, and sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant countries."

I much regret that in this branch of the subject this article will consist almost entirely of quotations, but to prove a principle, I conceive I am compelled to show the authorities on which my

opinion is based, and the matter quoted, coming from the lips or pens of men eminent in financial science, can tell its own tale better without than with any comments of mine.

In speaking of the "unreasonableness of those restraints (on importation) even upon the principles of the commercial system," Dr. Smith proceeds thus:—

"Those mutual restraints (by France and England) have put an end to almost all fair commerce between the two nations, and smugglers are now the principal importers, either of British goods into France, or of French goods into Great Britain. The principles which I have been examining in the foregoing chapter took their origin from private interest and the spirit of monopoly; those which I am going to examine in this, from national prejudice and animosity. They are, accordingly, as might well be expected, still more unreasonable. They are so even upon the principles of the commercial system.

"1st. Though it were certain that in the case of a free trade between France and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France, it would by no means follow that such a trade would be disadvantageous to England, or that the general balance as to its whole trade would thereby be turned more against it. If the wines of France are better and cheaper than those of Portugal, or its linens than those of Germany, it would be more advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign linen which it had occasion for of France, than of Portugal and Germany. Though the value of the annual importations from France would thereby be greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be diminished, in proportion as the French goods of the same quality were cheaper than those of the other two countries. This would be the case even upon the supposition that the whole French goods imported were to be consumed in Great Britain.

"But secondly. A great part of them might be re-exported to other countries, where, being sold with profit, they might bring back a return equal in value, perhaps, to the prime cost of the whole French goods imported. What has frequently been said of the East India trade might possibly be true of the French,—that though the greater part of East India goods were bought with gold and silver, the re-exportation of a part of them to other countries brought back more gold and silver to that which carried on the trade than the prime cost of the whole amounted to. One of the most important branches of the Dutch trade, at present, consists in the carriage of French goods to other European countries. Some part even of the French wine drunk in Great Britain is clandestinely imported from Holland and Zealand. If there was either a free trade between France and England, or if French goods could be imported upon paying only the same duties as other European nations, to be drawn back upon exportation, England might have some share of a trade which is found so advantageous to Holland.

"3rdly, and lastly. There is no certain criterion by which we can determine on which side what is called the balance between any two countries lies, or which of them exports to the greatest value. National prejudice and animosity, prompted always by the private interest of particular traders, are the principles which generally direct our judgment upon all questions concerning it. There are two criterions, however, which have frequently

been appealed to upon such occasions: the Custom-house books, and the course of exchange. The Custom-house books, I think it is now generally acknowledged, are a very uncertain criterion, on account of the inaccuracy of the valuation at which the greater part of goods are rated in them. The course of exchange is, perhaps, almost equally so."

That which Dr. Smith in 1775 shadowed forth as the probable result of a financial policy such as that which we have adopted, it will be seen has actually come to pass. But I give his own words:—

"I have endeavoured to show, even upon the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous.

"Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the balance of trade, upon which not only these restraints, but almost all the other regulations of commerce, are founded. When two places trade with one another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of them either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one of them loses, and the other gains in proportion to its declension from the exact equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A trade which is forced by means of bounties and monopolies, may be, and commonly is, disadvantageous to the country in whose favour it is meant to be established, as I shall endeavour to show hereafter. But that trade which, without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between any two places, is always advantageous, though not always equally so, to both.

"By advantage or gain, I understand, not the increase of the quantity of gold and silver, but that of the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, or the increase of the annual revenue of its inhabitants.

"If the balance be even, and if the trade between the two places consist altogether in the exchange of their native commodities, they will, upon most occasions, not only both gain, but they will gain equally, or very near equally; each will in this case afford a market for a part of the surplus produce of the other: each will replace a capital which had been employed in raising and preparing for the market this part of the surplus produce of the other, and which had been distributed among, and given revenue and maintenance to, a certain number of its inhabitants. Some part of the inhabitants of each, therefore, will indirectly derive their revenue and maintenance from the other, as the commodities exchanged too are supposed to be of equal value, so the two capitals employed in the trade will, upon most occasions, be equal, or very nearly equal: and both being employed in raising the native commodities of the two countries, the revenue and maintenance which their distribution will afford to the inhabitants of each will be equal, or very nearly equal. This revenue and maintenance, thus mutually afforded, will be greater or smaller in proportion to the extent of their dealings. If these should annually amount to £100,000, for example, or to a million on each side, each of them would afford an annual revenue in the one case of £100,000, in the other of a million to the inhabitants of the other.

"The sneaking arts of underling tradesmen are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire: for it is the most underling

tradesmen only who make it a rule to employ chiefly their own customers, a great trader purchases his goods always where they are cheapest and best, without regard to any little interest of this kind.

"By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the present and preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe, than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy. But the mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are, nor ought to be, the rulers of mankind, though it cannot perhaps be corrected, may very easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of any body but themselves. * * *

A nation that would enrich itself by a foreign trade, is certainly most likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious, and commercial nations. A great nation, surrounded on all sides by wandering savages and poor barbarians, might no doubt acquire riches by the cultivation of its own lands, and by its own interior commerce, but not by foreign trade. It seems to have been in this manner that the ancient Egyptians and the modern Chinese acquire their great wealth. The ancient Egyptians, it is said, neglected foreign commerce, and the modern Chinese it is known hold it in the utmost contempt, and scarce deign to afford it the decent protection of the laws. The modern maxims of foreign commerce, by aiming at the impoverishment of all our neighbours, so far as they are capable of producing their intended effect, tend to render that very commerce insignificant and contemptible."

Dr. Smith also inquires into the operation of the Corn Laws in a similar manner, and shows that the abolition of these laws must be advantageous to the country. On this part of the subject, however, I confine myself to a quotation from a supplemental note by Mr. McCulloch, the editor of the edition of Dr. Smith's work from which I have quoted. He says:—

"But the increase of prices is not the worst consequence of restricting the importation of corn. The fluctuations it occasions are still more injurious than their enhancement. Now that the freedom of the corn-trade is established, our prices can hardly ever differ more than 10s. or 12s. a quarter from the prices of corn of equal quality in the surrounding countries; for the expense of conveying a quarter of wheat from the United States, Dantzic, Hamburg, &c. to London, does not exceed that amount. And when prices in one country are governed by the average prices of the surrounding countries, they must necessarily approach much more nearly to a common level than under the restrictive system. The larger the surface from which a country draws its supplies of food, the less likely is it to be injuriously affected by variations of harvests. The weather that is unfavourable to the crops raised in a particular district, is

most commonly favourable to those raised in districts having a different soil or climate. A failure of the crops throughout an extensive kingdom is a calamity of rare occurrence; and there is no instance of a simultaneous failure of the crops throughout the commercial world. It is observed by Gibbon, that 'those famines which so frequently afflicted the infant republic were seldom or never experienced by the extensive empire of Rome. The accidental scarcity of any single province was immediately relieved by the plenty of its more fortunate neighbour.' Holland, during the days of her greatest prosperity, was chiefly fed on imported corn; and prices in Amsterdam were comparatively moderate, and fluctuated less than in any other market of Europe. The experience, in a word, of all ages and nations proves that freedom is the best antidote to those sudden fluctuations in the price of corn that are so exceedingly ruinous to all classes of the community, and most of all to the farmer.

"But while the freedom of commerce is productive of plenty, cheapness, and what, perhaps, is of still more importance, steadiness of price, monopoly is 'the parent of scarcity, of dearth, and, above all, of uncertainty.' When a rich and highly populous country like England excludes foreign produce from her markets, the necessity under which she is placed of resorting to inferior soils for supplies of food, raises her average prices above those of the surrounding countries. Hence, when an unusually luxuriant crop occurs, no portion of the surplus produce can be exported until the home prices have fallen much below their common level. The real object of the corn-law of 1815, which prevented the entry of foreign wheat for consumption until the home price reached 80s., was to keep the price steadily up to that level. But the slightest acquaintance with the principles of economical science would have taught the framers of that law that it could not effect the object in view. To maintain prices in any particular country at a forced elevation, it is necessary, not only that foreign corn should, under certain circumstances, be excluded, but that its markets should never be overloaded with corn of its own growth. For it is clear, according to the principle now explained, that if the supply should, in ordinary years, be sufficient to support the population, it must, in an unusually productive year, be more than sufficient for that purpose; and it is equally clear that, in the event of such a case occurring, its merchants could not export any portion of its surplus produce until prices had fallen below the level of the surrounding countries. Now this was the precise situation of this country at the return of peace in 1815. Agriculture had been so far extended previously to the opening of the ports of Holland in 1814, as to furnish a nearly adequate supply for our consumption. And such being the case, it was obvious that the first luxuriant crop would sink prices; and that the market could not be relieved by exportation until they had sunk about 50 per cent. under what was then reckoned the lowest growing price!"

On the soundness of the policy favouring treaties of commerce between nations, I may have again to treat; but it may be advisable while on the theory of the matter to give the following quotation from Vattel, who says,—

"All men ought to find on earth the things they stand in need of. In the primitive state of communion they took them wherever they happened to meet with them, if another had not before appropriated them to his own
1870.

use. The introduction of dominion and property could not deprive men of so essential a right, and consequently it cannot take place without leaving them, in general, some means of procuring what is useful or necessary to them. That mean is commerce; by it every man may still supply his wants. Things being now become property, there are no means of obtaining them without the owner's consent; nor are they usually to be had for nothing; but may be bought or exchanged for other, things of equal value. Men are therefore under an obligation to carry on that commerce with each other, if they wish not to deviate from the views of nature; *and this obligation extends also to whole nations or states.* It is seldom that nature is seen in one place to produce everything necessary for the use of man; one country abounds in corn, another in pastures and cattle, a third in timber and metals, &c. If all these countries trade together, as is agreeable to human nature, none of them will be without such things as are useful and necessary; and the views of Nature, our common mother, will be fulfilled. Further, one country is fitter for some kind of products than another, as, for instance, fitter for the vine than for tillage. If trade and barter take place, every nation, on the certainty of procuring what it wants, will employ its land and industry in the most advantageous manner, and mankind in general prove gainers by it. Such are the foundations of the general obligation incumbent on nations reciprocally to cultivate commerce."

The following quotation from the speech of William Pitt, when he introduced his Treaty of Commerce with France in 1786, disposes with great ability of many of the foolish objections with which the present Treaty with France was and is assailed. He said,—

"France was, by the peculiar dispensation of Providence, gifted, perhaps more than any other country upon earth, with what made life desirable, in point of soil, climate, and natural productions. It had the most fertile vineyards and the richest harvests. The greatest luxuries of life were produced in it with little cost, and with moderate labour. Britain was not thus blessed by nature; but, on the other hand, it possessed, through the happy freedom of its constitution, and the equal security of its laws, an energy in its enterprise, and a stability in its exertions, which had gradually raised it to a high state of commercial grandeur; and not being so bountifully gifted by heaven, it had recourse to labour and art, by which it had acquired the ability of supplying its neighbours with all the artificial embellishments of life, in exchange for their natural luxuries. Thus standing with regard to each other, a friendly connection seemed to be pointed out between them, instead of that state of unalterable enmity which was falsely said to be their true political feelings towards one another."

Having triumphantly refuted the commercial arguments against the treaty, Mr. Pitt inquired, in answer to an argument inculcating constant jealousy of France, "whether, in using the word jealousy, it was meant to recommend to this country such a species of jealousy as should be either mad or blind; such a species of jealousy as should induce her either madly to throw away what was to make her happy, or blindly grasp at what must end in her ruin. Was the necessity of a personal animosity with France so evident and

pressing that for it we were to sacrifice every commercial advantage we might expect from a friendly intercourse with that country? or was a pacific connection between the two kingdoms so highly offensive that even an extension of commerce could not counterpoise it? The quarrels between France and Britain had too long continued to harass not only those two great nations themselves, but had frequently embroiled the peace of Europe,—nay, they had disturbed the tranquillity of the most remote parts of the world. They had, by their past conduct, acted as if they were intended for the destruction of each other; but he hoped the time was now come when they would justify the order of the universe, and show that they were better calculated for the more amiable purposes of friendly intercourse and mutual benevolence." "Considering the treaty," he continued, "in a political point of view, he should not hesitate to contend against the too frequently advanced doctrine that France was, and must be, the unalterable enemy of Britain. To suppose that any nation was unalterably the enemy of another was weak and childish. It had neither its foundation in the experience of nations nor in the history of man. It was a libel on the constitution of political societies, and supposed diabolical malice in the original frame of man."

That the principles here advocated were appreciated by our merchants in the early part of this century is evident from the petitions of the merchants of London presented to the House of Commons on 8th of May, 1820. Petitions to the same effect were also presented from all the great trading and manufacturing towns. That from the merchants of London was drawn up by Thomas Tooke, Esq., the eminent author of a work on "Prices." I venture to quote a paragraph or two from this petition:—

"That the prevailing prejudices in favour of the protective or restrictive system may be traced to the erroneous supposition that every importation of foreign commodities occasions a diminution or discouragement of our own productions to the same extent; whereas it may be clearly shown that, although the particular description of produce which could not stand against unrestrained foreign competition would be discouraged, yet, as no importation could be continued for any length of time without a corresponding exportation, direct or indirect, there would be an encouragement, for the purpose of that exportation, of some other production to which our situation might be better suited; thus affording at least an equal, and probably a greater, and certainly a more beneficial employment to our own capital and labour.

"That of the numerous protective and prohibitory duties of our commercial code, it may be proved that *while all operate as a very heavy tax on the community at large, very few are of any ultimate benefit to the classes in whose favour they were originally instituted, none to the extent of the loss occasioned by them to other classes.*

"That among the other evils of the restrictive or protective system, not the least is that the artificial protection of one branch of industry, or source of production, against foreign competition, is set up as a ground of claim by other branches for similar protection; so that if the reasoning

upon which these restrictive or prohibitory regulations are founded were followed out consistently, it would not stop short of excluding us from all foreign commerce whatsoever. And the same train of argument which, with corresponding prohibitions and protective duties, should exclude us from foreign trade, might be brought forward to justify the *re-enactment of restrictions upon the interchange of productions* (unconnected with public revenue) *among the kingdoms composing the Union, or among the countries of the same kingdom."*

Coming to a more recent but no less eminent author, I now give a few quotations from the work of Mr. John Stuart Mill, on the "Principles of Political Economy," setting out with an extract from what he says as to the Corn-Laws:—

"One of the commonest cases of discriminating duties is that of a tax on the importation of a commodity capable of being produced at home, unaccompanied by an equivalent tax on the home production. A commodity is never permanently imported unless it can be obtained from abroad at a smaller cost of labour and capital on the whole than is necessary for producing it here. If therefore, by a duty on the importation, it is rendered cheaper to produce the article than to import it, an extra quantity of labour and capital is expended without any extra result. The labour is useless, and the capital is spent in paying people for laboriously doing nothing. All custom duties which operate as an encouragement to the home production of the taxed article are thus an eminently wasteful mode of raising a revenue.

"This character belongs in a peculiar degree to custom duties on the produce of land, unless counterbalanced by excise duties on the home production. Such taxes bring less into the public treasury, compared with what they take from the consumers, than any other imposts to which civilized nations are usually subject. If the wheat produced in a country is twenty millions of quarters, and the consumption twenty-one millions, a million being annually imported; and if on this million a duty is laid which raises the price ten shillings per quarter, the price which is raised is not that of the million only, but of the whole twenty-one millions. Taking the most favourable but extremely improbable supposition that the importation is not at all checked, nor the home production enlarged, the State gains a revenue of only half a million, while the consumers are taxed ten millions and a half, the ten millions being a contribution to the home growers, who are forced by competition to resign it all to the landlords. The consumer thus pays to the owners of land an additional tax, equal to twenty times that which he pays to the State. Let us now suppose that the tax really checks importation. Suppose importation stopped altogether in ordinary years; it being found that the million of quarters can be obtained by a more elaborate cultivation, or by breaking up inferior land at a less advance than ten shillings upon the price—say, for instance, five shillings a quarter. The revenue now obtains nothing, except from the extraordinary imports which may happen to take place in a season of scarcity. But the consumers pay every year a tax of five shillings on the whole twenty-one millions of quarters, amounting to five and a quarter millions sterling. Of this the odd £250,000 goes to compensate the growers of the last million of quarters for the labour and capital wasted under the compulsion of the law. The remaining five millions go to enrich the landlord as before.

"Such is the operation of what are technically termed corn-laws, when first laid on; and such continues to be their operation, so long as they have any effect at all in raising the price of corn. . . .

"The repeal of corn-laws tends to lower rents, but it unchains a force which, in a progressive state of capital and population, restores and even increases the former amount. There is every reason to expect that, under the virtually free importation of agricultural produce, at last extorted from the ruling powers of this country, the price of food, if population goes on increasing, will gradually, but steadily, rise, though this effect may, for a time, be postponed by the strong current which, in this country, has set in (and the impulse is extending itself to other countries) towards the improvement of agricultural science, and its increased application to practice."

On the subject of taxes on commodities generally, Mr. Mill says:—

"There is one more point, relating to the operation of taxes on commodities conveyed from one country to another, which requires notice; the influence which they exert on international exchanges. Every tax on a commodity tends to raise its price, and consequently to lessen the demand for it in the market in which it is sold. . . .

"Taxes on foreign trade are of two kinds—taxes on imports and on exports. On the first aspect of the matter it would seem that both these taxes are paid by the consumers of the commodity; that taxes on exports consequently fall entirely on foreigners, taxes on imports entirely on the home consumer. The true state of the case, however, is much more complicated."

I dare not, for fear of intruding on space, quote the examples by which Mr. Mill illustrates the subject, but any reader will find them by referring to page 513 of the People's Edition of the work named; viz., "The Principles of Political Economy."

On the subject of taxing imports, I must crave the reader's indulgence for the introduction of the following extract from the same excellent work:—

"Those are, therefore, in the right who maintain that taxes on imports are partly paid by foreigners; but they are mistaken when they say that it is by the foreign producer. It is not on the person from whom we buy, but on all those who buy from us, that a portion of our custom duties spontaneously falls. It is the foreign consumer of our exported commodities who is obliged to pay a higher price for them, because we maintain revenue duties on foreign goods."

"There are but two cases in which duties on commodities can in any degree or in any manner fall on the producer. One is, when the article is strict monopoly, and at a scarcity price. The price in this case being only limited by the desires of the buyer; the sum obtained for the restricted supply being the utmost which the buyers would give rather than go without it; if the Treasury intercepts a part of this the price cannot be further raised to compensate for the tax, and it must be paid for from the monopoly profits. A tax on rare and high-priced wines will fall wholly on the growers, or rather on the owners of the vineyards. The second case in which the producer sometimes bears a portion of the tax, is more important: the case of duties on the produce of land or of mines. These might

be so high as to diminish materially the demand for the produce, and compel the abandonment of some of the inferior qualities of land or mines. Supposing this to be the effect, the consumers, both in the country itself and in those which dealt with it, would obtain the produce at smaller cost; and a part only, instead of the whole, of the duty would fall on the purchaser, who would be indemnified chiefly at the expense of the landowners or mine-owners in the producing country.

"Duties on importation may, then, be divided into two classes: those which have the effect of encouraging some particular branch of domestic industry, and those which have not. The former are purely mischievous, both to the country imposing them and to those with whom it trades. They prevent a saving of labour and capital, which, if permitted to be made, would be divided, in some proportion or other, between the importing country and the countries which buy what that country does, or might, export.

"The other class of duties are those which do not encourage one mode of procuring an article at the expense of another, but allow interchange to take place, just as if the duty did not exist, and to produce the saving of labour which constitutes the motive to international as to all other commerce. Of this kind are duties on the importation of any commodity which could not, by any possibility, be produced at home; and duties not sufficiently high to counterbalance the difference of expense between the production of the article at home and its importation. Of the money which is brought into the Treasury of any country by taxes, of this last description, a part only is paid by the people of that country; the remainder by the foreign consumers of their goods.

"Nevertheless, this latter kind of taxes are, in principle, as ineligible as the former, though not precisely on the same ground."

On the subject of "Protection," Mr. Mill wisely says:—

"Of these false theories, the most notable is the doctrine of protection to native industry; a phrase meaning the prohibition, or the discouragement by heavy duties, of such foreign commodities as are capable of being produced at home. If the theory involved in this system had been correct, the practical conclusions grounded on it would not have been unreasonable. The theory was, that to buy things produced at home was a national benefit, and the introduction of foreign commodities generally a national loss. It being at the same time evident that the interest of the consumer is to buy foreign commodities in preference to domestic whenever they are either cheaper or better, the interest of the consumer appeared in this respect to be contrary to the public interest; he was certain, if left to his own inclinations, to do what, according to the theory, was injurious to the public.

"It was shown, however, in our analysis of the effects of international trade, as it had been often shown by former writers, that the importation of foreign commodities, in the common course of traffic, never takes place except when it is, economically speaking, a national good, by causing the same amount of commodities to be obtained at a smaller cost of labour and capital to the country. To prohibit, therefore, this importation, or impose duties which prevent it, is to render the labour and capital of the country less efficient in production than they would otherwise be; and compel a waste of the difference between the labour and capital necessary for the home production of the commodity, and that which is required for producing the things

with which it can be purchased from abroad. The amount of national loss thus occasioned is measured by the excess of the price at which the commodity is produced, over that at which it could be imported. In the case of manufactured goods, the whole difference between the two prices is absorbed in indemnifying the producers for waste of labour or of the capital which supports that labour. Those who are supposed to be benefited, namely the makers of the protected articles (unless they form an exclusive company, and have a monopoly against their own countrymen as well as against foreigners), do not obtain higher profits than other people. All is sheer loss to the country as well as to the consumer. When the protected article is a product of agriculture—the waste of labour not being incurred on the whole produce, but only on what may be called the last instalment of it—the extra price is only in part an indemnity for waste, the remainder being a tax paid to the landlords.

"In countries in which the system of protection is declining, but not yet wholly given up, such as the United States, a doctrine has come into notice which is a sort of compromise between free trade and restriction, namely, that protection for protection's sake is improper, but that there is nothing objectionable in having as much protection as may incidentally result from a tariff framed solely for revenue. Even in England, regret is sometimes expressed that a 'moderate fixed duty' was not preserved on corn, on account of the revenue it would yield. Independently, however, of the general impolicy of taxes on the necessities of life, this doctrine overlooks the fact that revenue is received only on the quantity imported, but that the tax is paid on the entire quantity consumed. To make the public pay much that the Treasury may receive a little is not an eligible mode of obtaining a revenue. In the case of manufactured articles the doctrine involves a palpable inconsistency. The object of the duty, as a means of revenue, is inconsistent with its affording, even incidentally, any protection. It can only operate as protection in so far as it prevents importation; and to whatever degree it prevents importation it affords no revenue."

A writer on the subject in "Chambers' Encyclopædia," truly says of Free Trade, that:—

"From its simplicity, it affords to those who expect to make political economy an exact science, the hope that they have obtained at least one axiom. But it has, in reality, been established as the result of a double experience, the one being the failure of all deviations from it, the other the practical success of the principle during the short period in which it has been permitted to regulate the commerce of this country.

"The many attempts made by Governments to regulate trade for the purpose of benefiting the communities over which they ruled, may be divided into two great classes: the one prohibited the exportation of commodities, the other encouraged exportation, and prohibited or discouraged importation. The former was the old rule in this and in other countries. It was supposed that the wealth of the country depended on its retaining within itself certain productions of native growth or industry, and their removal out of the country was prohibited or restrained. Until a late period, the exportation of machinery was prohibited; but this was an exceptional remnant of the old principle which had yielded to its converse i-

which it was maintained that exportation is the source of wealth, and importation is a wasting of a nation's substance. On this theory the great body of British commercial and financial legislation, which received its death-blow in 1846, was founded. By it a commercial community was thus likened to an isolated human being possessed of a certain fund, which he must, of course, spend, so as to become so much the poorer, if he buys commodities, which, to him, is equivalent to a nation's importing them. The notion was founded on the analogy of the miser, who will, of course, increase his store by restricting his purchases. Communities, however, are not in the position of the miser, possessing separate capital, which he can protect and increase; they rather resemble the merchant who buys and sells, making a profit on what passes through his hands. Whatever communities import they pay for by exports. This can be shown by analysis in any class of a nation's transactions. If we pay for the goods we import by bills of exchange, these bills represent goods exported, otherwise they would not be paid. If we pay for goods in bullion it is the same thing; gold does not grow in this country, and every sovereign we send abroad to pay for goods has been got as the price of goods exported, unless it have been brought by any of our own people from the gold districts, and then it is virtually a produce of British industry. It is, in fact, a sort of dynamic law that importation causes exportation, just as a vacuum in physics is filled up by air, or the other nearest fluid.

"The progress made by this country since 1846 has afforded a wonderful experimental illustration of this truth, since the exports have been tripled. They were, in round numbers, forty, and are now, 120 millions."

Reverting to another branch of the subject, I venture to quote the following passage from a writer on the Corn-Laws in the same valuable work:—

"The results of the repeal are well known. Every evil prognostication has been falsified. Poor lands are as much cultivated as ever, and even more so. There has been no stoppage of imports by war or otherwise, nor are there likely to be. Manufacturers and shopkeepers have thriven better than previous to the repeal. Instead of falling, the rent of lands of all kinds has risen, and tenants and proprietors are alike satisfied. The working classes are better instead of worse employed. In place of disorder there is general contentment. The liberation of the trade in corn has not, however, lowered the price of bread to the extent that some persons anticipated. This is accounted for as follows: an increased demand in consequence of the population increasing in numbers, and also improving in means and taste; the cost of freight and other charges virtually protect the home-grower to the extent of several shillings a quarter; and a small duty of one shilling per quarter is still exigible, in order to pay the cost of registering imports.* To these causes might be added the misdirection of capital from agriculture to manufactures in the United States, by which the export of bread stuffs from that country has never been fully developed. The substantial benefits arising from the repeal of the Corn-Law consist in the stimulus given to trade, the removal of apprehensions as to the effects of insufficient harvests, along with a certain modification and less fluctuation in price. No longer a gambling kind of trade, involving large capital, corn

* This small impost has, however, now been removed in the Budget of 1869-70.

dealing has subeided into an ordinary branch of commerce, which is pursued by a largely augmented number of merchants."

Having thus proved by quotations from reliable authorities the wisdom of the principles now advocated, I proceed to show, from the experience of facts, that the result of the adoption and exercise of those principles proves practically that they are just and wise.

It is an indubitable and admitted fact, that since the adoption of the present financial system in 1846, the commerce of the country has increased to an unprecedented extent.

But the Protectionists of the present day say that this is not attributable to Free Trade, but to railways, colonies, and increase of population. Passing by the fact that the increase of trade has necessitated the increase of railways, if we examine the matter we shall find that, on 1st of January, 1867, there were in Great Britain and Ireland 13,854 miles of railway, while in France at the same date, notwithstanding that she has double the number of square miles possessed by England, and a population exceeding ours by 9,000,000, there were only 8,200 miles of railway.

As to the Colonies the figures are quite as conclusive,—

In 1846, the date of the removal of protective duties, we exported to the colonies (including India) British produce amounting to	£17,391,542.
In 1867, in consequence of the free importation of goods, we exported to the same colonies	£49,799,610.

In the year 1846 we exported to foreign countries British produce amounting to £40,394,334, while in the year 1867 we exported similar produce to the amount of £131,162,313, thus showing an increase of £90,767,979.

But I now proceed to show the fallacy of the "addition to population" theory advanced by the Protectionists.

	Increase.
In 1821 the census returns show a population of	21,193,458
1841	26,895,518
1861	29,191,009
	2,295,491

Now let us see what was the state of our exports at those periods:—

	Increase.
In 1821 exports of British produce	£36,659,630
1841	£51,634,623
1861	£125,162,814
	£73,468,191

Thus the exports per head amounted to 34s. in 1821; in 1841, although the population had increased by nearly 6,000,000, they only amounted to 38s., while in 1861, notwithstanding that there had only been an increase to the population of less than 2,300,000, the exports had increased to £4 5s. per head.

Another fallacy advanced by the Protectionists is, that the increase of commerce (which they cannot deny) is principally owing to the gold discoveries in California and Australia. But we test

this, and we find that during the ten years ending 1867, the average import of gold bullion from Australia was £6,378,869, and from the United States £5,884,286, in all £12,263,155. In 1858 the total import of bullion from both sources was £13,567,227; in 1867 it was only £10,827,392, or nearly £3,000,000 less; but in the year 1858, when the import of gold was at its *highest*, we exported British produce to the value of £116,608,756; while in 1867, when the import of gold was at its *lowest*, we exported British produce to the value of £190,961,923, an increase of £64,333,167, notwithstanding a decreased import of that which the Protectionists say causes the increase of commerce. The total increase of the exports of British produce from 1846 to 1867 amounts to £123,000,000, and it is thus clearly proved that this increase cannot be assigned to the causes to which the Protectionists would fain attribute it, but is solely attributable to the sound policy of free imports.

In 1844 Sir Robert Peel commenced the remission of protective duties, or, as they may be more properly termed, obstructions to commerce, and from that date until 1844 his remissions amounted to £1,807,697. In consequence the exports from Great Britain rose from, in 1841, £51,545,116 to, in 1844, £58,534,705.

In 1845 the tariff was revised, in 1846 the Corn Laws were repealed, in subsequent years other duties were removed, and the protective duties on sugar gradually reduced with a view to their ultimate removal. The total remissions from 1845 to 1852 amounted to £8,633,216, while the exports in the latter year amounted to the sum of £78,076,854, or an increase of nearly £20,000,000 upon the amount of the exports in 1844.

In 1853 the tariff was again revised under Mr. Gladstone, who repealed 123 duties and reduced 133, the consequence of which was that in the year 1853 the exports rose to the amount of £98,933,781, or an increase of nearly £20,000,000 upon the preceding year.

The occurrence of the Russian War necessitated the imposition of war duties, and our exports fell in consequence to the sum of £95,698,085. But when those duties were reduced in 1856-7 to the extent of £3,831,965, exports immediately rose, amounting in 1857 to £122,066,107, and in 1859 to £190,411,529.

In 1860 another revision of the tariff took place, and the French treaty was made. Between 1860 and 1865 duties were remitted amounting to £9,471,420, and our exports in the latter year amounted to £165,835,725.

Another and an equally fallacious objection raised by Protectionists is, that, by the present financial system, we have allowed our trade to pass into other hands.

To this there is one conclusive answer, viz., that in the year 1867 our exports were 260 per cent. greater than they were in 1841, when protection was in full swing.

It is further alleged that "since protection to British shipping has been abandoned, a large number of foreign vessels have been employed to bring to England the articles purchased abroad."

Now the Navigation Laws, by which this protection was given, were repealed in 1849, in which year the tonnage of vessels entered and cleared in the United Kingdom with cargoes only from and to foreign countries and British possessions was as under:—

	Tons.		Tons.	Tons.
Entered 1849, British	4,390,375	+	Foreign 1,680,894	= 6,071,269
" 1867, "	9,356,814	+	" 3,984,634	= 13,341,448
Cleared 1849, "	8,762,182	+	" 1,667,726	= 5,429,908
" 1867, "	10,586,058	+	" 4,261,528	= 14,847,581

The above figures show an increase of British tonnage entered and cleared with cargoes in 1867 over 1849 of 11,790,315, while the increase in foreign tonnage is only 4,897,537.

The registered vessels (excluding the river steamers) belonging to the United Kingdom, employed in the home and foreign trade in 1849 and 1867 respectively, are as follows:—

	1849.		1867.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
In the home trade	91,610	719,815	12,155	993,767
Partly home and partly foreign trade	1,917	287,490	1,321	250,047
Foreign trade	6,694	2,089,037	8,301	4,249,894
Total	18,221	3,096,342	21,777	5,493,708

And in 1849 the total number of men employed (excluding masters) was 152,611, while in 1867 this number had reached 196,340.

Comparing the results as to shipping during the periods of Protection and Free Trade we find that—

In 1815 the registered tonnage of the United Kingdom was	2,447,381
" 1841 (after 25 years' strict protection) only	2,935,399
" 1848 (owing to a freer Trade)	3,400,809
" 1867, registered tonnage of United Kingdom	5,753,973

It is also alleged by Protectionists that ship-builders, especially the builders of sailing ships, are ruined in consequence of Free Trade; but I am happy to say that by resorting to facts we shall come to just the opposite conclusion, for in the following table we see that the ships built and registered in the United Kingdom were as follows:—

	SAILING VESSELS.		STEAM VESSELS.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
1845—1849	3,745	564,067	427	70,852
1863—1867	4,554	1,154,539	1,684	677,704
Increase	809	590,472	1,257	606,952

The Protectionists further allege that Free Trade has been " "

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only drawback to almost unlimited prosperity in England," and that "if we had compelled reciprocity, or continued on the old system of protecting British industry, our prosperity would have been something beyond all computation."

To refute this assertion I will trouble the reader with a table extending from 1815 to 1842, during which period the strictest protection prevailed, showing its effects on British exports:—

	£		£		£
1815	51,603,028	1824	38,396,300	1833	39,667,347
1816	41,657,873	1825	38,877,388	1834	41,649,191
1817	41,761,132	1826	31,536,723	1835	47,372,270
1818	46,603,249	1827	37,181,335	1836	53,368,571
1819	35,208,321	1828	36,812,756	1837	42,069,245
1820	36,424,652	1829	35,842,623	1838	50,060,970
1821	36,659,680	1830	38,271,597	1839	53,233,580
1822	36,968,964	1831	37,164,372	1840	51,406,430
1823	36,458,048	1832	36,450,594	1841	51,634,623
				1842	47,381,023

The kind of "prosperity beyond computation" which the Protectionists promise can thus be seen from the fact that in a period of twenty-seven years, during which their principles were in full exercise, our trade, at the end of that period, was less by several millions than it was at the beginning.

An increase of the revenue is a sure test of the prosperity of a people, and by applying this test we shall find that in 1841 the total revenue from Customs and Excise was £38,118,222, of which £27,419,527 was paid on the following six articles, viz., tea, sugar, wine, tobacco, spirits, and malt; and that in 1867 the revenue from these sources was £42,855,319, of which the six articles named contributed £37,597,502. This increase of above ten millions arises from the increased consumption of the articles specified, and this increased consumption is the natural result of the increased purchasing power of the working classes. It should perhaps be remarked that the greatest increase is in tea and sugar.

The Protectionists farther say that our exports consist principally of *raw material*, but this is easily disproved by a reference to the statistical abstract of 1867, from which it will be seen that the total value of exports of British produce and *manufactures* was in 1849 £63,596,025, and in 1867 £181,183,971. The items, which it would be tedious to introduce here, show that the increase has been in *manufactures* and not raw material.

But besides exporting our own produce a large trade has sprung up by our exporting foreign and colonial produce. The returns of this trade were first given in 1854, in which year we exported £18,636,366, but in 1867 our foreign and colonial exports amounted to £49,988,146.

Another accusation against Free Trade is, that, in consequence of an alleged inundation of foreign manufactures, "British workmen and British manufactures have no employment."

In refutation of this I quote the following analysis of imports compiled from the statistical abstract issued in 1868. The year 1854 is the earliest date for which we can obtain the real value of imports:—

	1854	1867
Articles of food, drink, and tobacco	£58,060,620	£101,938,049
Raw materials	68,768,479	119,338,798
Guanco, oil-cake, and seeds	6,439,299	8,452,785
Manufactures	4,658,184	16,678,769
Total of enumerated articles	£137,921,582	£246,408,351
Unenumerated articles	14,467,471	28,774,786
	£152,389,051	£275,183,137

Thus it will be seen that the manufactures we import do not amount to 7 per cent. on our gross importations. But the proof of this matter may be carried still further by reference to an annual Trade and Navigation Statement for 1867, which shows that the total of unenumerated articles above stated at £28,774,786 has been reduced by £8,547,288.

The value of enumerated foreign manufactured articles imported in 1867 was £20,869,458, while the British manufactured articles exported during the same period was £45,317,070. It will therefore be seen that England exports of its own produce and manufactures £181,000,000, and its trade is now said to be by importation about £20,000,000, or at most—taking one third of the unenumerated articles to be manufactures—£25,000,000, from other countries.

Protectionists, by the mouth of the chairman of the "Revivers'" Association, say, "Close your ports to manufacturers who do not reciprocate, and you will have real Free Trade in one year." But, unfortunately for this theory, experience teaches exactly the reverse. Take for instance the silk trade. In 1818 the importation of foreign silks was prohibited. But did that benefit the English trade? Not at all. So far from it indeed, that petitions in that year were presented to the House of Commons from Spitalfields and Coventry, stating that the very existence of the trade was threatened by smuggling, and that wages had consequently decreased from 30s. and 40s. per week to 10s. and 11s. In 1824 a protective duty of 30 per cent. was substituted for prohibition, but it met with no better success than absolute prohibition. It must be remembered that these statements are not mere guess work or hearsay, for the Custom returns of England and France show that during the seventeen years ending 1843, half the silks used in England were smuggled.

In 1859 we imported from France stuffs and ribbons, value £1,372,065, and in 1867 £6,175,297. The figures for 1859 do not, of course, include the value of silks imported by smuggling. We

we able to arrive at those figures, we should no doubt be startled by finding that the total amount of the imports of 1859 much exceeded those of 1867, there being now no advantage in smuggling. Again, in 1859 we sent to France woollens, linens, cottons, and machinery to the value of £640,190 only, while in 1867 we sent them the same kind of goods to the value of £6,390,834.

But suppose for a moment we were to go back to Protection, what would be the result? "The silk weavers would be relieved from French competition; but, as they acknowledge inferiority by claiming protection, they would not sell an increased quantity of goods at all equal to those they would displace. What would the operatives employed in producing the manufactures sent to France say to such a proceeding? They would at once lose a considerable market, and find a diminished demand for their labour. The displacement in other trades would be greater, for the reasons already shown, than the increase in the silk manufacture, and the balance of the transaction would be a loss to the productive classes generally."

What then are the real reasons which cause depression in the silk trade? These will appear from the following extracts from the "Reports of Artisans selected by a Committee appointed by the Council of the Society of Arts to visit the Paris Universal Exhibition, 1867." One of these—Mr. L. S. Booth, of Coventry—says (the italics are mine), "For making good plain ribbon England has nothing to fear from the construction of the looms, or the ability of the workmen. . . . *A hundred Jacquard looms, of moderate size, with five or six tiers of shuttles, brought into Coventry, would be one of the greatest boons that could happen to the city.* There is more than ability to manage them. There are artistic skill, excellent dyers, steam power, gas, and every facility at our doors to do a good trade in this direction. . . . The ribbon the people of Coventry have long made, and can make well, *is not now required: other fabrics have sprung up, and it behoves the town to look into the matter, and adapt itself to the requirements of the age.*" Another of these—Mr. Joseph Gutteridge, of Coventry—thus gives the result of his visits to the factories of St. Etienne and Basle:—"I felt convinced, from what I saw, that *with improved machinery, and a better system of treatment of the raw material, we should be able to compete successfully with continental manufacturers.*"

Our protective financiers also quote the trade with Belgium, as an instance of the evil effects of Free Trade, for, say they, "We send, for instance, iron to Belgium, and they send us in return locomotive machines, made in that country, at a cheaper rate than they can be manufactured in England!"

But how stand the facts? In 1867 we imported from Belgium wrought and manufactured iron to the value of £111,775, and exported to Belgium the same kind of goods of the value of £124,443. During the same year we exported to Belgium steam engines of the value of £26,007, and other machinery £150,949, making in all a

total export of iron and steel manufactures to that country to the value of £301,412.

Similar instances might be adduced as to other articles and other countries.

I think I cannot do better than, in conclusion, to quote the following passage from a pamphlet on the subject by Mr. John Noble, to whom I am indebted for the greater portion of the figures quoted above :—

"A complete investigation of the facts of the case shows that the present depression of trade has not been caused by the policy of Free Trade. The re-imposition of duties on foreign manufactures, and the re-enactment of hostile tariffs would be no mitigation of the existing distress, which will be most easily removed by the abolition of restrictions upon trade, and not by a renewal of the principle of protection. If those who are now clamouring for a revival of protective duties, in order, as they allege, to secure perfect freedom of trade, will direct their energies towards the opening of fresh markets by the removal of duties levied upon imports at British ports, to the securing of free trade between Great Britain and her colonies, to the reduction of the burden of taxation now imposed upon us by reason of our heavy national expenditure, and to the spread of education throughout the United Kingdom, they will do far more to promote a revival of trade and employment, and to secure that reciprocity which they profess to desire, than by the advocacy of a system of commercial legislation which the experience of the last half century emphatically condemns."

H. K.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"*Finances*, a French word incorporated with our language, means the art of managing money matters; the person who professes this art being called a *Financier*. Finance in the plural is often used for money itself, but still with a reference to the purpose to which it is to be applied . . . We use it in this country rather in a political and economic sense than officially . . . There is a special connection between finance and taxation, which has become closer and stronger since the progress of political economy has shown that the taxes which are the most productive, and even the most easily collected, are not always the best, looking at the gain or loss of a nation, in the long run."—*Chambers' "Encyclopædia."*

THIS question covers a vast field of inquiry, to go into it fully it would be necessary to touch upon many distinct subjects and to examine a multitude of details. Probably no two writers upon this subject will be in complete harmony with each other, for doubtless some who may contribute papers on the affirmative will approve of measures that are condemned even by others who take the same side in the debate, whilst some who maintain the negative of this question will probably condemn measures approved by other negative writers. This diversity of opinion in the ranks of the allied forces on either side will arise from various causes, such as the multiplicity of principles at stake in the discussion of +

question; the alternate successes of opposing parties in the State, inducing legislation from different points of view; the fact of these subjects being so little studied, and so little understood by the people at large, &c. Probably no contributor to this debate will be so rash as to assert, on the one hand, that no part of the financial policy of this century has been just and wise, or, on the other hand, that every part of it has been so. We believe that just and wise measures have been passed in connection with our financial policy during the present century, nevertheless we must maintain that, as a whole, the financial policy of the nineteenth century has not been wise and just. In supporting our view of this question we shall not pretend to enter into every detail, but will chiefly confine ourselves to three fundamental points, viz., 1. The Restriction of the Currency to that which has an Intrinsic Value; 2. The System of Banking determined by Legal Enactments; 3. The Preponderance of Indirect over Direct Taxation.

1. *The Restriction of the Currency to that which has an Intrinsic Value.*—We do not advocate a currency wholly symbolical, because that would not be suitable for our foreign trade; but we do advocate a mixed currency, part symbolical and part bearing an intrinsic value. At present the Bank of England is permitted to issue £14,000,000 on securities, but for all notes issued beyond that sum it must retain in its coffers a sufficient amount of bullion to give gold in exchange for those notes when presented for that purpose. Thus, with the exception of the £14,000,000 issued by the Bank of England, *on the security of its own property*, and about £8,000,000 which the country banks may issue, *upon the security of their own property*, all the other paper-money in circulation is issued on the security of specie, therefore it is the representative of money having an intrinsic value, and, consequently, in reality, has itself an intrinsic value. The extent of our currency, therefore, depends upon the amount of gold we possess, and however much the mineral wealth of the country, the produce of its manufacturing industry, and the value of its stock-in-trade may increase, yet if the amount of gold in its possession decreases the amount of its currency must also decrease, to the serious derangement of its internal trade. However much an extended currency may be required, it cannot be had without an increase in the amount of gold, and it is when the amount of gold is limited that an extended currency is most needed. Paper-money is issued to represent gold in the coffers of the Bank, why could not paper-money be issued representative of other kinds of property? It is not within our province to elaborate a scheme for issuing a symbolical currency, but merely to show that such a currency could be safely issued, and that it is not just or wise to withhold it. Under the present system it might so happen that a man who was really rich might not be able to make use of his riches. He might have sunk all his moneyed wealth in land, houses, stock-in-trade, &c., and though his credit might be good, circumstances might have at the same time drained the gold

out of the country; so that bankers, having issued paper-money to the full extent of their stock of bullion, and having no large reserve of notes, might be quite unable to advance him a loan for the carrying on of business, &c. We know that this is supposing an extreme case, but such a case might occur, and a large amount of distress would be produced before such an extreme were reached. Surely such a state of things is neither wise nor just. It should be the aim of our legislators to enable a man to make the best possible use of his property, whatever the nature of that property may be. Why could not our banks be authorised to issue notes in exchange for valuable securities deposited with them, to an amount rather less than the minimum value of the property secured to them, those notes to be made legal tender, and the securities deposited with the banker to be redeemed on the payment of an amount somewhat in excess of that originally given in exchange for those securities? This would create a symbolical currency just as it was needed, and such an arrangement would have saved many an honest man from ruin. By the Bank Restriction Act of 1797 the Bank of England was authorized to issue a large amount of paper money; this paper money was made legal tender, and the Bank was not compelled to give gold in exchange for its notes. Thus a symbolical currency, which had no intrinsic value, was issued, and it was this symbolical currency which enabled Pitt to carry on the war with Napoleon, and to effect the deliverance of Europe. But to pursue this subject further would trench upon our next point, we will therefore proceed to criticise,—

2. *The System of Banking determined by Legal Enactments.*—In dealing with this subject we shall not go back to the Cash Payments Act of 1819, but shall dwell chiefly upon the Bank Charter Act of 1844, for the latter is an extension and fuller development of the former; the former was the bud of which the latter is the fruit. With respect to this Bank Charter we fully agree with the writer of a leading article in the *Daily News*, who says that “whatever of judgment, capacity, or discretion the Bank might exercise in times of difficulty is taken from it by the Bank Act of 1844, by the provisions of which the governors of the Bank must be governed. . . . The Bank is powerless to restrain speculation and prevent the accession of the wildest manias, and is indeed itself the chief though involuntary instigator and promoter of them, and it is equally powerless to save or to mitigate the effects of these manias upon the purely commercial interests of the country. . . . These evils are clearly traceable to the anomalous character and constitution of the Bank.” The effect of the Bank Charter Act is to stimulate speculation in times of prosperity, and to increase the depression in times of financial difficulty. For every £1,000,000 exported in gold, bank notes to the amount of £1,000,000 must be withdrawn from circulation, although the decreased supply of gold currency causes an increased demand for paper money. The contraction of the currency caused by the exportation of gold is increased by the

withdrawal of a corresponding amount of paper money at the same time. We know that a contraction of currency produces a reduction of prices, but though this does in some respects lessen the inconvenience and danger, it is far from removing it. If the decrease in the amount of gold circulating in the country does not arise from over-trading or excessive speculation, it should be counteracted by an increased supply of paper money. If we suppose that £30,000,000 are required to carry on the foreign and internal trade of this country, and that the currency is just equal to that amount, and then, if from a series of bad harvests, foreign war, or any such cause, the gold circulating in this country were drained away, so that the currency were reduced to £20,000,000, a vast amount of distress and ruin would be produced, a distress and ruin that might be prevented by the issue of paper money sufficient to keep the currency up to £30,000,000, the sum we have supposed to be required for our commercial wants; but such a measure the Charter would not permit the Bank authorities to adopt.

On the other hand, when gold is abundant, the Bank issues an increased supply of paper money, and the rate of discount is low; this gives an undue stimulus to speculation. A system of over-trading is begun which in the end recoils upon itself. Companies are formed to commence undertakings which they have not the capital to complete, large sums are sunk in these undertakings which cannot be realized unless the enterprises be fully carried out, therefore they strain every nerve, individuals are brought to bankruptcy, and every other interest is made to suffer, in order to complete the undertakings that have been commenced. These evils are fostered by the operation of the Bank Charter Act.

The Bank Act of 1844 has not led to a diminution of commercial panics, and the fluctuations in the Bank of England rate of discount have increased since it was passed. Since 1844 the Bank rate of discount has sunk lower and risen higher than it ever was for 140 years previously, thus showing that when money is plentiful in this country the Act increases that plenty, and when money is scarce it increases that scarcity. The Bank Charter Act has been three times suspended; on each occasion that suspension saved the Bank of England from insolvency, and we are not aware that it led to any disastrous results; this goes far to prove that the Bank Charter Act is an unjust and unwise measure.

Sir R. Peel often spoke of the Bank Charter Act as a main cause of England's commercial prosperity in the years 1845-6, but that prosperity was in reality produced by other causes, such as the increased supply of gold from Russia, which had more than doubled in five years; the cessation of the wars in South America, which led to a much more abundant supply of the precious metals from that quarter; and the fineness of the harvests, which reduced the importation of corn, so that in 1845 the imports of wheat into Great Britain were less than a third of what they had been in the pre-

ceding year, and less than a seventh of what they were in 1842. These were the real causes of England's commercial prosperity in 1845-6, and these circumstances caused an increased influx and retention of the precious metals. Gold being unusually plentiful in this country, the provisions of the Charter led the Bank authorities to afford every facility for speculation, a railway mania was the result, and when failures became imminent for want of capital, the Bank Charter increased the difficulties of the situation by necessitating the withdrawal of notes from circulation. After 1850 the large discoveries of gold in California and Australia brought large accessions of bullion, and gave a fresh stimulus to commercial enterprise; but if the supply of the precious metals should not continue to increase, however much the necessities of an increasing commerce may demand an extended currency, an extended currency cannot be granted so long as the Bank Charter Act shall continue in force.

3. *The Preponderance of Indirect over Direct Taxation.*—Every class of the inhabitants of a state should contribute to the revenue of that state, and the greater the capital the greater should be the proportion of taxes paid. There is a large number of people who cannot be reached but by means of indirect taxation, and in order that they may contribute their quota to the revenue of the state, it is necessary that some indirect taxes should be imposed; but it should always be borne in mind that in taxes upon articles of ordinary and every-day consumption, the quota paid by the lower classes is much larger in proportion to their means than that paid by the upper classes. At the present time the amount of revenue derived from indirect taxation is about three times the amount derived from direct taxes, and we do not think it is either wise or just for so large a share of the revenue to be derived from indirect taxation. Taxes imposed upon articles of universal and daily use must always add to the difficulties of those who are barely able to earn a livelihood. They take as much from a tradesman when he is losing by his business as when he is making a profit by it, and they press more heavily upon the labouring man with a large family than upon the labourer with no family, although both may be earning the same wages. Taxes upon tobacco and other luxuries are not so objectionable, but there are only a few of such taxes that would be sufficiently productive, and the large amount of revenue derived from indirect taxation could never be raised by them alone. Thus we see that indirect taxation presses most heavily upon those who are the least able to contribute to the revenue of the state.

There is in the English mind a deep-rooted antipathy to direct taxation, which is not shared by other nations closely allied to us. The official inquiry into the state of his affairs is repugnant to the feelings of an Englishman; but if the New Yorker submits to have the amount of income for which he is taxed officially published in the newspapers of his city, why should the Englishman object to state the amount of his income to an officer who receives that state-

ment as a private and confidential communication? We know that an income tax presses heavily upon persons of small and fluctuating income when they have to pay as much in the pound as persons of larger income, but this difficulty could easily be removed. In Denmark the property tax is imposed so as to specially favour the middle classes, and the system of a graduated scale proportioned to the amount of income enjoyed by the persons taxed might be so modified as to form a wise and just measure of direct taxation for this country.

Indirect taxation costs the country more in its collection than direct taxation does. This has been admitted even by the opponents of direct taxation. A parliamentary orator, in opposing the measure by which Sir R. Peel levied an income tax of 7d. in the pound, in 1842, said, "*The facility with which it is collected offers a constant temptation to extravagance on the part of Government,*" thus adducing an argument in favour of that very kind of taxation he was then opposing. The system of tax-gatherers costs the nation less than the system of customs and excise officers, and this fact, taken in connection with the facility with which direct taxes may be collected, affords an additional argument in favour of direct taxation.

In a small volume issued by Messrs. Chambers we find the following remark, where, in speaking of indirect taxation, it is said, "By this arrangement, doubtless, any distinction as to liability is very much lost. Some who should pay large sums, perhaps, pay comparatively little; and those who should be taxed lightly are, in reality, taxed heavily." This statement is undoubtedly true, and such being the case, we cannot believe it to be either just or wise for so large a share of the revenue to be raised by means of indirect taxation.

We have now a strong, active, patriotic, able, and liberal ministry, at the head of affairs in this country; will they inaugurate a wiser and more just system of financial administration? His speeches last session proved that the vigorous mind of the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been occupied with a consideration of the management and constitution of the Bank of England; our Prime Minister attacked the Bank Charter Act in December, 1857; and those who are now at the head of the army and navy are striving to avoid both the extreme of effecting economies at the expense of efficiency, and also that of cultivating efficiency by an extravagant expenditure. We therefore look forward with hope to the administration of the ministry which is now at the head of affairs in this country to make the financial policy of the nineteenth century both wise and just.

SAMUEL.

Literature.

HAS THE AGE OF SATIRISTS PASSED AWAY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"We have novelists, and essayists, and journalists, who are satirical; but where is our satirist?"—"Satire and Satirists," by James Hannay.

It was with sincere pleasure that I observed the selection of the above topic for discussion in these columns, for it is one eminently calculated to interest the student of literature, while I think that its ventilation at the present time is a matter of importance. It seems to me that we are just now in the midst of a great epoch in literature. The most extraordinary and sudden leap forward that the mechanical part of literature has taken within the last forty years is beginning to tell upon the atmosphere of ideas; and new forms of expression and novel ways of looking at old things are starting up daily. Perhaps no form of literature has been so much affected by the diffusion of facts and their critical valuation through the medium of a cheap press, as satire.

The origin of the word satire is obscure. The Roman derivation traces it to *satura*, a mixed dish. The Greeks had satires of their own, and there is no doubt that satires, in some shape or other, date from the dawn of humanity.

Satires are, in brief, humorous protests against exaggerations of conduct or taste, abuse of power, or offences against the social amenities. Every language and every literature is spiced with satire. In the days of despotism and priestcraft, satire was the readiest and frequently the most powerful weapon which men could wield against their oppressors. No form of literature, also, was more apt to enlist the sympathy of a down-trodden people, and therefore more apt to be popular. In early days men devoted themselves to satire, as they now-a-days devote themselves to science, because public taste lay in that direction. Horace and Juvenal among the Romans; Sir David Lindsay, George Buchanan, and Burns, among the Scotch; Dryden, Swift, Pope, Churchill, Junius, Byron, Moore, &c., among the English; and Boileau, Rabelais, &c., among the French, are all distinguished for their satirical writings; these being in some cases, such as Juvenal, Lindsay, Swift, Churchill, and Rabelais, the writings by which we best know and remember them.

In the hands of these eminent writers satire was a powerful and useful weapon. It so dissected public abuses that their rankness was apparent to every one, and made the corrupt in office writhe with pain at their keen and searching sarcasm. Rabelais's comical travesties assisted to undermine the despotic power of the French monks. Swift's "Gulliver," &c., were all instrumental in directing

public attention to some absurdities of his day. The letters of Junius, it is well known, struck a severe blow at the political corruption of the day. Pope's "Dunciad," again, administered a wholesome flagellation to the smaller verse scribblers of his time.

The great writers of satire were public censors. In the days when the press was not allowed the freedom of speech, men looked to the great writers of satire for the criticism and exposure of political jobbery and public eccentricity and recklessness. It is no matter of argument that such satirical composition, in the hands of the men of genius who wielded it, assumed such pleasing shapes of poetry or prose as secured for it a permanent place in literature. But such was actually the case. The great satires, written originally for a temporary purpose, are now treasured as models of literary elegance. The man who knows nothing about the political subterfuge of the time reads Junius's letters with pleasure and profit. One knows little now about Pope's dunces, but to read Pope and miss his "Dunciad" resembles reading Shakspeare but skipping "Hamlet."

We live in a great age. To one who, with the aid of histories, old newspapers, and, it may be, the personal reminiscences of others, retraces the steps of progress back, say forty years, the present state of literature, science, art, and civilization generally, appears little short of marvellous. The progress of the printing press alone is astonishing. Every family has its newspaper, every young gentleman or lady reads his or her favourite magazine. You come down to breakfast in the morning, six hundred miles from London, and find on the table a summary of last night's debate in Parliament, along with scraps of intelligence from the four quarters of the globe. A great war is raging in another hemisphere, three thousand miles away, yet your daily newspaper regularly chronicles for you battles fought and won but yesterday. Turn to the leading articles of your newspaper, and you will find the state of parties, the conduct of public men, the management of the law, the state of public opinion, and the general intelligence of the day, freely, impartially, and thoroughly examined and sifted by cultured and clever men.

Now if you will recall my definition of satire, you will readily perceive that in the present day, and I think for the future, the occupation of the satirist, *per se*, is gone. The daily newspaper is the greatest and most profuse satire that ever was penned. It opens up the whole onspread of life and liberty to the gaze of the humblest, and therefore we do not look for, nor do we need, the satires, poetic and prose, that once upon a time fulfilled the purpose now performed by the public press.

The age of satirists *has* passed away.

But do not mistake me: *satire* has not, and never will pass away, but it has henceforward no distinct existence. Satirical novelists, poets, essayists, and politicians we have, and will have to the end of time, but there is an end for ever to the satire *per se*.

It is true that we have more than one living satirist of the ori-

ginal caste at the present day, but that proves nothing. Thomas Carlyle is a notable satirist, probably the greatest modern satirist, but he has no heir to his satiric vein. Not one of the rising *littérateurs* of the present day has written satires, a most significant fact. The writer whose words are quoted at the head of this article probably knows more and has written more about satire than any other writer of the day, and he has never attempted to increase the literature of satire, but, on the contrary, has deliberately proclaimed its death.

When anything passes away, its place is immediately filled by something else. Such is the case with satire. We have now no satires, but we have a literature perhaps more imbued with satire than ever was before known. Our great novelists, Thackeray, Dickens, and Bulwer, are deeply tinged with satire. To write with a pen dipped freely in gall is a speciality of the age. Thackeray's works are, collectively, a clever satire upon the society of the age, diluted, of course, with incidents, personal and descriptive. Dickens satirizes the working of the poor-law, of the civil service, and other abused departments of Government, as successfully in his novels as if he had written specially for the literature of satire.

The poetry of the age is brilliantly tinted with satire. Tennyson, fancifully sentimental as he is, can be dreadfully and satirically earnest occasionally. Jerrold was a satirist of the first water, but you find the precious ore of his sparkling vein embedded in tales and plays. And so with all the *belles lettres* literature of the age. No satires or satirists, but abundance of satire.

This, I hold, is as it should be. The age of satirists has passed away. We need their aid no longer. A free press has arisen to be the censor of the times, and henceforward satire has no individuality.

WALTER SHEERINGTON.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Probably every nation, under every form of government, has developed out of its national life some kind of political satire. It is certain that satire itself is one of the oldest things in the world; and that men learned to knock wit out of a dunce almost as soon as to knock fire out of a flint.

That 'political wit' will ever cease, any more than eloquence, to be part of politics, we no more believe than we believe that the earth will cease to bear prickly roses, or white nettle flowers. There may be an occasional lull, but the wind of party excitement will continue to blow, and, like certain winds in the south which bring locusts, it bears wit and satire on its wings."—*James Hannay's "Essays."*

SATIRE has been defined as "a discourse or poem in which wickedness or folly is exposed and held up to contempt or ridicule." It is not so biting or scornful as sarcasm, so personal and ill-humoured as a lampoon, nor so maliciously toned as a pasquinade. The severity of its rebuke, the sternness of its invective, and the keenness of its point, are the means by which a high moral nature

seeks to express its own detestation of the mean, the foolish, the sinful, and the unprincipled. "The satirist," as Mr. Gifford said of Juvenal, "smiles indeed, but his smile is more terrible than his frown; for it is never excited but when his indignation is mingled with contempt."

"The satire should be like the porcupine,
That shoots sharp quills out in each angry line,
And wounds the blushing cheek, and fiery eye,
Of him who reads, and heareth guiltily."

It is on this account that satirists have always had a similar experience to that of Horace, who says,—

"Sunt quibus in satira videor nimis acer et ultra,
Legem tendere opus," &c.

("There are to whom I seem in satire to be somewhat too severe, and to stretch this sort of writing beyond proper limits;) because those who feel the lash generally think the infliction hard and harsh. I refer the reader to John Dryden's "Discourse on Satirical poetry," prefixed to his translation of Juvenal, for an able exposition of the principles of satire; as any farther attempt to enlarge on the nature of satire would cramp the space at disposal for debate. In case, however, I may be accused of taking a signification of the word which is not now generally affixed to the term, I may make the following quotation from one of the most modern authorities upon literary subjects:—

"Satire, or satiric poetry, is allied with eloquence, the intention being to vituperate, to vilify, to lash, or, it may be, also to reform the victims. The satirist of antiquity conceived himself to be a moral preacher or reformer, or as lifting a testimony against the vices of his age. Such were Horace and Juvenal. Erasmus and Buchanan had large scope for satire in the age of the Reformation. Many of our recent poets have plied the weapon. We need not name Butler, Dryden, Swift, Pope, Arbuthnot, Churchill, Burns, Byron. The subjects are various; religious hypocrisy, political dereliction, literary pretensions, and the failings of mankind generally."*

Any reader will see that the question proposed for discussion has great importance, not only to our understanding of literature, but to our correct appreciation of the morality and wisdom of our own age; for, as it seems to us, there are only two grounds on which we can fairly come to a conclusion that "the age of satirists has passed away," viz., by being able to prove that wickedness and folly have disappeared, or by bringing forward evidence that the age is so wicked and foolish as to have lost its hatred of these in its sympathy for them.

I am not prepared to believe either of these, and hence I am unable to admit that the age of satirists has passed away.

I do not think that any argument is so potent and patent as a fact, still more as a series of facts, and therefore I shall adduce a

* Professor A. Bain's "English Composition and Rhetoric," p. 233.

few instances of actual satirists existing in our age as a proof that they have not passed away, that the species is not yet extinct, of the effects of the efforts of one of whom Juvenal has given us this description,—

"Ense velut strieto, quoties Lucilius ardens
In fremuit, rubet auditor cui frigida mens est
Criminibus, tacita sudant præcordia culpa—
Inde iræ et lachrymæ."

"As often as the enthusiastic Lucilius brandishes his pen as if it were a drawn sword, the hearer who has a mind hardened in regard to crimes blushes, his innermost conscience sweats for his silent fault—thence his rage and tears."

It is not necessary to name here Thackeray, Jerrold, A'Becket, Barham, &c., who might all, however, be included in our age. We have only to name Dickens, Bulwer, Disraeli, Hannay, &c., and to quote *Punch*. Those, too, who know the writings of J. R. Lowell, Henri Rochefort, &c., will know that satire has not gone out, either in America or France. Nay, may we not quote our great and noble-hearted Poet-laureate as a most distinct and strong satirist, in his "Lady Clara Vere de Vere," "Locksley Hall," "Maud," and, more recently, in his two photographs in verse of "The Northern Farmer," "Old Style and New Style"? Is not John Bright, too, in his vigorous invectives, an eloquent satirist of the political delinquencies of the age?

But I remark now, that if wickedness and folly are to be denounced, and ought to be so, our age is one in which there is more work than enough for the satirist to do. In religion, politics, business, social life, and every-day dress there is abundance of temptation to be satirical. Once on a time a Byron arose and splashed into literary satire. Aytoun at another period did work in the same direction. I have seen a very excellent piece of satire on philosophy, entitled "Mill and Carlyle," by P. P. Alexander. The novels and essays of James Hannay are full of satire. In "The New Timon" of Lord Lytton we have good feeling and some exquisite satire; and the mention of this reminds us, that when his Lordship twitted "school-miss Alfred" (Tennyson) on "the jingling medley of purloined conceits, out-babying Wordsworth and out-glittering Keats," the "school-miss" turned the rough side of the tongue upon the vituperator, and retaliated on—

"The padded man that wears the stays,
Who killed the girls and thrilled the boys
With dandy pathos."

In contrasting "The new Timon" with Shakspeare's old utterer of "fine speeches," he waves him grandly off:—

"A *Timon* you? Nay, nay, for shame!
 It looks too arrogant a jest
 That fierce old man—to take his name,
 You band-box! Off and let him rest."

But we must recollect, too, that as learning increases, and the power of appreciating the true meaning of epigram and irony is extended, the greater the enjoyment will be found in twirling round the sinner against decorum with a sharp twitch of wit, and pointing the finger of scorn at the fool. Carlyle saw that this would be the case, but he began too early in his "Latter-day Pamphlets," for education was not diffused enough to afford him an audience of the proper sort. But the constancy of the renewal of the endeavour to establish and maintain journals devoted to lashing the vices and follies of the age, the increasing interest taken in the serials which make that their object, and the eagerness with which any good thing in satire is reprinted and referred to, seem to me to give fair ground for affirming that the age of satirists has not yet (if it ever will depart) passed away. Nor do I think that it is desirable that it should so long as iniquity abounds and folly stalks about. May the sense of shame never depart from men, nor the power to evoke it by the sting of reproof and the keenness of satire.

R. FIELDING.

The Essayist.

THE POETRY OF JOHN KEBLE.

BEFORE proceeding to an examination of Keble's poetry a brief sketch of his life may not be out of place; for without knowing something of the *man* the writer will be little more than a shadow and a name. This, which is true of writers in general, holds in an especial manner in the case of the author of "The Christian Year," whose poetry was the reflex of his own pure and saintly life, and must be read in that light, as he was one to whom, while living, Goldsmith's celebrated description of the country parson, the "Village Preacher," would have been eminently applicable, or the similar portraiture of the pastor in the poems of his own favourite bard Wordsworth:—

"'Wonderful' Walker was probably one of the last and best known of this class of clergy: beloved by his flock, holding a living endowed with five pounds a year, leaving at his death a far-famed reputation for piety and wisdom, and £2,000 accumulated by labour, exercised in part while teaching school children in a damp church, without fire, in the coldest days of a Westmoreland winter. But *vixere fortes ante Agamemnona*. 'Wonderful' Walker found a sacred bard in Wordsworth; and many an obscure

pastor, with the love of God in his heart, and with a 'plentiful lack' of food and fire, had to solve the problem of living in an equally wonderful way."*

"Preaching, administering, in every work
Of his sublime vocation, in the walks
Of worldly intercourse 'twixt man and man,
And in his humble dwelling he appears
A labourer, with moral virtue girt,
With spiritual graces like a glory crowned."

Such, emphatically, was the author of "The Christian Year." Fame he sought not, nor the giddy world's applause; content was he, had it been so ordered, to have trodden in silence the pathway of obscurity, inglorious obscurity; content would he have been so to have journeyed through life, and to have "gone to the grave unthought of," his name and memory lost in oblivion's darkest gloom! Fame he sought not, yet did fame come to him unsought, —even an immortality of fame!

The following account of his life and efforts is taken from a kindly and appreciative notice, under the title of "Keble and 'The Christian Year,'" which appeared originally in the pages of *The North British Review*. That essay, so genial in its sentiments, in its vein of criticism so delicate and refined, derives a peculiar value and significance from a circumstance noted by the writer in the preface to a subsequent republication, viz., that "while Keble will generally be portrayed by those who have been all their lives surrounded with the same associations as he was, he is here described as he appeared to one reared amid quite other traditions."

"His father, whose name the poet bore, was a country clergyman, vicar of Coln St. Alwynd's, in Gloucestershire, but the house in which he lived, and in which the poet was born, was at Fairford, three miles distant from the cure. John was the second child and elder son of a family which consisted of two sons and two daughters. His mother, Sarah Maule, was, we have heard, of Scottish extraction. The father, who lived till his ninetyeth year, was a man of no common ability. Of him his son, we are told, 'always spoke not only with the love of a son, but with the profoundest reverence for his goodness and wisdom.' It would seem that this was one of the few clerical homes in England in which the opinions, traditions, and peculiar piety of the Nonjurors lived on into the present century. Unlike most sons distinguished for ability, John Keble never outgrew the period of absolute filial reverence, never questioned a single opinion or prepossession which he had imbibed from his father. Some of his less reverential companions used to think that this was an intellectual loss to him. The father's ability and scholarship are proved by his having himself educated his son, and sent him up to Oxford so well prepared that, at the age of fifteen, he gained a Corpus scholarship, an honour which seems to have then held the same place in university estimation that Balliol scholarships have long held and still hold. This strictly home training, in the quiet of a Gloucestershire parsonage, placed in the very heart of rural England,

* *Quarterly Review*, January, 1868, "Church Progress."

under a roof where the old High Church tradition lived on, blended with what was best in modern piety, makes itself felt in every line the poet wrote. On all hands one hears it said that there is no education like that of one of the old English public schools. For the great run of ordinary boys, whether quick-witted and competitive, or lazy and selfish, this may perhaps be true; but for natures of finer texture, for all boys who have a decided and original bias, how much is there that the rough handling of a public school would ruthlessly crush? From all the better public schools coarse bullying, we know, has disappeared; but for peculiarity of any kind, for whatever does not conform itself to the 'tyrant tradition'—a manly and straightforward one we admit—they have still but little tolerance. If Keble had once imbibed the public school spirit 'The Christian Year' would either never have been written, or it would have lacked some of its tenderest and most characteristic traits.

"If he was fortunate in having his boy-education at home, he was not less happy in the college which he entered and the companions he met there. It is the happiness of college life that a young man can command just as much retirement and as much society as he pleases, and of the kind that he pleases. All readers of Arnold's life will remember the picture there drawn of the scholars' common-room at Corpus, by one of the last survivors, the venerable Sir J. Coleridge. He tells us that when Keble came into residence, early in 1807, it was but a small society, numbering only about twenty undergraduate scholars, and these rather under the usual age, who lived on the most familiar terms with each other. The Bachelor scholars resided and lived entirely with the undergraduates. Two of Keble's chief friends among the Corpus scholars, though younger in academic standing than himself, were Coleridge, afterwards Judge Coleridge, and Arnold. Keble, indeed, must have already graduated before Arnold came into residence. Besides those were many other men distinguished in their day in the university, but less known to the outer world. It was a stirring time when Keble was an undergraduate." Within the university the first wakening after long slumber had begun, and competitions for honours had been just established. From without, news of the great Peninsular battles was arriving from time to time. Scott's trumpet blasts of poetry were stirring young hearts. In Corpus common-room, as elsewhere, the battles were fought over again, and the classical and romantic schools of poetry were vehemently discussed. And among these more exciting subjects, the young scholar Coleridge would insinuate the stiller and deeper tones of Wordsworth's lyrical ballads, which, then but little known, he had heard of from his great-uncle. These two, Scott and Wordsworth, were to the end Keble's first favourites of contemporary poets, and those who chiefly moulded his taste and style. Most of the scholars were high Tories in Church and State, great respecters of things as they are; none, no doubt, more so than Keble. The great questioner of the prevailing creed was Arnold, who often brought down on his own head the concentrated arguments of the whole common-room. But youth's genial warmth healed these undergraduate disputes, as, alas! the same controversies could not be healed when taken up by the same combatants at a later day. In that kindly atmosphere Keble's affectionate nature expanded, as a flower in the sun. His was a temperament to drink in deeply whatever there was of finest influence in Oxford. No doubt the learning he there gained was something to him, but far more was the vision of the fair city herself, 'with

high aisle and solemn cloister, seated among groves, green meadows, and calm streams.' These and the young friendships which they for a few years embosom, are what made Oxford then, and make it even now, the one spot in England wherein 'the darlings of the nation' find romance still realized. Keble seems to have been much the same in character then as in after-years. His affection toward the friends he made at Oxford was warm and deep, and lasted, in most instances, with his life. With what feelings they regarded him may be gathered from the words of his brother scholar at Corpus, who, when a fifty-five years' friendship had come to its earthly close, could say of him, 'It was the singular happiness of his nature, remarkable even in his undergraduate days, that love for him was always sanctified, as it were, by reverence,—reverence that did not make the love less tender, and love that did but add intensity to the reverence.'

"In Easter term, 1810, Keble obtained double first-class honours, and this success was soon afterwards followed by another still greater—his election to an Oriel Fellowship. The Oriel common-room numbered among its fellows, then, and for some time afterwards, all that was most distinguished in Oxford for mental power and originality. Copleston, Davison, Whately, then belonged to it, and were among Keble's electors. Arnold, Newman, Pusey, were soon afterwards chosen fellows of the same college. 'Round the fire of the Oriel common-room,' we are told, 'there were learned and able, not rarely subtle and disputatious conversations, in which this lad of nineteen was called to take his part. Amid these he sometimes yearned for the more easy, yet not unintellectual, society of his old friends at Corpus.' He found, no doubt, that undergraduate days are more congenial to warm friendships than the highly rarefied atmosphere of an intellectual common-room. Where men touch chiefly by the head, they find that this is the seat as frequently of a repulsive as of an attractive force. While he was an undergraduate, and during the early days of his fellowship, he wrote a good many beautiful little poems, which his friends still possess, and the year after his election to Oriel he gained the university prizes for the English and Latin Essays.

"The interval from 1810 to 1815 he spent at Oriel, taking part in college tuition, and acting as an examiner in the Degree Schools. Was it some time during these years, or at a later date, that the incident recorded by Dr. Newman took place? 'When one day I was walking in High Street, with my dear earliest friend, with what eagerness did he cry out, "There's Keble!" and with what awe did I look at him! Then, at another time, I heard a Master of Arts of my college give an account how he had just then had occasion to introduce himself on some business to Keble, and how gentle, courteous, and unaffected Keble had been, so as almost to put him out of countenance. Then, too, it was reported, truly or falsely, how a rising man of brilliant reputation, the present Dean of St. Paul's, Dr. Milman, admired and loved him, adding that somehow he was strangely unlike any one else.'

"In 1815 he was ordained deacon, the following year priest; soon afterwards he left the university, and never again permanently resided there. He had chosen the calling of a clergyman, and, though within this field other paths more gratifying to ambition lay open to him, he turned aside from them, and gave himself to parochial work as the regular employment of his life. He became his father's curate, and lived with him at Fairford, engaged in this duty for twenty years, more or less. This rare absence or

restraint of ambition, where it might have seemed natural or even right to have gratified it, was quite in keeping with Keble's whole character. The Church, says Sir J. Coleridge, he had deliberately chosen to be his profession, and he desired to follow out that in a country cure. With this he associated, and scarcely placed on a lower level, the affectionate discharge of his duties as a son and a brother. Calls, temporary calls of duty to his college and university for a time and at intervals diverted him (he was again Public Examiner from 1821 to 1823); but he always kept these outlines in view, and, as the occasion passed away, reverted to them with the permanent devotion of his heart. Traces of this feeling may be found again and again in "The Christian Year." This book was first given to the world on the 23rd of June, 1827, when Keble was in his thirty-fifth year. This, the great work of his life, which will keep his name fresh in men's memory when all else that he has done will be forgotten, had been the silent gathering of years. Single poems had been in his friends' hands at least as early as 1819. They had urged him to complete the series, and by 1827 this was done. No record of the exact time when each poem was written has yet appeared. We should imagine that more of them were composed at Fairford than at Oxford. The discussion and criticism natural to a university are not generally favourable to poetic creation of any kind, least of all to so meditative a strain as Keble's was. But it may have been that in this, as in other things, he was 'unlike any one else.' It was only at the urgent entreaty of his friends that he published the little book. He was not anxious about poetic fame, and never thought that these poems would secure it. His own plan was 'to go on improving the series all his life, and leave it to come out, if judged useful, only when he should be fairly out of the way.' Had this plan been acted on, how many thousands would have been defrauded of the soothing delight these poems have ministered to them! But even those who most strongly counselled the publication little dreamt what a destiny was in store for that little book. Of course, if the author had kept it by him, he might have smoothed away some of its defects, but who knows how much it might have lost in the process? 'No one,' we are told too, 'knew its literary shortcomings better than the author himself. Wisely, and not in pride or through indolence, he abandoned the attempt at second hand to amend this inharmonious line, or that imperfect rhyme, or the instances here and there in which his idea may be somewhat obscurely expressed. Wordsworth's acute poetical sense recognised such faults; yet the book was his delight.' Probably it was a wise resolve. All emendation of poetry long after its first composition runs the risk of spoiling it. The author has to take up in one mood what was originally conceived in another. His first warm feeling of the sentiment has grown cold, and he cannot at a later time revive it. This is true of all poetry, more especially of that which deals with subtle and evanescent emotions which can never perhaps recur exactly in the same form. Once only in a lifetime may he succeed in catching—

'Those brief unisons, which on the brain
One tone that never can recur has cast,
One accent never to return again.'

"In 1833 Keble was appointed Professor of Poetry at Oxford. The Statutes then required the professor to give two or three lectures a year in

Latin. The ancient language was required to be spoken from this chair longer than from any other, probably from fear of the trash men might talk if fairly unmuzzled.

"However prudent this may have been when a merely average functionary held the chair, it is greatly to be regretted that when it was filled by a true poet, who was intent on speaking the secret of his own art, he should have been so formidably weighted. The present gifted occupant of that chair, Matthew Arnold, has fortunately been set free, and has vindicated the newly acquired freedom by enriching our literature with the finest poetical criticism it has received since the days of Coleridge. But Keble had to work in trammels. He was the last man to rebel against any limitations imposed by the wisdom or unwisdom of our ancestors. Faithfully he buckled himself to the task of translating into well-rounded Latin periods his cherished thoughts on his own favourite subject. Of the theory of poetry embodied in the two volumes of his published lectures, something may yet be said. The Latin is easy and unconstrained, the thoughts original and suggestive. A great contrast to the more than Ciceronian paragraphs of his predecessor Copleston, bristling as they do to a marvel with epigrammatic Latinity, but underneath that containing little that is not commonplace.

"With slight interruptions, Keble continued to live with his father at Fairford, and to assist him as his curate till 1835. 'In that year this tie was broken. At the very commencement of it the venerable old man, who to the last retained the full use of his faculties, was taken to his rest; and before the end of it Keble became the vicar of Hursley, and the husband of Miss Charlotte Clarke, second daughter of an old college friend of his father's, who was incumbent of a parish in the neighbourhood of Fairford. This was the happy settlement of his life. For himself he had now no ungratified wish, and the bonds then tied were loosened only by death.' When, in 1835, Keble left the home of his childhood for the vicarage of Hursley, he found a church there not at all to his mind. It seems to have been a plain, not beautiful, building of flint and rubble. He determined to have a fresh one built new, all but the tower—and in this he employed the profits of the many editions of 'The Christian Year;' and when the building was finished, his friends, in token of their regard for him, filled all the windows with stained glass. 'Here daily for the residue of his life, until interrupted by the failing health of Mrs. Keble and his own, did he minister. He had not, in the popular sense, great gifts of delivery; for his voice was not powerful, nor was his ear perfect for harmony of sound; but I think it was difficult not to be impressed deeply both by his reading and his preaching; when he read you saw that he felt, and he made you feel, that he was the servant of God, delivering His words; or leading you, as one of like infirmities and sins with your own, in your prayer. When he preached it was with an affectionate simplicity and hearty earnestness, which were very moving; and the sermons themselves were at all times full of that abundant scriptural knowledge which was the most remarkable quality in him as a divine: it has always seemed to me among the most striking characteristics of "The Christian Year." It is well known what his belief and feelings were in regard to the sacraments. I remember on one occasion when I was present at a christening as godfather, how much he affected me when a consciousness of his sense of the grace conferred became present to me. As he kept the newly

baptized infant for some moments in his arms, he gazed on it intently and lovingly with a tear in his eye, and apparently absorbed in the thought of the child of wrath become the child of grace. Here his natural affections gave clearness and intensity to his belief; the fondest mother never loved children more dearly than this childless man."

The writer of the essay thus goes on to describe the closing scene of Keble's life, in connection with a remarkable event, and one of touching interest, that shortly preceded it:—

"The appearance of Dr. Newman's 'Apologia' in 1864 was to Keble a great joy. Not that he had never ceased to love Dr. Newman with his old affection, but the separation of now nearly twenty years, and the cause of it, had been to Keble the sorest trial of his life. If the book contained some things regarding the Church of England which must have pained Keble, there was much in it to gladden him,—not only the entire human-heartedness of its tone, which made its way to the hearts even of strangers, but the deep and tender affection which it breathed to Dr. Newman's early friends, and the proof it gave that Rome had made no change either in his heart or head, which could hinder their real sympathy. The result was, that in September, 1865, these three, Dr. Newman, Dr. Pusey, and Mr. Keble, met under the roof of Hursley vicarage, and, after an interval of twenty years, looked on each other's altered faces. It happened, however, that at the very time of this meeting, Mrs. Keble had an alarming attack of illness. Keble writes, 'He (Dr. Pusey) and J. H. N. met here the very day after my wife's attack began. Trying as it all was, I was very glad to have them here, and to sit by them and listen.' Soon after this, in October, Mr. and Mrs. Keble left Hursley for Bournemouth, not to return. Since the close of 1864, symptoms of declining health had shown themselves in him also. The long strain of the duties that accumulated on him in his later years, with the additional anxiety caused by Mrs. Keble's precarious health, had been gradually wearing him. After only a few days' illness he was taken to his rest on the day before last Good Friday. In a few weeks Mrs. Keble followed, and now they are laid side by side in Hursley churchyard."

Such is the picture—a simple yet attractive one—drawn by the writer in the *North British Review*. To this we may add, as illustrative of the traits and habits of feeling, the inner life of Keble, the following sketch from the eloquent pen of Sir James Stephen:—

"It happened that at this period Mr. Wordsworth had at Oxford a pupil and an imitator, who would have surpassed his master if he could have attained to the exquisite felicities of his master's occasional and better style. The author of 'The Christian Year,' like the author of 'The Excursion,' inhabited a world in which the humblest objects and the most familiar incidents were symbolical of whatever is most elevated in things spiritual, and most remote from our experience in things invisible. In the same suburbs, the dusty roads, and the busy streets of Oxford, Mr. Keble lived by imagination, not by sight. On every side they teemed for him with analogies and interpretations of the significance of her liturgical offices, of the mysteries of her priesthood, and of the temples erected

by no human hands in the souls of her worshippers. When he transferred to the canvas the rich hues in which the sanctuary within the veil of common things was disclosed to his own eyes, he was accustomed to throw over the picture an atmosphere which, however brilliant, was not seldom so hazy as to be almost impervious. What the Virgin Mother had been to the great painters of Italy, that the Anglican or Elizabethan Church became to him. Immaculate in conception, peerless in beauty, resplendent with every grace, she presented herself to him as a living personality to be loved and wooed, and as a divine impersonation to be adored and hymned."

Such is a brief outline of the mortal career of him, the poet and saint,—

"One of that small transfigured band
Whom the world cannot tame,"

to portray him in the words so eminently descriptive of his illustrious friend* and coadjutor of earlier days—one long since buried in the seclusion of a "monastic home," the Oratory of St. Philip Neri, Birmingham. We now proceed to mention his poetry—the lovely reflex of a lovelier life. Keble's poetry is a modern reproduction of what might be called the *Christian mediæval* school of poetry of the seventeenth century—the beauties, disordered and detached, of that school being there concentrated and fused into harmonious unison; the beauties unalloyed with the blemishes, quaintness, mysticism, extravagance, &c., of which sufficient mention was made in a previous paper. This, which holds true of Keble's poetry generally, *especially* applies to "The Christian Year," the work by which his name is immortalized. The object of the work is thus stated by the poet himself:—

"Next to a sound rule of faith, there is nothing of so much consequence as a sober standard of feeling in matters of practical religion; and it is the peculiar happiness of the Church of England to possess, in her authorized formularies, an ample and secure provision for both. But in times of much leisure and unbounded curiosity, when excitement of every kind is sought after with a morbid eagerness, this part of the merit of our Liturgy is likely in some measure to be lost on many even of its sincere admirers; the very tempers which most require such discipline setting themselves, in general, most decidedly against it. The object of the present publication will be attained if any person find assistance from it in bringing his own thoughts and feelings into more entire unison with those recommended and exemplified in the Prayer Book. The work does not furnish a complete series of compositions; being in many parts rather adapted, with more or less propriety, to the successive portions of the Liturgy than originally suggested by them. Something has been added at the end concerning the several occasional services; which constitute, from their personal and domestic nature, the most perfect instance of that *soothing* tendency in the Prayer Book which it is the chief purpose of these pages to exhibit." †

* John Henry Newman.

† Advertisement, "The Christian Year."

The purpose here enunciated, Keble has consistently carried out, even at the expense of strength and vigour, elements in which his poetry is, upon the whole, we may admit, deficient, being characterized rather by an almost womanly tenderness and grace; not but that he *can* strike on occasion a martial and spirit-stirring note. As in the case of another and far greater poet, it may indeed be regretted that he did not give us more of these "soul-animating strains," these rousing trumpet tones—trammelled and hampered as he was by the exigencies of a somewhat narrow and limited plan, which precluded the giving of free scope to the exercise of his genius, or reaching the highest range of his poetical powers, high as these undoubtedly were. But while this may be matter of regret, let us, remembering the sage critical maxim of Pope,—

"In every work regard the writer's end,
Since none can compass more than they intend,"

thankfully take him for what he is—the sweet poet and singer, the Coryphæus of the sacred minstrelsy of the nineteenth century. The idea of embodying in verse the teaching of the Church of England in the yearly course of her services—an idea wrought out and perfected by Keble—did not, however, wholly *originate* with him, having been already to some extent anticipated by Herbert in "The Temple," and at a later period by Wordsworth in his Ecclesiastical Sonnets, of which that on "The Liturgy" seems so like a distinct preface or forebode of his successor's more finished and elaborate work that we feel constrained to quote it:—

"THE LITURGY.

"Yes, if the intensities of hope and fear
Attract us still, and passionate exercise
Of lofty thoughts, the way before us lies
Distinct with signs, through which in set career,
As through a zodiac, moves the ritual year
Of England's Church; stupendous mysteries!
Which whoso travels in her bosom, eyes,
As he approaches them, with solemn cheer.
Upon that circle traced from sacred story,
We only dare to cast a transient glance,
'Trusting in hope that others may advance
With mind intent upon the King of glory,
From His mild advent till His countenance
Shall dissipate the seas and mountains hoary."

(To be continued.)

The Reviewer.

A Synoptical History of England. London: James Walton.

THIS is a good idea ingeniously worked out. It presents "the events of English and general history in a form hitherto unattempted in this country," and constitutes "a work combining the interest of a continuous narrative with the clearness of the tabular form." It is an oblong quarto, which, on being opened, displays on each page three columns. "The first column in each page contains in chronological order a brief abstract of the leading events of the period under review. In the second column fuller details are given with reference to those points which require a more lengthened notice. The third column is occupied by a summary of the principal occurrences in contemporaneous history." "At the end of each line of kings a rapid sketch is given of important constitutional and legal changes." The genealogies of each line are also presented, tables of the battles of the civil wars are given, as well as of the principal treaties and statutes, and there is appended to the work a summary of the present state of the British Empire, and of the condition of its people. This arrangement enables great clearness of statement to be maintained, and has a most effective influence on the memory, at the same time that the statement can be made in the fewest possible words.

In no other study is it of such importance to introduce orderliness of thought and explicitness of statement, and hence any means by which these essentials can be had in combination, with fair views of events and accurate estimates of their effects, confer great advantages on students. This book would be exceedingly useful we would say in all classes of history, in connection with young men's mutual improvement associations, and in the private studies of those who are under training for the Civil Service examinations. To teachers, as affording them fine examples of condensed statements and orderly arrangement, it would be very useful as showing how to bring into one view, by black-board illustration, the chief events of a period. The book has a capital index, and has quite the appearance of being what it is, a handy guide to the easy comprehension and sure retention of the facts of the story of our own land in connection with the events which were transpiring at the same time. The present reviewer, who knows not a little of the difficulties of historic compilation, in synoptic form, in small compass, truly believes that this is a really good manual for school teaching and private study. It may often, too, be serviceable in the casual consultations, the need of which arises so often in connection with the reading of the day.

The Bible Plan unfolded. By JAMES BIDEN.
London: Elliot Stock.

THIS is a wonderful book. In it Mr. Biden has outdone himself.

It is a work which must have occupied much time, engaged a great deal of thought, and employed much reading, calculation, and reflection. The whole Bible is, in this view, a prophetic history of "the education of the world." It is a symbolic relation of the spiritual progress of the race—a shadow and type of the future—a revelation as by vision of the course of the divine dealings with men. It is "the Book of Life"—of life guided and guarded by the infinite and the eternal.

It must be admitted that in this small pamphlet of a hundred pages there are many singular thoughts, many suggestions of much worth, and a consistency of interpretation which all together go to prove that the author has a theosophy before his mind which has been thoroughly thought out with much care and concentration. The view taken is not by any means a common one, but it is set forth with a power and vigour, an originality and conciseness, which should commend the work to the study of Bible inquirers. We do not pledge ourselves to its details, but we do affirm that it is worth perusal, and will repay thought. If it does not convince, it will at least lead to reflection, while incidentally it will communicate ideas which may be of much use in Bible interpretation to an intelligent reader, who thinks while he reads, and keeps the whole line of reasoning and analogy before himself, as Mr. Biden has placed it before him.

We quote a passage explanatory of Bible principles, and make a few extracts from an able section on Bible politics:—

"We will enumerate the principles observed in the construction of the Bible:—1. All primary narratives supply terms used as symbols for language, in which to express spiritual ideas. This principle applies to every first narrative of physical things, of seeming history and of true history. 2. A system of types is maintained to express and to foreshadow their antitypes. 3. Names are given to things and persons literally expressive of their peculiar characteristics, and of the meanings intended to be conveyed. 4. The Bible is divided into three principal sections—Patriarchal, Mosaic, Christian. All these abound in prophecy. The patriarchal supplies terms for an alphabet on which to raise a divine language. The patriarchal section is not history, but prophecy, the lives of the patriarchs presenting phases of Christianity, which are now become history. The Mosaic section commences with Abraham, and with the promises made to an exhibited faith. The divine teaching then begins. The teaching is carried on in commands, in types, in prophecies, the divine language enlarging until the Christian section, when spiritual truth is announced.

"The Bible has helped to shape the politics of nations, from the time of Moses to the present. Containing a body of divine laws, it governed the Hebrews. Its influence extended beyond them. It struck chords which vibrated to the remotest nations. In its modern form, the Old and New Testaments combined, it has influenced the policies of Eastern and Western nations. It formed the foundation of Mohammedanism, and helped to give it direction and force. It is the source of the whole history of modern Europe. . . . Every Christian knows that the gospel is the harbinger of peace and good-will, and every Christian knows, to his shame and confusion, that the gospel hitherto has been accompanied by bloodshed and

rapine, at which the finger of scorn can point as the reproach of a spurious Christianity. The perverted Christian condition is ephemeral and evanescent. Ignorance is to be displaced by knowledge, and the misrule ignorance has permitted and encouraged to be put down by the force of knowledge. The Bible, the divine text-book, supplies the needful knowledge. It has only to be rightly studied. . . . Christian ethics are intended for the elevation of all, and a social equality to be a result; not an equality in the possession of outward things, but an equality of rights as fellow-members of one body. Christianity has a wide scope, embracing this world and the next, and especially concerns a right policy here. The Bible regulates human affairs. It instructs with respect to them, and is so marvellously compiled that it serves all the varied conditions of society, whether results of ignorance or knowledge. To read it aright it must be viewed as a unique book, and be studied in accordance with its principles of construction. Accepted thus, it is seen to be a book which instructs in the science of a divine policy on earth, just as any other scientific work instructs in any specific science. . . . No one will dispute the influence the Bible has exerted over human affairs. It is destined to exert a yet greater influence. Christ's labours are not to be inefficient; they will produce the results intended. . . . There can be no doubt that the Bible, which helped to rear a past state, will conduce to the formation of a new order of social life. Instruction will reach all, mental culture be bestowed on poverty, and a free intercourse of wealth and poverty be a result, which will soften the manners of all. . . . Truth will be able to assert itself, and have a free course through humanity."

The Literary World. London: James Clarke.

THE *Literary World* was commenced about two years ago as a supplement to the *Christian World*, and was continued monthly for some time. Its aim when projected was to "help its readers to form a just estimate of books," as one means of aiding in the moral and religious improvement of its readers, and of cultivating in them high, pure, and spiritual longings. In November, 1868, it was altered and remodelled, and became an independent serial, issued in weekly numbers at a penny, and in monthly parts at sixpence, for which sum it presents "choice readings from the best new books, and critical reviews of some of them." At the time of our writing we have seen six numbers, and we feel bound to state that these contain a well-varied and pretty careful digest of current literature. And though we could easily conceive it to be improved, both in plan and execution, it appears to us to deserve a handsome word of encouragement from us as an agent in self-culture, if properly used. As a guide to the books of the day for reading clubs, young men's societies, working men's institutions, &c., we think it would be very serviceable. We certainly would not like to see it degenerate into an index to Mudie, or a provider of a *soupeçon* to members of lending libraries, though even for these purposes it would be useful.

The Spirit Controversy. By DANIEL BIDDLE. London: Williams and Norgate.

THOSE of our readers who have been interested in the controversy on "the natural immortality of the soul," will read these "Les

ters and dissertations on the human spirit and soul, their nature and their condition, both here and hereafter, with remarks on future rewards and punishments," with eagerness, and reflect on them with candour. We have here fourteen letters, of which a concise abstract is given in the contents. This is followed by a disquisition on the human soul and its destiny in a future world, in two parts; to which there is added, as an appendix, a republication of a very interesting pamphlet, entitled "A Post-mortem Examination; or, What is the Condition of the Disembodied Human Spirit?" The author is a member of the English Royal College of Surgeons, and was formerly House Surgeon in St. Thomas's Hospital in the Borough of Southwark, London. In the *Reviewer* department it is usual to avoid strong recommendations of books bearing on disputable topics, because it may be supposed that these notices indicate the feelings, inclinations, or opinions of the conductors. As, however, the topic has been discussed in these pages recently, we may here safely enough, though occupying only the subordinate place of a contributor, note that the writer is clearly on the negative side of the question, as he affirms that "the doctrine of the soul's immortality is in no way countenanced by Holy Writ, which teaches us that a *resurrection* is to be looked for as a *necessity* of our fallen nature." Yet the author does not deny a future life, but goes "to the full length of the orthodox in regard to the eternity of future rewards and punishments." It will be seen that he has a word to say which concerns thinkers on both sides. The idea is striking, and the mode in which it is treated is able and suggestive. We commend it to thinkers.

How to Retain our Elder Scholars, and Regain some who have Left us. By J. A. COOPER, F.R.S.L. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

THIS is a wise and worthy pamphlet. It is a revised reprint of "a paper read at the autumnal meeting of the Congregational Union, held at Wolverhampton, October, 1869." Its author is an earnest labourer in the cause of human elevation, and his name is a heart-word among those who are employed in schemes of Christian usefulness; and there is probably no Sabbath school teacher in the three kingdoms who does not feel that he is an elder brother, whom to reverence and imitate is advisable. Sound discretion, careful thought, apt phrase, eminent suggestiveness, characterize all that he writes; while there is a suffusion of the whole with the very effluence of Christian grace, that charms and captivates those even who do not themselves feel the call of duty pressingly upon their souls. Those of our intelligent and thoughtful readers who desire to undertake a needful labour in an open field, would do well to read the pamphlet now spoken of. If the advices of the author be followed, there can be little doubt that many elder scholars would be retained in our Sunday schools, and that many would be regained, both to school and church. The pamphlet met with a warm welcome when read, and has been earnestly longed for in type by many thoughtful, earnest Christian men.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

858. Who was the author of the following line, and under what circumstances was it produced?—"The modest water saw its Lord and blushed."—D. H. F.

859. Any information which you could communicate to your readers at this time about Dr. Temple, the new Bishop of Exeter, would, I have no doubt, be highly acceptable. May I ask you to tell us all you know?—JOHN C.

860. Notable sayings form a highly valuable portion of history. I should like to know who was the author of one which ought, in my opinion, to be written in letters of gold in the apartments in Downing Street sacred to the Chancellor of the Exchequer—"Give me a good policy, and I will give you good finances."—TH. N.

861. In the volume of the *British Controversialist* for 1855 appears a graphically wrought and most interesting instalment of an essay on "Byron," signed E. W. S. I have carefully looked through every successive volume for the concluding portion of this essay, but in vain. If it would not be asking too much, will our kind editor, or the esteemed writer, afford a word or two of brief explanation?—O. D.

862. The following question, which appeared in the number for January, has not yet been answered:—Did Addison die drunk? I for one (and I have no doubt "Querist") would like some information respecting the last moments of Addison, as I have been greatly stunned by such a question as "Did Addison die drunk?" be-

cause that same beautiful writer, in his last moments, said, "See how a Christian can die."—D. H. F.

863. Hugh Miller, in one of his works, speaks in praise of Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding," "notwithstanding its fundamental error." What is the fundamental error referred to?—J. B. T.

864. I have been told that one of Mr. Dickens' novels contains characters sketched from two celebrated poets. Which is it, and who are they?—A. NOVION.

865. It has been stated in a recent review that one Blake "wrote songs equal to Shakspeare's." This suggests two questions: (1) What songs did Shakspeare write? and (2) Who is Blake?—J. C. A.

866. I was extremely pleased to see Dr. Ingleby's able remarks on the "Design Argument," but should like to know a little more concerning his views on the larger subject of the Possibility of any Natural Theology whatsoever. It is generally admitted, I think, that there can be but two ways of demonstrating the existence of a God—the *a priori* argument and the *a posteriori* method. Now I may be wrong, but I gather from Dr. Ingleby's observations on this topic that he holds with *neither* way. If this be the case, I should be much obliged if he will kindly say how he avoids the seemingly logical conclusion of Atheism.—T. S. B.

867. Is the ordinary use of "fitting" for fit, or of "fittingly" for fitly, in English composition baseable on any valid reason or plea save that of euphony?—O. D.

868. To my simple taste it seems less correct to say "equally as," &c., than "equally with," &c. Am I right? A friendly answer to each query will be esteemed a favour by—O. D.

869. Whether is Mill or Hamilton at the head of modern philosophy?—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

870. Has Ireland any philosophy or philosophers of its own?—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

871. Had the ancient Egyptians any poetry?—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

872. What one writer could be safely adopted as a model for the formation of style?—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

873. Is it true that Wm. Lisle Bowles was the father of modern poetry, and why?—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

874. What is the best modern text-book of logic?—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

831. Cheap legal handy books (at 1s. per volume) are published by Mr. Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange. One of the series is on the subject mentioned by J. J. M. Instructions to executors are likewise clearly and well given in one of Messrs. Routledge's "Useful Library" series, price 1s. The title of the book is "The Law of Wills, Executors, &c., by W. A. Holdsworth, Esq."

838. Many excellent editions are extant,—Cary's, Doran's, Gilfillan's, Robert Bell's, &c.; prices range from 2s. 6d. to 7s. 6d.—B. G.

841. H. B. will find a brief history of GNOLOGY in Chambers's Encyclopædia under the word.—R. W.

843. In "Memoirs of Professor John Wilson ('Christopher North'),

poet, critic, novelist, journalist, metaphysician, moralist, humorist, &c.," by his daughter Mrs. Gordon, "Youth" will find pretty full information.

"Christopher North" was a *nom de plume* of John Wilson (Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh), which was used in various papers contributed to *Blackwood's Magazine*. The best known of them was a series entitled "Noctes Ambrosianæ."—D.

844. As yet the edition issued under the care of Robert Carruthers of Inverness is by far the best. Elwin has promised an edition for nearly a dozen years.—B. B.

850. The phrase "Lake School of Poetry" appears to claim far more significance than is really attached to it. Professor Wilson ("Christopher North") called Wordsworth, Southey, and Coleridge, the "Lake poets," and their poetry the "Lake school;" but whether he did so because the three poets chanced to live together for a time at the Lakes—which indeed inspired their earliest lines,—or because he considered their works of a "watery" nature, is not a matter of much moment. One scarcely ever hears anything now of the Lake school, and there never seems to have been any more in the name than there was in the title of that other poetic coterie which Wilson dubbed the "cockney school," and which numbered Leigh Hunt, Keats, and others among its students.—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

The Lake school of poetry is a misnomer as applied to the works of the three poets, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey, to which it was first applied: so called because Wordsworth and Southey lived at the Lakes, and Coleridge, as a youth, wrote in conjunction with them, and later, used to stay there with them. The term origi-

nated with, I think, the *Edinburgh Review* in a severe notice of Wordsworth's "Lyrical Ballads." &c. Coleridge repudiated the title in the third and fourth chapters of his "Biographia Literaria," where he speaks of the "fiction of a new school of poetry." The school is supposed to bear the marks of simplicity and sentimentality, a fidelity to natural objects, and a childish fondness for rustic scenes and unsophisticated feelings.—O.

853. Elizabeth Smith was born at Burnhall, near Durham, 1776, and died of consumption in 1806. She was the author of a new translation of the "Book of Job," and of a *Life of Klopstock*, the German Milton. She displayed remarkable talents in ancient and modern languages, mathematics, and polite letters. She drew skilfully, and was one of the learned ladies of last century.—R. M. A.

854. We believe 1768 to have been the year in which Napoleon was born. Alison, in his *History of Europe* (9 Ed: III., 246), says that he was born on the 5th of February in that year. Napoleon subsequently assumed August, 1769, as the date of his birth, in order to constitute himself a French citizen, because in the interval between these two dates Corsica had been incorporated with the French monarchy. A strong proof that he was born on 5th February, 1768, is to be found in the record of his marriage with Josephine, which still exists in Paris, and gives that as the date of his birth. The marriage register bears the signature of Napoleon; and, as Alison justly remarks, "this official act, signed by Napoleon himself on an occasion when no one but a very young man represents himself as 'elder' than he really is, and when his interest lay the other way, as Corsica was not incorporated with France till June,

1769, decides the matter."—GEORGIUS.

Having the "Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte," by M. De Bourrienne, Napoleon's private secretary, I have taken the following extract relating to Napoleon's birth:—"Napoleon Bonaparte was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th of August, 1769. The name was originally written Buonaparte; but during the first campaign in Italy he dropped the *u* merely to render the spelling conformable with the pronunciation, and to abridge his signature. It has been said that he suppressed a year in his age, and that he was born in 1768; but this is untrue. He always told me [De Bourrienne] that the 15th of August, 1769, was his birthday; and as I was born on the 8th of July in that year, our proximity of age seemed to strengthen our union and friendship when at the military school of Brienne."—GEORGIUS D. E.

"Samuel" should be cautious in his statements. Is it a "fiction" that Napoleon I. was born in 1769? Are a "respectable" newspaper and Alison (a well-known blunderer) to be pitted against Wm. Hazlitt (a writer praised for his great care and accuracy) and Vieusseux (a French authority of value)? These latter writers distinctly assert that Napoleon I. was born on August 15th, 1769, after Corsica had become a French dependency, and with the view of meeting discussion, give their proofs, which appear to be quite satisfactory.—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

855. The Rev. Edward Henry Bickersteth, the eminent sacred poet, is the only son of the Rev. Edward Bickersteth, Rector of Wotton, voluminous writer on religious subjects. The poet is the nephew of the Bishop of Ripon. He graduated at Cambridge in 1847, taking double

honours (Senior Optime and third-class Classics). He gained the Chancellor's medal for an English poem in 1844, 1845, and 1846, and the Seatonian prize for a sacred English poem in 1854. This was the only occasion, from 1852 to 1863 inclusive, that the Rev. J. M. Neale was unsuccessful in competing for the Seatonian prize. The Rev. E. H. Bickersteth is also favourably known as the author of several practical religious works.—O.

The Rev. E. R. Bickersteth is, I believe, either brother or first cousin to the Bishop of Ripon. When an undergraduate (Trinity College, Cambridge), he obtained the Chancellor's Medal for English poetry during three successive years, 1844—1846. In 1854 he obtained the Seatonian Prize, but has failed to take it since then. He has published several volumes of poems; the best known being that entitled "Yesterday, To-day, and for Ever," which has lately passed through a second edition. A poem by him on "John the Baptist" appeared in the last volume of the *Sunday Magazine*, apparently written for last year's Seatonian Prize.—CAMUS.

Perhaps the following sketch from "Men of the Time" may be interesting to "Samuel." "Bickersteth, the Ven. Rev. Edward H., D.D., is the second son of the late Rev. John Bickersteth, M.A., and brother of the Bishop of Ripon; was born in 1814, at Acton, Suffolk. He entered at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1832; and graduated B.A. in honours at Sidney Sussex College, having previously obtained the Taylor's Mathematical Exhibition. He afterwards entered as a student in theology at Durham University, where he gained the first prize for a theological essay in 1837. He was ordained deacon

at the end of that year, and priest in January, 1839. He served as curate to the late Archdeacon Vickers, at Ohetton, Shropshire, in 1838-9, when he was appointed to the curacy with sole charge of the Abbey, Shrewsbury. Having occupied this position for nine years, he was presented by the Earl Howe, in 1848, to the incumbency of Penn Street, Buckinghamshire. He was appointed Rural Dean of Amersham by the Bishop of Oxford the same year; Vicar of Aylesbury and Archdeacon of Buckingham in 1853; select preacher before the University of Cambridge, 1861; Deputy-Prolocutor of the Convocation of Canterbury upon the resignation of the Dean of Bristol, and admitted to the degree of D.D., *propter merita*, by a grace of the Senate of Cambridge in 1864. He has published 'Questions illustrating the Thirty-nine Articles,' 'Catechetical Exercises for the Apostles' Creed,' 'Prayers for the Present Times,' charges delivered at his visitation in 1855, 1856, 1858, 1859, 1861, 1862; 'God's Judgments in India, a Warning to England'—a sermon on the Fast Day, Oct. 7th, 1857; 'Church Music,' a sermon; 'The Convictions of Balaam,' an Oxford Lenten sermon; a 'Catechism on Confirmation'; 'An Address from the Pastor to his Flock on Confirmation'; &c., &c."—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

866. The answer to this query will be found at p. 472 of *British Controversialist*, vol. xxxi.—B. P.

870. Has not S. N., in *British Controversialist*, vol. xxx., pp. 393-397, replied to a query which involves that now put by "Walter Sherrington"? For therein we find an abstract of the history of philosophy in Ireland.—R. M. A.

The Societies' Section.

SELFHOOD.

A NEW YEAR'S ADDRESS TO YOUNG MEN.

TO-DAY a new year dawns on us from eternity. It comes to us as a gift—a priceless gift from the Sovereign of life. As a gift beyond the value of a king's ransom it should be received—used—improved. The past is *past*—irrevocably and irrecoverably it has gone into the light of “the great white throne,” *there* its record has been presented, and “the great seal” has been affixed to it that it may be laid up in the archives of the moral universe. Out of the mystery of silence, an unseen Hand has given us to-day—the firstling of the year, a newly gathered forget-me-not from the gardens of the eternal God—and we have taken it gladly and joyously as a token of loving remembrance and care, and as a call to gratitude and duty. Here, at this moment, “the weariness, the fever, and the fret” of the past are forgotten, and the soul feels itself free “to take a new reckoning,” and to endeavour to set itself right for the voyage from the pleasant port of the present, along the unploughed sea of the future, towards the haven of the hereafter. This, then, is a supreme moment in our destiny. Before life's currents move away let us fix some thought firmly, wisely, and well in our inmost spirits—some thought suited to the hour, yet suitable for all hours, taking its tone from circumstance but yet superior to circumstances, suggested by this single point of time though concerned with the infinite reaches of eternity.

We mark off and distinguish the passage of time, and that “the course of time” may be more definitely and practically recognised by us we divide and subdivide it into

calculable periods, whose successions and recurrences we can note and notice. We feel and know that we change with changing time, and yet we cannot consent to regard ourselves as a part of it. We speak of the period in which we live as “*our times*,” and we acknowledge the appropriateness at seasons such as this for admonishing one another that to us—

“Time is the nurse and breeder of all good,”

if we employ it rightly—remembering that “the fashion of this world passeth away;” and hence that we should take “the present time by the top” to do with diligence and patience whatsoever lies before us of duty. But we never mistake ourselves for bundles of successions and recurrences, for constant sequences of relations and experiences, and for involuntary aggregates of sensations woven within us in the roaring loom of time;—

“Or, from an endless chain of causes wrought,
And, of unthinking substance,
born with thought.”

We perceive around us the panorama of circumstance, and know that it moves and stirs and changes. We feel its influences, and are conscious of the flowing tide of events and scenes in which our life is passed, but we do not each suppose ourselves destined to—

“Be, as a wave of multitudinous life,
That with the general movement
rolls along
To shores where all must break.”

We demarcate ourselves from the onflow of circumstances; we regard the events of life as things external; we reckon them up as items in our history, not as elements of our life. We know ourselves capable of resistance to the outward and the visible, and of forming, by express determination of the intellect-prompted will, resolutions which become laws,—

“Maugre all circumstance to be obeyed.”

The current of events may sweep along in one direction while the current of thought flows steadily onward in quite a different way. The influences of the things which surround us permeate us, but we feel that they are less permanent than we. They affect us, we work effects on them. They change in constant successions, we change too, but all the changes we perceive as taking place in an enduring personality—a personality which, so far from being one with, or a part and product of circumstances, makes itself felt to be—

“Distinct as is the swimmer from the flood.”

Against time this personal being of ours rebels and asserts its enduringness; and against circumstance it revolts, affirming its independence. Our life is not of the same stuff as time and circumstance. Even after our most painstaking care to comprehend them they are indefinite and excentric; we are definite and self-centred, while they but reflect themselves in us—

“As the whole heavens
Within a single drop conglobed
themselves
In shadow.”

We are centres of desire and design; we possess powers of initiation and invention; we can cognize

our own personal being as distinct from all that we recognise around us. We are each certainties to ourselves. We can conceive ourselves existing apart altogether from and entirely independent of time and circumstance, but we cannot conceive ourselves as being only *these*, or believe, what that would necessitate, that—

“Wind-piled and moulded by the wind

Our spirit-essence floats a little space

Amidst a might of things.”

We mark and discriminate ourselves from time and circumstance as conscious entities—beings individually subsisting and numerically distinct one from another, possessed of special sentience, intelligence, and conscience—consisting of a certain intrinsic quintessence and pith, exerting peculiar functions and developing ingrained idiosyncrasies—displaying not only aggregation round a centre of consciousness, but segregation from other conscious centres, and not only inclined but enabled to act on circumstances and to set ourselves “‘gainst the tooth of time and razure of oblivion.” This individual, conscious, positive certainty of being a centre and upooled unity of life reveals to us—*self*, that static oneness of specific life of which consciousness in the peculiar evidence, in which all the possible dynamic forces of the individual are stored, contained realizable under the conditions.

“What is self? What is that many-sided unity which is centred in the single ego of a man’s being?”

“Self is the representation of an integral individual human being—the organization of a certain fabric of flesh and blood, biassed, perhaps, originally by the attributes and peculiarities of the fabric itself—by

hereditary predispositions, by nervous idiosyncrasies, by cerebral developments, by slow or quick action of the pulse, by all in which mind takes a shape from the mould of the body;—but still a self which, in every sane constitution, can be changed or modified from the original bias, by circumstance, by culture, by reflection, by will, by conscience, through means of the unseen inhabitant of the fabric. . . .

True self-control, therefore, is the control of that entire and complex unity, the individual self. It necessitates an accurate perception of all that is suggested by the original bias, and a power to adapt and to regulate, or to oppose and divert every course to which that bias inclines the thought and impels the action. . . .

"Self-control is self-completion."

Each one of us is such a *self*. A treasury of powers is aggregated in us with a specific purpose for the carrying out of a definite, peculiar, and unsharable intent. We have above and before, in spite of and through all things, to be that single determinate core and mainspring of force, which so fulfils the prime cause of its being that the result may precisely accord with the aim and intent of its own existence. We must realize our selfhood. All that is in us of actual power or possible efficaciousness must be used and developed. We must ripen our being into fruit. We must be all that we can, do all we are able, think every thought within our power, acquire all knowledge within our reach, affect all with whom we come in contact, enjoy all that is given, aspire our highest, strive our utmost, contrive our best, expend our whole soul's strength on our duty, and resist all that impedes our life's purpose—so only can we become our *true selves*, and thus only are the full contents of our special nature,

the selfhood with which we have been endowed, able to be employed or enjoyed. The chief duty of man, *as man*, is to be himself; for to be one's self is to develop and bring to maturity all that is in us actual and possible in such a way that all the past shall aid each present effort, and every present act shall tend to the full and thorough outcome of the future, that there may be no waste or misdirection of force or will, and that the entire capacity of our nature be exerted and expended at the proper moment to the right effect.

Not only as the fruit of one plant differs from that of another; not only as the flower of one fruit-bearing tree differs from that of another, but as any one leaf (of the same plant) differs from any other, and as "one star differs from another star," so should each man in his selfhood differ from every other, not by intent and with effort, but by the mere development of his individuality into a distinct personality. This discrete substantiality, along with a common sameness of nature, makes us human creatures, while we are also clearly not only independent existences with a definite form and special numerical unity, but co-organic beings, conscious of separate and single life, in which certain peculiar and distinct properties distinguish us each one from the other partakers of the same specific natures and generic powers. To attain to this personality, while we must have many similarities to those who are of the same race, we must display (or, at least, possess) distinct peculiarities of development and power proper to ourselves and unshared in by others. This is what is meant by and known as selfhood.

It is true that selfhood is unfashionable, that the supreme canons of etiquette tend to mould men into

an "indistinguishable throng;" but ever as men become distinguished, and acquire any special claim upon the gratitude of their compeers in existence, it is because they show some rare individuality of being and dexterity of power, which constitute a difference from the ordinary mass and multitude, and produce recognisability.

Well, we maintain that selfhood is a human right and duty; that it has been made a law of our being that we shall so culture, develop, train, and manifest ourselves, that each should be different from every one; and that while it is true and of verity that—

"Nothing in this world is single,
All things by a law divine
In one another's being mingle,"

it is equally true and requisite that variety of character should be asserted, that conscious personality and independent (but natural) originality, that spontaneous play and exercise of faculty, should be attended to; and that amidst general selfsameness there should be aimed at, the manifold diversity of all possible human selfhood; for, as J. S. Mill avers, "the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being." We must counterpoise the assimilative influences under which we exist, by the assertion and exertion of independence, and the vigorous conservation of all our inborn specialities and prerogatives. We may smooth off and level down the results of the accidents of our position, but the peculiar properties entrusted to us for development and employment we must by no means "hide" or waste, neglect or disregard. That which has its origin in us is our share of originality, our express intended character; that without which we might as well have been anybody as the persons we are. We

plead, then, for a full, free, thorough, and genuine culture of all the powers lodged in our frames and inherent in our spirits, in due subordination to the law of justice which prescribes that we shall never aim at the attainment of our own ends by means which would interfere with or prevent an equally active and anxious prosecution of the development of others. The raw material of our human nature is given to us to work up into a definite mass of personal being. Our individual endowments, impulses, passions, inclinations, preferences, and proclivities—all that constitute the elements of our character, all the peculiar energies of our nature—are given us to use and exercise with discrimination and decision in the free forthgoing of their several activities; to build together and form a self—an integral unity of conscious responsible existence in the best state and condition to which it is possible for us to attain. This implies not only self-development, but self-decision, self-government, and self-censorship—the outworking of all the initial forces of our nature in harmony with the aims and schemes, the capacity for achieving which we find within ourselves, under the dominion of the free choice of our own will, and controlled by the supervision of our own conscience. The selfhood so attained will insure fullness of life, freedom of being, and originality of character. Our genius is only capable of producing its noblest results where there is free scope and true independence.

If the immortal truly throbs in our breasts, and we feel the real nobleness of the human life possible to us, let us employ the "mortal summers" to some purpose, in endeavouring to become something definite in the world, a being whose speciality of capacity and accomplishment the fellows of our earthly life

may know, and when we are called hence may miss. A high aim beating in the very heart is essential to a noble existence. The poet has truly said that—

"Whoever with an earnest soul
Strives for some end from this low
world afar,
Still upward travels,—though he
miss the goal
And strays—but towards a star."

The master spirits of the earth should know self thoroughly; for self-knowledge is the condition of self-mastery, and self-mastery is required for self-control. That is the pre-requisite of all dutifulness and moral obedience. He who has fully learned his own power, honestly trained his whole nature, diligently fitted himself for the performance of his part in this life, and resolutely fulfils, as a matter of principle, every duty to which he is called, as it occurs or recurs, has acquired the capacity of being a distinct and peculiar personality—has attained to selfhood, and is, though but "a voyager in time," a being of a destiny which is able to look finchlessly into eternity. Such a one is not mightily moved by—

"The vain low strife
That makes men mad—the tug for
wealth and power,
The passions and the cares that
wither life,
And waste its little hour."

One bright Exemplar of supreme selfhood has been given to us, to show how we also should be like Him who is being's Unity and All, in our positive personality. His is the true likeness to God—of God the self-existent and the self-true—after which we must strive. We are to bear His likeness, and to be renewed in His image. To do so we must be self-contained, have fixed purposes, glow with spiritual animation towards the noblest ends, do the duty of each day and hour, and dare all consequences, rather than be false to the supreme, all-controlling intent of existence. To fulfil the will of God with sanctified spirits is to be most gloriously man. Our highest selfhood is best revealed in holiest servitude. He served and He saved; if we serve we shall be saved, for we shall thus become the younger brethren of the lowly, holy Christ—the Elder Brother of the children of God. He who so inspires his selfhood with Christhood has attained to man's true life; and he may serenely look upon Life and its perplexities, and Death and its changes, for he can in either case—

"The darkening universe defy
To quench his immortality,
Or shake his trust in God."

N. L.

Literary Notes.

A new work by Emerson is in the press.

Horace Greeley is about to defend protectionism against J. S. Mill in a new work on Political Economy.

J. Swinton (of the *New York Times*) is to record "Ten Years of American Journalism."

Froude's History is selling in America in vols. at a dollar and a half. Could we get them at such a price the sale would be greatly extended.

The recent issue of "The Life of Jane Austin" has led to a complete edition of her works in five vols.

"The Administrations of the Nineteenth Century in Great Britain" are to find an historian in F. C. Carr, of the Inner Temple.

Messrs. Macmillan are to give us "Galileo's Private Life."

J. G. Fichte's "Science of Knowledge" has been translated.

"A Biography of B. Spinoza," by R. Willis, M.D., is said to be nearly ready. A book on the same topic was in 1856 ready for the press from the pen of G. H. Lewes.

W. B. Greg is to publish a work on "The Political Problems of our Age and Country."

Sara S. Hennell, a philosophic thinker of great sententiousness and power, author of "Comparativism," has just issued as a sequel "Comparative Metaphysics."

L. B. Philip's "Dictionary of Biographical Reference" will contain nearly 100,000 names.

The Rev. Alex. B. Grosart, one of the genuine "lovers of good books," who has by his "Fuller Worthies' Library" added greatly to the gratification and instruction of his subscribers, in providing for them careful, complete, and handsome reprints of many scarce and valuable works, is about to extend his favour by producing the Complete Works of Henry Vaughan the Silurist, and also those of Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke,—while he has other biographical rarities in preparation. He also projects the publication of two vols. of Miscellanies during 1870-1, which are to include—I. (1) The Poems of Lord Bacon; (2) The Poems of Jeremy Taylor; (3) An Interlude by John Bale (1538); (4) The Poems of Sir William Herbert; (5) A Poësie of Gillofloures by Humfry Gifford; (6) Wm. Loe's Song of Sion; and (7) Contemporary Judgments of Poets. II. The complete poems of Christopher Brooke and Christopher

Lever; "Emmanuel," by Abraham Fraunce; "Tears of the Beloved" (St. John), by Gervase Markham (P); John Bultokur's "True Description of Passion of Jesus," and several other rare old poems. We would direct the attention of secretaries of mechanics' institutes, librarians, members of reading clubs, &c., to this series, of which the impressions are limited. The books issued by this editor are not only worth in themselves, but they are excellently and lovingly edited. Mr. Grosart's work is a labour of love: he is a bibliophilist who needs no profit, and seeks no payment—except gratitude for his pains and painstaking.

Lord Macaulay's "Lays of Ancient Rome" have been translated into Italian by an Irish lady, and issued at Florence.

Just while Tennyson's Legend of the Holy Grail is delighting its thousands of readers, news comes that a fragment of 800 lines of alliterative verse on the history of that notable cup has turned up in the Bodleian. It is to be edited for the Early English Text Society by Rev. W. W. Skeat.

Sir James Prior, biographer of Goldsmith and Burke (b. 1790), died 15th November.

M. Victor Hugo has sold the MS. of his novel "The Crime of the 2nd December" for £1,600.

Sir H. Bulwer has added to his "Historical Characters" Lafayette, Peel, and Brougham.

Dickens' novels at a shilling a vol. are again spoken of.

A. C. Swinburne has in the press "Bothwell," a tragedy, and "Songs of the Republic."

Messrs. A. and C. Black are preparing a "Centenary Edition" of Sir Walter Scott's Works, with unpublished notes, &c., by the author. It is to consist of twenty-five vols., with new type and annotations, 3s. 6d. per vol.

CS.

that her seat is the
all things in heaven
care, and the greatest
men, and creatures of
art and manner, yet all
of their peace and joy."

John Locke.

general course of domestic
actual qualifications and
awakening to the diffi-
systematic legislation."—

like diamonds."—*Jeremy*

Wish to acquire and to
and to make the best of
subject to many laws, on
safety depend. These form
and him, and compel atten-
for the transgression of
the laws of health are
understanding are settled, the
of the state in which we live
decision, prior, in general,
of this time-life;—in short, the
formed for us, in us, and around
as well as a static power; and
it requires and insists on oppor-
means of insuring order while securing
legislation. It makes possible not only
progressive order. Law is the safeguard
regulates at once the functions and agencies
the duties and obligations of their subjects.
determines the principles and forms according to
shall be exercised, as well as the extent and manner
due by the citizen. Legislation is the means of
the agent of personal security.

is not now the irresponsible administrator

compulsory force. Law is not now a mere expression of will. Legislation is the thoughtful adaptation of the powers of society to the proper effecting of the purposes of society. While it imposes duties it confers rights, and though it confers power on the executive of a state, it also provides security for the subjects of each Government. In former days the constitution of empires and the rights of dynasties formed matters for grave speculation and hot discussion, and became occasions of revolution or of war. But in our day the kind of sovereignty to which men are subject has sunk into unimportance when compared with that of the sources, forms, methods, and extent of legislation. If legislation can be made just and appropriate, it is felt that little or no regard need be paid to the sovereignty under which the State is placed. Hence changes in government are not nearly so earnestly pursued as alterations in laws. Government, when considered as the executive and administrative agency of the State, cannot, it is thought, very materially veer towards or indulge in tyranny or oppression if life is guarded by just laws impartially applied and enforced. But here there comes into play a possible evil against which we should endeavour to set our mind, namely, that if we can propose good ends to ourselves, and make them enforceable by Government, such legislation is good and right. Thus legislation may be made the agent of a tyranny which no Government could, on its own account and at its own hand, attempt.

In consequence of this risk it has become a most important inquiry, What is the province of legislation? What ought law to do? and what should it leave undone? What is it that law cannot effect, and what ought it, therefore, to leave untouched? Eager reformers who have good ends in view, and who, knowing the efficacy and force of authority, are anxious to secure the passing of legislative measures in favour of their views, and to enlist the might of Government in the carrying out of their beneficent intentions, not unfrequently endeavour to overstretch the province of legislation, and induce the passing of coercive measures for the enforcement of the performance of acts as duty, the obligatoriness of which neither conscience nor public opinion admits; while, on the other hand, many thinkers, jealous of power and suspicious of authority, full of memories of instances in which Governments have employed legislation for purposes very far from being in harmony with the public good, or with very mistaken notions of what would tend to and effect the greatest advantage of the governed, desire to confine legislation within the very narrowest bounds, and to restrict the legislature as much as may be to the mere regulation of the financial, administrative, and judicial functions of the official agents of the Government.

With this class of thinkers we greatly sympathize; though, as will be seen in the sequel, we do not altogether agree with them. Perhaps the most concise and epigrammatic exposition of their views may be given in the words of T. H. Buckle:—

In his "History of Civilization" he says, "Men may talk as they will about the reforms which Government has introduced, and the improvements to be expected from legislation; but whoever will take a wider and more commanding view of human affairs will soon discover that such hopes are chimerical. They will learn that lawgivers are nearly always the obstructors of society instead of its helpers; and that in the extremely few cases in which their measures have turned out well their success has been owing to the fact that, contrary to their usual custom, they have implicitly obeyed the spirit of their time, and have been, as they always should be, the mere servants of the people, to whose wishes they are bound to give a public and legal sanction."

While we admit that in the idea of Carlyle on Government—that a few wise and strong men should settle and arrange the duties and responsibilities of life, and enforce their performance—there is at first sight a simplicity and attractiveness which inclines to its acceptance; yet having learned something of the evils of bureaucracy, and the kindly despotism under which it aims at placing men, we are not quite anxious to see it increased or intensified in our land. But neither are we prepared to concur entirely with the extreme advocates of representative legislation—that law should be simply a reflex and enforcement of prevalent public opinion. Public opinion is a great power, and no law can be beneficially enacted which greatly contravenes it; but public opinion requires guidance, education, and keeping to the point. The legislator must have some definite principle on which to base his proposals, and he must also have a distinct and practical means to present of getting his proposals adopted and obeyed. Public opinion is availing as to the desirable, legislation has the task of making the desirable, the attainable, if it is just and consistent with the highest interests of mankind. Hence the responsibility of the legislator is weighty, and the task of those who choose them is a much more serious thing than merely proceeding to the poll and registering a vote.

At this peculiar juncture, when the electoral constituency by which the members of the Legislature are chosen has been so considerably extended, this seems to be a suitable topic for a few reflections. What is the province, the aim, and the purpose of legislation? For if this were well known and properly considered, those who were called upon to select advisers to the Government would be better qualified to judge of the fitness of men to assume the difficult duty of legislators, either as originators or critics of proposed measures; and, indeed, candidates themselves would have clearer views, not only of their claims to the notice of constituencies, but also of their duties to the State and their constituents, if they realized to themselves more accurately what can and what cannot be effected by legislation, what place legislation holds among human agencies, and to what extent it may be beneficially employed in the promotion of the best interests of men.* It is in

* "Better qualifications for legislation exist, and may be found if sought for, than a fluent tongue, and the faculty of getting elected by a consti-

the hope that by concentrating our thoughts for a short space on this important topic, our views may be made clearer and our ideas become more correct, that we now proceed to consider, in the best manner in our power, the question in "the Philosophy of Politics," which seems to us to be so important as to deserve serious reflection and thoughtful inquiry—both from ourselves and from our readers.

Legislation is necessary to enable men to live in society without injuring and oppressing each other, to hinder the strong from ill-using his weaker neighbour. The main end of legislation, therefore, is to see that no one is allowed to wield his strength (of will, might, wealth, intelligence, or craft) to overawe or overreach his fellow-citizen, and so unduly to sacrifice the good of others to the advancement of his own.

"Legislation" is defined by J. S. Mill as signifying "making laws;" and he affirms that "the science of legislation (a term used by Filangieri in 1780) is an incorrect and misleading expression," because "we do not talk of the science of making anything." From this decision of the able author of "*Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy*," we are inclined to dissent. Legislation is, like logic, both a science and an art. It includes an inquiry into those political principles which a knowledge of man's nature, capacities, wants, feelings, and conditions shows to be essential as overruling and circumscribing the free choice of those who would make laws, and which must be accepted of and acted upon as imperative by those who would fix the powers and limits of sovereign and of popular rights. Besides this, and more apparent indeed to the ordinary onlooker at Governmental requirements, it implies a practical adaptation of means to ends, a determination of the co-efficients by which the desirable results of order and progress are to be brought about. Hence, as Charles Comte in his "*Traité de Législation Criminelle*" says, "The science of legislation has for its object the knowledge of the natural connections which exist either among the different individuals or the different classes of which each social unity or state consists, or among men and the things which are intended to provide for or preserve their existence;" in other words, it is "the science of the natural laws which regulate the conditions of nations, and determine their prosperity, decline, or stationariness." It concerns itself with the *leges legum*—the laws of laws, the pre-requisite knowledge of man and of nature, to which civil law and social polity must conform, the theoretical principles on which human law must rest, and the

tuency; it would soon be recognised that, in legislation as well as administration, the only task to which a representative assembly can possibly be competent is not that of doing the work, but of causing it to be done; of determining to whom or to what sort of people it shall be confided, and giving or withholding the national sanction to it when performed."—*J. S. Mill, "On Representative Government,"* p. 100.

facts of existence with which it must concur and harmonize. Law may be, but legislation never is, arbitrary. Law may rest on mere force or convention; legislation must be reasoned and reasonable. Law simply signifies those principles or rules of conduct which have been laid down by some competent and sovereign power for the regulation of the ways and actions of men, obedience to which is enforced or enforceable by constituted authority. They may be well or ill considered, but they must be imperative, and they must be enforceable. Man exists amidst conditions and with powers and capacities which operate with great universality, and are all but independent of time and circumstance; these, under the name of laws of nature, require to be known, recognised, and admitted by the legislator; and in subservience to or in concurrence with these inevitable necessities of being, he is required to determine by what practicable means the well-being of man may be best effected and sustained.

Legislation is a term which must be explained historically as well as etymologically before we can fully comprehend the precise, peculiar, yet very distinct meaning which the word has now assumed in the minds of the highest thinkers on the difficult art of managing men in their social, corporate, and national relations. The early legists proclaimed, prescribed, and ordained duty, they regulated life by statute and force, they decided, and the people were compelled to coincide or suffer. The Greeks, "who called that *nomos*, that is to say, distribution, which we call law, and defined justice by distributing to every man his own," appointed officials called *Nomothetæ*, who codified the customs of the several tribes, and legitimated what had become usual, and they revised the laws from time to time to bring them into harmony with the customary forms of life. Their inductions had the force of decrees. They determined the bounds of imperative duty, but they left a large margin of the allowable beyond the touch of the legal. Gradually, however, as the allowable became concreted into custom, it came under their cognizance, and the customary became the legal duty of man to man—the institutes of law. In Rome, a magistrate who proposed a law, or, as we should say, brought in a bill, was said *legem ferre* ad populum; when his *Rogatio* or proposal was approved of, or as we should say, passed or carried (*lata est*), it became *lex*, a decision which, having been asked, has been confirmed and been made binding. Hence *legislator*, the carrier of a law, and also *legislation*, the proper proposal of measures by a competent person before the constituted assembly of the people, so as to obtain the sanction of the right persons to the affirming, confirming, and enforcement of the proposal made as a limiting or regulating decision, binding on those whom it concerned. Thus law becomes the *canon* or fixed authoritative rule of the sovereign determining power, and is obligatory on all those who are under duty to that power.

Legislation has as its chief and prime element the word *lec-*

which originally means "I select and arrange in order, and there-
after I read or proclaim;" and therefore in its most extended and
philosophical signification it implies these six elements, viz., (1)
The wisdom which perceives and selects the best means for the
accomplishment of the proper ends of social and civil life. (2) The
knowledge requisite to adapt the proposed means to the present
circumstances of the community in its various relations. (3) The
capacity of persuading and convincing the several parties, classes,
or interests, which the proposal would affect, either as agents in
enforcing or as actors in obeying the same, of the propriety and
rightness of the plan advocated and the method suggested. (4)
The ability to express in clear, distinct, intelligible, and unmis-
takable language, with definite inclusion of all that is meant and de-
terminate exclusion of all that is not intended, the proposed enact-
ment. (5) The mental acumen to perceive and to apply a prevailing
sanction sufficiently active and available to procure obedience or
secure punishment. (6) The moral influence which shall be weighty
enough to set the proposal before those who are to be affected by
it, so as to incline to and induce its immediate acceptance and
adoption as a definite rule of life, in so far as it reaches.

Legislation might be called the logic, and jurisprudence the
ethics of law. Jurisprudence inquires into and decides upon what
rights are due to and what obligations are imperative upon man in
his several relations in accordance with justice or equity between
man and man, and in harmony with the conditions in the midst
and under the power of which human life is passed, which latter
constitutes *fas*, or the supreme law ordained by the divine will;
while the former is *jus*, or the authoritative decisions of morality
in regard to human conduct. Jurisprudence is *à priori* and ulti-
mate, legislation is *à posteriori* and instrumental; the former seeks
out the original principles and reliable sources, the grounds, the
extent, and the nature of human rights and duties; the latter en-
deavours to find means whereby effect may be given to these
pre-determinate principles in the actual circumstances of a given
period, so that they may really and truly, as far forth and as
thoroughly as is possible, be acted upon by all, and act as the
safeguards of all. Jurisprudence throws the light of philosophy
over human nature as having a social and dutiful part to fulfil on
the earth; legislation gathers up the light of jurisprudence, and
concentrates it on a single element of the problem of social exist-
ence, and considers narrowly and keenly how the principles of
jurisprudence may be inwrought, with practical efficacy, into the
daily duty and life of man, so far as concerns the given portion
under survey, and proposes to define and determine what shall
henceforth be permissible and what imperative in regard to it.
Life is activity; the activities of men, if indulged uncontrolledly,
would result in such a series of interferences of the acts of each
with the purposes of others, that some regulation becomes neces-
sary even in the interest of the free exercise of will, purpose,

endeavour, and activity. All that series of restraints which men impose upon each other by common consent for mutual protection and the general good, is embraced in the term legal duties or obligations on the one hand, and rights on the other. All that sphere of human activity which cannot be interfered with or restrained, and of which the due use must be permitted, constitutes the irrevocable and necessary right of humanity, any attempt to interfere with the free exercise of which would cut to the roots of life, and be inexcusably tyrannous; and therefore no laws must impede or hinder the proper exercise of the necessary functions of life as a condition of social fellowship and existence.

Between the necessary and the legal there intervenes the allowable—a margin or border-land of unregulated duty and obligation. Here the will and inclinations of men have scope for giving and taking, and the craft and ingenuity of man has opportunity for the exercise of deftness and dexterity so far as to demand caution, and sometimes to elicit precaution. Of the right to exercise some rights which are necessary, some may voluntarily denude themselves; but such acts of volition are seldom endorsed or covered by law; while within the very sweep and sway of law many things are held to be allowable which are not in strictness legal. Of some other matters law refuses to take cognizance, and leaves the responsibility of them and in regard to them with individuals. But beyond the legal there is also another circle of activities, which may be denominated the laudable, the praiseworthy duties, which are not only permitted but encouraged. The proper distinguishing of these respective spheres of human activity is one of the difficulties in regard to legislation. Legislation has its own proper field and province, beyond which, if it endeavours to operate, it becomes tyrannous and obnoxious; and to the full extent of which if it does not exercise its functions it is defective, ineffective, and permissive of abuse. Hence a few remarks on the philosophy of legislation may neither be useless nor out of place.

Every man naturally seeks his own gratification; even the anchorite denies himself certain enjoyments which other men pursue with eagerness, in order that he may have what is to him a higher gratification, a sense of superiority over others, a consciousness of self-control, or a more intense rapture arising from the endeavour after nobleness of mind, character, condition, and influence. It is legitimate, according to the natural light of the understanding, for man to endeavour to attain his gratification on the condition that, to procure his gratification he does not interfere with, hinder, or render less possible the gratification of any other. Thus the free will of each is limited by the free will of all others, and men find it advisable to bind themselves by compact to exercise the good pleasure of their own wills, in accordance with some settled usages, customs, forms, or laws. The widest possible formula of freedom is this—that a man may do what he pleases, so long as by or in his self-gratification he refrains from and avoids

either directly or indirectly injuring his neighbour. The sphere of legislation lies here—under what conditions can the highest possible amount of self-gratification, of whatever sort he most affects, be placed within the reach of each and yet interfere in the smallest possible degree with the power, the right, and the opportunity of the self-gratification which all desire and aim at?

Religion concerns the whole duty of man, in all his relations as subordinated to divine law; ethics considers and expounds the concurrent rights and obligations of men in their several individual relations; politics regards the duties and securities, the sanctions and the checks, applicable to and available in civil life; jurisprudence adjudicates on and determines the conditions, regulations, requirements, and obligations which civil life necessitates or makes advisable; and legislation employs itself in discovering the principles which determine and define the relative duties and rights of civil life, in accordance with the dictates and decisions of jurisprudence, politics, and ethics, in such a way as not to hinder, interfere with, or obstruct the proper performance of the duties enjoined on man by religion. If religion possessed full, thorough, and overmastering sway in man; if ethical considerations exerted their prevailing power efficaciously in the human spirit, politics would be only a set of convenient forms, jurisprudence an ingenious exercise of the logical faculty on the requirements of conscience, and legislation would merely supply convenient adaptations to social existence of the higher laws and wider rules of morals and religion. The sphere of operation of each of these is more extensive as it rises, and is more intensive as it descends; religion has the wider sweep, legislation the firmer grasp.

Religion is persuasive, legislation is coercive; the former makes man the lawgiver to his own nature, because it determines him to adopt and act upon the law of holiness which he deems divine; the latter binds itself around man as a constraint; the one affords the principle of individual action, the other supplies the condition of civil welfare. The morality of religion operates from within and restrains, the morality of legislation operates from without and constrains; the former uses as its imperative *ought*, the latter *must*.

Law is a command. Commands are enforceable by a sanction penal in its nature and deterrent in its intended effect. The object of legislation is to determine (1) what *laws* must be made imperative on men, in accordance with the jurisprudence possible under the political forms of life settled in any given country; (2) what *sanction* may be employed to enforce obedience and punish transgression; (3) what *means* can be set in operation to insure general concurrence and submission; (4) what *forms* of procedure are possible to bring home guilt to the transgressor and to make evident his amenability to the deterrent infliction; (5) under what exceptions or with what reservations must the law be passed to secure the due rights of all parties concerned, and avoid a conflict between the law proposed

and those which are already operative ; and (6) what is the minimum of observance which shall be regarded as obedience.

For laws are manifold—law in this sense being taken to signify conditions of well-being which must be observed and obeyed on penalty of suffering. These are, in the present aspect, 1st, the laws of nature, against which no law imposable by man can long, if for any time, hold sway, or gain observance. 2nd, the laws inculcated by religion, true or false, which, if thoroughly believed in, cannot be beneficially interfered with by any direct human law. 3rd, the law of conscience, or the moral sentiments and opinions prevailing in any civil society, which are in reality, so far as that society is concerned, a sort of *lex non scripta*, or unwritten law, more powerful than any possible deterrent power may seek to inflict. 4. The law of self-conservancy, for that is the very fundamental principle on which law is based,—law being but self-conservancy, brought to the highest perfection possible in the state of society in which legislation is exercised. All these must be permitted to hold supremacy over what may be termed constitutional law, as embodied in politics. Jurisprudence assumes these as the groundwork of its exploitations ; and legislation merely condenses into rules for the government of individual action in the midst of civil existence, such elements of general morality as are beneficially enforceable in the circumstances in which it is exercised.

In regard to the regulation of human action, legislation ought to premise and hold as operative the natural ongoings of the external universe, the ordinary forces of public opinion and religious sentiment, and the special activities of self-conservancy ; and it is liable to two main errors in this regard : (1) deciding that a specific enactment, would be a benefit because it accords with a nobler morality than is current, without making sure that any power capable of being set in motion by the executive, and with which they are rightfully invested, can enforce and procure obedience and submission ; (2) determining to extend the area of legislative enactment as far as the executive force available will admit, independent of the concurrence of men as to the beneficiality of the measures proposed. In the latter case law becomes tyranny, and tends to its own destruction ; in the former, law becomes ineffective, and tends to its own defeat. Civil life is a consent to the sacrifice of a certain portion of the means of self-preservation and enjoyment equally open to all, for the securing of the remainder in as large a measure as possible by each, and the great difficulty in legislation is so to adjust these sacrifices as not to require from any one a larger sacrifice on his part than he receives an equivalent for from the social security provided for him.

“The end and scope of laws, whereto all their decrees and sanctions ought to tend, is the happiness of the people ; which is procurable—(1) by rightly instructing them in piety, religion, and the duties of morality ; (2) securing them by arms against foreign enemies ; (3) guarding them by laws against”

factions and private injuries; (4) rendering them obedient to the government and magistracy; and (5) thus causing them to flourish in strength and plenty. . . . That may be esteemed a good law which is—(1) clear and certain in its sense, (2) just in its command, (3) commodious in the execution, (4) agreeable to the form of government, and (5) productive of virtue in the subject.”*

Legislation is the guardian of *existence*, and that existence may be possible it must become the safeguard of *subsistence*, of which the agents are *labour* and *capital*, and the protector of *enjoyment*; for which alone to man, *as man*, existence is valuable. As legislation is the defender and upholder of life, so its supreme power was conferred on it of taking away life when the interests of society seemed to demand it. Hence the *ultima ratio* of legislation has hitherto been, in individual cases, *capital punishment*—in international cases, *war*. In this case, as in so many others, “extremes meet;” that which was instituted for preservation becomes a destroyer. This, however, is tolerated as means to an end, and that end is security to life and limb, to person and property, to rights and privileges, to family life and social incorporations. There can be but little happiness in a state of life in which existence is constantly threatened and insecure; in which provision is not made for the possession of a fair chance of passing the ordinarily allotted years of man’s being in at least a minimum of comfort. But the support of life depends on the means of subsistence available through the combined operation of labour and capital on the original supply of the first elements of comfort provided in nature, and therefore legislation must arrange for the safety of capital and for the protection of labour; the former being the accumulated store of reserved funds under investment as a guarantee for order, the former being the interest immediately available from the capital invested in life, as the condition of progress—a pair which are only reproductive to their highest power of beneficiality when they are properly mated and harmoniously related. Hence a large proportion of legislative ingenuity has been expended on regulating the exchanges between capital and labour, especially in arranging that the former may not be so locked up by the selfishness of individuals as to excite apprehensions, at all well-founded, of death by starvation; and that the latter may not be left unused and neglected while its possessors prey upon the capitalized property, on which the State depends, as a reserve fund for the legislative protection of life and the promotion of well-being. Capital and labour are alike unproductive while unemployed, and the whole country is made poorer as well as the individual possessors of these wealth-beggetters, by the non-employment of either, and in a less degree by their partial disuse or their misuse. To preserve the best ratio between capital, labour, and the capabilities of the earth under the power of the Legislature, forms one of the chief securities for enjoyment, whether

* Bacon’s “Advancement of Science,” Book VIII., chap. iii.

animal, mental, or moral, and is therefore a greatly important consideration in connection with legislation.

Political economy, as the science of wealth—that which contributes to, enhances, or promotes the *well* of men—is, of course, a study which demands much of the thought of a legislator, as it supplies many of the principles of legislation—that is, the laws which regulate the commonwealth. The wealth which is possessed by the members of a nation in common, consists of the elements and powers of nature; the portion of the divine gifts to which they have acquired, and can maintain, a possessory right, the physical power and industrial skill which they can make operative on these, the capital applicable in setting industry to work, and the moral sentiment by which the use of capital is regulated and the exercise of labour is overruled. Legislation requires to consolidate and to interwork these differing sources of well-being into a co-operative unity in which as much equality and rivalry may be introduced as possible, in order that enjoyment may be as extensively diffused as may be, and that the intensity of the desires of men may be as forcibly excited as is requisite to keep the means of enjoyment up to the highest attainable pitch—rivalry being the spur to progress, and equality affording security for order. Legislation, therefore, is that entire aggregate of means adapted to ends employed—to use the language of Edmund Burke, “to put affairs into that train which experience points out as the most effectual, from the nature of things and the constitution of the human mind,” in order that due protection is given to all citizens in regard to person, property, and privileges. This *trine* of pre-requisites to proper civic safety demand from the legislature the most thorough protection possible. The person of the citizen, so long as he performs his due share of the duty imposed on him by the State, must be free and protected in its freedom. In order that the person of each may acquire and possess the highest possible amount of comfort, legislation must provide for the security of property; *all*, that is, which can rightfully belong to the individual as a citizen in a State; all that he can retain, use, exchange, or enjoy, after having performed, or while engaged in discharging, the duties and obligations to the State of which he is a member. But more than this; as man is a creature to whom the accidents, peculiarities, honours, and rewards of life, are matters of pride or interest, legislation must surround the status or privilege of the various persons or classes who form the elements of the State with some such securities as surround the more material articles commonly regarded as property, so that a citizen may not be deprived of the enjoyment, benefit, or advantage arising from them, without cause, or by the act of another, without authority and power. In all these cases legislation requires to plan and provide protection for the citizens; and that it may do so it must devise and consolidate deterrent agencies to operate upon men's minds as defences against violation of rights.

The idea of law is twofold, inasmuch as it always suggests bot

constraint and security; for without either voluntary restraint of their inclinations and will, or legal constraint of them, each man would be master of the life of every other. On this account, for the furtherance of justice, the exercise of force is necessary. The laws are of no power to protect men unless there is conferred on some men, or body of men, the right and the duty of causing these laws to be obeyed. The science of legislation searches into and deliberates upon the nature and relations of men, for the purpose of attaining to theorems or reaching conclusions concerning what does or may conduce to the conservation and defence of the lives, property, and position of men; and these, when so arranged as to be made applicable to life, and have been so proclaimed and determined on as to take the force of order, become laws, a portion of that system of things by which a State is upheld and society is controlled. Legislation must discover, arrange, and apply the principles by which the public and private safety and progress of a State may be secured, and its integrity may be maintained by those to whose hands the duty has been committed; but it must also think out, furnish, and lay down the means by which the citizenry united in industry and prosperity may have their social rights protected and their personal freedom of thought, speech, and act may be possessed and exercised. It must provide for the proper development and use of all the physical functions of man's nature, and of all the efforts it can make to enhance the joy of life and multiply the utilities of social existence. To this, the basis of industry, it must add a provision for the proper excitement and improvement of skill, inventiveness, talent, intelligence, and thoughtfulness as a basis for knowledge. Still farther, it must not only permit and encourage, but insist upon moral uprightness and just peaceableness among those over whom it claims rule. In this way civic life may be made and kept just, intelligent, industrious, and dutiful in the various relations of man to man.

Legislation, as the science of law, defines rights and imposes obligations in reciprocity. It only refers to and exerts itself upon the reciprocal relations of men. The principles of religion, which so improve and affect man that he feels—

"To walk with God (is) to be divinely free;"

those of morality, which teach man his duties as man, may form the basis of the legislator's enactments; but they cannot fairly be prescribed by him, for they are not enforceable reciprocally. It is this reciprocity of duty and right which gives limit to legislation, and wherever it cannot give more than, or at least an equivalent for, what it takes away, it is intruding beyond the proper province of law.

This is the key to the settlement of the province of legislation, —Does any projected or existent act of the Legislature propose any enactment which proffers and provides for no fair countervailing and reciprocal advantage?—then it sins against the very first

principles of legislation. Should a legislator bring in a bill to interfere with or curtail the citizen's liberty in regard to his absolute duties—those, that is, which relate to and concern only himself, he would overstep the province of legislation, and would be invading the moralist's field; should he, however, introduce a proposition to abrogate or annul any portion of the rights of the citizens, without offering and providing for commensurate reciprocal advantages, he would be acting against the first principles of the science of legislation, and would be committing a blunder in the art of statesmanship; he would be perpetrating an injustice. The great problem of legislation is how to secure the greatest possible amount of personal, social, and political advantage, with the smallest possible interference with individual liberty, happiness, and wealth. Hence legislation ought to be mainly regulative and formal, to afford full scope for equity among the citizens, and should interfere as little as possible, except administratively, with the management of the affairs of men as citizens, except to see to the effective and fair reciprocal fulfilment of contracts or duties. Meddlesome legislation is vexatious, but not efficacious. Mere adjudicative legislation is not sufficient, and experimental legislation, unless limited in area and in effect, is highly objectionable.

"There is hardly any kind of intellectual work which so much needs to be done, not only by experienced and exercised minds, but by minds trained to the task through long and laborious study, as the business of making laws. . . . A reason no less conclusive is, that every provision of a new law requires to be framed with the most accurate and long-sighted perception of its effect on all the other provisions; and the law when made should be capable of fitting into a consistent whole with the previously existing laws."—*J. S. Mill "On Representative Government,"* p. 97.

Our legislators are too frequently men of crotchets and specialties, and they are chosen with too great a regard to party and partisanship, and these initial disadvantages are increased by the rough and ready debates, resolutions, and party divisions of our legislative bodies. Legislation has fixed principles and a definite field. It is a moral and metaphysical science as well as a practical art. This our legislators ought to study. But if our representative system is incompatible with the demand on the part of constituencies of trained and cultured legislators (not lawyers), then it is all the more important that the electors should possess clear and definite views on legislation, that they may choose men who are likely to act wisely and fairly in the decision of questions affecting the rights and liberties of the people,—men who will firmly and distinctively demand a just and equitable settlement of all difficulties in the State, and who will guard the personal, civil, moral, and religious freedom of men intact from the touch of tyranny and the profanation of the despot's hand.

Religion.

ARE THE SACRAMENTS ESSENTIAL TO SALVATION P

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE sacraments are holy ordinances instituted by Christ, "who was given to be head over all things to the Church, which is His body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all."

The word *sacrament* is a Latin word, signifying an *oath*—a pledge to be true and faithful unto death, never to desert, disobey, or fail in duty. It has been adopted by theologians in a high spiritual sense, to signify the outward institutions of the Saviour as the channels of His saving grace and tender mercy. Christ is the "Captain of our salvation," and as such we must take the oath of fidelity to Him. We are called upon to fight the good fight of faith, and to "vow and pay unto the Lord" (Psa. lxxvi. 10, 11). The vow is called a sacrament, and the observing of it is the payment required.

It is quite true that *sacrament* is not a Scripture term; but neither is *morality*, and if this were a valid argument against the observance of or in favour of carelessness in regard to sacraments, it would be equally valid against attending to and in favour of negligence concerning morality. We do not suppose that any of our readers will put much stress upon an argument like this, though there are few subjects in which warfare of words is more persistently carried on than on those which relate to theology.

This is not a question on which it is safe to employ mere technical objections; it is too important for man to know the affirmative or negative of it to make it justifiable to indulge in any play upon words. We all know what is meant by a sacrament. It is an ordinance of Christ appointed to be observed by the Church in all time coming, as a sign of obedience, and as a token of gratitude, love, reverence, and fidelity. We may quote here the terms of the Thirty-nine Articles:—"Sacraments ordained of Christ be not only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession, but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace and God's good-will towards us, by the which He doth work invisibly in us, and doth not only quicken, but also strengthen and confirm our faith in Him."

We are not in the least concerned here with the heresy of Sacramentarianism, nor do we require to define the peculiar characteristics of sacraments which make them binding. It does not fall to us to describe those forms and ceremonies insisted on by some sections of the Church as sacraments which "have not any visible sign or ceremony ordained of God," and are therefore

"not to be counted for sacraments of the gospel." "There are two sacraments ordained of Christ our Lord in the gospel, that is to say, Baptism and the Supper of the Lord;" these we maintain to be "essential to salvation."

Let us look at the terms of the institution of these two ordinances, and the scriptural statement of their nature and efficacy; and,—

I. Of *Baptism*. Jesus said, "Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt. xxviii. 19); and see similarly Mark xvi. 15, 16. "By one Spirit are we all baptized into one body" (1 Cor. xii. 13), so that believers become one body, of which Christ is the head; whence St. Paul says, "As many of you [believers] as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ." Thus "we are buried with Him by baptism unto death, that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi. 4).

II. Of the *Lord's Supper*. This, it is undeniable, was not only instituted, but initiated by Christ, as may be seen in Matt. xxvi. 26—29; Mark xiv. 22—26; Luke xxii. 19—21. In the last we get the command of Jesus concerning this communion of saints,—*"Do this in remembrance of Me;"*—a command which St. Paul, by express revelation, reiterates: "As often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do show the Lord's death till He come" (1 Cor. xi. 26). Of this feast Jesus says, "My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed" (John vi. 55); a declaration which He preceded by saying, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life" (John vi. 53, 54).

In the preceding references we have pointed out the main sources where an acquaintance with the purpose, object, and institution of the sacraments is to be found. We have seen that they are express commandments of Christ, and we know that "he that keepeth His commandments dwelleth in Him, and He in him" (1 John iii. 24); while the same author informs us, "He that saith I know Him [Christ] and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him" (1 John ii. 4). Now whereas the ungodly "eat the bread of wickedness and drink the wine of violence," heavenly wisdom invites us, saying, "Come, eat of my bread, and drink of the wine which I have mingled" (Prov. ix. 5).

In the above passages the necessity of baptism and of the partaking of the Lord's Supper are shown; and these passages, as we incline to think, fully prove that these sacraments are essential to salvation. This, of course, is not to be held as affirming that God cannot and will not save any one who has not been baptized and become a partaker of the Lord's Supper. That would be to limit the power and goodness of God, who works not only through means, but also independent of means. But it is meant as an assertion that these are the appointed means of grace, which it is

incumbent on all those who would rightly and truly serve God and keep His commandments to attend to at their peril. Unto whom much is given, of them shall much be required. Those who have never had the opportunity will not, of course, be judged for not having partaken of these ordinances; but those who have had the opportunity of so fulfilling the law of Christ, and have despised or neglected the opportunity, have despised the ordinance of God, and are blameworthy. The prayer and endeavour of every professed disciple should be—"With my whole heart have I sought Thee: O let me not go wrong out of Thy commandments" (Psa. cxix. 10); and this cannot be the heart's desire and prayer of any one who, knowing that our Lord has commanded them to be baptized and to take the good creatures of bread and wine into their hands in remembrance of Him, fail to obey their Lord and to worship Him in the beauty of holiness. We can only be like-minded to Him when we follow His example, fulfil His desires, and obey His commandments. If God opens the channels of His grace, and we refuse to place ourselves livingly in connection with them, we are really closing our hearts against the ordinances of heaven, and cannot expect to be held excusable. If Christ invites us to His table, saying, "Come, for all things are now ready," and we begin "to make excuse," shall the King of the feast be other-wise than offended at us? It is certain that when the Saviour says "come" we ought to go quickly, humbly, and reverently, saying, Lo, I come to do Thy will, O Lord.

We are very expressly commanded not to "forsake the assembling of ourselves together, as the manner of some is." But if it is wrong to absent ourselves from the usual assemblies of God's worshippers, how much more heinous is it to keep aloof from the table to which Jesus Christ invites His own people! If we are to draw near to God that He may draw nigh to us, then surely we ought most eagerly to draw near to Him when He gives us an opportunity of saying, "Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of mine enemies; Thou anointest my head with oil; my cup runneth over" (Psa. xxiii. 5).

From all that we have advanced it seems to us that those who believe in Christianity at all cannot do otherwise than believe, and act upon the belief, that the sacraments, being holy ordinances instituted by Christ, are essential to salvation. P. S. A.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

In perfect consonance with the terms of the question now to be debated, we might look at the sacraments from either the Protestant or the Roman Catholic point of view; and regard them either as only two in number, or as amounting to seven. Seeing that the two sacraments acknowledged by Protestants are included amongst the seven sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church, we shall take the more comprehensive view of the subject. This will be attended with the advantage of enabling us to give a consideration of the

sacraments, taken both in the Protestant and in the Roman Catholic senses of the word. A further benefit will attend this. A section of the Protestant Church of England maintains the seven sacraments of the Church of Rome. In extending our arguments, therefore, to all of these sacraments, we shall meet the views of these members of the Church of England as well as those of the Church of Rome.

That we may debate with fairness, we shall give in their own words the views both of those Protestants who maintain the seven sacraments of the Church of Rome, and of the Roman Catholics themselves. First we shall quote from "Tracts for the Day," edited by the Rev. Orby Shipley. These contain the following language:—"The Catholic Church, both East and West, acknowledges seven sacraments, but not all of equal importance. Thus two, viz., Holy Baptism and the Eucharist, are defined as generally, i. e. universally, necessary to salvation; while of the others the same necessity is not predicated. Two of the five, viz., Holy Matrimony and Holy Orders, are indeed absolutely necessary for the continuance of the visible Church; but they are not necessary for all members of the Church. The other three are means of grace, but are not absolutely necessary for salvation."

We shall now quote from a Roman Catholic standard, the creed of Pope Pius IV., the words of Dr. Doyle respecting which are, "It is acknowledged by every Catholic," and when perverts are received into the bosom of the Church of Rome, they are required to repeat the Creed. It consists of twelve articles. One of these articles is as follows:—"I do profess and believe that there are seven sacraments, truly and properly so called, instituted by Jesus Christ our Lord, and necessary for the salvation of mankind; though not all of them to every one; viz., baptism, confirmation, eucharist, penance, extreme unction, orders, and matrimony; and that they do confer grace; and that of these things, baptism, confirmation, and orders, cannot be repeated without sacrilege. I also receive and admit the received and approved rites of the Catholic Church in her solemn administration of all the aforesaid sacraments."

We here see that the tracts published by a certain section of Protestants maintain that two of the sacraments—baptism and the eucharist—are "universally necessary to salvation," while the creed of Pius IV. affirms that the observance of some one or more of the sacraments is "necessary for the salvation of mankind." It will be our endeavour to show that no one of the sacraments is requisite for salvation; that salvation is attainable without the observance of any one of them.

We propose to show, first, that the Bible does not teach that the sacraments are essential to salvation; and secondly, that the Scriptures furnish instances of individuals who have been saved without them.

I. *The Scriptures do not teach that the sacraments are necessary to salvation.* Under this head we shall first produce the ger

teachings of Scripture as to what is essential to salvation ; and secondly, call attention to what it teaches respecting the sacraments individually.

It is by the Scriptures that the question now debated must be decided, as doubtless will be admitted by the affirmative writers. And if our opponents cannot show that the Bible teaches that the sacraments are essential to salvation, they cannot substantiate their side of the argument. On them lies the *onus probandi*. If we succeed in showing that the Bible does *not* teach that the sacraments are essential to salvation, the arguments of our opponents fall to the ground.

The design of the Bible is to show the way of salvation—to point out how men are saved from a deserved hell and brought to heaven. This we believe will not be denied by those who may be opposed to us in this debate. Now nowhere do the Scriptures represent the sacraments to be necessary to salvation. Yet they do point out what is essential thereto. They do declare, "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v. 20); and, "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. xviii.); also, "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish" (Luke xiii. 3); likewise, "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God" (John iii. 3.) The Scriptures thus declare the necessity of a righteousness surpassing that of the scribes and Pharisees, which consisted in the observance of outward ceremonies, such as sacraments are. They declare the absolute need of regeneration, of repentance, and of such a conversion as makes converted persons become as little children in innocency. And if the sacraments were essential to salvation, would there not be some intimation thereof in the word of God? If the sacraments be necessary to salvation, how is it that the Bible—which in such unqualified terms declares certain things to be needful thereto—gives us no hint of the indispensableness of these sacraments? And if the sacraments be requisite to salvation, how does the Bible answer the end for which it was given, viz., to point out the way of salvation, when it gives no intimation of the necessity of the sacraments thereto? Our opponents will agree with us that the Scriptures are given by divine inspiration; but how can it be conceived that a book given by infinite wisdom, for the express purpose of showing what is needful to salvation, omits to state that the sacraments are essential to salvation, if they be so? As proof of our statements, and as instances of the teachings of Scripture respecting salvation, we commend to the serious attention of all our readers the portions of Scripture to which we shall now refer. John, iii. 14—16, declares that *whosoever believeth in Christ* shall not perish, but have eternal life. From this scripture what conclusion can fairly be drawn but this,—that if any man or woman believe in Christ, that individual shall be saved, whether

any of the sacraments have been observed by such a person or not? How could it ever be reasonably inferred from such a scripture that any of the sacraments are essential to salvation? Rom. iii. 24—26 shows that *he who believeth in Jesus* is justified. Not the most obscure hint is given of the necessity of the sacraments to salvation. John iii. 36, as well as John vi. 35, 37, 40, 47, testifies that *whosoever comes to Christ and believes on Him* shall be saved. As no mention is made of sacraments, we are warranted in believing that whoso thus comes to Christ and believes on Him, will be saved, whether such a one has observed any of the sacraments or not; for as the Bible is a guide-book—pointing out the way to heaven—a revelation made by infinite wisdom, is it credible, if the sacraments are needful to salvation, that the God of boundless wisdom would not have made it known to us in plain terms, in a revelation which He has given us for the express purpose of teaching us what is essential to salvation? In Matt. v. 3, 8, 10—12, the present and eternal blessedness of certain characters is affirmed too plainly and positively to admit of the thought that they cannot be saved unless they have attended to some one or more of the sacraments. Of the *poor in spirit* it is positively affirmed that the kingdom of heaven is theirs. Concerning the *pure in heart* we have the unqualified declaration that they *shall see God*. Of *those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake*, Christ declares that the kingdom of heaven is theirs; and He yet again affirms of those who are persecuted for His sake, that great is their reward in heaven. Not the obscurest intimation is given that such cannot be saved unless they shall have observed some of the sacraments.

We now take notice of what the Scriptures teach respecting each of the sacraments.

1. *Baptism*.—Respecting this sacrament the Scriptures show us that when John preached in the wilderness of Judea, he baptized in the Jordan such as confessed their sins. John was so far from teaching his audiences that baptism was necessary to salvation, that he objected to baptizing the Pharisees and Sadducees, on the ground that they did not bring forth fruits meet for repentance; whereas if baptism—a merely external act, and so easy of being performed—had been essential to salvation, would not John have enforced its necessity? and how could he be a faithful preacher if he neglected to show that there could be no salvation without it?

The Scriptures likewise show us, that when Christ had risen from the dead, He commanded His disciples to go and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; but we are not told that Christ commanded them to teach that baptism was essential to salvation. The Scriptures also tell us that the apostles and other preachers of the gospel enjoined baptism on those who were converted. But Philip was so far from preaching that salvation was impossible without baptism, that when the eunuch inquired what there was to hinder his beir

baptized, Philip gave him to understand that he had no right to baptism unless with all his heart he believed; and not till he had received the eunuch's confession of faith did Philip baptize him. Peter, too, when preaching in the house of Cornelius, spoke of the receiving of the Holy Ghost by his hearers, as fitting them for baptism; and thus implying that without the receiving of that great gift they would not have been qualified for baptism. Thus he was far from enforcing it as requisite to salvation. St. Paul (1 Cor. i 17) affirms, "Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach;" and at ver. 14 he exclaims, "I thank God that I baptized none of you but Crispus and Gaius." Would he have done so if the sacrament of baptism had been essential to salvation? Besides, he expressly says of the rite of which baptism was the antitype, "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God," (1 Cor. viii. 19).

The only portions of Scripture which we can conceive of as being interpreted to signify that baptism is essential to salvation are Mark xvi. 16; Acts ii. 38; and 1 Pet. iii. 21. But these scriptures do not really teach that baptism is necessary to salvation. Let us examine each of them.

In Mark xvi. 16 we find the Lord declaring that he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. In the same verse we have the Lord's declaration that he that believeth not shall be damned; but He does not say that he who is not baptized shall be damned. If baptism be essential to salvation why is it in the former clause of the verse named in connection with believing, while in the latter clause of the same verse the neglect of baptism is not mentioned in connection with not believing? The words "he that believeth and is baptized" show that believing should precede baptism; and also that baptism should follow faith as a public profession of that faith. They also plainly declare that not all who are baptized shall be saved, but only those who believe as well. The solemn declaration, "he that believeth not shall be damned," plainly shows that without faith there can be no salvation for any, whether they be baptized or not, and conclusively proves that there is nothing saving in baptism. If there were, how could the absence of faith in the baptized be invariably followed by damnation?

In Acts ii. we have an account of Peter preaching on the day of Pentecost. A divine blessing attended his preaching when the converted inquired, "What shall we do?" by that inquiry doubtless signifying what shall we do that we may be saved? Peter said unto them, "Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." We have already shown that the Scriptures teach the necessity of repentance to salvation, but does Peter join baptism therewith, because it also is essential to salvation? Is it not rather set forth, as in the words of Christ which we have already noticed, as the evidence and public profession of faith and

repentance? As we have before remarked, baptism is enjoined on those who believe as a public profession of their faith, and without faith there can be no true repentance, for how can a man repent of his sins unless he has first believed those things to be sins? Peter therefore preaches the necessity of repentance, and enjoins baptism as the evidence and public profession of it. But does he not say, "Repent and be baptized *for the remission of sins*"? He does. But did he intend to signify that the remission of sins could be obtained by baptism? Did he even intend to signify that such remission could be procured by repentance? Repentance for sin is essential to salvation, because without it none would be fit for heaven, but it does not procure salvation. If our repentance could obtain salvation, where was the need for the blood of Christ to be shed to obtain it for us? And if repentance does not procure salvation, can baptism do so? Why, then, did Peter exhort to repentance and baptism for the remission of sins, but that those who were converted might have in their own souls the sense and enjoyment of the remission of sins which they could not have without repentance, for such a blessing is bestowed only on the penitent; and also that by their repentance and baptism they might be evidenced to others as those who possessed the remission of sins?

In 1 Peter iii. 21 we read, "The like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God) by the resurrection of Jesus Christ." Here Peter speaks of baptism as a figure, and says it saves us. But how? "*By the resurrection of Jesus Christ.*" Baptism is a figure, and only a figure. It saves not really, but figuratively, as the ceremonies and purifications of the Levitical law cleansed from sin, not really, but only in a figure. Thus baptism is a figure of that which saves, even the resurrection of Jesus Christ. In baptism there is figuratively both a burial and a resurrection; thus it is a type of the death and resurrection of Christ, by which we are saved. And Peter expressly declares that it does not put away the filth of the flesh or cleanse from sin; consequently it has no saving efficacy.

2. *Confirmation.*—The only confirmation of persons which we read of in the New Testament is a confirmation of believers in their faith in the doctrines of Scripture, so that their faith became settled and established; as at Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch, the disciples were confirmed by Paul and Barnabas (Acts xiv. 21, 22.) We never read in the New Testament that the persons confirmed ratified any promise which had been made for them by others; neither have we any reason to believe that either the apostles or any other persons laid hands on those who were confirmed. We may safely challenge all to find any instance in the Scriptures of such a confirmation as is practised in the Church of England, and the endeavour to find it would assuredly prove an everlasting task. The confirmation effected by the apostles was what none could come at by presenting themselves before an apos'

or a bishop, nor could the apostles confer it as they pleased, as bishops in the Church of England confer another kind of confirmation, for it was a spiritual gift, bestowed through the divine blessing on the preaching of the apostles, and this confirmation was not, nor is it now, essential to salvation. The thief who was crucified with Christ was brought to believe, and he went to heaven immediately afterwards, without having received or having needed any confirmation of his faith; and doubtless others have died and gone to heaven as speedily after being made believers in Christ. We never read in the Scriptures—He that believeth and is confirmed hath everlasting life; neither—he that believeth not, and is not confirmed, shall be damned; but we read, “He that *believeth* on Me hath everlasting life,” and “He that *believeth not* shall be damned.”

3. *The Eucharist*.—The Scriptures teach respecting this sacrament that shortly before His crucifixion it was instituted by Christ, who broke bread, and gave it to His disciples to eat; He also gave them to drink of the fruit of the vine. The apostles, with those who believed in Christ, continued to partake, at frequent intervals, of this ordinance; and the apostle Paul, when writing to the Corinthians, enforces it on them, for the purpose of showing forth the Lord's death, for which end Christ instituted it; but not the faintest intimation is in any part of Scripture given of the necessity of the eucharist to salvation, and we are utterly at a loss to know on what text any one can build who holds that this sacrament is essential thereto.

4. *Penance*.—What is penance? It is suffering for sin, either voluntarily undergone or imposed by authority. But where in the Scriptures is any such penance enjoined on any individual? Of whatever particular nature the penance may be, whether flagellations, the wearing of horsehair next the person, the cutting off the hair almost to the roots, or, as has been frequent in Spain, the scrupulous avoidance of soap and water, the practice has no authority in the word of God. Let it be remembered that penances are not repentance. The latter is essential to salvation, but it is a grace of the Spirit, and consists in grief for sin, from a discovery of its offensiveness to God; whereas penances may be undergone to any extent or degree without this *feeling* of sorrow for sin. Repentance differs from penance in that it cannot be produced by an act of the will, as a person can will to do penance, and also in that it is an inward feeling, not a mere outward act. True repentance will necessarily manifest itself by leading us to forsake the sins which are repented of, but penances God does not require, neither has He given to any one authority to impose them; and as they are practices the existence of which the Scriptures nowhere recognise, it is certain that those Scriptures give no evidence of their being necessary to salvation.

5. *Extreme Unction*.—This sacrament is a solemn anointing of a person who is believed to be at the point of death. The only

scriptures which we can discover to afford even the shadow of a warrant for such a practice are Mark vi. 13 and James v. 14, 15. But do these scriptures really furnish any authority for the practice at the present time of anointing the sick with oil? and yet more, do they in the remotest manner intimate that any anointing with oil is either essential to salvation, or of saving efficacy? Let us briefly notice these scriptures. Mark (vi. 13) tells us of the apostles, that "they cast out many devils, and anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them." Here let us remark, 1, that it was the *apostles* who anointed with oil, and their healing the sick by this means is spoken of in connection with their power of casting out devils, and this power was conferred upon them by Jesus Christ. See Mark vi. 7 and Luke ix. 1, 2. But has there, since the days of the apostles, been any person possessed of the power of casting out devils, and of healing sicknesses by *miraculous* means? Were not the apostles *extraordinary* persons, and have not their office and the extraordinary power which was conferred upon them ceased? 2. The apostles did not anoint with oil for the benefit of the souls of the anointed, but for the recovery of their bodily health. 3. They did not always make use of *that* for this purpose. Sometimes only words were spoken, at others merely the hands were laid on the sick, sometimes merely the shadow of Peter was productive of healing, and at other times handkerchiefs and aprons from the person of Paul had the same effect; thus showing that the healing virtue was not in the means, and that it was not confined to either anointing with oil, or to any other special instrumentality. In Jas. v. 14, 15, we read, "Is any sick among you? let him call for the elders of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up, and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him." Here, again, it is clear that anointing with oil was directed to be used for the healing of bodily sickness, not for the salvation of the soul. Besides, even as regards recovery from bodily sickness, James does not say the anointing with oil shall save the sick, but he does say, "The prayer of faith shall save the sick," thus clearly attributing greater efficacy to the prayer of faith than to anointing with oil. As, then, the Scriptures furnish no authority for anointing with oil for the benefit of the soul, and give no instance of its being used for such a purpose, certain it is that they do not teach that any such unction is essential to salvation.

6 & 7. *Holy Orders and Matrimony*.—Even by our opponents these sacraments will not be maintained to be essential to salvation, there is therefore no need for us to attempt to prove that salvation is obtainable without them.

II. The Scriptures furnish instances of individuals who have been saved without the sacraments. Baptism and the Lord's Supper were not instituted previously to the New Testament dispensation, yet even our opponents must admit that persons were saved bef-

the commencement of that dispensation. And were they not saved in precisely the same way as that in which men are now saved? Has there ever been more than one way of salvation? Is not everything requisite to salvation now, that was requisite to it in the days of Abraham or of Isaiah? And was not everything essential to salvation then that is requisite to it now? Has any alteration ever taken place in what is needful to fit men for heaven? and if there has, when did that alteration take place, and in what part of the Bible have we any information respecting it? It cannot be proved that the sacraments are essential to salvation unless it be first shown that the way of salvation is not the same now as it was when Moses and David were saved. But to come to New Testament times; the thief who was saved on the cross died without observing any of the sacraments; yet he was assured by Christ himself that he should be *that day with Him in Paradise*. One instance of salvation without the sacraments is proof sufficient that they are not necessary to salvation, and as the Scriptures never teach that salvation is not obtainable without them, though they do teach that there are certain things without which it is not obtainable; and as it is easy to adduce instances of individuals who are declared by the Bible to have been saved though they never observed the sacraments, we maintain that the sacraments are *not* essential to salvation.

S. S.

National Education.

OUGHT EDUCATION TO BE SETTLED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LEAGUE OR THE UNION?

THE LEAGUE.—II.

In this article we purpose answering such *arguments* as have been brought forward by M. T. in support of the Union and against the League. We must, therefore, pass over the first page and a half of that gentleman's article, for it cannot be said to contain any argument at all, being simply an attack upon the *motives* of those who support the League. Were we so inclined, we could easily retaliate by ascribing improper motives to such as favour the Union. But the plainest rules of courtesy and common sense forbid this; and even if they did not, we can afford neither time nor space for indulging in the luxury of calumniating our opponents. We feel sure that it is not necessary to reply to M. T.'s attack, and defend the motives of the League, for we are confident that every fair and reasonable supporter of the Union believes the advocates of the League to be actuated by the same motive as

himself, viz., an earnest and pure desire to promote that scheme of national education which shall prove the most effective, and confer the greatest benefits on the ignorant. We will therefore content ourselves with quoting a few words from "The Young Debater," which we seriously commend to the attention of M. T. :—

"Our business is, not what are the motives of the man, but are his assertions true or false?—his reasoning valid or invalid? To intermix motives and opinions in one mass of verbiage is not argumentation—leads not to the elucidation of truth, but tends to introduce confusion and difficulty into our inquiries. . . . Diatribes volubly uttered, in well-rounded phraseology, may deceive the vulgar, but cannot make men wiser, or impart more accurate opinions on any topic."

On page 24 M. T. says that the principles of the Union are superior to those of the League, because whilst the latter would "cast off," the latter would "utilize" presently existing schools. This, however, is a mistaken notion. So far from that are the intentions of the League, that it proposes to double the grants given to schools which now have, or are willing to adopt, a conscience clause. Mr. Dixon has well replied to this objection in his paper on "The Best System for National Schools." He says,—

"What the League proposes is this,—not to interfere with the existing system where it is effective. We don't wish to revolutionize the present schools; we don't wish to sap them away. What we do wish is this, that where voluntarism and denominationalism have failed the State should step in."

This is the real principle of the League. It will not "cast back the hand of munificence," as M. T. terms it. Its object is not to destroy but to supplement the existing system. As S. W. R. has stated, 7,406 parishes have schools aided by Government; but of 4,692 parish schools nothing whatever is officially known. Now, if we understand the principles of the League aright, it is principally in these 4,692 parishes that it proposes to carry out its scheme. The League does not advocate the erection and maintenance of schools in such parishes as already have a good school, the managers of which are willing to adopt a conscience clause; but that in those parishes that have not such a school, or, having it, the managers are *not* willing to adopt a conscience clause, a school should be built, and be supported by local rates and Government grants.

On page 25 M. T. says, "National Education may be quite as thoroughly given under the denominational system as under the secular method." We are, however, inclined to doubt this. "Betwixt two stools one falls to the ground," says the old proverb; and it appears to us that a teacher who attempts to impart both religious and secular instruction either divides his attention between the two, and thus teaches neither thoroughly, or he neglects one in order to teach the other efficiently. No teacher

can properly attend to both branches of education. He who can give his whole attention to secular education is far better able to perform his duties thoroughly than he who is obliged to divide his time and efforts between religious and secular instruction.

According to M. T., the Union would not attempt a direct system of compulsion, but would only allow parents to "profit by the labour of all educated children," i. e., we presume, would not allow uneducated children to work. As a supplementary mode of securing attendance we believe this might answer, but it would be very unwise to rely on it alone; for, by itself, such a scheme would not effect the desired object. There are thousands of "gutter children" who neither go to school nor work, whose parents have either deserted them or are in jail, and who have no one to care for them or to require them either to be instructed or employed. How would this indirect plan affect them? It certainly would not educate them. And even in large manufacturing towns where there are great inducements to send children to work too early, the plan of the Union would never be so thorough as that proposed by the League. We believe that if open direct compulsion were resorted to for a few years, we should soon require none at all. This has been the case with other countries where direct compulsion has been tried. The people have soon learnt to appreciate the advantages of education, and compulsion therefore was rendered unnecessary. Why should not the same result attend compulsory education in England?

We do not see, however, how the Unionists, if they recognise that conscience which, according to M. T., the "secularists" ignore, can even justify that indirect compulsion which they propose to add to the existing system of education. For the State could not, with justice, say to Dissenters, "If you do not send your child to an Episcopalian school" (where he would be taught religious doctrines abhorred by his parents), "you shall not profit by his labour." M. T. says, "The denominationalists propose a conscience clause." But are they all ready to adopt it? Are there not many parsons and others who would never consent to it? And what would be done in those parishes where they would not? Surely no child could be compelled to go to a school without a conscience clause? It would be grossly unjust to make him do so, and England would never sanction compulsion, either direct or indirect, in such a case. Practically, therefore, the system of compulsion proposed by the Union would never be of much use, at least under the denominational system; for it would necessarily be limited to such places as had schools willing to adopt a conscience clause. Moreover there are very many parishes in which there is no school at all approved by the Government, and it would be manifestly unfair and even ridiculous to punish parents for not sending their children to school when there is no proper school for them to attend. Hence, under the denominational system, compulsion would only be very partial in extent. Under the League

scheme, however, in every parish where a fit school does not exist, or, being in existence, will not adopt a conscience clause, an unsectarian school would be established and maintained; and thus compulsion would be rendered possible, not, as under the Union plan, in certain isolated places, but everywhere throughout the country. This we believe to be a strong argument in favour of the League, for we hold with S. W. R. that compulsion is right and necessary.

There are many other points to which we should like to refer, but this article is already so long that we must content ourselves with a few words on one which has provoked more discussion than any other. We allude to the question of religious education. The League proposes that where necessary schools shall be erected and maintained by rates and taxes, levied alike on people of all classes and all sects. It would not be fair, therefore, to devote any portion of the money thus raised to the furtherance of the doctrines of any one particular sect in preference to those of the others; and it would be impossible to teach the doctrines of all. Hence the League wisely proposes that national education should be purely unsectarian. Nor do we see any cause to regret this, but rather consider it an advantage; for we believe that it is more consistent with the teachings of the Bible, and better both for religion and the State, that they should be separated.

M. T. says, "The League denies the necessity of teaching religion," but he is mistaken. The League does not express any opinion as to the necessity of religious teaching, it only denies that it is the duty of the State to undertake it. Let religious instruction be left to parents, ministers, and Sunday school teachers—to those whose duty it is to give it. They will give it far purer, quicker, and more thoroughly than any State agency ever can. And why should the teaching of the "three Rs," with the addition, perhaps, of history and geography, be so much attacked by our opponents? Surely it will not make children infidels, but rather will it help them in after life better to discharge their duties as husbands, parents, and citizens.

We should like further to ask, what sort of religious training do children really receive in day-schools? It ought to be very precious, for M. T. devotes much space to attempts at proving its importance. In point of fact, however, it is little more than reading the Bible, and few if any attempts are ever made to expound or moralize on what is read. A Government inspector of schools has thus described the religious education given in denominational schools:—"Their (the children's) attention is solely directed to the events of the story (if I may so call it) which is the subject of the lesson; and even when the questions do aim at pointing a moral, it is pointed for the particular case, without any attempt being made to extend its application. The answers of the children seem to prove that they only repeat parrot-like what is ringing in their ears, and that as far as any moral lesson goes they might as well be answering in 'Jack the Giant-killer.'"

This is the sort of religious training to which the Unionists attach so much importance. Instead of tending to imbue the minds of the children with reverence for and an interest in God's word, it degrades it in their minds to the level of a mere lesson-book. They regard the Bible as they would a grammar or a history, and are led to think of scriptural knowledge as a thing only to be remembered in order to answer a teacher. Surely children had better receive no religious training at schools than receive such as this. With Mr. Miall we are inclined to think that even the League does not go far enough when it proposes to allow the Bible to be read in national schools "without note or comment;" but that it would be better not to use the Bible at all in such schools. It is in this way alone that the deplorable results we have just mentioned can be entirely avoided.

The great question to be decided really is this,—What is to be done in those parishes where voluntaryism has failed to supply the means whereby the children of the poor may be educated? The Unionist would say, "Wait, and they will all be supplied in time by voluntary effort." In time! But how long a time? Denominationalism has long ago proved insufficient to meet the public demands. Why then delay longer? We have already waited too long in the vain hope that voluntary effort would be able to furnish the schools we so much need. And whilst we have thus been vainly waiting, other nations, more alive to the importance of education, have adopted systems supported, as our League proposes, by rates and taxes, and we are left far behind them in education. We cannot then afford to wait longer. We want a system of education which does not depend on the uncertain and tardy aid afforded by voluntaryism for its efficiency, but which shall be at once thorough and permanent. And even if we could wait for voluntaryism to supply the schools we require, is it reasonable to suppose that it could ever establish a *complete* system of education? *i.e.*, would it establish a school, as the League proposes, in *every* parish where it is required? Surely not. Its most sanguine friends cannot expect that it will. There are many places that never will or can raise that portion of the cost which the Government requires to be collected before it will grant any aid, and under the existing voluntary system these would never have any school at all. This is why we object to the plan proposed by the Union. It must fail in the poorest districts, where education is most urgently required. We would not disparage the denominational system. It has done much for England. But when it asks, as it now does through the Union, that all it cannot educate shall remain ignorant, we say that the demand is unreasonable and improper. We cannot sacrifice the education of thousands as an offering at the shrine of voluntaryism. We cannot allow vast masses of our people to grow up ignorant in order to gratify the prejudice and foibles of the Unionists, and allow them to have it all their own way. Voluntaryism has proved, and must ever prove, insufficient to accomplish the task of national

education. We want, therefore, a system which will do this great work *thoroughly* and *quickly*. This the League, and the League alone, offers. We therefore heartily support it, for we believe that if education is settled on its principles, England will obtain what she has so long and so urgently required, "a system which shall secure the education of every child in the country."

GEORGIUS.

THE LEAGUE.—III.

THE advocates of the League and the Union are, we think, agreed as to the great importance, and indeed the necessity, of universal education; they do so far agree, that every child in the kingdom shall receive a good primary education in reading, writing, and arithmetic; to this the Unionists want the teaching of a creed to be added.

The plan of the League is unsectarian, that of the Union is denominational; the League seeks to place education on a basis free from all sectarian animosity, the Union wishes to perpetuate and subsidize all sects. The League proposes to have a system of national rate schools free to all, the Union desires to have the present system of Privy Council grants extended; the League wants schools established by the nation, to teach the rising and future generations indisputable truths, truths upon which the people are agreed; the Union in addition wishes to have dogmatic theology taught, which may or may not be true. The League, by thus placing education on a foundation on which all are agreed, makes education strictly national; the Union, by preserving its denominational character, makes education sectional and sectarian, instead of national and Christian, each school being or becoming a centre of proselytization. That the present system of education has had a sufficiently long trial to justify us in saying that it has proved itself to be incapable of meeting the educational requirements of the nation, none, we venture to say, will deny. Such being the case, the sooner we get a superior system in its place the better, some system that *will* meet the wants of the present and future generations. That plan proposed by the National Education League will, we think, do this. Although, in order to prove its merits, we do not want any such lengthened trial as that which the present system has had.

"The National Educational League seems to us to wish to school men, to improve them as machinery; the National Education Union appears to wish to school men because they have high responsibilities and a lofty destiny." So says M. T. (page 23). Now to us it seems quite the reverse. The League in dealing with this, the religious element in education, says in effect, "They (the people) are not agreed as to which religion is true, and we (the League) will not teach what is untrue; and in order to do this, we will not teach any theological doctrine, although we will allow the Bible to be read in school. This, by leaving the child to decide

upon religious opinions when its reasoning powers are more developed and its judgment ripened, the child's conduct in life being influenced in the meantime by those who surround it, we consider is treating man as a rational being, and not as if he were a piece of machinery. Whereas the Union, by insisting on dogma being taught in school to every child, treats them as if their minds were to be the mere receptacles of dogmatic theology which afterwards they most likely will detest.

Religion being a thing of growth, we maintain that no amount of doctrine will ever make a child religious; hence it is useless to teach children dogmas for the purpose of making them religious, as it at best only makes them sectarians and schismatics, not Christians. It is owing to the high idea that the members of the League attach to the soul, that they will not mislead or misdirect it by having doctrine taught in their schools.

M. T., having previously implied (page 23) a selfish motive to the League, states (page 24) that the leaders of the League *are* animated by such a motive, and that by their acting from such a motive they provide a great argument against themselves."

We maintain that the facts of the case prove quite the reverse, that instead of being moved by a selfish motive, they are animated by a pure and holy motive—love for their fellow-men. The members of the League, seeing such an amount of ignorance and such a mass of corruption amongst the lower classes of society, which the present system of education has been unable to cope with, banded themselves together in order to do away with all this ignorance by agitating for the *establishment* of schools which shall be free to all, and for the purpose of carrying this out they have subscribed upwards of £50,000, and yet the League has been in existence a very short time. The present system has been in existence upwards of thirty years, and yet during that time it has done comparatively nothing. Certainly we acknowledge that it has done good, but we hold that there ought to be at the present time greater results by far from such a lengthened trial.

The members of the League consider that the State has nothing at all to do with the teaching of doctrine, and that it is not the duty of the schoolmaster to instruct the children in any creed; but that it is the duty of ministers and teachers of religion to instruct their respective congregations and classes in their own particular doctrines, their (the children's) conduct in life being formed by the practical and consistent conduct of their parents, teachers, and ministers.

Is it to be supposed for one moment that we, as Christians, can conscientiously pay for the support of those schools wherein it is taught that Jesus Christ is an impostor? or as Protestants can we with any degree of consistency pay towards the maintenance of those schools wherein is taught the infallibility of the Pope; or any other papal dogma; or yet as Dissenters can we with clear consciences promote the welfare of those schools wherein is taught the Athanasian Creed, or any other such damnable belief?

It is asserted by M. T. (page 24) that "the League proposes to cast off as worthless, useless, and, in fact, injurious, all those schools which have been in past times the only means of spreading the light of education." Such is *not* the case, for at the Educational Conference held in Newcastle, the President of the League (Mr. George Dixon, M.P.), after giving a sketch of the principles of the League, went on to say, "This is our system, and under it the people will find that they will have two great divisions of schools in the country. The existing denominational schools, and in those districts where now there are no schools at all, and only in those districts will there be what I call national rate schools, new schools built by the local authorities, that shall give facilities to existing schools to convert themselves into national rate schools. But this conversion will be entirely voluntary on their part. Now these schools will receive the same amount of grant from the Government, but the national rate schools will provide the remaining one-third out of the rates, and with that will go the duty of managing the schools. The denominational schools, in like manner, will provide one-third, and along with that will go the privilege of continuing to manage their schools." And speaking of education being gratuitous,—"Well, then, the League meets that in this way. It says, 'We will make it free to them all.' We cannot make it free in the present denominational schools, because we are not going to touch them, we do not wish to interfere with them."

M. T. will see from this that there is plenty of scope for voluntarism, that the charity of certain individuals needs not be withheld, that the liberal and benevolent feelings of the munificent patrons of education need not lie dormant, so as to keep the schools of the Union on a par with those of the League.

No amount of patchwork can ever make the Union scheme good or satisfactory; its *principle* must undergo an entire change before it can merit our confidence or our support. NEANIAS.

THE UNION.—II.

"I understand by education that which embraces the culture of the whole man with all his faculties, subjecting his feelings, his understanding, and his passions to reason, to conscience, and the evangelical laws of divine revelation."—*De Fellenberg*.

"I would at least have people taught, in the name of Christ, that sorrow and self-denial are necessary conditions of present life: a national education, which gives a nation neither religion nor morality, nor civil liberty, nor political liberty, is an education not worth having."—*Thiers*.

"WISDOM is the principal thing, *therefore* get wisdom; and with all thy getting, get understanding." These words of Solomon contain the principles on which I shall ground my arguments. Religion is the bond which unites man to God; it inculcates godliness, piety, and virtue; it teaches us to perform those duties which we owe directly to God our heavenly Father and only true Guide

of our youth, with humility and obedience to His will; and highest of all, it proclaims the glorious tidings of salvation through the death of our Saviour for us. "Religion," says Solomon, under the figure of wisdom, "is the principal thing;" whether we be educated or have understanding, it is essential to our present and our everlasting welfare that we have true religion, that we know God; "therefore get wisdom," which, the inspired author of Proverbs still further states, "leads in the way of righteousness," and "is better than rubies, and all things that may be desired are not to be compared to it."

Although I take my stand under the banner of the Union, I do so only inasmuch as it upholds religion as its chief feature in education. Both the League and the Union have the same object in view, i. e., the national education of the people—an education that not only shall be for the *middle classes*, but for the children of the poorest in this land.

It is with a deep feeling of their responsibilities as regards the position, character, and intellectual capabilities of the next generation, as well as the children of the present, that the members of these respective societies put forth their theories and plans for the furtherance of this noble and loving work. Both these societies number among its members men of the highest intellectual powers, men who have made this important subject their study, and men holding high positions in the Church and in the educational departments of this country.

It will therefore not become us as impartial critics, who are sitting as it were in judgment on the respective merits or demerits of the League and the Union as being most suitable as a national education scheme, to maintain, as our friend M. T. has done, that the League has a "selfish motive," consequently is not worthy of our consideration, but rather may *we* "prove all things, and hold fast that which is good," whether it be in the League or the Union.

The policy of the Union, as well as the League, has several important objections, which, I believe, are very prevalent, so much so that I think the Government Bill, whenever it may be introduced into Parliament, will be, or ought to be, based on the leading principles of both societies, viz., the utilizing of the existing schools by the building of "Free and Unsectarian Government Schools" in the different parishes as needed, so as to bring a good education within the reach of all.

Denominationalism, as held by the Union, has signally failed as a universal education scheme; it has not reached the masses. This may be through trusting in voluntary support, or through the lack of Christian charity in the different sects towards each other, or even the Government grants may be insufficient; but from whatever cause this may arise, it is evident that there is a something additional needed to make this a great national education system. Some would have a compulsory clause added thereto, so that parents or guardians would be bound to have the children under a

certain age educated; but this will necessitate, if the Union is conscientious and maintains the denominational system, the building of schools for every sect that may make a demand, consequently this will be much at variance with political economy, especially in these days of "reform," "economy," and "retrenchment."

Denominationalism might work very well on the whole in large towns, but how about the *villages*? How many schools would the Government be prepared to give grants to, or even build in a village of seven hundred inhabitants, containing families belonging to the different sections of the Church, such as the Establishment, Roman Catholic, Wesleyan, Baptist, Independent, Primitive Methodist, &c.?

Multiplicity of the different schools in villages, even though it fulfilled the mission of the Union, inasmuch as religion was upheld, and that every parent might have his children taught in his views, creed, or belief, and every church in this land have the special charge of the "lambs of the flock," could not be carried out to meet the requirements of the age, could never educate the children of the poor for nothing, without those very heavy burdens, which are not very light at the present time—*taxes*. Of course I am not going to maintain that we can have a "national education scheme," without taxes; certainly not. Still, to have one unsectarian school built in the place of six sectarian schools would be an advantage, as it would cost less to build, be economical in its maintenance, and would greatly *reduce taxes*—the "poor man's load."

The denominational system of education has another general objection. The Roman Catholics are warm adherents to denominationalism; and if the principles of the Union, in all its bearings, should be adopted, what is to save Ireland? If England has it, the Roman Catholics know full well it will be of the greatest importance to them that Ireland should have the same. Denominationalism in Ireland would hand over the education of Irish children almost entirely to Roman Catholic priests,—a scheme which, I believe, would be protested against by every Protestant and Constitutionalist in the United Kingdom.

The League, knowing the above popular objections to the Union, has, evidently with a warm and ardent desire to educate all classes *free*, proposed sweeping measures, laughed at the objections to the Union instead of reforming them; cast religion aside, calling it "bigoted sectarianism," a "stumbling-block" to education, "Churchism," and that schools "are not for the inculcation of doctrines," forgetting that religion with every Christian is placed first, and is his *daily* light in life throughout his earthly pilgrimage to heaven.

If a sound knowledge of the Scriptures is not implanted in a child in his youth; if he has not been impressed with a religious and moral education when young, or if he be not taught, or at least kept in remembrance of the principles of Protestantism at

school, when will he, I ask the advocates of the League, be taught the saving knowledge of Christianity?

True, we have Sunday schools; but that is a *one day* religious system, if we leave the teaching of religion to the Sunday schools. If we allow it to be a *one day in seven* religion, I am inclined to believe that it will be one of the greatest national sins against God that this country has committed. Few, alas! even at present, are those children of our Sabbath schools who have become members of our churches; and if religious instruction should be *given up* in our day schools, I have no doubt the numbers will be less. Both the League and the Union very properly advocate "compulsory education." When every child is compelled to be sent to school, where will there be Sunday schools sufficient to teach religious instruction? There are not sufficient at present; every Sunday school report refers to the thousands of children in their neighbourhood not receiving any knowledge of the God who made them and the Saviour who died to redeem them. "Parents ought to give their children religious instruction." This may be all very fine in theory, but it will not do for us to rely on what *ought to be done* when we find *what is done*. How many parents in this Christian land give their children a religious education? There are many parents of the poorer classes who have not received a religious instruction themselves. Parents "*ought*" to give their children a sound and useful education. True, they *ought to* do so, but has it *been done*? In fact, the unanimous opinion that there needs a reform in education, and that it must be *compulsory*, proves that it *has not* been carried out by the parents. If, then, the secular education of a large number of our children has been neglected, and it has been considered necessary for the State to take the matter in hand, with authority to compel parents to send these poor neglected children, and in some cases "street Arabs," to school, is it not right on the part of a Christian and Protestant Government, seeing that a *compulsory* act relating to religious training would interfere with the liberties and consciences of Englishmen, to establish schools, or at least aid schools, where a sound religious education may be had? If we, as a Christian nation, *give up* religious instruction in our day-schools, we shall be neglecting the only sound cultivation of *virtue and equity*, and pull down a barrier against vice and iniquity. Mental education *minus* religion will not be very strengthening to the moral character of the child. Besides, if Governments ignore religion, what will induce men to observe it with such an example before them?

Seeing, then, the general objections to the principles of the League and Union, I think it would be expedient, as well as a quick, economical, and practical scheme, for the Government to establish free Government schools, on the principles of the League, in towns, villages, and districts, in addition to those already existing. This plan would meet the wishes and requirements of all parties, whether of the Union or League. We should have good

religious and mental education in our denominational schools, and a serviceable secular, unsectarian training in our Government free schools. This plan also would have the following advantages :—

1. It utilizes the existing schools, which would be of great importance, especially to our *middle* classes.

2. It supplements the denominational schools, where defective, by the building of free schools, by this means reaching to the wants of the poorer classes.

3. Parents have the option of sending their children either to denominational or free Government schools.

4. The present schools being *still* aided by Government grants, we retain establishments, *instead of setting them aside*, for Sunday schools.

5. The dream or prophetic sentiment of the poet Wordsworth will be fulfilled,—

“ Oh for the coming of that glorious time,
When, prizing knowledge as her noblest wealth
And best protection, this imperial realm,
While she exacts allegiance, shall admit
An obligation, on her part, to *teach*
Them who are born to serve her and obey ;
Binding herself, by statute, to secure
For all the children whom her soil maintains,
The rudiments of letters, and to inform
The mind with moral and religious truth !”

CONSERVATIVE.

THE UNION.—III.

GRATITUDE has been ironically defined 'to be "a lively sense of favours to come," implying that men are too often exceedingly ready to be forgetful of past favours. The League has in a most unjustifiable manner depreciated the results of voluntarism, and has very quietly ignored the fact, that without these much-vilified schools in which denominationalism has been very partially taught there would have been an almost entire destitution of the means of education in the country, and that without the smaller results of voluntarism, that very public opinion to which they now appeal, and on the force of which they rely, would not have existed or been possible. By far the larger proportion of the education which has been provided in England has been the gift of the piety of our forefathers, or the donation of the munificence and Christian compassion of those who were animated by religious feeling. It is unfair and unwise to depreciate and undervalue, to despise and decry, what has been accomplished by denominationalism, when nationalism can show so little, and Leagueism can show so much less.

Prior to 1839, all the education that the country had an opportunity of receiving was provided on the voluntary principle, as a work of Christian charity and zeal for good works. Only for thirty years has Government been recognising the education of the

people as a duty; and so slight was its estimate of that duty, that it commenced then with a grant of £20,000. This Governmental aid afforded to the cause of education had increased in 1868 to £484,000, but this includes the whole expense of the Department of Education, and does not represent the sum which issues thence in grants to promote, elevate, and insure education. This seems to be a large sum, and figures as a strong argument in favour of the League. Now if this is a mighty irrefragable argument in favour of Governmental force and State interference in the cause of education as advocated by the League, it is a far weightier fact in favour of the principles of the Union. For, be it observed, the whole of this parliamentary grant is given with a pre-condition, and is proportioned to the manner in and the amount to which that prerequisite is supplemented. Well, this mighty Government of Great Britain and Ireland provides from its income of £79,000,000 an educational grant of £484,000, and is lauded for its liberality and enterprise; while 194,745 persons having at heart the education of the country, and under no other obligation than their own sense of duty, in addition to the gratuitous performance of all local duties connected with the schools, provided £492,941, for education by that voluntary effort which is so despised and contemned by the League.

Nor is this the full extent of voluntary effort, for the Committee of Council only takes note of the income from voluntary sources, which fits schools for becoming recipients of grants in aid, while much voluntary effort is made where, with the conditions attached to the grants, no aid can be attained; and there are many voluntary agencies set on foot for the promotion of education in which personal labour and effort are the outlay—labour and effort which, though not reducible to any pounds, shillings, and pence standard, yet have their effect in the diminution of ignorance and the prevention of crime. Even this is not all; for in addition to the sum of nearly half a million already mentioned as the gift of voluntaryism to co-operate with Government, £144,547 were expended in building schools in fulfilment of the pre-conditions of receiving any grant. The League boasts itself of its £50,000 subscribed for *agitation*, but voluntaryism might boast of its £500,000 subscribed for *doing the work*; only that it prefers, unless compelled for the removal of misrepresentation, to obey the maxim, "Let another praise thee, and not thine own mouth." In the race of Government *versus* Voluntaryism in the promotion of education, voluntaryism is far ahead, despite the League against it. Then the League despises the school pence of the children, and thinks that it is degrading to allow the itching palm of school boards or teachers to be contaminated with these base payments. They will have free schools, not fee schools. Let us see what statistics say to this. Government provides £484,000, and is praised; but the insignificant sum arising from school pence, which the League regards as of no consequence, only provides £508,772! In the face of these facts the League

affirms that Government is the only efficient and trustworthy agency, and that we should agitate to get education completely and universally put under its supervision. Let us throw away our crutches, voluntarism and school pence, and pursue our way on the sure legs of Government and police! Let us continue the argument by one other observation. Government was stirred up to its work in 1839 by denominationalism, and it is voluntary effort which has pulled it grudgingly forward from year to year. Voluntarism has been, in fact, the *primum mobile* in education, while Government aid, compelled by its own meanness to follow, "that, like a wounded snake, drags its slow length along," only advancing, and that reluctantly, as voluntarism pulls it forward by its free motions. These are not vague and random rhetorical figures, they are the very figures of solid fact, and the League ought to consider them well, and improve the hint they give.

The League advocates not only a politic and polite, but a police compulsion. We all know—and those know it best who have tested the fact in their hour of need—the efficacy of the police. Under the perfect, unrelaxing, and all-prevailing vigilance of the police, property and life and limb are perfectly safe. No murderers exist who are not found out and brought to the end of that line of life; no burglars make off with their booty and escape detection; no conspirators are guilty of Broadheadism on whom they do not lay their hands; no thieves acquire mastery of their art and of other people's property along our streets; and upon them garotting is impossible, and assault a thing unknown. Therefore great is the power of the policeman; and if besides doing all these things so well for the ratepayers, he puts forth his strength and vigilance for the prevention of ignorance with equal efficiency, we shall soon be able to say of ignorance as we can now surely say of crime, Where is it to be found, and in what corner of the land does it dare to show its hateful mien? During the day the omnipotent and omnipresent policeman will crimp the imps who seek to shirk school, and during the night he will keep guard against those who seek to crimp the lieges into dens of vice; and as occasional diversions among his serious pursuits, he will see to the observance of the Contagious Diseases Act, the proper government and regulation of the licensed houses of public entertainment, and the unlicensed houses of private entertainment, the protection of life, limb, property, and peace. So beleaguered, crime, ignorance, and disease must hide their diminished heads, and find their "occupation gone," and, the only outcasts in reformed social life, sing dolefully, We've got no work to do! I have more faith in the union of Christian voluntarism and endeavour than in this League of police and secular education.

But the League has its *ultima ratio*—rates. We have seen in the preceding paragraph the efficacy of police-rates, and we may take as another analogy the efficacy of poor-rates. By the Poor Law Bill we have workhouses built which are always

willingly filled, "and the poor have ceased from the land." So when by the League Bill we have schools built by rates, we shall have them always filled, and "ignorance shall cease in the land."

I do not approve of the divorce of education and religion; I do not believe the police to be the best schoolmasters; I do not believe in the fiscal worthlessness of school pence and voluntarism, I do not feel a perfect faith in the unfailing efficacy of rates; and hence I approve of the Union, and disapprove of the League.

M. E.

ROBERT BURNS.—I am quite unable to join in the notion that Burns was unfortunate; on the contrary, I think that in his life, and the results of it, he was specially fortunate; and I cannot doubt that if he could enter into a compact with Fate to live over again, he would not desire another course of life than that to which he was appointed from the beginning. I think he was fortunate in his father—sagacious, severe, irascible, religious, the high-priest of "The Cottar's Saturday Night;" that he was fortunate in his mother, so kindly, shrewd, and affectionate; and that he was fortunate in being born among the only race on the face of the earth, or that has ever been on it, that could have afforded materials for his poetry, and encouraged and cheered him on in the production of it—the industrious, humorous, superstitious, virtuous, inquiring, speculating, mirth-loving, God-fearing lowland Scotch. He could not have transmuted the experiences of the poor into poetry if he had not shared them. He could not have found the themes for his serious poetry, nor for his satires, except among the descendants of the Covenanters—their true descendants being among the best of men, and their false being among the worst—for it required a giant effort of hypocrisy to counterfeit the faith of those who cherished it, not as a code of barren dogmas, but as a possession secured to them by their forefathers' blood, as a creed to be resolutely lived by, and, if need were, died for. I think he was fortunate in his patrons, at least as fortunate as any man of genius ever was and is likely ever to be. They were not all like the patrons figured in Dr. Johnson's gruff letter to Chesterfield, written four years before Burns saw the light, that patron who sees a man struggling for life in the water, and when he has reached the ground encumbered him with help. They did not help him much, they could not if they would. But they helped him as far as his proud spirit would permit, and in so far as help is good for any true, brave man, who is cast by destiny not upon a bed of down, but upon the rocks, and whose life problem is to—

"Breast the billows
And grapple with his evil star."

James Ballantine.

Greek Days and Roman Nights.

No. I.—PLATO'S "PHAEDO."

INTRODUCTION.

"Across the night of paganism, Philosophy flitted on, like the lantern-fly of the tropics, a light to itself, and an ornament—but, alas! no more than an ornament—of the surrounding darkness."—*Coleridge*.

"Plato was a happy and beneficent spirit, sent into this world to sojourn in it for a season. He did not seek so much to make himself profoundly acquainted with it, as to communicate with gracefulness those treasures of wisdom of which mankind stood very much in need. He penetrated into the abyss of speculation, more from the lofty grandeur of his nature than from any vain delight in abstract thought. He took his flight to celestial regions, his soul glowing with desire to participate again in its divine nature. Everything he said had relation to the good, the beautiful, and the immutably true, and he ardently longed to inspire those who heard him with the same lofty and ennobling sentiments."—*Goethe*.

In a well-known story, told by Diogenes Laertius, it is related that one of the Lectures on the Soul which Plato was delivering was felt to be so irremediably dull, that the audience, which had assembled in the pleasant gardens of *Academeia* to listen to the wisdom of the master on that occasion, melted gradually away, until at last only one indomitable auditor—Aristotle—heard it to the close. Dr. E. Alberti, of Kiel, believes that the composition which led to the dispersion of that student assembly was the *Phaedo* of the great academician. A tradition, equally current, tells us that an Ambraciot thinker, on reading the *Phaedo*, was so enraptured with its picture of the supernal joys of the future life, that, in his eagerness to be made a partaker of the happiness promised to the soul hereafter, heedless of the warning against such a course given by Socrates in the Dialogue, he rushed headlong to a suicide's death, and has since been notable as—

"He who, to enjoy
Plato's elysium, leaped into the sea—
Cleombrotus."

These two incidents show the wide extremes to which criticism can diverge on a topic where disturbing moral elements enter into activity to influence, and so unbalance, the pure judgment of the mere intellect. We neither countersign the scornful estimate of Dr. Alberti nor admire the frantic enthusiasm of the Ambraciot, but we agree with the learned Greek professor in the University of Aberdeen—W. D. Geddes—in considering the *Platonis Phaedo* as "the most memorable monument of thought in the history of philosophy." It is, to our thinking, the grandest unaided human attempt—

"To look
Out on the vast of darkness, undismayed,
Which circumscribes this habitable globe."

and, by the subtlety of mere thought, to form some envisagement of what lies beyond the "black concavity without," while man stands—

"Before that curtain of obdurate woof
Which limits mortal vision, whose dim folds
Perpetually do stir, but never rise."

to show mankind the drama of futurity "o' the other side."

Aristotle said that Plato's works were a sort of complex hybrid between poetry and prose. His Dialogues, indeed, are philosophic dramas, in which the evolution of thought holds the place of the development of plot; in which the fable fulfils its artistic end of supplying interest and action, and the interlocutors of the dialogue afford opportunity for bringing into definiteness the very idea with which the purpose of Plato is informed. Hence his Dialogues not only possess a dramatic form, but their style displays a semi-poetical exaltation and rhythm, while they are composed with singular attention to the laws of unity which governed the ancient stage.

The great conquerors Time and Death excited many speculations among the thinkers of the old time. The terrible inevitableness of their power and the mystery of their action, the very commonplaceness of their influence and their effects, made them remarkable among the phenomena observed by man, and suggestive of the inquiry whether—

"His life is a watch or a vision
Between a sleep and a sleep."

Against death, as a final exodus from being, the soul revolted and rebelled. The continuous succession of generations, the everlasting procession of change, gave Life an apparent perennialness, an ever-recurring and renewing spontaneity of developable manifestation, involving—

"Obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from us, vanishings,
Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realized,
High instincts, before which our mortal nature
Doth tremble;"

for Death as surely comes "life's cherished fetters to unbind," to call the thinking spirit from this world of endeavour into the fearfully unknown deserts of eternity; and we shiver involuntarily at the brink of the unexplored immensity which seems to lie before us when the heart fails and the eye closes, the hand falls uselessly by the side, and the brain ceases to be "the dome of thought, the palace of the soul."

When man puts off this "muddy vesture of decay," does he say farewell to being as well as to earth? does he disappear into a great darkness of nonentity, or does his life survive the change produced at death, and move into new realms of consciousness, contemplation, and activity? These were speculations which stirred the Greek mind to a degree which we, who have a sort of traditionary notion of the soul's immortality, can scarcely even sympathize with. The very joy of living made the hunger and thirst of the spirit for knowledge or faith on this subject a passionate yearning and an irrepressible desire. Plato, the solemn, high-minded academician, put forth the utmost reach of his spirit in the attempt to pierce the "darkness infinite" of dreadful death, and to overcome "the palpable oppressions of despair" which crowd upon the hopeless soul on the margin of the drear abyss of futurity. To this we owe the wonderful "Fable of Er" with which "The Republic" closes, and the splendid moral argument which that superb parable is used to illustrate; but more than all to this insatiable earnestness of desire for continuous thoughtful life we owe the *Phaedo*, a dialogue of which Professor Geddes most correctly remarks that "it combines the perfection of style with the highest dignity of subject, the greatest grace of form with the greatest richness of matter."

"The doctrine of the immortality of the soul," says Professor J. S. Blackie, "is most fully set forth in the *Phaedo*—a dialogue which combines with the abstract philosophical discussion, a graphic narrative of the last hours of Socrates, which, for simple pathos and unaffected dignity, is unsurpassed by any human composition." It is perhaps unfortunate for the due appreciation of this famous production that it is not only usually printed, but also usually read, in conjunction with "The Apology of Socrates," which refers to the period of the trial of the great philosophic controversialist of Athens; and the "Crito," a discussion on the duties of citizenship, represented as having occurred two days before the execution of the sage, because this supplies a sketch of the day when the hemlock was taken. Schleiermacher gives some cogent reasons for believing that the supposed unity of this trilogy of dialogues originates in a mistake, and advocates its transfer from that connection to a place between the "Symposium" and the "Philebus." We agree, so far at least, with the German Platonist that the unity of this trilogy is not biographical but dramatic; and, whatever the place ultimately assigned to the *Phaedo*, by scholars, in the series of Plato's works, we believe that it will be granted that it is a distinct and independent member of that series, having a oneness of topic sufficient to justify its consideration as a striking philosophical drama. "Each of Plato's Dialogues," says Lord Lytton, "has more or less of the dramatic spirit; but the *Phaedo* is the most dramatic of all. It is a picture of extraordinary sweetness and grandeur, in which the figures are distinct and life-like" ("Miscellaneous Prose Works," vol. ii., p. 328).

Little service would be done here by criticising the opinions of

Bitter, Ast, Stallbaum, Socher, or Cousin, Janet, Lewes, and Grote, as much more pleasant and profitable occupation for us will be to acquire and communicate some general notion of the contents and characteristics of this famous treatise, which embalms for us such a delightful picture of calmness in death, such a fervour of intellectual hope, so much soul-charming philosophy concerning the superiority of the human spirit to decay, dissolution, or death; and so noble a series of reasonings regarding the future of man.

"Clothing the palpable and the familiar
With golden exhalations from the dawn."

To comprehend in some measure the excellency of this admirable prose drama of metaphysic thought it will be requisite that we should devote a few observations to (1) the *circumstances* in which the dialogue is reported to have arisen, (2) the scene of its reported occurrence, (3) the *dramatis personæ* who take part in it, (4) the *character* alluded to in it, (5) the argumentation employed, and (6) the peculiarities of and the noticeable elements in the matter of the dialogue; but we must introduce an analysis of the dialogue, after treating of the first four topics, in order that we may be able to gain the material for remark in regard to the remaining two subjects, which seem to us to require attention to make our notice of the first distinctly argumentative treatise on the immortality of our human spirit capable of giving even a shadowy hint of the merits of that flash of finite thought across the darkness of eternity.

1. *The Circumstances of the Phædo.*

Socrates had been charged before the Dikastery of Athens with (1) not worshipping the gods worshipped in the city, but introducing new gods; (2) corrupting the youths of the city. He had been found guilty, and the penalty pronounced was death. "Under ordinary circumstances Socrates would have drunk the cup of hemlock in the prison, on the day after his trial; but it so happened that the day of his sentence was immediately after that on which [the priest of Apollo having crowned its poop] the sacred ship started on its yearly ceremonial pilgrimage [in memory of the safety of Theseus and his companions from being devoured by the Minotaur] from Athens to Delos, for the [Delian] Festival of Apollo. Until the return of this vessel to Athens it was accounted unholy to put any person to death by public authority. Accordingly, Socrates remained in prison—and, we are pained to read, actually with chains on his legs—during the interval that this ship was absent, thirty days altogether. His friends and companions had free access to him, passing almost all their time with him in the prison; and Crito had even arranged a scheme for procuring his escape by a bribe to the gaoler. This scheme was only prevented from taking effect by the decided refusal of Socrates to become a party to any breach of the law." "His days were spent in the prison, in discourse

respecting ethical and human subjects, which had formed the charm and occupation of his previous life; it is to the last of these days that his conversation with Simmias, Cebes, and Phaedo, on the immortality of the soul, is referred in the Platonic dialogue *Phaedo*.^{*} On the day preceding the execution, the friends and companions of "the father of moral philosophy"—some Athenians, and some foreigners,—as they were leaving the prison in the evening, heard that the sacred ship had arrived from Delos, and they knew that the nightfall after that would bring to their master the hour of death. They accordingly resolved to be early at the prison-house next morning. At dawn they were there, mournful though not despondent, mingling their grief with a calm, sad, delicious joy; but they could not then be admitted, for the Eleven were unloosing the bands of the captive, and were giving directions for his execution in the evening. Shortly afterwards the door opens, the gaoler appears, they are admitted; and in the prison-cell they found Socrates sitting unbound, with his wife Xantippe by his side, holding his little boy in her embrace, and weeping. On seeing his friends she burst out into the reproachful vituperations and the sad bemoanings for which strong feminine emotion has a demand. Socrates, feeling that such a scene would unman him, kindly asked Crito to see to her being taken safely home. By Crito's orders, some of his servants led her away in a state of great excitement, being overcome with grief. Socrates, sitting on the couch which had for the previous thirty days been his resting-place, rubs his newly released limbs, smarting still from the galling fetters which had just been taken off, and looking round on his faithful friends, who would not desert him even in the hour and power of the law and of death, commences the conversation which constitutes the dialogue.

II. *The Scenery of the Phaedo.*

The scene of the prologue of the *Phaedo* is "the Grasmere of Greece." Phlius is the chief town of a small province in the north-east of the Peloponnesus. It occupied a hollow among the Arcadian hills, about 900 feet above the level of the sea, but the mountain-ranges around it tower upwards nearly four or five thousand feet, and in this seclusion, under the shadow of the immemorial hills, in the upper reaches of the valley of the Asopus, whose waters flow through the vine-clad slopes of Sicyonia into the Gulf of Corinth, the preliminary incident of or prelude to the dialogue occurs. Here *Phaedo*, having probably left Athens during the eclipse of philosophy consequent on the death of Socrates, meets Echechrates, a philosopher of the later school of the Pythagoreans, a native of Phlius, who knew *Phaedo* as an intimate friend of Socrates and Plato, as well as a fellow-seeker after wisdom. The conversation naturally turns on the recent loss sustained by philosophy in the demise of Socrates. Echechrates eagerly asks information, and

^{*} Grote's "History of Greece," vol. viii., p. 662.

Phaedo readily accedes to his request to give him full particulars; for "to recall Socrates to one's mind, whether by speaking of him one's self, or in listening to some one else, is always a matter of most exquisite delight." In the course of the narration the scene is changed, under the influence of sympathy, to the Athenian *Desmoterion*, or house of bondage. This prison was near the courts of justice—the *Areopagus*, or *Mars' Hill*, on which the court was held. It was situated on the north of the *Agora*, or market-place, the favourite resort for news, talk, and disputation. The *Acropolis*, or citadel, stood on the east side of the *Agora*, the *Pnyx*, or place of assemblies, on the west, and the *Museum* on the south. From the *Agora* the company of Socrates pass into the *Desmoterion* in which Socrates had been detained with his feet made fast in the stocks (*koini*), though from these he was now freed, as he had been visited by the magistrates who had charge of the prisons and the direction of public executions. These consisted of one member of each of the *ten* tribes, and a secretary, and hence they were called "the Eleven." The Socratic group themselves around the wall of the prison, silent and sad, in the dungeon-gloom which harmonizes with the gloom of their thoughts. They form, as it were the chorus in the dramatic dialogue. The Athenians can utter no word, for Athens has doomed their master to his fate, and they almost feel as if they too were partners in the treason against wisdom which is that day to be consummated. To the non-Athenians, Simmias and Cebes, falls the duty of active interlocution, and following the law of parsimony observed by the Greek dramatists, the dumb show is left to others. The speaking characters are restricted to three, viz., the chief character—the hero of wisdom—as "Protagonist," Socrates; the parts of "Deuteragonist" and "Tritagonist" being assigned to Simmias and Cebes.

How much of the grand dramatic element of contrast is supplied here! The busy streets of Phlius, the recognition of friendship, the engrossment of philosophic conversation, gradually changed to the dim dawn of the Athenian market-place, the anxious crowd, influenced by "a sadness not altogether unpleasing," waiting in the pale light of the early morning of the Sage's latest day, the dull creak of the prison-door's hinges, and then the cell, with its living but death-doomed tenant in the dark, and his friends grouping themselves around the bed by the wall, stricken dumb by the intensity of their emotions. Gloom of space, and of spirit, and of outlook, however, are suddenly illumined by the outbreak of the light of the soul of the great thinker—whose doctrine it was that Reason should rule and Passion obey—for he, moralizing in the very presence of the inevitable, declares, to their astonishment, that "to die is to be immortal;" and the philosophy of Hope, spoken in a dungeon, gave a heaven of happiness to his followers and friends, the gloom of the death-hour was brightened by a star-beam from eternity.

The Essayist.

IN MEMORIAM 1869.

"From amid the press of ruddy, busy life, the pale messenger beckons silently; wide-spreading interests, projects, . . . what thing soever man has on hand, he must suddenly quit it all and go!"—*Thomas Carlyle*.

"The mightiest in one minute stoop to death."—*Thomas Dekkar*.

ALREADY ten years have sped since these obituary memorials were begun in this serial. A seventh part of threescore years and ten have we been chronicling the doings of death. How time speeds, and life with it!—nay, is not life itself time? "Life," Lord Lytton says, "is the verb *to do*." What a mystery life is! but how much more mysterious is death! Death is the most positive of all negations; the surcease not only of action, but of capability of action; the "solemn stillness" of heart and thought, of effort and ambition. Pliancy of muscle, play of limb, power of purpose, pursuit of aim—all gone! permanency of being, peculiarity of existence, individual *ipse-ity* itself—lost! man, thoughtful, brain-quick, teeming with plan and scheme, and hope, and selfhood turned to dust, and but a cold clod left of all that he *was*! *Is that death?*—"to lie in cold obstruction and to rot." We have only to ask the question, "and Feeling staggers back and answers, No!" But has Reason no word to say concerning that mystic moment which "ends all deeds" and closes up the record of a soul's achievings? It is Reason's part to look beyond the petty known and to seek the enduringly true; it endeavours after, not only science, but pre-science; for Knowledge, as the partner of Hope and the parent of Certainty. Does Reason see wave after wave of human life recede, and crave no solution of that fateful phenomenon of existence? or does its eye rest only on the ebbing tides of life as on an expanse of uncomprehended eventlessness?

Reason can be no such indifferent spectator of the dread experience which is to be tasted of but once. Standing on this isthmus, between two eternities, with the mystery of birth on the one side and death on the other, with the floating sea of Change behind and before, Reason cannot but desire to look into and to know if human life is all comprised in the brief endeavourings of time. It sees and knows that all force is indestructible; and as it esteems the might of thought the very majesty of causation, it is incapable of believing that that prime and chief of forces can be dissipated in the far stretches of exploreless space, or the unsearchable reaches of eternity, and be the one only force which is not only dissoluble but destroyed. Tennyson pertinently asks,—

"What know we greater than the soul?"

If then Reason sees inferior things persist and subsist, it cannot consent to hold it for true that the soul is that alone which the All-wise will crush into nothingness—is that alone to whose existence He is indifferent. "Such waste of spirit were indeed a disproportionate prodigality, wholly alien to the economy and system of the universe." He who taught men to "gather up the fragments, that nothing be lost," is not likely to blot from the wealth of being the thought, experience, acquisitions, self-development, and enrichment in wisdom, which the soul shows and the consciousness of every mind must re-echo the saying of Lord Lytton, "It requires an eternity to develop all the capacities of the soul." At no moment is the sense of immortality made so vivid as when we reflect on the men of renown who have passed from the world of effort and care, but have left behind them thoughts that are powers, and achievements which are full of the reproductive might of cause, to circle through and permeate society—eternizing themselves not only in the memories of men, but also in the effectiveness of their lives upon those who survive and succeed them. Therefore it is that we affirm with the poet that—

"Death is nought

But the soul's birth—and so we should it call"—

"a transition," as Lord Lytton says, "from dim guesses and blind struggling with a mysterious and adverse fate, to the fulness of all wisdom." How strange is the feeling which enters the spirit as one stands thus like a lamp-bearer, casting a light on the graves of "the great departed" who have gone into "the silent land!" or like a "cicerone" to the dark and dismal territory of death! Yet it seems right that we should have some estimate of the losses of the year, that we should know who have been erased from the lists of the living, and what are the doings owing to which their loss must be felt; and why it is that, in the dark of the hours of sorrow, they shine out on us like the stars—prophecies of a destiny nobler than the time-life of the earth. Of those who have so gone from the crowd and turmoil of time, from the known to the remembered, from the few to the many, some dwell upon our hearts and rise into our thoughts, to whom we desire to devote a page or two of "*In Memoriam*" notes.

January's first day made an inscription in the Book of Death. R. C. Weld, a name of some note in relation to science as assistant secretary to the Royal Society, and author of several books of travel, especially of one upon the Etrurian Athens, Florence, the city of Dante, and the new capital of Italy, of that Italy which has acquired the nationality for which Dante with "the spirit of the fervent days of old"—was then written; and few of the thoughtful of our country's travellers are likely to wander "along the banks where smiling Arno sweeps" without recalling his name to their memory. Scarcely more than a week had passed when Viscount Strangford, linguist, poet, and son of a poet, departed from among

men—having lived a strange, unfinished life of power spent in aspiring. At upwards of twice the age of the author of "Historic Fancies," Sir Henry Ellis passed away on the 15th. He was a veteran in life and literature. He who wrote an introduction to "Domesday Book," in 1816, has had his own name written in the Book of Doom in 1869. He was an illustrator of history and letters, and he was the chief custodian of the National Library for a complete generation. He was a helper in many an enterprise, and his sympathies with literary men, as well as his own substantive additions to the comprehension of the poetry and history of old England, claim regard and recognition. William Ewart, who died 23rd Jan., was not perhaps in himself exactly entitled to remembrance as a literary man, but he had literary tastes and tendencies. He was an earnest advocate for the removal of the taxes on knowledge, for the extension of national education, for the establishment of public free libraries, and for the abolition of capital punishment. Only three days afterwards there passed from our midst a politician and a poet who had lived a chequered life, who had a large share in the Chartist agitation, who not only suffered for that cause, but sacrificed for it position and wealth, because he refused, at the wish of a rich relative, to cease to use against the Government the "weapon" he could well wield,—

"The whip of words,
And truth's all-teaching ire."

He was enthusiast, orator, thinker, and organizer. He had acquired for himself the love of many and the respect of more for his consistency, intelligence, honesty of purpose, and independent thought. He died at the moment when the ambition of years seemed at his finger-tip; for Manchester had selected him to be the labour's advocate of the new reformed House. When we think of this and of the newspaper eulogies which followed his demise, some little known lines of this departed one, rise to our memory, which run thus—were they suffused with prevision?—

"And I shall sink in the dark gulf of years—
In the sea of time—that deep sea of tears!
And those who wronged me may then regret,—
I will but ask them to forget.
I scorn the love that comes too late;
Far sooner would I bid them hate:
That might death's dull hour beguile,
For I shall then be calm—and smile."

Ernest Jones was one of the strong stirring spirits of a blood-hot time, but now his are calmness and peace.

But one more day of bleak January lay in the future when one of the finest minds of Ireland—one from whose exuberant nature pathos, passion, and poetry, in companionship with folly, frolic, and fun, rushed and romped. Who that ever read the "Traits and Stories of the Irish Peasantry," and the powerful and varied novels

which succeeded them, can forget the name or cease to admire the memory of William Carleton, "the poor scholar of Munster," whose fresh and forcible pictures of Erin's life have for forty years quickened the pulse and excited the interest of those who know the reality of fiction as truth imaginatively reproduced? Might he not almost be called the Goldsmith of the nineteenth century, with his turn for story-telling more highly developed than his poetic faculty, so far as regards the accomplishment of verse?

Dr. John Epps, who died on Feb. 8th, was known as a quaint and singular thinker, with many peculiar points about him. Despite a sort of desultory, rambling, ill-digested style, he made an effective conversationist and lecturer. We remember especially the anti-devil orations which he used, almost a quarter of a century ago, to deliver with much earnestness and force.

On, in this case truly, "the unlucky 13th" of February, a life almost more than romantic in the strangeness of its vicissitudes, came to an end. Then Gustave Bergenro died at Madrid. He had been brought up with Spartan rigour, but when a student had delighted in all the pleasure available to a handsome, clever young man; he had dulled down into a German official, and then become excited on Radicalism—so far as to require to take to voluntary, to avoid enforced exile. He was then a revolutionary pamphleteer. He became an emigrant, and, after having had yellow fever, was thrown as an outcast on the quay of San Francisco; picked up by the hand of charity, he recovered, but was subsequently seized with cholera and expelled the town. He went to the diggings as a Californian adventurer, and got on so ill that he had to support himself by hunting; and as a hunter he became the captain, or king, of a band of half-desperadoes. Returning to Germany he turned tutor, and went to Italy. From Florence he came to England to pursue historical researches, intending to compose a history of the Tudors. He became reader of records in Simancas, and in that dull town he was seized with gastric fever. He got to the capital, but only to die. His was a sad end in its loneliness, and in the very mesh-work of unfinished schemes.

Charles Baldwin, a newspaperist, as proprietor and editor, who spent forty-five years of a busy life in journalism, may gain mention for the memories in letters which hang about the *Standard* in its old Tory smartness, though the sympathy of the writer inclines him to favour the literary rather than the political memory of the upholder of the standard of the old form of Conservatism. He died 18th Feb., aged 94.

Of Alphonse de Lamartine, poet, historian, orator, statesman, whom February with his latest swoop carried away from the France of his adoration, what can be fittingly said by the friendly hand which pens these lines? The writer admired the fine, fervid, generous fire of the political enthusiast, the varied power of the poet of the *Meditations* and the *Harmonies*, so far as to write *Tu vivras* on his copy of the lyric effusions of the lover of Elvira, although he

confesses to the feeling that some of his subsequent writings suggest too strongly *La Chute d'un Ange*. His oratory was brilliant, versatile, ready; if dry and cold, it was intense and clear, sparkling and powerful, and if he wanted logical solidity, he was earnest and epigrammatic. His History is deficient in logic and learning, but it is vehement, vivid, varied, and vast—perhaps too vast and pamphletish. His sketches of celebrities are crayon outlines well marked but hastily done. His fiction is vague and poetical, but not dramatic. He is, however, one of the many-sided minds of France. It has been said that he lived too long for his fame, and that his sighs were too frequent and manifold. He had lost much and endured much, as well as done much and been much. He was able to welcome death when it came.

“Rayon divin! est-tu l'aurore
Du jour qui ne doit pas finir.”

(O beam divine, art thou the dawn
Of that bright day that knows no end?)

March took away, on the sixth day of his power, Sir James Emerson Tennant, who had fought as a young enthusiast for Greek freedom, who had represented his native city, Belfast, had been the practical governor of Ceylon, and who had been in the Poor Law Board and the Board of Trade, a man of various labours. He had written of Greece in his early days, and in his riper years he wrote of “India’s utmost isle Taprobane.” “Copyright in Designs,” and the “Taxation of wines” had occupied him politically, and he had proved himself a most efficient public servant and a most earnest seeker after truth. He felt a deep interest in philosophy and religion, and has won for himself a right to mention in the records of our times as a man and a writer. Of the other persons who died during March few were otherwise than remotely connected with literature. John Hearne was for many years a bookseller of note; the Rev. Sir F. Shelley was connected with the poet of “Queen Mab;” Lieut.-Col. Sleight was the founder of the *Telegraph*; Henri Jomini, a Swiss by birth, a French baron, and a Russian general, was also an author of some repute on military strategy—a topic which he treated with lucidity and liveliness. He was ninety years of age. After having spent the same number of years among men, Thomas Brown, a member of the house of Longmans, also departed. Major Griffiths, writer of “The Artillerist’s Manual” and other works on cognate subjects; and Laborde, the Eastern traveller, complete our list of March losses.

April’s second day brought mourning not only to the heart of the most ardent positivist in Britain, J. H. Bridges, but to many homes, in the demise of the Rev. Charles Bridges, Rector of Hinton Martell, Devon, the expositor of the Book of Proverbs, a divine whose plain, practical, and devotional interpretations of Holy Writ have made his name a household word in the land, especially for his illustration of the character and exercises of Christian experi-

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ence drawn from *Pea. cxix.*—a truly profitable and valuable book, whose reasonings are close, whose appeals are fervent, and whose lessons, if laid to heart by those who read them, cannot but conduce to good, in purifying the lives of those who attend to the sayings of the wise and the law of the Holiest. On the 17th a theologian of a sterner stamp, one of the celebrities of the Scottish Establishment, Dr. John Cook, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of St. Andrew's, after a lengthy illness, departed from the church militant, in whose warfare he had taken a prominent part. He was an able though dogmatic debater, and could do smart business in the popular assemblies of his section of the Church; he was a quiet, unostentatious preacher, and a painstaking lecturer on the history of the progress of Christian truth. He took much interest in the literary culture of students, and was much consulted as to the disposal of ecclesiastical patronage.

On the 10th of May Sir Charles W. Dilke's name was written in the obituary list. He had been the successor of Mr. J. Silk Buckingham, as proprietor of the *Athenæum*, an able editor of "Old Plays," a contributor to the *Westminster Review* and *The Retrospective Review*; and he had investigated the "Junius" question with great assiduity and persistence. As editor of the *Daily News* he succeeded Dickens and Forster. He had excellent business habits—gained in the Navy Pay Office,—much literary experience, a wide acquaintance with the world of letters, fine skill in the selection of men, and personal talents. He was somewhat autocratic in his style, but he was much beloved by a large circle of the men who think and write not only for the age but for all time.

Five days thereafter Alexander Dyce, author and editor, at the close of threescore years and ten, passed away into the silent land. As an editor Dyce exhibited great research and critical sagacity. His editions of the dramatists Peele, Greene, Webster, Middleton, Beaumont and Fletcher, Marlowe, and Shirley, though somewhat Giffordish, have become *standard*. His Aldine editions of Pope, Collins, Beattie, Akenside, &c., are choice and full; and the manner in which he brought out the critical and theological works of Bentley won the approval of many of his critics. His publications, superintended for the Camden, the Percy, and the Shakspeare societies, were done with taste, care, and judgment. As a classical editor he was scrupulously practical. His position as a Shakspeare scholar was perhaps rather too near to the Steeven's school. There can be little doubt that his extensive and varied reading supplied many illustrations of Shakspeare's plays. In regard to the biography of the bard he was too much under the influence of the traditional interpretations. He belonged rather to the Johnson and Collier school than to the documentary school of Halliwell, the romantic school of Charles Knight, the critical school of Staunton, or the logical school of Samuel Neil. That he was unwilling to revise his idea of Shakspeare as a man was unfortunate; but no one can look upon the accumulations of illustrative matter which

he has brought to bear on the deathless poetry of Shakspeare without acknowledging that he has fully entitled himself to take place and rank among the most meritorious of the illustrative school of Elizabethan editors. We happen to know that, at last, he was conscious that a new interpretative view was possible and probable, and had seen the incidence of the arguments brought towards the interpretation of the memoirs of Shakspeare by the combination of the logical and the chronological methods, of which the first specimens appeared in the pages of this serial.

A friend and fellow-labourer in the same fields of literature, antiquarianism and the drama, in three days thereafter, followed Dyce. This was Peter Cunningham, son of "honest Allan" Cunningham, the poet, novelist, and sculptor, and the son-in-law of John Martin, the magnificent painter. He was editor of Johnson's "Lives of the Poets," Walpole's "Letters," Pope's "Works," Oliver Goldsmith's "Writings," the Plays of Philip Massinger, &c. He was the biographer of Drummond of Hawthornden, of Inigo Jones, J. M. W. Turner, &c. He has also told the "Story of Nell Gwynne," written a "Handbook to Westminster Abbey," and compiled a "History of London." He was a genius of a peculiar sort. He had poetical and art sympathies, extraordinary stores of cunningly sought out and well-assorted facts, singular conversational powers, and delightfully convivial aptitudes. He was a connoisseur in wit, poetry, criticism, art, and antiquities, yet he was alive to all the interests of the day and the delights of the day; but now he will no more—

"Imp feathers to the broken wings of time,"

for he has passed under the power of the "lean fellow that beats all conquerors"—Death.

On Whitsuntide, the Rev. J. J. Tayler, of Manchester New College, to whom the religious life of England owed much, a man of refined tastes, singular speculative ability, extensive historical reading, and great powers of research and collocation, passed into the Presence. He was thoroughly interpenetrated with the idea that Christianity is "a possession of everlasting value, rather than a theme of transient controversy;" he was conversant with the history of Christianity, not only in its eventful course as an active agent in an active world, but in its manifold relations to the varying forms of civilization and the most profound speculations in philosophy. He felt that it exerted a purifying, enlightening, energetic, and spiritualizing influence in the worlds of thought, emotion, and action, and that it afforded the only possible solution of the miracle of life and the mystery of death.

Just when the name and fame of Byron were again to become the topic of the day, after a long life of fourscore and two years, on the 3rd of June, Baron Broughton de Gifford, formerly John Cam Hobhouse, a Cambridge friend of the poet of intensity, himself a

poetling and an author, as well as the companion and illustrator of "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage" (canto iv.), was blotted from the page of life. A long, strange, varied, chequered career yielded at last to the period of periods, the hour of dissolution. Talented, energetic, enthusiastic, and restless, he had pleasure in the stormier elements of life; yet, singularly enough, sixty years after the publication of his earliest volume of poems, and forty-five years after the Childe had become what Shelley called him, "the Pilgrim of Eternity," Cam Hobhouse, under the conduct of "the dunniest of all duns"—the "gaunt gourmand"—Death, went to be laid in "one small grass-grown patch," and be henceforth only a linked memory to a great fame.

To June belong also the death days of Captain C. Sturt, one of the earliest explorers of Australia, whose merits in the hasty onrush of time had almost been forgotten, when his death recalled his labours in bringing within British ken that great and precious province of her empire; of Sir William à Becket, formerly Chief Justice of Victoria, a gentleman who had great literary attainments, and whose influence in that colony was employed to widen and heighten intellectual culture; of the Rev. J. H. Todd, one of the most learned of the antiquarians of Ireland, who had done much to elucidate the history, especially the ecclesiastical history, of that country of eventfulness and romance, of mystery and misery, of mirth and grief, of loyal heart and rebellious impulse; and of Dr. Edward Greswell, famous as a harmonist of the Gospels, and a writer of extensive research and great perseverance of thought concerning sacred and ecclesiastical chronology.

William Jerdan, critic, journalist, and man of letters in many senses, died 11th July. His autobiography contains very full particulars of his own career, and much information on the career of others. He displayed a more than ordinary power of labour, and was quite a man of what his Scottish friends would call a through-putting turn. He had no very marked characteristics as a writer or a thinker, but he had an appreciative nature, and did a good stroke of work well in his day and generation. He deserves the tear of pity, because, after a life of much effort and great accomplishment, he felt sore sorrows, and had learned, we believe, to yearn for the visitation of welcome death.

Lady Lucy Duff Gordon, daughter of John Austin the jurisprudent, and Sarah Austin (*née* Taylor) his wife, died 13th July. She was a French and German translatrix of great dexterity, and, along with her husband, Sir A. Duff Gordon, author of "*Sketches of Grecian Life*," kept up high literary culture in the midst of active life. She possessed superior abilities, and cultivated them assiduously; she won for herself the admiration of many, and drew to herself sympathy, affection, and respect.

On the 8th of July, at the advanced age of eighty, Dr. John Martin died at Lisbon. He was a veteran in literature and science, who, after the exhausting duties of an arduous profession, yet de-

voted thought to letters and labour, to investigations on the conditions of health and disease in relation to meteorology. The 19th deprived Liberalism and literature of the able and earnest socialist of Germany, Victor A. Huber, the historian of the English universities, the popularizer of Spanish literature in Germany. He was a progressist in 1848, and in 1852 resigned his professorship of literature at Berlin to devote himself to the propagation of co-operative socialism at Wernigerode, a village in the Hartz mountains, where he humbly but enthusiastically laboured to introduce a practical paternalism in government, and brotherhood in social life. He was but a few days ill, and in his seventy-first year exchanged, it is to be hoped, life social for life celestial. One word of friendly remembrance and personal sorrow may here be allowed to one who in his twenty-first year had attained the highest place in Sir William Hamilton's class as a student, and took up for graduation a list of philosophical works not then equalled in any Scottish university. Devoted to the ministry, he had little opportunity for productive authorship, but he had rare literary tastes, genuine scholarship, a good heart, and a noble spirit: the Rev. William Shaw was a man whom it is a happiness to have known and to have admired.

On 21st July, the Very Rev. George Waddington, D.D., Dean of Durham, whose reputation as an ecclesiastical historian—though somewhat eclipsed by the success of D'Aubigne's volumes—was deservedly considerable, died. He was a learned and painstaking writer, whose aid, in its early days, was of some service to the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. It is, we think, to be regretted that his "History of the Reformation" has been left incomplete. Our comprehension of that great crisis in history is not likely to be complete until it has been looked at from many sides, and been examined by many minds. The calm judiciousness with which Dean Waddington wrote, while it may have lessened his present popularity, must have added future value to his endeavour to unfold the records of Church history.

Joseph Beete Jukes, who died 29th July, was a man of no ordinary mark. He was a thorough geologist, conversant alike with theory and practice, who laboured in his task of duty with all the earnest love of an enthusiast. He had nothing of the hireling in his manner of setting about and accomplishing his work. The multitude of considerations which he had to keep constantly before his mind, and to the solution of which he brought undaunted industry and indefatigable versatility, weighed heavily upon him—too heavily, as the end proved. Besides his survey of Newfoundland, his sketch of the physical structure of Australia, his voyage to the Eastern Archipelago, on all of which, besides his official reports, he has written with elegance and interest, he has made most effective advances towards the completion of the Geological Survey of Ireland, and to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* he has contributed a monument of his geological knowledge and his literary skill. He was successful as a lecturer, and highly esteemed.

among his *confrères* in science for his kindly urbanity, his general information, and his lively and ready turn of helpful thought.

The Hon. Emily Eden (sister of Lord Auckland, of the late Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells, and of Elinor Eden, the first and last "love" of Premier Pitt), who had travelled with an observant eye, and had exercised an acute mind on moral topics, and in her books of travel as well as her contributions to romance given evidence of both, died 6th August. Though never ranked among the matrons of this country, she saw pretty clearly into the mysteries of domestic life, and in her "Semi-detached House" and her "Semi-attached Couple" contributed lively pictures of home life; while in her "Up the Country" she detailed her experiences of life in India. On the 10th the Italian geographer and mathematician, Ferdinando di Luca, a man of high reputation, much influence, and versatile as well as popular talents, passed, much regretted, from this transient life of time. Dr. Speirs, the lexicographer, author of many works on the study of the French language, expired suddenly, after a few hours' illness, just as August was making way for September—in order, some of the wags said, that he might have an august death, and dispel any suspicion of his being "a Septembrizer." He was well known in Paris, and useful to those Englishmen who desired to see the external life of Paris, but he had little absolute connection with literature proper.

On 5th September, at the lengthened age of 86, there died one of the prime movers in many of the political changes of the last half-century. Gen. T. P. Thompson—the Andrew Marvell of his time—was not so systematic as Jeremy Bentham, so philosophical as either James or John S. Mill, nor so thorough an orator as W. J. Fox, but he combined in himself many of the characteristics of each of them. He was thorough-going in the sweep of his thought and in his determination to apply it to every conceivable topic. He had faith in his principles, and hesitated not to spend and to be spent in the furtherance or defence of them. He was sterlingly honest in the expression of his opinions, however adverse to the common current, and he had singular aptitude and felicity in bringing these into concrete comprehensibility. His was the philosophic, as Elliott's was the poetic, Fox's the rhetorical, Cobden's the moral, and Bright's the political force of Corn Law repeal. It is true that he brought down the law of Christ to the level of Benthamism, but he broadened with Christianity the wisdom won from the somewhat narrow basis of the Master of his spirit. During a lifetime extending a year beyond that of Bentham, he was a persistent advocate of the greatest happiness of the greatest possible number, and took part in the various movements set on foot to realize that great political end. He was the main political spirit of the *Westminster Review*, when it was the philosophical radical organ, and he published for popular gratuitous distribution six volumes of his articles selected from that repertory of revolutionary thought. These, in variety, ability, power, and pith, form a col-

lection of "Exercises, Literary and others," of much interest and value. They must now be becoming somewhat scarce. In 1846 an autographed copy was diligently perused by the present writer, and the contents affected him much from their vigorous incisiveness and their almost remorseless application of the main theories of the school in which he was a leader. His memory has been but ill-requited by his party, but it will not surely be able to be laid to the charge of the British public that they have forgotten the merits of T. P. Thompson.

On 9th September, Thomas Watts died, deeply and deservedly regretted by many literary men, to whom he had been helpful by his extensive, almost unequalled knowledge of books, their topics and contents. As keeper of the Printed Book Department, he seemed to have acquired, as if by insight, yet really as the result of intense labour, an acquaintance with the immense treasury of knowledge which the Palace of Learning contains. He was a ready and correct contributor to many periodicals, a punctiliously conscientious public servant, and a linguist of most extensive acquirements.

Three days afterwards, at the age of ninety, Dr. Peter Mark Roget went hence. He was eminent as a physician and as an author on medical, scientific, and mathematical subjects. He was author of the Bridgewater Treatise on "Animal and Vegetable Physiology in Relation to Theology," and the literary world owes him thanks for his suggestive if not exhaustive "Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases." As Secretary and Fellow of the Royal Society, he was highly useful and influential, and his varied talents had procured for him the membership and honours of an extraordinary number of societies.

Another link between our own age and the Byronic one was severed on 16th September, by the demise of the Rev. Wm. Clark, M.D., Professor of Anatomy, Cambridge, who in his early years was a companion of the poet, and who secured his lordship's vote for the professorship. He was a cautious and conscientious teacher of anatomy; he had considerable powers of oral exposition, and though he published little, was a profound scientific thinker. He was an earnest, courteous, and accomplished gentleman of the olden time, whose efforts for the improvement of human knowledge were disinterested and long-continued.

On the day after this loss, Thomas Graham, Master of the Mint, crossed over to the Majority. He was a man of marvellous industry in "toiling upward." To tell the successive steps of his useful and noble career of effort and discovery would not be an easy, though it would undoubtedly be an agreeable task. His sympathies were so thoroughly in favour of general self-culture, and his co-operation with all endeavours to forward popular scientific training, that he merits from us a word of note as a teacher, a discoverer, a scientific writer, and an instance of the might of perseverance in the progress of life.

Perhaps we should not err very much were we to say that th-

Right Rev. Henry Philpotts, Bishop of Exeter, was the most voluminous controversial pamphleteer of this age. On points connected with the doctrines and discipline of the Church of England, on Roman Catholic claims, on education, on poor laws and their administration, on rubric observance, episcopal ordination, on lay Scripture readers, the offertory, the law of marriage, the sacrament of baptism, the inspiration and interpretation of Holy Writ, a friend, well up in these matters, informs us that a collection of the pamphlets of Harry of Exeter would exceed 200. He was a sort of Lord Brougham of ecclesiasticism—fiery, restless, vehement, indefatigable, versatile, and vigilant, alert either for a hit offensive or defensive, capable though captious, and master of a vigorous, violent, sometimes virulent, but always trenchant style in speech and writing, which gave him immense advantage in controversial skirmishes. As the leader of the High Church party of England he never consulted his ease if their advantage was to be gained by any effort open to him. Born in the same house as Whitefield, he had, as it were, got the mantle of the great “stress and storm” preacher of a former age converted into an episcopal robe. One of the bishops of the Iron Duke, he seems to have had much of the *ardor Wellingtonius*. He was quite a bishop of the church militant order, but he fought, let us hope, the good fight of faith in good earnest; and now may the peace of God in Christ be his.

On 12th October the Librarian of Windsor Castle, B. B. Woodward, passed from the living to take his place among the dead, of the life-blood of whose spirits, as preserved in books, he had been the custodian. He had a wide and accurate knowledge of literature and art, history and bibliography. He was an earnest and ardent student, and an able and intelligent writer, whose stores of information were readily placed at the disposal of those who consulted him.

Edward Geoffrey Stanley, Earl of Derby, on 23rd October, having completed his threescore years and ten, succumbed, after a long illness, to the ultimate fate. He was scholarly in his instincts and acquirements, and had a refined and ingenious mind. He carried with him from Eton to Christchurch, Oxford, the reputation of a disciplined and superior scholarship, and this reputation he more than maintained—improved. On entering the House of Commons, half a century ago, he diligently and energetically devoted himself to the understanding of politics, and he soon acquired a reputation for eloquence which, by unceasing culture, he increased till he became known as one of the most eminent orators of the age, and was acknowledged in those great contests—

“Whose glorious strife

Formed this free England, and still guards her life,”

to be a debater of surpassing power and excellence. To a singular intelligence in threading the maze of motive, he joins polish, clearness, causticity, and a style nicely adjusted to the purpose and the

spirit of his speeches. It is not ours to pass any judgment on the statesman and his contributions to the progress or stability of the Government. No sketch can here be given of the stately manner and the skilled courtesy of the Aristocrat of Orators, the most urbane of scholars, and the most considerate of modern public men with regard to what he thought the preventable sorrows of the poor, in accordance to and within the limits of the—

“Forms which hem in the civic life of man.”

In the fine pellucid, didactic speech which his lordship delivered as Lord Rector of the University, his scholarly sympathy and literary skill are very manifest. The taste, elegance, and easy mastery of words with which he has transferred into English many of the gems of verse of ancient times and foreign critics attest the versatility and extent of his powers; but it is in the manner in which he has transferred the vivid Greek of Homer's eternal page into the very prime of English phrases that he has best proved the undoubted accuracy, taste, fulness, and excellence of his scholarship. Even while he lived he might have used to his contemporaries the words of Nestor, sage in counsel,—

“In times past
I lived with men—and they despised me not—
Abler in counsel, greater than yourselves.
Such men I never saw, and ne'er shall see. . . .
The mightiest they among the sons of men,
The mightiest they
With them I played my part: with them not one
Would dare to fight, of mortals now on earth,
Yet they my counsels heard, and me obeyed;
And hear ye also, for my words are wise.”

But to wise and noble, brave and able, there comes, as to the poor and woe-worn, the ignorant and the low-born, the one inevitable hour, when heart and flesh fail, and we go hence; and in the latter as in the former—

“This fleshly form
Enfolds a subtler which escapes the worm,
And is the true one which The Maker's breath
Quickened in dust and privileged from death.”

On the same day as the interpreter of Homer departed from earth, the spirit of the interpreter of the great Roman epic poet, Virgil, also passed into the infinite light. John Conington had a noble nature and a kindly as well as a kindling spirit. Only twenty-five years ago he was a bright young spirit at the University, being at that time Dean Ireland's scholar and the university scholar, both by competitive examination as the best Latinist of 1844. He passed B.A. in the first class in 1846; in 1847 he gained the Latin poetry prize for verses on “The Tower of London,” and was chosen Fellow of his college; next year the English Essay prize

was his, for a composition on "The Respective Effects of the Fine Arts and Mechanical Skill on National Character." In 1849, for an essay on "The Platonic Idea in Politics," he won the Latin prose prize, and gained the Eldon Scholarship (£200 per annum), tenable for three years, one intention of which is to "confer a real benefit on meritorious individuals who may have to struggle with difficulties in the early part of their professional career."

His future progress did not belie these beginnings. His labours as a Corpus Professor of Latin in his university, his translations of classics, Greek and Roman, and his editions of classics for study and reference, are too well known to require note or comment here. He seems, in the hour of his first triumphs, to have resolved, in the words he gives to Nisus in the *Æneid*,—

"No after-day
This hour's fair promise shall betray,
Be Fate but kind."

And nobly did *he* strive for fame against fate. At the early age of forty-four, with whole continents of effort lying before him, he "vanished into light."

Only on the day after completing his seventy-fifth year, William Ramsay, a man of taste, readiness, resource, and knowledge, died on 28th October. He was the editor of the "Paston Letters," of an abstract of "Hudibras," and author of "Shakspeare in Germany." He was connected with Charles Knight in almost all his periodical publications, and amidst illness and toil the lamp of life flickered in the socket and went out. A far more sudden stroke deprived the literary and historical world of the ingenious and conscientious labours of John Bruce, whose "calendars" have always been remarkable for clearness and fulness. As editor of Cowper, of many works for the Camden Society, and of the old series of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, he won golden opinions, not rewards. He was an able, earnest, cheerful, and indefatigable worker. Instant death snatched him at once into the Presence.

The old Greek proverb from Menander—"He whom the gods love dies young," a proverb which Byron has exquisitely turned thus:—

"Heaven gives its favourites early death—"

is, we may say, not always true; for "love is heaven, and heaven is love;" and surely he who, after exercising prudence, sagacity, industry, and perseverance in the pursuit of prosperity, finding his store of treasure more than suffice for the fulfilment of the dreams of kings, so turned the channel of his benevolence that he justly earned the rare and more rarely deserved title of "the Poor Man's Friend," can scarcely have been an object of displeasure to the heavenly Eye. George Peabody seems to have taken the idea of "Abon Ben Adhem,"—

"Write me as one who loves his fellow-men."

Of all the names inscribed on the bright page on which the angel Philanthropy writes the records of men's doings, his seems to take the lead in spontaneity and purity, so that surely among the gains of eternity we may write this loss to the earth and time.

The Rev. William Harness died, unbeneficed, close on the verge of eighty years; he had seen, and been a part of, literary life in the brilliant period when the last century closed and this one opened. He had enjoyed communion with many of the best and greatest of those whose names give brilliancy to the pages of the literary history of our era, and he had sympathies such as made him beloved by many of them. He gave, as his legacy to letters, a preface to the memoir of Miss Mitford, recently published.

At the early age of thirty-three, a young clergyman of much promise and rapidly extending power, J. C. Bryce, went, as he said, "home." He had toiled laboriously through the taskwork of preliminary life amid much difficulty, and had, from the earliest, employed his efforts in the cause of human progress; in his eagerness to make known the "glad tidings" with which he was charged, he overwrought a constitution already enfeebled by the earnest toils of the student. He was a rare and a happy spiritually inclined nature. He had aspirations which have been nipped by the, to us apparently, untimely frost of death; but in the other vineyard of the Great Taskmaster, spirits may ripen in the exceeding glory of a light surpassing that of earthly suns.

William H. Coxey, the Sanscritist, an enthusiast in the pursuit of the cuneiform studies to which Oriental languages incline, died, in his thirtieth year, December 18th. He was a diligent scholar at Charterhouse, at Balliol College, Oxford, an admirable student. He became, in 1861, university Sanscrit scholar, and then assistant in the Oriental Department of the British Museum. In 1865 he was chosen Professor of Sanscrit in King's College, London, but was subsequently appointed, in 1869, Assistant in the Education Department at Calcutta. As Professor of History and Philosophy at Kistagar, his health failed, and he returned to the Museum, and despite pain and illness, he prosecuted his duties till death laid his hand upon his heart—and all was still.

Thus has passed the year; and we have noticed a few of those who have made the recess from the personal to the infinite life; whose anchor has been weighed to speed from the insular existence of time to the wider and vaster being of eternity; and who have undergone the great change. We have been able to note only a few of those who have gone beyond the veil of human things. Many are the worthy who have gone from among men, of whom the huge self-seeking world knew little and thought less. Slight is the hold men have of life, still slighter even is the hold they have on man's remembrance. When the chill shadow of the scythe-bearer falls upon the aching heart of those who feel the bereavement, men are startled into a sense of their loss; but the shadow passes off as the sunshine of life rises on their own hearts and affects their pulses, and

the forgetless too often becomes the forgotten. Is man's life—

“Only an isthmus of time
Between two eternities.”

Or is it not rather a work or a warfare, in which there is joy in making a good fight, and a gladness unspeakable when all is over and peace has come? Life is at best a hope—death is an embalmed memory; and memory itself is a sort of resurrection. Life is not transient; it is permanent. It is an indestructible force, it is for ever a fact. We have laid our little bouquet of forget-me-not on the graves of the dead in 1869, with a sense of the silence and certainty with which the leaves fall and man departs. But while we feel that life is to be loved, because it is the condition of thought and action; death is not to be feared as the end—it is rather the transfer—of being. Death is change—the music of a sweet song interrupted, but to be begun again in new company. Death leaves but a memory on earth, but it transports life into new scenes and prospects. Death is immortality. If a dewdrop or a raindrop can hold heaven within them, need a human soul doubt its capacity to feel the eternal within it, if it but open to the grace that is offered? However this may be, there is truth in the saying of Goethe, which we quote in Whewell's hexameters:—

“The touching image of death stands
Not as a fear to the wise, and not as an end to the pious.
That it sends to the business of life, and teaches him action;
This one finds in it solace, and hope of a glorious future.
Each in death sees life.”

“*Herman and Dorothea.*”—*Urania.*

THE Queen gives two gold medals annually to the Royal Geographers, one called the Founder's and the other the Victoria Medal. They are given to those two persons, of whatever nation, who have done most in furthering the progress of geographical science. This year the Victoria gold medal is most deservedly awarded to Mrs. Mary Somerville, for her “Physical Geography;” a work which, written by any hand, would richly deserve the distinction, but which all the more merits to be marked with such a signal honour, because it is a woman's contribution to scientific education. We believe that no one in all Europe will grudge Mrs. Somerville the high distinction which she has gained. Although specially signalling her services to geographical instruction, it has, of course, a natural reference to the almost universal physical learning which this accomplished lady has shown—not least in those admirable volumes upon “Microscopic and Molecular Science” with which she has very lately favoured her countrymen. The Founder's medal goes to M. Nordenskiöld, for his recent explorations within the Arctic circle. This reward also has been nobly merited.

Poetic Critique.

(Continued from page 391, Vol. XXXI.)

HARMONY of expression, choiceness of phraseology, aptness of imagery and uncommonness of thought and association, are almost always characteristic of poetry. These are the elements of the originality which constitutes the poet a *maker*. He makes a substantive addition to man's wealth of expressed emotion, and the ennoblement of his customary ideas. It ought always to be remembered by those who endeavour to achieve poetry, that the idea is the embryo, that versification is only the form and vesture—the flowerage of the thoughts; the fluency of rhythm and rhyme, mere melody of phraseology, do not constitute poetry; they are only imitations, like wax or paper flowers, not the real and true effluences of beauty and thoughtfulness. Not a few of those who forward verses seem to us to fail in grasping the idea of the difference between originality of diction and originality of matter, and hence they mistake outward form for the genuine reality of true poetry.

Here are some lines whose inner essence is poetry, and whose outward expression, though perhaps a little stiff, is fairly chosen and well put together. They appear to us, however, to be rather fragmentary, as if they were but a slip from a branch of olives of a larger growth. If not, we would suggest that they would, on the whole, be materially improved by some introductory lines to place us in the proper point of view for taking in their meaning; such, perhaps, as—

Angels one eve, from out the listening skies,
Proclaimed "glad tidings" of God's mysteries,—
That Christ had come a priest to ransom men,
And lead them into God's own flock again.
He lived, wrought, taught, and died, then rose on high
Conqueror o'er sin—our soul's fierce enemy;
Yet left behind Him a supreme command
To teach His love to the apostle band;
They, too, the glorious trust to others gave,
To tell of Christ—omnipotent to save.

Here followeth the poem as it has reached our hands, with one or two suggestions as to the artistry of words which may, in our opinion, improve the versification and structure of the verses. We suppose if W. O. is inclined to take offence at our freedom, he will consider that he has fair game before him for attack, and he will not require to thirst Job-like for opportunity, and say, "Oh that my critic now would write some lines." But we respect him too much to believe that he will take amiss our kindness of intent.

GOOD TIDINGS.

They held us out a peerless, glorious Heaven,
 Far-passing upper sun-rays earthward driven;
 Where sits the Eternal awfully *benign*, [sublime
 Reckoning who to Immortal Life would climb,
 But told how only through the Lamb once slain, [its
 Souls, Faith-wing'd, rise to walk *the* golden plain;
 That bathed in His redeeming precious blood, [by
 The sin-sad soul *at* prayer finds peace with God.
 Then pressed the linked truth upon the heart,
 Of tireless watch and prayer on *human* part; [our soul's
 Of vigorous toil 'gainst raging lusts at war
 Within—e'er aiming Christliness to mar.
 And said, *the* baleful soul-foes bent on spoil, [these
 Vile tempers, passions foul, base *self-loves*, all [self-love's moil
 Must prostrate *lie*, enslave by sword All-prayer, [fall
 And Heaven's full light, faith, love, peace, *purity* dwell there [hope
 Ah, blest attainment, triumph of *rich* grace! [Christ's
 Spirit Divine, from out thine Holy place
 Breathe, in celestial influence, gracious forth
 Thy quickening breath; reveal to us Life's worth,
 For we, through Him, than conquerors more would be,
 Who loved, *washed*, and enthroneth us Immortally. W. O. [saves

Here is a pretty idea—from a youth of seventeen summers—which has poetry in it:—

A SONG.

O! the oft-roamed banks of the clear flowing Nene,
 Ye are dear, passing dear, unto me;
 All arrayed in that daisy-pied carpet of green,
 Where in my childhood *hath* sported with glee. [I've
 Ah! *in happiness* there with my comrades I've played, [gladness oft
 Free from trouble as lark on the wing,
 Till the twilight of eve 'gan to merge *in the* shade, [into
 And the *choristers* ceased to sing. [choir of the woods
 Chorus:—O! the oft-roamed banks, &c.
 [O!] I muse on those days when my heart was all clear [omit O
 Like the dew, crystal dew, of the morn,
 When I gamboled as free as the balmy fresh air
 On the wings of the *prairie* breeze borne. [meadow
 There I felt what I never shall realize more,
 For the blossoms of joy 'gan to bloom, [Then . . . were in bloom
 But they now are all dead, like the ages of yore,
 And my spirit is *sunken in* gloom. [sunk in deep
 Chorus:—[O!] I muse on those days, &c.

ERATO.

If the essential formal elements of a song be that it wells up out of the heart from emotion's ecstasy, and finds itself unconsciously music—in short, if a song must be something able to be sung, that is, be uttered musically with the same series of recurrent notes, verse after verse, we

doubt Erato has not succeeded in his endeavours. Lyric sprightliness he has, and there is a lilt in the caper of his words; but consistency of phrase and tone, the overcome of the emotive rush, is not preserved.

The other song, on "Lenore," by ERATO, being in opposition to the law of letter-press, written on the other side of the paper, I have not been able to use. Perhaps if he had a copy beside him it may be useful to remark on that song, first, that in a mild calm evening the moon does not sweep through the skies; second, that the light of a lady's eyes would scarcely be enough to "bathe in." I am aware that he may quote against me the sonnet of the world-renowned Shakspeare, 153—

"The bath for my help lies
Where Cupid got new fire—my mistress's eyes"—

but at what a cost will he do it? for *primo*, one of the first of living poets, (Gerald Massey) affirms they are not Shakspeare's lines; *secundo*, Shakspeare means "the agency of healing," while Erato means "the act of cleansing delightedly;" but *tertio*, if the ideas are similar, where is Erato's originality.

But again, we object that a young lover must be a self-lover who, addressing the charmer of his affection, wishes time to stand motionless, "that *my* presence might linger with *you*," instead of turning the phrase, as it ought to be, "that *thy* presence might linger with *me*;" and Erato may take our word for it—and if he doubt that we shall appeal to Miss Lenore in substantiation—that young ladies do not care about lovers who promise that they "ever will dream" about a time when they shall be one (won), instead of setting about it without dreaming, but in serious reality. Still Erato has an arch kind of humour, and a fair tripping muse on the whole, and we hope—

"That he may his dreams soon, as nonsense, give o'er;
May win, wed, and comfort his lovely Lenore."

Another lover, stricken in soul, comes like the Ghost in Hamlet, when—

"The glowworm shows the matin to be near,
And 'gins to pale his ineffectual fire."

B. F. takes up the ghostly refrain, and with a very pretty suggestive—though inartistic—song reiterates the old, old story of false heart and constancy, with the requiem—

"REMEMBER ME."

When thou roam'st where Avon gently glideth,
And the winds hum o'er the pleasant lea,
While the jinking sunshine slyly hideth—
Then remember me!

There is a tune which Avon water singeth,
Singeth sadly, sadly as can be;
There is a memory which the sunshine bringeth,
Known to you and me.

Should'st thou wander where the sea's breast heaveth,
 In unrest, moaning piteously,
 Or where a cypress o'er some gravestone grieveth,
 Then remember me!

I have an unrest of the heart, it moveth,
 Wilder, sadder, than the aching sea,
It never loved, and was betrayed—yet loveth;
 So 'tis not like me.

Over a place of death the cypress waveth,
 And its tears fall on it uselessly—
 But my heart cannot get the death it craveth—
 I remember thee!

To me a heart's truth once was pledged, and ever,
 Were the words said meant to be
 Held sacred! But, alas! they've never
 Been true of you to me.

B. F.

PARISIAN PSEUDONYMS.—French journalists and artists are seldom content with the names which Heaven has allotted them. The Frenchman is anxious, above all, that the name which he signs to an article, or which appears as his on a play-bill, shall have a striking uncommon appearance, which may separate its owner from the vulgar. A Parisian has written a book on the subject of this mania, to unmask all his pseudonymous contemporaries for the edification of the public. We are told in this work that the name of *Mdme. George Sand* is *Dudevant*; of *M. de Persigny*, *Fialin*; of *Arsène Houssaye*, *Housset*; of *M. Granier de Cassagnac*, simply *Granier* (the "*de Cassagnac*" was tacked on when *M. Granier* became an official candidate); of *Eugène de Mirecourt*, the biographer, *Gigot* (there is some excuse here); of *Michael Masson*, author of the "*Contes de l'Atelier*," *Gaudichot*; of *Belval*, the singer, *Gaffot* (these two are excusable again,—no Frenchman with such a name as *Gaudichot* or *Gaffot* could make his way in France); of *Mdme. Carvalho*, *Carvailhe*; of *Marie Cabel*, of the *Opéra Comique*, *Cabu*; of *Father Hyacinthe*, *Loyson* (*Loyson* means "the gosling"); and of the well-known restaurateur, *Peters*, *Fraise*—i. e., strawberry, which name appears more appropriate than the pseudonym. It is rare that a Frenchman, being possessed of authentic title, conceals it out of modesty; nevertheless, this happens in the case of *Cham* and *Gill*, the two caricaturists, the first of whom is *Viscount de Noé*, and the second *Count de Guines*; and in that of *M. Henry Rochefort*, who, as most people are aware, is *Count de Rochefort Lucay*.—*Pall Mall Gazette*.

The Reviewer.

History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada. By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M.A., late Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. Vols. XI. and XII., being the *Fifth* and *Sixth* Volumes of "The Reign of Elizabeth;" with a copious Index to the Twelve Vols., of which the entire work consists. London: Longmans and Co.

THE moment of the conception or the inception of a great design possesses a strong interest for human curiosity—especially when that design has been completed, and the originator can write *finis coronat opus*. The coming to hand of these two volumes from the pen of one whom even a hostile critic—himself a labourer in the same field of letters—admits to be "the ablest of modern historians," recalls such an event. About seventeen years ago, in the winter of 1852, as nearly as we can remember the story, J. A. Froude, Charles Kingsley, H. T. Buckle, and Henry Kingsley, in the fine enthusiasm of youthful energy, were looking about them for open space for effort and endeavour, and were determining to bring "the progress school" into a more prominent intellectual position by doing something in literature worthy of the thoughts that breathed within their spirits so earnestly. In the eager conversations then held as to what possible department of letters could supply an interesting life-work, the talk turned upon the "Comic History of Rome," which Gilbert & Becket had then recently issued, and this recalled the "Comic History of England," published in 1848 by the same writer; as well as Macaulay's "History," the rhetorical effervescence of which had excited the liveliest interest. The former some of the party were almost prepared to denounce as a crime, the latter they were nearly as much inclined to declare to be a mistake—as being written without faith, though written about an age of intense and fervent faith. They held that the true key to history was to know what faith lay at the heart of life. That invested with sacredness the events of the periods of the past. As with the sudden impulse of an inspiration, Mr. Froude's face lighted, and his eye beamed, while he said, "I shall write the history of the struggle of the Reformation in England, and prove the inspiring might of purpose in the record of progress." At that time Froude was weakly and wan, the disappointments of life had fallen heavily upon him, and his friends, though they considered it quite improbable that he should ever complete an undertaking so vast, glad to find an absorbing pursuit for him, prompted and encouraged him in his ambition. The aim of writing the *History of the New Birth of the British Nation* seemed to have operated like a new birth to his own spirit, and he settled himself to the achievement of his great work. The intensity, earnestness, and industry with which he has laboured at his exposition of the problem of Protestantism in England may be roughly estimated

1870.

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by a glance at the contents of the twelve huge volumes which have passed under his pen within the seventeen years which have elapsed between the conception and the completion of the scheme; and this not the exclusive labour of these years only,—for in the meanwhile he has given much time to editorial toil, and has given off from his active intelligence his "Short Studies on Great Subjects," his address to the students at St. Andrew's, &c.

By this means, as we have said, we may form some idea of the mechanical quantity, but not of the mental quality of the labour expended on the great problems of the Tudor age. It is only when we compare the state of knowledge on this topic prior to his efforts with what it is now—when we weigh the contributions he has made to the comprehension and the settlement of the controversies involved in the subject, and the pertinent additions to our knowledge of the circumstances and intrigues of the time he has brought together, that we can fully estimate the value of this seventeen years' labour. It is to be hoped that it was from no foreboding fear that life is waning with him, that he has curtailed his plan and circumscribed his design. Though the present volumes do bring down the History to a time when the curtain can be dropped in full accordance with the dramatic character of the story, yet we hope it has been chiefly a publisher's anxiety to secure a complete book that has weighed with him, and that he will yet, in a supplement of two more volumes, supply a narrative of the remaining years of Elizabeth's reign, when, the great labour and care of her life being accomplished, she was able to breathe and live with more confidence. Surely Mr. Froude will not willingly forbear from detailing to us what may be called the Shaksperian era of the History of the Tudors.

This Tudor-Stuart period of British history not only introduces us into, but keeps us within a perfect maze of romance. The passions and the capricious intrigues, personal, social, and political, of two clever scheming women, really rivals, yet outwardly friends, and entrusted with sovereign sway in troublous times, when policy has a tendency to sink or shrink into cunning, constitute the very first elements in the programme of a romance. There we have loves and hates, with lovers and enemies, of which not unfrequently the former are hated and the latter beloved. In these the contentings of ambition complicate still more the ravelled skein of events; while the jealousy of principals, the treachery of agents, the dishonesty of all more or less, bring about an embroglio which it is almost impossible to comprehend, and perfectly impossible to narrate with straightforwardness and consistency. Then public life in those times was as full of intrigue and passion, of alliances and misalliances, as private life was; political courtships and jiltings, jealousies and reconciliations, come about with nearly as little apparent causative agency as the drama of a dream. To get this inconsequent in consecutiveness, and this inconsecutive sequence mapped out and detailed, explained and expounded,

would be highly agreeable and pleasant, if one could only persuade one's self of the truth of it all, this romance of reality.

Whenever we have such combinations of persons and incidents, and endeavour to account for them, either as they were or as we suppose that they have been, we get involved in controversy, and controversy, too, which is nearly interminable. The varieties of emotion and motive which may be considered as capable of explaining these things satisfactorily, must vary greatly, according to our theory of life, history, morals, and politics. Where the facts of history are themselves romantic, and the motives which have led to them partake of romance, mystification is sure to becloud the minds of those who seek to comprehend them. Of what a web of romance has Elizabeth been the centre! Is not Mary Stuart's name suggestive of innumerable enigmas of the heart, of fate, and of policy? Leicester and Murray, Knox and Burleigh, Darnley and Babington, Philip of Spain and James VI. of Scotland—are they not riddles which are worse to read than those given by the Sphinx? Then there are the mysteries of the Vatican—Pius V., who excommunicated the queen, and of the sly, cold, sage Sixtus., who encouraged Philip II. in his Armada expedition; and there arise such events of interest as the massacre of the Huguenots in France, the Norfolk conspiracy, the French Alliance, the Irish Rebellion, the contests between the Crown and the Commons about constitutional rights, &c., all of them affording food for thought, as well as supplying elements for controversy. These, though Mr. Proude has often treated with surpassing skill, he has not always succeeded in solving, and indeed he sometimes seems to think that history is a field of research peculiarly full of insoluble problems.

While in these volumes we see no palpable evidences of the failure of the cunning of the author's hand, we think traces occur more frequently of a cynical scorn of the actors who play their parts before him. They do not appear to him the stately figures in the great pageantry of events which they have been represented to be. But he has himself here, to appearance, become a dupe to a fallacy of the imagination. He has got behind the curtains, and he has seen the preparations for the play; while those who have handed down their impressions of these actors have generally only been spectators, or have been but imperfectly acquainted with the whole action. Besides, the scorn with which he looks on the transactions of that time of intrigue is, in reality, in some measure the growth and product of the efforts these great actors made in their day to bring life into working order by inspiring action with new ideas. He, going back from the light of the present into the darkness of the past, sees the blackness intensified; they, pressing forward from the darkness of their own position into the light of the future, hoped much would be hidden which time has now revealed.

We hope, in our next, to supply selections on some of the above-noted points, which may indicate the value of these volumes, a

help the reader to comprehend the high rank assigned to Mr. Froude as the modern historian of Tudor England; in the meantime we present the following as a "taste of his quality :"—

THE DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH ARMADA.—To the ships at Plymouth the news was as a message of salvation. By thrift and short rations, by good management, contented care, and lavish use of private means, there was still one week's provisions in the magazines, with powder and shot for one day's sharp fighting, according to English notions of what fighting ought to be. They had to meet the enemy, as it were, with one arm bandaged by their own Sovereign; but all wants, all difficulties, were forgotten in the knowledge that he was come, and that they could grapple with him before they were dissolved by starvation.

The warning light flew on to London, swift messengers galloping behind it. There was saddling and arming in village and town, and musters flocking to their posts. Loyal England forgot its difference of creeds, and knew nothing but that the invader was at the door. One thing was wanting, a soldier to take the supreme command; but the Queen found what she needed, found it in the person in whom, in her eyes, notwithstanding his offences in the Low Countries, all excellences were still combined—her own Leicester. Worse appointment could not possibly have been made; but even Leicester was lifted into a kind of hero by the excitement of the moment. He was not a coward, and not entirely a fool. Tilbury had been chosen as the place where the force was to assemble which was intended to cover London. It was the lowest spot where the Thames could be easily crossed, and it was impossible to say on which side of the river the enemy might choose to approach. Leicester flew at once to his post there, and so far he had fulfilled his duty, that he had sixteen thousand men with him at Tilbury, with thirty thousand forming rapidly in his rear, out of the musters of the midland counties, before Parma could have advanced, under the most favourable circumstances, within a day's march of London.

Meanwhile, on the night of the 19-29th, while the Armada was still some leagues to the south of the Lizard, the wind blowing fresh into Plymouth Sound, the Queen's ships and a few of the privateers were warped out behind the shelter of Mount Edgecombe. All hands went merrily to work; vessel after vessel was brought to moorings behind Ram Head, so placed that they could fetch clear to the sea; and by Saturday morning, when the Spaniards were first sighting the coast of Cornwall, forty sail were lying ready for action under the headland.

The day wore on: noon passed, and nothing had been seen. At length, towards three in the afternoon, the look-out men on the hill reported a line of sails on the western horizon, the two wings being first visible, which were gradually seen to unite as the centre rose over the rim of the sea. On they swept in a broad crescent, slowly, for the air was light; and as the hulls showed clear, it was seen that report had not exaggerated the numbers said to be coming. A hundred and fifty, large and small, were counted and reported to Lord Howard, a few stray tenders bound for Flanders having sought the company and the protection of the mighty escort.

The English ships at once weighed, but showed themselves as little as they could. The evening was cloudy, with the wind hanging to the land. It was growing dusk when the Armada opened Plymouth, and then for the first time Medina Sidonia perceived that Howard was prepared for him,

and that if he wished it he could not enter the Sound without an action. There was not light enough for him to measure his enemy's strength. He saw sails passing continually between his fleet and the land, and vessels tacking and manœuvring; but confident in his own overpowering force, he sent up signals to lie-to for the night, and to prepare for a general action at daybreak.

About two o'clock the moon rose with a clear sky—a gibbous moon, no more than a half-circle,*but by the light of it the Spaniards perceived that sixty or seventy ships had glided out behind them, and were hovering at their rear just out of cannon shot.

The dawn was still, but towards eight o'clock the breeze freshened from the west. The Armada made sail, and attempted to close. To Medina Sidonia's extreme astonishment, it seemed at the pleasure of the English to leave him or allow him to approach them as they chose. The high-towered, broad-bowed galleons moved like Thames barges piled with hay; while the sharp low English sailed at once two feet to the Spaniard's one, and shot away as if by magic in the eye of the wind. It was as if a modern steam fleet was engaged with a squadron of the old-fashioned three-deckers, choosing their own distance, and fighting or not fighting as suited their convenience.

The action opened with the *Ark Raleigh*, carrying Howard's flag, and three other English ships, whose name the Spaniards did not know, running along their entire rear line, firing successively into each galleon as they passed, then wearing round and returning over the same course. The *San Matteo* luffed into the wind as far as she could, inviting them to board, but they gave her their broadsides a second time and passed on.

Astonished and confounded, as well by the manœuvring as by the rapidity of the fire, the Spanish officers could not refuse their admiration. They knew that they were inferior at sea, but how inferior they had not realized. The English were firing four shots to one, and with a fresh breeze even the galleasses could not touch them. Such artillery practice, and ships so handled, had never been seen. Alonzo da Reyva, in the huge *Rata*, attempted to cross the *Ark Raleigh*. Howard kept away as if to meet him, but ran by, and again fired into the *San Matteo*, which was lying head to wind, unable to move, and swept on upon his way.

The rest of the English ships were now engaged on the same conditions. The action continued through the whole forenoon, the Spaniards making efforts to close and always failing. Conscious of their disadvantage, they still fought bravely. "So far as we see," wrote Drake, "they mean to sell their lives with blows." But they had been flurried and surprised. Being to leeward, and leaning over to the wind, their shots had flown high and had scarcely touched the English ships at all, while they had themselves suffered considerably. The Biscayan flag ship, the *San Juan*, had her mainmast shot through in two places, many spars carried away, the captain wounded, and fifteen men killed. Oquendo had specially distinguished himself, being present wherever the danger was greatest, driving back into action vessels which were inclined to finish; but as the wind held, neither he nor any one could change the fortunes of the day, or enable the Spaniards to hurt an enemy whom they could not touch; and the rest of the English fleet coming out of the harbour, Medina Sidonia signalled to make sail up Channel, Martinez de Recalde covering the rear with the squadron of Biscay.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

875. Who was the author of "Cleanliness is next to godliness" ?

—M. F. P.

876. Is the following sentence correct?—"I have taken into partnership my two eldest sons." I cannot understand how a man can have two eldest sons. If not correct, how should it be put?—M. F. P.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

850. The following remarks of Thomas De Quincey, which occur in a paper on Coleridge, may be acceptable to the querist:—"By such accidents of personal or family connection as I have mentioned was the Lake colony gathered; and the critics of the day, unaware of the real facts, supposed them to have assembled under common views in literature—particularly with regard to the true functions of poetry and the true theory of poetic diction. Under this original blunder, laughable it is to mention that they went on to find in their writings all the agreements and common characteristics which their blunder had presumed; and they incorporated the whole community under the name of the *Lake School*. Yet Wordsworth and Southey never had one principle in common." De Quincey admits, however, that they agreed in "exchanging the old prescriptive diction of poetry, introduced between the periods of Milton and Cowper, for the simple and profounder forms of daily life in some instances, and 'the Bible in others.'" It was

Cowper who began that reform, as a reaction against Pope; Wordsworth and Coleridge followed the lead with boldness; Southey with hesitation. Byron revolted from it, as is well known, and reverted to the model of Pope.—O.

855. The three answers to this inquiry may readily cause some confusion in "Samuel's" mind. I believe the answer by "Walter S." relates to the father of the Rev. E. H. Bickersteth, respecting whom the inquiry is made. The answer by "Camus" relates to the son, but he should be described as E. H. B., and as *nephew* to the Bishop of Ripon. I may add that the Rev. E. H. Bickersteth, M.A., the son, is vicar of Christ Church, Hampstead, and chaplain to the Bishop of Ripon. He is esteemed a hard-working and faithful Christian pastor of the ultra-Evangelical school. To this his poem of "Yesterday, To-day, and For Ever," bears painful witness. It even goes to the extreme of representing a glorified soul increasing his celestial happiness by gazing over the verge of heaven at the distant, yet visible, eternal torments of the lost. Satan, too, is made to glorify God in noble strains, while yet his condition is set forth as for ever hopeless. The work contains many passages of unquestioned power, but in my view is far from being a healthily religious one.—W.

856. I expected to see a reply to this query from a Greek scholar, but no answer at all having been given, I beg to state as an opinion, being ignorant of the original language of Scripture, that the phrases S. S. inquires about are English, and

that they were first employed by the translators of the Bible. I cannot see that such phrases as "make haste," "By any means," &c., could possibly occur in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin. That their use in conversation is borrowed from Scripture, I do not at all think. There cannot be any doubt, I think, that they are as old as the English language itself. I think it likely that they would be employed by the earliest translators of the Bible. Wycliffe's version, for instance, presents to modern readers an excess of idiomatic and familiar phrases, and these would be more likely to be toned down and subdued than increased by the translators of the reign of James I. "S. S." can, I should say, get ample information upon the subject from any Church or other library. I think there was a special work upon the Bible and its translators issued a year or two ago.—WALTER SHERRINGTON.

858. Richard Crashaw (1616—1650) is the author of the words,—

"The modest water saw its Lord,
and blushed;"

or, as better written,—

"The conscious water saw its
God, and blushed."

It is a quotation from his volume of Latin poems,—

"*Nympha pudica Deum vidit, et
erubuit*."

(*Epigr. Sacra, Aquæ in Vinum
Versa*, p. 299). It is part of an epigram on John ii. 1—11.—S. R. G.

The line,—

"The modest water saw its Lord,
and blushed,"

is doubtless a misquotation of Aaron Hill's line,—

"The bashful stream has seen its
Lord, and blushed."

In Richard Crashaw's "Epigram-

meta Sacra," 1634, is a piece headed,
"Jeann. 2, Aquæ in Vinum Versa."
It runs thus:—

"Unde rubor vestris et non una
purpura lymphis?

Quæ rosa mirantes tam nova
mutat aquas?

Numen, convive, pumescens agnosce
numen,

Nympha pudica Deum vidit, et
erubuit."

Aaron Hill's familiar version is as follows:—

"When Christ at Cana's feast, by
power divine,

Inspired cold water with the
warmth of wine;

'See,' cried they, while in red-
dening tide it gushed,

'The bashful stream has seen its
Lord, and blushed.'"

The late Dr. Booker (I think) availed himself of a similar and equally pretty conceit in the lines which, it is said, he improvised in reply to a young lady who had asked him whether the rose was originally white or red,—

"To beauteous Eve's admiring sight
The rose expanded snowy white,
When, in an ecstasy of bliss,
She gave the modest flower a kiss;
And instantaneous, lo! it drew
Forth from her lips its blushing hue,
While from her breath its sweetness
found,
And shed new fragrance all around."

O.

859. The Rev. Frederick Temple, D.D., was the son of an officer in the army, and was born in Devon, 20th November, 1821; he is now, therefore, forty-eight years of age. He was educated at the Grammar School of Tiverton (founded in 1599), from which, in accordance with the will of Mr. Peter Blundell, the founder, being "aptest in learning," and intended for the ministry, he was elected to a Scholarship in

Balliol College, Oxford, in 1838, to endure for a period of seven years from his entrance at such college. At the Easter Term of 1842 he took his Bachelor's degree, standing "double-first" under most trying examinations. He was soon afterwards elected to a Fellowship in his college, and appointed mathematical lecturer therein. He was ordained by the Bishop of Oxford (S. Wilberforce) in 1846; and was almost immediately thereafter appointed Principal of the Government Training College at Kneller Hall, near Twickenham. He was one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools, 1855—1858. On the elevation of Dr. Goulburn to the Deanship of Norwich, 1858, Dr. Temple was chosen Head Master of Rugby. Here success has fully justified his promotion, and he has since been one of the living influences of Liberalism in Warwickshire. He was one of the Queen's chaplains, and chaplain to the Earl of Denbigh. He has been select preacher, and, in fact, delivered in St. Mary's, Oxford, the chief portion of that matter which constitutes the gist of his contribution to the "Essays and Reviews" which created such a sensation in 1860, and has caused such a disturbance now as to threaten a schism in the Church. Of this celebrated paper on the education of the world, our readers have had an abstract and a criticism presented to them, both brief and effective, in two papers on this renowned pamphlet contained in the *British Controversialist* for May and June, 1861. The "Sermons" preached in the chapel at Rugby, which have recently been published, are perhaps the best sermons to boys that have ever been delivered, and this we say with a full recollection of Dr. Arnold's manly and sensible admonitions. Dr. Temple is an educational reformer; he was an advocate for the

Disestablishment of the Irish Church, and he is an active member of the United Kingdom Alliance, at the evening meeting of the anniversary of which, 19th October last, he took the chair. The opposition threatened on his elevation to the see of Exeter is not, we should say, likely to affect the personal issue much, and it may bring on a crisis such as his opponents may not relish much, as it may precipitate an agitation for the disestablishment of that church, zeal for whose orthodoxy is given forth as the ostensible cause at least of the "mist and confusion."—R. M. A.

860. Baron Louis Dominique Louis, sometimes called the Abbé Louis, born at Toul in 1755, was one of the distinguished statesmen of the Empire. He was trained for the Church and took orders, but his interest in politics drew him away from the sacred office, and brought him into circles having participation in public affairs. In 1793 he came to England, and spent a few months in examining its constitution and government. He had appointments thereafter in several subordinate offices. In 1811, Napoleon nominated him a councillor of state, and soon afterwards created him a baron, and set him over the treasury, where he served his master well. As treasurer he refused to indemnify the allied powers in 1815, and was dismissed from his post. Louis XVIII. restored him to his office, where he exercised great influence, and where, at several critical junctures, he did prominent service to his king and country. To the remonstrance of the king on the failure of the finances he is said to have replied, "Give me a good policy and I will give you good finances"—a wholesome truth tersely put.—A. A. R.

862. Johnson, in his "Lives of the Poets," although he most fairly ad-

mits all the weak points in the character of Addison, is evidently not of the opinion that this illustrious mandied drunk. Nor does Macaulay, in his review of a Life of Addison, seem to have the slightest idea of that accusation. In fact, as recorded by both of these responsible men, Addison's death could not have been that of a drunkard.—S. R. G.

863. In all probability, the fundamental error referred to by Hugh Miller was Locke's exclusion, or rather ignorance of any ideas derived from an innate source. He allowed only sensation as the source of our ideas, and reflection as a means of representing what we so perceive.—O.

864. Probably the novel alluded to was "Bleak House." It has been said that Harold Skimpole was a caricature of Leigh Hunt. I do not believe it. It would suit Coleridge quite as well.—O.

In Dickens's "Bleak House" the character of Mr. Boythorn is said to be in the main that of Walter Savage Landor, and of Mr. Skimpole that of Leigh Hunt; but there is great doubt entertained as to their correctness as portraits by good judges. "A novice" should read Foster's "Life of W. S. Landor," and Leigh Hunt's "Autobiography," supplemented by his "Correspondence" and "Bleak House." On these he might then form his own judgment.—R. M. A.

865. It is supposed that Shakspeare wrote a hundred and fifty four sonnets, that were published in one volume and dedicated to the Earl of Pembroke. He wrote "Venus and Adonis," and the "Rape of Lucrece." Blake (1757—1828) the engraver lived in London and was well known to Coleridge, and, I believe, Wordsworth. He lived in the most extravagant belief that he held converse with the departed spirits of

such men as Homer, Dante, Milton, and Moses. He published "Songs of Innocence and Experience, showing the two contrary states of the human soul."—J. A. G.

866. To the question, What songs did Shakspeare write? the answer is easily culled from any edition of Shakspeare. The chief of them are—

"Blow, blow, thou winter wind"
 ("As you Like it").
 "Under the greenwood tree"
 ("As you Like it").
 "What shall he have that killed the deer?" ("As you Like it").
 "When daisies pied and violets blue"
 ("Love's Labour Lost").
 "When icicles hang by the wall"
 ("Love's Labour Lost").
 "Now the hungry lion roars"
 ("Midsummer Night's Dream").
 "Sigh no more, ladies, sigh no more"
 ("Much Ado about Nothing").
 "Tell me where is fancy bred"
 ("Merchant of Venice").
 "Where the bee sucks, there lurk I"
 ("Tempest").
 "Come away, come away, death"
 ("Twelfth Night").
 "Who is Sylvia? what is she?"
 ("Two Gentlemen of Verona").
 "Fear no more the heat o' the sun"
 ("Cymbeline").
 "Take, O take those lips away"
 ("Measure for Measure").

But more are to be had for the search.

To the question, Who is Blake? the only answer can be that he is, we hope, a beatified spirit. Who was Blake? is a question to which the editor is invited to give an answer at length, in the shape of a memoir of that highly gifted engraver, painter, poet, and seer.—O.

866. For reply to first half of this question, see "Songs and Sonnets of William Shakspeare," edited by F. T. Palgrave (Macmillan & Co.).—R. M. A.

866. For the answer to this question, see that to 849 on p. 472, in the vol. of the *British Controversialist* for 1869, July—December.

867. "Fit" signifies qualified, proper, suitable, convenient, right, but implies no moral or intellectual intention. "Fitting" implies this intention, and includes the further notion of becomingness; "fitly" and "fittingly" bear the same relation.—T. T. A.

868. "Equally as" signifies in similar proportion; "equally with," in a similar degree; proportion referring to share or quantity, and degree implying condition or state. Sometimes either word will suit the purpose, but sometimes words fitly spoken may not be fittingly spoken; they may be right enough in their matter, and yet very far wrong in their manner. We may employ gas equally with candles, but not equally as candles.—T. T. A.

872. To this I unhesitatingly reply, *Nemo*. There is hardly a more injurious thing that a young writer can do than to attempt to form a style upon the model of some great man, or some one, at least, that he thinks to be great. Every author has or should have his own style—his own way of putting and describing things; just as in conversation we soon recognise the peculiarities of those with whom we associate. Of course there are few minds so remarkable that they can be placed upon pinnacles of eminence, and readily isolated from others in all that they say or write; yet most might form themselves by practice and perseverance, so as to have a style which should be at least recognisable as having the impress of the

particular personality. "We imitate," it has been said, "just in proportion as we admire; and excessive partiality for some particular author produces attempts (sometimes unconscious) at copying his mannerisms; and it is always more easy to follow a man's blunders than his excellences. Hence, men of mark in the literary world are sure to have their schools of followers; we have a host of Carlyleists, who idolise and therefore aim at the style which the rugged prophet of Chelsea makes pliant to his purposes, but which woefully deceives all copyists thereof. So we have also Tennysonian imitators, who find, at any rate, not much difficulty in being obscure. Every young writer should read carefully the writings of our standard authors, of whom a list is easily made; and it may be well for him to write occasionally, by turns, as far as he can, in the manner of Addison, Macaulay, Johnson, De Quincey, and so on, but to change his author from time to time. I strongly advise any one interested in this subject to read the valuable essay on *Style* by the last-named gentleman, published in his collected works (Vol. x., pp. 158—292). A little paper in *Good Words* of 1863 on "Literary Work," by the late Alexander Smith, though brief, is suggestive. It has been republished in "Last Leaves" (Edinburgh, Nimmo), pp. 112—140. A careful study must also be made of standard works on the English language: such as those of Neil, Latham, and Craik; and Whately, and other writers on rhetoric and logic, should be consulted.—J. R. S. CLIFFORD.

The Societies' Section.

ATHENÆUM, GLASGOW.

A LECTURE on Condorcet, in connection with the Glasgow Athenæum, was delivered, December 29th, to a numerous audience in the large hall of the institution by John Morley, Esq., editor of the *Fortnightly Review*. Prof. George Ramsay presided, and on the platform were Professors John Veitch and Edward Caird; Rev. Dr. Craik, Rev. G. Burns; Messrs. Alexander Dennistoun, Miller, Strong, R. Leggat (chairman of the directors), and others.

Prof. RAMSAY, in introducing the lecturer, said Mr. Morley's connection with the *Fortnightly Review* was so well known to all those who made it their business to become acquainted with the best thought of this country, that he felt it quite unnecessary to do more than to mention his name. It was generally admitted, he believed, by every one—as well by those who agreed as by those who disagreed with the general tone of opinion which prevailed in the *Fortnightly Review*—that we had few periodicals, if any, which were so distinguished by the combination of high philosophical power with practical statesmanlike consideration of the means by which those principles could be carried into effect. Mr. Morley himself belonged to a class who were rising into prominence, and who, he ventured to say, had a great part before them to play in the history of our country—those, namely, who combined high culture and philosophic power with deep sympathy with the great masses of our population; or—if he were to make use of a distinction drawn a few days ago by the bishop

elect of Exeter, and which had been made the subject of comment in most of the newspapers of the day—those who combined the spirit of justice, which was the attribute of the many, with that high culture which was the privilege of the few. In conclusion, the Chairman spoke of Mr. Morley's qualifications to deal with the subject on which he was to lecture that evening, as evidenced in his fascinating life of our great English statesman Edmund Burke.

MR. MORLEY, who was received with applause, began by remarking that of the illustrious thinkers and writers who for two generations had been actively scattering the seeds of revolution in France only Condorcet survived to behold the first bitter ingathering of the harvest. Those who had sown the wind were no more; he only was left to see the reaping of the whirlwind, and to be swiftly and cruelly swept away by it. Voltaire and Diderot, Rousseau and Helvetius, had vanished; but Condorcet both wrote in the *Encyclopædia* and sat in the Convention; the one eminent man of those who had tended the tree, who also came in due season to partake of its fruit, at once a precursor and a sharer in the fulfilment. Yet in neither character had he attracted the good wish of any of those considerable sections and schools into which criticism of the Revolution had been mainly divided. As a thinker, he was roughly classed as an Economist; and as a practical politician he figured first in the Legislative Assembly, and next in the Convention. Now, as a rule, the political parties thr

had most admired the Convention had least sympathy with the Economists, and the historians who were most favourable to Turgot and his followers usually were most hostile to the great revolutionary chamber, alternately swayed by a Vergniaud, a Danton, a Robespierre. So between the two Condorcet's name had been allowed to lie hidden for the most part in a certain obscurity, or else had been covered with those taunts and inuendos which partisans in revolutionary epochs were wont to lavish on men of whom they did not know exactly whether they were with or against them. Few of the men of the Revolution had had so little cheerful justice done to them, because, as a rule, they were criticised in blocks and sections, and Condorcet could not be accurately placed under any of those chief schools. He was an Economist, but he was something more; for the most characteristic article in his creed was a passionate belief in the infinite perfectibility of human nature. He was more of a Girondin than a Jacobin, yet he did not always act any more than he always thought with the Girondins, and he did not fall when they fell, but was prescribed by a decree specially levelled at himself. Mr. Morley afterwards proceeded to sketch the career of Condorcet. He was born at a small town in Picardy in the year 1743. His father was a cavalry officer. His mother was a devout and trembling soul, who dedicated her child to the Holy Virgin, which, however, did not prevent him from growing up the most ardent of the admirers of Voltaire. His earliest instructors were the Jesuits, then within a few years of their fall. At the early age of seventeen, when the ardour of even the choicest spirits was usually most purely intellectual, moral and social feeling was rising

in Condorcet to that supremacy which it afterwards attained in him to so admirable a degree. He wrote essays on the integral calculus, but he was already beginning to reflect upon the laws of human societies and the conditions of moral obligation. In 1769, at the age of six-and-twenty, he became connected with the Academy, and about the same time, or a little later, in company with D'Alembert, went to Ferney and saw Voltaire, to whom he conceived the warmest attachment, while, in turn, Voltaire had the highest respect for him. The lecturer referred to the currents of opinion and circumstance in France when Condorcet came to take his place among her workers, and joined with eagerness in the reforming movement which set in with such irresistible velocity after the death of Louis XV. in 1774. The first political functions which he was invited to undertake were those of member for the municipality of Paris; when the Constitution was accepted, and the Legislative Assembly came to be chosen, the Parisians returned him for one of their deputies, and he was appointed one of the secretaries; and he was subsequently elected to the National Convention for the Department of the Aisne. There was afterwards noticed the accusation brought against him in Oct. 1793, before the Revolutionary Tribunal, of conspiracy against the unity and individuality of the Republic, when in absence he was condemned and outlawed. He was provided with a refuge by Madame Vernet, under whose roof he remained concealed for some months, which he spent in the composition of his memorable work on the progress of the human mind; but having afterwards quitted his hiding-place, he was arrested at Clamart, sent to Bourg la Reine, and cast into prison, where, next morning—

April 8, 1794—he was found dead, having perished of hunger and weariness, as some said, or of poison, as others said, ever carried by him in a ring. Mr. Morley concluded by referring to Condorcet's work as having been an exposition of the doctrine that there is a scientific order in the facts of human society, a definite science of the laws of social progress, discovered by a rational study of the historic experience of the race. This lecture forms one of the papers in *Fortnightly Review* for Jan.

WOOLWICH YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION.—The object of this association is to promote the spiritual good and mental welfare of the young men of Woolwich. It is perfectly unsectarian in its character, and nearly all the evangelical churches in the town are represented in its committee and members. The meetings are free to all young men, who are affectionately invited to attend them. They are held in Rectory Place Chapel Library on Sunday afternoons, at a quarter to three o'clock, and on Wednesday evenings at nine o'clock. The association possesses probably no very novel features, but it has one which is rather uncommon, i. e., "extemporaneous speaking." On an appointed night members bring with them in MS. such queries as they wish to get answered, and the secretary writes the names of the members present on slips of paper. The questions are then shaken up together, and so are the names. The chairman next takes a question indiscriminately from the heap before him, and reads it aloud. He then picks up one of the slips containing the names, and reads that aloud also. The young man named requires them to stand up at once, and reply to the question "off-hand," as best he can. This plan of ex-

temporaneous speaking was adopted in order to induce our silent members to speak, and it has in our experience proved to be very successful. After the query has been answered, any member may speak on it, and we have often had spirited debates on these queries as they were brought before us. The following subjects have been discussed (*inter alia*) on these occasions:—"Compulsory vaccination;" "Early closing;" "Conduct of House of Lords;" "Ritualism;" "Apostolic succession."

ADDISONIAN DEBATING SOCIETY, GLASGOW.—Alexander Smith's *debut* as a literary man was made at the Addisonian Society,—that is, a literary society for reading essays and debate, consisting of young men in the same position in life. He joined it in 1846, and was a member of it for seven years. His first essay astonished all his hearers. He had been previously almost silent as a member; but they had now discovered his ability, and he was tacitly by all placed in the first rank. Later in life Smith said to his biographer, "Well, that society did us both a vast amount of good; for myself, I know I derived much benefit from it. Through its means I was first stimulated to composition, and had my latent powers roused to action." Smith's essays were on "Intellect," on "Man," "The Claims of History," "Religious Poetry," "Earnestness," "Progress," "Life," and "Napoleon." His last and best essay, read in 1862, was on "Burns as a National Poet." —*Rev. T. Brisbane's "Early Years of Alexander Smith."*

THE METROPOLITAN CLUB.—There is at present in London a club newly formed, which is certainly one of the "signs of the times." It is called "The Metro-

political Club," and its object is the freest discussion of the great philosophical and religious questions of the day. It is to include representatives of all sections of thought, and a Tennyson and a Hurley, a Maurice and a Martineau, a Dean Stanley and an Archbishop Manning are to be among its members.

. . . This select vestry of master spirits and the works to issue from it may be of service in checking the reaction of mediæval imposture on the one hand, and of destroying some of "the beggarly elements" of a doting Protestantism on the other. —*Preface to the Rev. George Gilfillan's "Modern Christian Heroes."*

CARLISLE DEBATING CLUB.—At Carlisle a debating club has been formed under good auspices, and with fair prospects of success and usefulness. A recent meeting of the club was presided over by R. Potter, Esq., M.P. for the northern city, when the subject of debate was "Are the Principles of the National

Education League worthy of acceptance?" In the course of his introductory remarks Mr. Potter congratulated the members of the club on the successful formation of their society. He knew no greater charm in life than the possession of what he called sound eloquence. He knew no more than three or four men in the House of Commons who were really eloquent. Without exception, Mr. Bright was the most eloquent man in the House, and he always spoke with great feeling and great deliberation. On one occasion, when Mr. Bright was at his (Mr. Potter's) dinner-table, he, in talking the thing over, told him (Mr. Potter) that the secret of it was this:—"If you mean to speak, you must know what you are going to say in the first place, and when you have ascertained that, speak deliberately; in fact, bring out every word and syllable. If you do that, and have anything worth listening to, depend upon it you will be listened to."

Literary Notes.

A MEMOIR of Hugh Miller by Peter Bayne, who was for some years sub-editor of the *Witness*, under the interpreter of "The Old Red Sandstone," is nearly ready.

David Macrae has a work on "America, its Men, Manners, and Means," in the press.

The first issue of Tennyson's new volume amounted to 30,000.

1,100 Chinese books have been added by the gift of Wang Taon and Dr. Legge to the British Museum.

The private letters of Eminent Authors and Artists, received by G. P. Putnam, have been printed.

"The Life of Lord Palmerston," by Sir H. Bulwer, is nearly ready; vol. i. is in the press.

Dr. P. A. Nuttall, lexicographer, &c., died 10th Dec.

Dr. Charles Mackay has supplied "Medora Leigh: a History and an Autobiography" to the Byron controversy begun by Mrs. Stowe, who has a volume in her own defence just out.

A biography of Sir George Sinclair of Ulbster, by James Grant, the theologian, of the *Morning Advertiser*, has been issued.

It has been stated that Sir John Bowring is editing the Life and Letters of Wm. J. Fox.

It is proposed to erect a memorial of De Foe in Bunhill Fields.

It is perhaps a sign of the times, and the strong competition going on

among literary organs, that *Fraser's Magazine*, established in 1830, appears with the name of J. A. Froude on it as editor, thus publicly announcing a fact which has been known for years in literary circles.

Colburn's *New Monthly Magazine* has passed into new hands.

Meliora, after eleven years' good service in elevating the platform of Temperance advocacy, has been discontinued, as the *Alliance* believes that the liquor traffic has now secured keen enough critics in the ordinary organs of intelligent debate.

The *Morning Herald* has followed the *Morning Star* in going down.

The *Athenæum*, enlarged and somewhat altered in arrangement, is now managed by Sir C. W. Dike.

The *Register*, a magazine of biography,—"an off-shoot of the old *Gentleman's Magazine*," has, after a year's existence, been discontinued.

It has been proposed to establish an Historical Society in Scotland, for the publication of the early histories of that country, and documents of an authoritative nature regarding it.

J. H. Noyes promises a "History of Socialism in America."

Earl Russell's speeches and despatches have been prepared for the press and published.

A new edition of the prose works of Emerson has been issued in America.

A new Life of Mohammed will shortly be published by Syed Ahmed Khan Bahadoor, C.S.I., author of the *Mohammedan Commentary on the Holy Bible*. The author has perused the various biographies which have been written by Christian authors, but finds none of them has distinguished the apocryphal traditions from the genuine and accepted ones.

The Marchioness Campana, an Italian literary lady, is about to

publish a very extensive work on the Stuarts at St. Germain, which will comprise the substance of a large quantity of hitherto unpublished papers.

The Rev. Rowland Williams, D.D., author of "Bunsen's Bible Researches" in *Essays and Reviews*; "Hinduism and Christianity compared;" "Broad Chalke Sermon—Essays," &c., died 18th Jan., aged 58.

"Samuel Bailey of Sheffield" (of whom a biography appeared in *British Controversialist*, July, 1868) died 18th Jan.

The Life of John Wesley is to have illustration from several quarters. Might not the Wesleyan Book Board usefully bring all these efforts together, by announcing its intention to produce a proper and notable History of Wesley and Wesleyanism? Such a work would not want a public.

Dr. Franz Hüffer has issued the *Lyrical Poems of Guillem de Cabestanh*, a Troubadour of the twelfth century, and has prefixed to it a critical memoir of his romantic life.

St. Ignatius Loyola, founder of the Order of Jesus, is to be the topic of a new book by W. S. Rose.

Sir G. C. Lewis's *Letters*, edited by his brother, are to be published.

"The Life, Letters, and Works of Huss, the great Reformer, has been issued by M. Palacky.

Edward Dicey—formerly correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph*, and now editor of the *Daily News*—has in the press a work on "The East,"—and its questions.

A most important publication is about to appear in Florence. It is that of all the documents preserved in the archives of the Monastery della Cava. They relate principally to the Lombard rule in the kingdom of Naples, especially at Benevento, Salerno, Amalfi, and Capua. These are considered by the learned a rich mine of historic, palaeographic, diplomatic, and literary mediæval treasure.

The *Publishers' Circular* gives some statistics of the publishing trade during the year 1869; no less than 5,186 book titles have been registered in the lists of that publication in the year. But the actual number of new books and new editions is 4,669. Theology appears to be the most productive of all classes, as it is certainly the least subject to those fluctuations of seasons which affect the demand for lighter reading. Upwards of 1,000 publications are set down under this heading, against 461 new works of fiction, 600 juvenile works, 142 law books, 288 works of travel, 292 books of history and biography, 160 medical books, and 274 publications classed under "poetry and drama." When we come to look at the ebbs and flows of this great literary stream, some facts of interest present themselves. For example, the intimate connection between books and the fireside is shown in the fact that the numbers of books published rise from 249 only in September, to 522 in October, 479 in November, and 577 in December.

Dr. Lee, the Bishop of Manchester, has bequeathed his extensive library to the trustees of Owen's College. The library is unusually rich in valuable editions of the Holy Scriptures.

The minor poems of William Lauder, playwright, poet, and minister of the gospel, referring mainly to that year of famine and plague in Scotland, 1668, are to be edited for the Early English Text Society by Mr. Furnivall, from Mr. S. Christie-Miller's unique originals.

Garibaldi's work, "The Rule of the Monk," is to be published, early this month, in Italian, Spanish, Hungarian, and Dutch, as well as in English.

The life of "Walter, the Queen's Jester," will shortly be published.

L. D. Maurice is engaged in a

work on "Huss, Wycliffe, and Latimer."

"The Crime of December Second" is to be made the subject of a new novel by Victor Hugo.

W. C. Bryant's translation of the *Iliad* is in the (American) press.

E. Littré's great French Dictionary in its 23rd part reaches the letter R.

It has been resolved to record the proceedings of the University of Oxford, and for this purpose the Oxford University Gazette is "published by authority."

A new edition of M. de Cormenin's clever but unimpartial work "*Le Livre des Orateurs*" has been issued, revised and augmented.

Fragments of a hitherto unknown metrical version of Reynard the Fox, the La Vallière copy of an Italian "Plutarch" (the first book printed at Aquila, A.D. 1482)—a Wynkyn de Worde (Capgrave's "*Nova Legenda Angliæ*"), containing the suppressed Life of Thomas à Becket, A.D. 1716—and the first edition of J. de Voragine's "*Legende Dorée*," A.D. 1476, containing many singular passages not to be found in any subsequent edition—are to be sold this month.

Mr. Samuel Bailey has left the magnificent sum of £50,000 by his will to the town trustees of Sheffield for the benefit of the town.

J. O. Halliwell made a copy of a scarce tract, entitled "Humour's Looking-glass," by Samuel Rowlands, and this very rare work has been reprinted in J. P. Collier's yellow series of Reprints of rare tracts.

The "Tables of English Literature," by Prof. Henry Morley, are to be continued. They are most useful and effective means of bringing under the eye the whole course of letters in formal order and consecution.

Epoch Men.

THOMAS HOBBS, OF MALMESBURY.

"Thou great Columbus of the golden lands of new philosophies."—
ABRAHAM COWLEY.

"Hobbes is a great name in philosophy, on account both of the value of what he taught, and the extraordinary impulse which he communicated to the spirit of free inquiry in Europe."—JAMES MILL.

"There is an air of grandeur in the stern confidence with which Hobbes stands alone in the world of his own opinions, regardless of his contemporaries, and conscious that he is the founder of a new race of thinkers."—
WILLIAM HAZLITT.

To the larger proportion of ordinary readers in our day, the phrase "Thomas Hobbes, of Malmesbury"—*stat nominis umbra*,—stands the shadow of a name. Between 1839 and 1846, Sir William Molesworth edited and published, in a uniform and handsome set of sixteen octavo volumes, the entire works of this notable thinker, who, according to Sir James Mackintosh, "gave a new character to European philosophy." Prior to that time there had been no full and authorized collection of his writings published. Two Latin volumes in quarto, printed at Amsterdam, had been issued in 1668, in the eightieth year of their author's age, and a folio volume of his English works had been published in 1750, but there were numerous treatises and tractates, which were not included in either of these issues, which had become rare and costly, and were only to be gathered together with diligence, perseverance, and a full and ready purse. In college libraries one could get hold of an old-fashioned quarto bearing the somewhat quaint title of "*The Leviathan*," issued at London in 1652; and if he wished to help himself honestly or surreptitiously to the meaning of *Thucydides*, or the "*Rhetoric*" of *Aristotle*, an antique octavo of the former and a queer ugly thirty-twomo of the latter might be got at by the knowing. Even when Sir William Molesworth's edition was nearly completed, though it was dedicated to George Grote, the historian of Greece, and, then, one of the leading members of the House of Commons as an advocate of philosophical radicalism, the works of this bold and original thinker remained unhonoured and neglected in the publisher's shop, until, for a time, an accidental and adventitious interest was added to the publication. During the years 1841-5, Sir William Molesworth, who had represented Leeds previously, instead of holding a seat in the Commons, resolved on giving himself a second and sounder political education. Having fitted himself for renewed efforts in parliamentary life, Sir William Molesworth solicited the suffrages of the electors of the borough 1870.

of Southwark in 1845. Immediately thereupon the committee-rooms of "the free and independent electors of Southwark" became the centres of illumination in regard to the works of Hobbes, Molesworth's opponents representing him as an active disseminator of the writings of a great free-thinker in religion, and an advocate of despotism in politics; while his friends endeavoured to convince the possessors of the franchise in "the Borough" that the treatises of Hobbes "on Logic, Human Nature, and Government, were and still are deservedly admired as well for depth of thought as for exquisite precision of style both in Latin and English." Lectures and harangues on Hobbes abounded, so that along Blackfriars Road and in Horselydown the *Leviathan* was for a time a household word, and "the philosopher of Malmesbury" a theme for public talk. But the excitement of a contested election passed away, and with it departed too the memory of the fame of the nonagenarian thinker, whose wisdom or wickedness was "a matter of two hundred years old."

Sir William Molesworth after his election became an active administrative reformer, and devoted himself with energy and usefulness to the improvement of penal discipline and the development of colonial self-government. The labours in which he became thus involved impeded the progress of his literary and philosophical endeavours; and when he was suddenly stricken by the hand of death (October 22nd, 1856), he left behind him unfinished and in MS. some portion of a "Critical Biography" of Hobbes, an epitome of his philosophical tenets and political opinions in the sequence of their issue, and with notices of the modifications these had undergone in the course of his long thoughtful life, illustrations and elucidations of his career, and a large quantity of accumulated materials intended to have been worked up into a complete and consistent memoir of his life and times. These, it was long hoped by the philosophical world would eventually be issued in some available form by his colleagues in thought and purpose, John S. Mill and George Grote, but hitherto expectation has been balked, and no signs appear on the horizon yet.

It is, in our opinion, much to be regretted, that no adequate and exhaustive biography of this influential thinker—this "veritable force of nature, formidable, incorruptible, fresh still, after all these centuries, gnarled it may be like an English oak, but also with roots profound, holding by the earth, while slighter generations fall and disappear"—has as yet been given to the world; and that while the facts of the lives of his distinguished contemporaries, Bacon, Clarendon, Cudworth, Descartes, Grotius, Gassendi, Galileo, Locke, Milton, &c., should be fully known to most readers, there should be no standard and available memoir of this man, "who," as Bishop Warburton remarks, "with all his errors, we must allow to be one of the first men of his age for a bright wit, a deep penetration, and a cultivated understanding." Had this been done, we should not now so frequently meet as we do allusions to "Hobbes

the atheist ; " Hobbes, the apologist of despotism ; " " Hobbes, the prophet of libertinism ; " " Hobbes, the contemner of all religion, natural or revealed," &c., freely bandied about by persons who have never read the works in which these pernicious speculations are said to appear ; for then it would have been known that even his enemies declared that he was " a man who, besides his eminent learning and knowledge, has been always thought a man of probity, and free from scandal ; " that he was a consistent communicant of the Church of England, and believed that " Holy Scripture is the voice of God ruling all things by the greatest might."

These traditionary judgments of men can only be revised by a perusal of their works, and a study of the aims of their lives, a duty which John Austin, the jurisprudentist, pointed out could scarcely have been done by the more rancorous of Hobbes' revilers, seeing that his works were so scarce and costly that they could only with difficulty be procured. In fact, the prevalent opinion concerning Hobbes is only an echo from the time when the philosopher of Malmesbury was the terror of his age, when "the press sweat with controversy, and every young churchman militant would try his arms in thundering on Hobbes' steel cap." John Britton, the historian of Wiltshire, remarks that "the dogmatical style in which he wrote, and the pushing of some of his principles beyond their proper limits, added to the simple circumstance of his having been almost the first who attacked the prevailing notion respecting the foundations of religion and morals, are the chief causes which have operated to bring Hobbes' works into disrepute. His boldness created an alarm which few have been able to conquer, and which it is the interest of the prejudiced to keep up. Thousands reprobate his opinions, but not one in a hundred has actually looked into his works. The general judgment of him is formed upon the evidence of tradition only ; and hence the Tory condemns him as an enemy to royalty and the Whig as a supporter of despotism ; one calls him a Pyrrhonian ; another a materialist ; a third a deist ; a fourth an atheist ; in short, he is everything but a Christian ; yet not a sentence does he utter against our holy religion."

We have no fear ourselves of being classed among the advocates of "the selfish school of morals," or those who pander to the heterodox tastes of the times, because we invite to a consideration of the life and thoughts of one who has largely influenced the speculations of men, and been a stirrer up of the higher intellect of the country. "Many of the most important of the opinions of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—nay, not a few which form the very groundwork of their systems—will be found clearly propounded in the works of Hobbes." And, "notwithstanding the subsequent labours of Hartley and Mill, an intimate acquaintance with the ideas of the philosopher of Malmesbury is still indispensable for all who wish to acquire a mastery of metaphysical science." Hence we believe that those who will patiently and honestly take note of the

patent facts of his life and writings will accept as we do the opinion of the Rev. J. M. Moffat, in the "History of Malmesbury," that while, "like all other innovators in science, this great man experienced opposition and even obloquy from his contemporaries; yet impartial posterity will admit, that such merit as he possessed would have covered greater errors than he committed, and will allot him a distinguished place among those benefactors of mankind whose efforts have contributed to burst asunder the chains which ignorance and superstition had forged for the human mind."

James Mill unhesitatingly affiliates the speculations of Hobbes with the thought-sharpening era of the Reformation in the following terms:—

"The controversies roused by the daring attack of Luther on the established religion, had deeply, for a considerable time, engaged the minds of men on the great questions relating to the Creator, and his revelations to mankind. Philosophy, physical, mental, or political, was hardly an object of attention. A series of dogmas handed down by authority were passively received, and the very idea of inquiring into the foundation of them seemed to have passed away from the minds of men. Even the great effort of Bacon, to point the views of men to the proper object of physical inquiry, and to make them ardent in the pursuit, had not yet produced any considerable effects. With respect to the mental and physical sciences, they were hardly regarded as objects of inquiry. The opinions of Aristotle were taught as a branch of education; and the possession of them in the memory was all that even the most instructed men imagined they had any occasion to desire. In this benumbed and torpid state of the human mind, the appearance of such a man as Hobbes, who challenged so many received and fundamental opinions, and exhibited his own views with evidence and brevity, was calculated to produce very extraordinary effects. It is hardly, as Sir James Mackintosh somewhere acknowledges, too much to say, that the character of modern speculation was in a great degree determined by the writings of Hobbes."

To a similar view of the position and influence of the author of "The Leviathan," J. D. Morell assents; he says,

"The human reason had, in the person of Bacon, asserted for the department of science its independence of all former authority; the search after the foundations of truth was commenced by a master mind; but with this the tendency was already manifest, to fall back upon *the experience of the senses*, as the ultimate basis of the whole." "Hobbes, who had drunk deeply of the spirit of his master, began to philosophize just where *he* had left off. Many indeed were soon found to carry out this method in the department of physics to the most splendid results; but Hobbes was the only pupil who *began* by applying it, in its most empirical character, to metaphysics, morals, and politics." "Far would Bacon have been from following his pupil in these conclusions; but it can hardly be disputed that the germ of them was to be found in that empirical tendency which runs more or less through the whole of his philosophy." "The metaphysics of Hobbes indeed can by no means be considered brilliant efforts of genius, nor can they possibly serve as a basis upon which any deeply

thinking mind would rest in its search after the fundamental principles of human nature. Yet Hobbes was undoubtedly, of all the adherents of the Baconian school, the greatest writer of his age."

On this latter point, Sir James Mackintosh gives most unequivocal testimony in the following terms, which follow a full consideration of what he regarded as Hobbesian errors, and come before a full acknowledgment of the power of the deep-searching genius of the system-maker, whom, as akin in power of logical inference, he brackets along with and between Aristotle and Kant:—

"A permanent foundation of his fame consists in his admirable style, which seems to be the very perfection of didactic language. Short, clear, precise, and pithy, his language never has more than one meaning, which never requires a second thought to find. By the help of his exact method, it takes so firm a hold on the mind, that it will not allow attention to slacken. His little tract on 'Human Nature' has scarcely an ambiguous or a meaningless word. He has so great a power of choosing the most significant term, that he never is reduced to the poor expedient of using many in its stead. He had so thoroughly studied the genius of the language, and knew so well to steer between pedantry and vulgarity, that two centuries have not superannuated probably more than a dozen of his words. His expressions are so luminous that he is clear without the help of illustration. Perhaps no writer of any age or nation, on subjects so abstruse, has manifested an equal power of engraving his thoughts on the minds of his readers. He seems never to have taken a word for ornament or pleasure; and he deals with eloquence and poetry as the natural philosopher who explains the mechanism of children's toys, or deigns to contrive them. Yet his style so stimulates attention that it never tires, and, to those who are acquainted with the subject, appears to have as much spirit as can be blended with reason. He compresses his thoughts so unaffectedly, and yet so tersely, as to produce occasionally maxims which excite the same agreeable surprise with wit, and have become a sort of philosophical proverbs; the success of which he partly owed to the suitableness of such forms of expression to his dictatorial nature."

While expressing our regret at the non-publication of Sir William Molesworth's posthumous collection of materials and partially executed memoir, we should have misled the reader if he understood us to imply that authoritative notices were not extant and available, from which a biography may be constructed. This is far from being the case. We have in Molesworth's edition "*Thomæ Hobbes Malmesburiensis Vita—carmine expressa—Auctore Seipse*"—"The life of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, related in [Latin] verse, [written] by the author himself;" in his eighty-fifth year; *Thomæ Hobbes, Angli, Malmesburiensis philosophi Vita*—(A life of Thomas Hobbes, Englishman, the philosopher of Malmesbury, 1681. To this there is attached a preface to the reader bearing the initials R. B.—which Anthony Wood, in his *Athenæ Oxoniensis*, ascribes to Richard Blackbourne, M.A., of Trinity College, Cambridge, and M.D. of the University of Leyden; but these may

refer to Ralph Bathurst, clergyman, physician, and poet, President of Trinity College, Cambridge, who, in 1650, prefixed some much admired iambic verses to Hobbes' "Treatise on Human Nature." To the brief memoir—which Anthony Wood regards as a product of Hobbes' own pen—there succeeds "Vita Hobbiana Auctarium," attributed by Wood to Dr. Blackbourne, but by the editors of the "Biographica Britannica" ascribed to Thomas Rymer, editor of the "Fœdera, Conventiones et acta publica," and regarded as having been written to the dictation of Hobbes; Rymer edited, with a preface, Hobbes' "Historia Ecclesiastica," 1688. In Wood's "Athenæ Oxoniensis" and in Aubrey's "Letters from the Bodleian" we have farther materials for the biography of Hobbes: these, with the incidental references to himself in his controversial tracts, and notices of him by his adversaries and contemporaries, if properly employed, might supply a pretty copious and trustworthy memorial sketch. Uniting these to the information afforded in the encyclopædias, &c., we shall endeavour to gather into one the facts of his long literary life with as much brevity as possible consistent with completeness, pledging ourselves to accuracy of statement and honesty of epitome, but by no means committing ourselves to acceptance of his views or discipleship to his philosophy, whether as a mental, moral, political, or logical system. Our aim in this paper will be to give correct information on the events of the life of Hobbes, and to supply an interpretative exposition of his doctrines. We shall abstain as much as possible in the course of our narrative from the expression of critical opinions on his tenets, but we shall hold ourselves free to speak of the specific merits of such works as we notice. Our critical judgment shall be reserved for a concluding review of his place among thinkers and his worth as a philosopher, that is, as an expositor of reasoned truth.

William Hazlitt, in the first of a series of "Lectures on the Rise and Progress of Modern Philosophy," delivered by him at the Russell Institution, Jan. 14th, 1812, while he spoke of Lord Bacon as the originator of the method of *modern science*, expressed his conviction that Hobbes was the father of modern philosophy, and ingeniously traced the *origo et fons erroris* in each to "a wrong interpretation of the word *experience*, confining it to a knowledge of things without us; whereas it in fact includes all knowledge relating to objects either within or out of the mind of which we have any direct and positive evidence." He closed his lecture with the following sentences:—"The true reason of the fate which this author's writings met with, was that his views of things were too original and comprehensive to be immediately understood, without passing through the hands of several successive generations of commentators and interpreters. Ignorance of another's meaning is a sufficient cause of fear, and fear produces hatred; hence arose the rancour and suspicion of his adversaries, who, to quote some fine lines of Spenser,—

"Stood all astonished like a sort of steers,
'Mongst whom some beast of strange and foreign race
Unwares is chanced, far from his straying peers;
So did their ghastly gaze betray their hidden fears."

In that series of "Dissertations on the History of Metaphysical and Ethical Science" prefixed to the "Encyclopædia Britannica," which Haslitt's lectures suggested, we find Dugald Stewart, in speaking of the works of Hobbes, affirming that "they everywhere evince in their author, even when he thinks most unsoundly himself, that power of setting his reader a-thinking, which is one of the most unequivocal marks of original genius;" and asserting that "they will be found, on an attentive examination, to have had a far more extensive influence on the subsequent history, both of political and of ethical science, than any other publication of the same period. The influence thus acknowledged by Stewart has been traced by his continuator or supplementist, Sir James Mackintosh, in these terms (the entire accuracy of the characterisation in which we neither assent to nor concede):—

"The answers to the 'Leviathan' would form a library. But the far greater part have followed the fate of all controversial pamphlets. Sir Robert Filmer was jealous of any rival theory of servitude. Harrington defended liberty, and Clarendon the church, against a common enemy. His philosophical antagonists were Cumberland, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Clarke, Butler, and Hutcheson. Though the last four writers cannot be considered as properly polemics, their labours were excited and their doctrines modified by the stroke from a vigorous arm which seemed to shake ethics to its foundation. They lead us far into the eighteenth century; and their works, occasioned by the doctrines of Hobbes, sowed the seed of the ethical writings of Hume, Smith, Price, Kant, and Stewart; and in a less degree also of those of Tucker and Paley, not to mention Mandeville, the buffoon and sophister of the ale-house, or Helvetius, an ingenious but flimsy writer, the low and loose moralist of the vain, the selfish, and the sensual."

We have now, we think, shown with some pertinence, so far as authority can affect the question, that Thomas Hobbes is a man of whom it would be well to know something, if we wish to comprehend the progress of moral, metaphysical, or political thought, as one who has marked out the lines of speculation for the centuries; one of the parent-thinkers of the nations; one of the lights of philosophy history, and one of those whose opinions have affected not only the schools, but the nations. Thought is the inner essence of history, and, in the ultimate, the prime mover of our states, churches, and social life is the thinker. What is *motive power*? is the first question of the sage of Malmesbury. Tell us but that, and we shall soon discover all the other secrets of man's life and nature's operations, of science and of philosophy. Of him who has been one of the motive-powers of modern progress, let us seek to learn as much as it may concern us to know, that we may estimate the man and the thinker, his life and his speculations.

Malmesbury, a small, ancient town in Wiltshire—famous in literature in connection with the memories of St. Aldhelm, and William, the historian,—was the birthplace of Thomas Hobbes. His father, a clergyman of humble talents and a modest disposition, officiated in the church of St. Mary's, Westport, and in that parish the philosopher was born, April 6th, 1588, when Shakspeare was about twenty-four, Bacon twenty-seven, and Ben Johnson fourteen years of age. Having been prematurely born, in consequence of the terror felt by his mother at a rumour, widely circulated, that the Armada had left the Tagus, he was tenderly cared for and became a strong healthy child. His father, noticing the precocity of the boy, taught him early and carefully to read, write, and cypher; and when he was six years of age he had him engaged on Greek and Latin. In his eighth year he was placed under the care of Robert Latimer, Master of the Royal Grammar School of his native town. This Oxford scholar, finding the pastor's son a lad of pregnant intellect, sharpness of mind, and docility of temper, treated him with marked kindness, and stimulated him to earnest endeavours so successfully, that in his fourteenth year he was able to translate the sweet-flowing iambics of the *Medea* of Euripides into Latin verse of a similar measure. In 1603 he was, at the instance of his uncle, alderman of and glover in Malmesbury, transferred to the University, where he was entered as a student on the books of Magdalen Hall, Oxford, then newly advanced to independency as a college, and put under the Principalship of James Hussee, LL.D., who, however, was shortly afterwards promoted to be the Chancellor of the diocese of Salisbury, and was succeeded by Dr. John Wilkinson, who, in 1605, became Head of Magdalen, a position in which he remained for thirty-eight years. During the early part of his university career Hobbes was supported by his uncle, the alderman. While his studies were still in progress his uncle died, but in his will provision was made that the young scholar's career should not be interrupted for want of means, as he left him an annuity in token of his interest. At Oxford, as was usual at the time, Hobbes devoted his chief attention to the Logic and Physics of Aristotle, as they were then taught, with some reference to the speculations and innovations of Peter Ramus, and probably not in the originals alone, but also in the *Systema Logica* of Bartholomew Keckermann, published in 1600, which was then pretty popular, though the professor at Dantzic was so youthful and so boldly thoughtful. Logic he learned, and learned to reject. That, however, he had acquired and retained a competent knowledge of the *Moods and Figures* of the Syllogistic process is evident from his "Elements of Philosophy," Part I. on Computation or Logic, chap. 4, of Syllogism, where he says, "The Figures, therefore, of Syllogism, if they be numbered by the diverse situation of the middle term only, are but *three*; in the first whereof the middle term has the middle place; in the second, the last; and in the third, the first place. But if they be numbered according to the situation of the

terms simply, they are four; for the first may be distinguished again into two, namely, direct and inverted. From whence it is evident that the controversy among logicians concerning the fourth figure is a mere *logomachia*, or contention about the name thereof; for, as for the thing itself, it is plain that the situation of the terms (not considering the quantity or quality by which the moods are distinguished) makes four differences of Syllogism, which may be called *Figures*, or have any other name at pleasure." He subsequently says that "the doctrine of moods and figures is clearly delivered by others that have written largely and profitably of the same." There were upwards of sixty distinguished writers on logic during the student years of Hobbes, and he seems to have been stirred by several of them, as is not uncommon among youths, to contemn speculations which led to so much restlessness of thought and uncertainty of method, rather than to the entertainment of a qualified estimate of the real advantages of what it actually did teach and explain.

Of physics, or the phenomena of nature, he was a more ardent admirer than of psychics, or the phenomena of mind. He was charmed with the realities into the presence of which they introduced him, and was delighted with the diagrams, charts, and visibilities by which they aided the mind to comprehend the mysteries of phenomena. He loved the books which taught him so much of what was new and seemed so true. From the references made by him to the various opinions entertained by Aristotle in regard to the nature and processes of phenomena, and from the way in which he notices the views of the elder thinkers, of whose views Aristotle presented abstracts and syllabuses, it might be presumed that Hobbes had obtained a very complete knowledge of the contents of those singular works in which the great stagyrite has preserved a sort of encyclopædic epitome of ancient science. But we know that Hobbes at a later period, and with more acute and accurate skill, re-studied the philosophical works of the most notable of the systematical thinkers of Greece, and that he was thus led to separate and distinguish what he calls *Aristotelity* from philosophy. Of his favourable allusions to Aristotle the following may here be quoted as connected with the studies pursued by him at the University of Oxford. They will show that he had attained to a proper conception of the great merits of the sage of the Lyceum, while he was wise enough to perceive the confusion made in philosophy by the continually-recurring assumption that the laws of the understanding and the laws of external nature are co-equivalents, and that by the dexterous linking of syllogism to syllogism we can construct in thought a rationale of the external physical cosmos:—

"Philosophy is the knowledge of natural causes. And there is no knowledge but of truth. And to know the true causes of things, was never in contempt, but in admiration. Scorn can never fasten upon truth. . . . Some, but few, there be that have studied it for curiosity, and the delight

which, commonly, men have in the acquisition of science, and in the mastery of difficult and subtil doctrines. Of this last sort I count Aristotle, and a few others of the ancients, and some few moderns: and to these it is that properly belong the praises which are given to philosophy. . . . All doctrine begins at the understanding of words, and proceeds by reasoning till it concludes in science. . . . Words understood are but the seed, and no part of the harvest of philosophy. And this seed was it which Aristotle went about to sow in his twelve books of *metaphysics*, and in his eight books concerning the hearing of *natural philosophy*. And in these books he defineth time, place, substance or essence, quantity, relation, &c., that from thence might be taken the definitions of the most general words for principles in the several parts of science."

In 1607 Hobbes took the degree of Bachelor of Arts, and was almost immediately thereafter, on the recommendation of the Principal of his college, engaged as tutor to William, Lord Cavendish, eldest son of the Right Hon. William Cavendish, Lord Hardwicke, who was shortly afterwards (1618) patented as the Earl of Devonshire. This nobleman, second son of Sir William Cavendish, biographer of Cardinal Wolsey and founder of Chatsworth, sought an able and trustworthy person to whom he could confide the moral and intellectual up-bringing of the inheritor of his state and estate: and it is no slight testimony to the precocity of Hobbes' genius and the propriety of his conduct, that, at the age of twenty, he should have been appointed to be companion of and instructor to a young nobleman of such position and promise, but that he maintained his influence, and attained the favourable regard, not only of his employer, but of his pupil, and all the members of the Devonshire family. Hobbes was judicious, industrious, versatile, and lively, as well as wise. He interested himself in all the pursuits, occupations, and amusements of his charge, and gained his confidence and friendship most thoroughly by his generous encouragement of all that was ingenuous and ingenious in the young man, and taking part with him, not only in the toils of the study, but in the perils and pleasures of the chase. Baron Hardwicke, who was a shrewd discerner of men, saw and approved of the method of training employed, and reposed such confidence in the tutor of his son, that when, in accordance with the fashion of that age, it was thought proper that the young nobleman should see the world, and so enrich his mind with variety of knowledge, rectify and exercise his judgment by observation and experience, and learn to conform his outward manners to the courtesy and grace of polite life, his lordship, in 1610, advanced Hobbes to be companion and secretary to Lord William Cavendish on his travels. In this way Hobbes had the opportunity of passing through France, Germany, and Italy, of observing men, manners, and cities, and of acquiring a thoroughly practical mastery of the languages of France and Italy, as well as of gaining a knowledge of the philosophy and literature of those times. On his return from the Continent Hobbes was installed as a retainer of the family, apparently on the footing of

friend and secretary. By the kindness and liberality of his patron he had plenty of leisure and full access to books, so that he might increase his attainments and indulge in the delights of studious hours. So favourably situated, Hobbes determined on a course of self-culture, which was preceded by a careful examination of his acquirements and inclinations. He found his mind indisposed to concur in the philosophy and logic he had learned in the schools, and discovered that, while pursuing continental travel, and the studies it suggested or involved, his classical skill had failed, and his knowledge of the language of the learned needed revision.

With sedulous diligence he fixed on a course of reading which included Horace, Virgil, and Plautus; Homer, Aristophanes, Sophocles, Euripides, &c., the Greek and Roman historians, and the annalists of more recent times. This, he said, was the brightest and happiest period of his life, so pleasing in the retrospect that the very dreams of his old age recurred to it as delightful and profitable.

While resident with the Earl of Devonshire in London, he was brought into connection and familiar intercourse with the men of the time most distinguished for genius, speculative ability, and wit. During this period he became the friend of Lord Bacon, and entered with delight into his views for the reformation of philosophy, so far assisting him and coinciding with him in his splendid efforts, as to translate several of the treatises of the author of the "*Instauratio Magna*" into Latin, as his lordship of St. Alban's found him of ready conceptive ingenuity to comprehend his ideas, and of fluent skill in Latin to express them with notable precision. Among the other friendships of this period, the memory of which he delighted to recall, we may note that of the author of the "*De Veritate*," Lord Herbert of Cherbury, an acute and singular thinker, with whom he had much fellow-feeling; of Sir Robert Ayton, the Scottish poet and courtier, who was noted for the fineness of his taste and the elegance of his critical scholarship; and of Ben Jonson, the dramatist, to whose scholarship he paid the compliment of submitting his translation of "*Thucydides*" for revision.

The Earl of Devonshire died March 3rd, 1625, little more than three weeks before the demise of James I., and Hobbes supplies us with this character of his excellent patron:—

"By the experience of many years I had the honour to serve him, I know this; there was not any who more really, and less for glory's sake, favoured those that studied the liberal arts liberally, than my Lord your father did; nor in whose house a man should less need the university than in his. For his own study, it was bestowed, for the most part, in that kind of learning which best deserveth the pains and hours of great persons, history and civil knowledge, and directed not to the ostentation of his reading but to the government of his life and public good. For he read, so that the learning he took in by study, by judgment he digested, and converted into wisdom and ability to benefit his country; to which also he applied himself with zeal; but such as took no fire either from faction or ambition. And as he was a most able man, for soundness of advice and clear expres-

sion of himself, in matters of difficulty and consequence, both in public and private; so also was he one whom no man was able either to draw or jostle out of the straight path of justice." "To his equals he carried himself equally, and to his inferiors familiarly; but maintaining his respect fully, and only with the native splendour of his worth. In sum, he was one in whom might plainly be perceived, that honour and honesty are but the same thing in the different degrees of persons."

The translation of the "Eight Books of the Peloponnesian War," written by Thucydides, the son of Olorus, interpreted with faith and diligence, immediately out of the Greek, by Thomas Hobbes, secretary to the late Earl of Devonshire," from the epistle dedicatory to which the foregoing quotation is made, appeared in 1628, though it had long lain in MS. in its writer's desk. "Its merit lies principally in the simplicity and force of the language, bearing in that respect some affinity to the original." He was led to engage in the making of this version by his anxiety to indicate the evils of popular government, "in order to lay open to his fellow-countrymen the follies of the Athenian democracy;" and "with an honest view of preventing, if possible, those disturbances in which he was apprehensive his country would be involved, by showing, in the history of the Peloponnesian War, the fatal consequences of intestine troubles." By inference and suggestion he designed this publication to be an instance of history teaching by example the evils of civil tumult, the waves of which seemed to him to be rising round the throne of Charles I. Hobbes took great care in the printing of this work, prepared complete and excellent indexes, drew maps with his own hand for it, and superintended the engraving of them; and it was brought out in so handsome a style as to be fit for the few and better sort of people, as well as of being presented to his patron, pupil, and friend.

Scarcely had the Earl an opportunity of giving any sign of his estimate of the compliment paid him or any indication of his opinion on its purpose, for in June, 1628, he died, leaving behind him a son about ten years of age, under charge of his widow, the Dowager Countess of Devonshire. Hobbes was deeply grieved at the early death of the Earl, who was about two years younger than he was, and expressed sincere gratitude for the generous friendship which he had accorded to him. To engage his thoughts and give a new turn to his interests, Hobbes gladly accepted an offer made to him, of the office of travelling tutor, to the son of Sir Gervase Clifton, a gentleman of rank in Nottinghamshire, and with him he remained eighteen months in France, chiefly in Paris. Here it was that, by a sort of accident, his notice was directed to mathematics. Opening a copy of Euclid, in the house of a friend to whose library he had access, his eye was arrested by the 47th Prop. Book I. He read the theorem with astonishment, and emphatically asserted that, notwithstanding the beautiful illustrative diagram, the truth of the statement made was impossible; nor could he be satisfied that it was otherwise till he had studied the whole of the preceding

demonstrations back to the first. Charmed with the clearness of the proofs employed in mathematical reasoning, he read and re-perused the book with great application and extraordinary pleasure, not for the sake of the results, but for the excellency of the method of demonstration. Henceforward his contemplations were earnestly directed to mathematical studies, and to the excogitation of the problems of physics. It must be confessed, or at least admitted, that, like most late learners, he was inclined to over-estimate his acquirements in this branch, and to speak with a dogmatism upon mathematical questions which his culture and knowledge did not justify. In the mathematical disputes, especially concerning the quadrature of the circle—the insoluble problem of the science of certainty—to which he devoted many years and several books, he does not appear to the best advantage, either as regards temper or intelligence.

In 1631 he was requested by the Dowager Countess of Devonshire to take under training the scion of that noble house, to whose father he had been so faithful a preceptor. To this flattering solicitation he speedily and delightedly agreed, and during the seven succeeding years laboured diligently with this boy to make him worthy of his parentage and position. The boy was diligent, faithful, and loving, and amply repaid the care bestowed upon him by his illustrious tutor, by his ardour in study, and by the extent of the acquisitions he made in the various departments of learning, logic, literature, philosophy and mathematics, to which his energies were directed. The latter portion of these seven years was spent in travel with his youthful charge in France and Italy, a large portion of the time being spent in Paris in the study of natural philosophy. In the French capital he formed the acquaintance of one of the most learned writers of that period, Marinus Marsennus, commonly called Father Marsenne, friar of the order of the Minims. This philosopher and mathematician was then one of the most celebrated men in Paris, and was the friend and correspondent of most of the thinkers of the age. At this time he was experimenting and collecting facts for his chief work, published in 1636, entitled "Universal Harmony." The influence of this popular and powerful mind was highly beneficial in the direction of the philosophical studies of the English scholar.

It is not a little remarkable, in our day, when the persistence, conservation, and indestructibility of force form the fundamental terms of physics, to find the prescient Hobbes declaring that "the gate of natural philosophy universal" is "the knowledge of the nature of motion." *Science* he regards as "the knowledge of the causes of things," and he affirms that "they have all but one universal cause, which is motion." "The variations of fancy, or (which is the same thing) of the phenomena of nature, have all of them one universal efficient cause, namely, the variety of motion;" all the "qualities called sensible are, in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth our

organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but diverse motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion." "Heat does not cause light at all. But in many bodies the same cause, that is to say, the same motion, causeth both together; so that they are not to one another as cause and effect, but are concomitant effects, sometimes, of one and the same motion." "The alterations of the things we perceive by our five senses are made by the motion of bodies, for the most part, either for distance, smallness, or transparency, invisible."

Having regard to the most advanced scientific teaching of our own day—that "the manifestation of life and the display of phenomena" are only modes of force, energy, or motion; that science detects everywhere, under its infinite variety of appearance, the same primeval force; that motion is but a mode of action of force, and that light, heat, electricity, galvanism, chemical affinity, attraction and repulsion, perhaps even life and mind, are only force in its different modes of action, capable of interchange and transference—we are justified in considering that a supreme moment in speculative thought, when at Paris, in 1634, the question flashed into the mind of Hobbes, What is it that causes anything to pass out of rest into motion? "Seeking first of all to know what that kind of motion might be which produces the phantasms of the senses and of the understanding and the other properties of animals." If we can discover the cause and the laws of motion, we shall have penetrated the great secret; for motive-power is cause and influence and life and liberty. What will move—things, thoughts, passions, men, and states? In the answer to that question lies the essence of all wisdom. "Wisdom, properly so called, is nothing else but this; *the perfect knowledge of the truth in all matters whatsoever*. Which being derived from the registers and records of things, and that as it were through the conduits of certain definite appellations, cannot possibly be the work of a sudden acuteness, but of a well-balanced reason; which by the compendium of a word, we call *philosophy*. Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or generation; and again, of such causes and generations as may be from knowing first their effects." "The first beginnings of knowledge are the phantasms of sense and imagination," but "the variety of all figures [or phantasms] arises out of the varieties of those [previously mentioned] motions by which they are made, and motion cannot be understood to have any other cause besides motion."

The very birth-epoch then of the science of our own day is 1634, and the very core-thought of it is that of Hobbes—what is *motive-power*? This fact justifies our recalling attention at this time to the thinker whose ideas permeate all science and influence all philosophy, whose name is in disrepute, but whose aim and effort are now being reapplied by the highest authorities in British physics as their chief claim to fame, as novelties and marvels of modern

generalisation and discovery; as maxima which suffice for the unriddling of all the mysteries of physics and psychics. To his work may be traced not only the most important of the opinions of Locke and Berkeley and Hume; of Hartley, James Mill, and Alexander Bain; but those also of Comte and Spencer and Littré in metaphysics, and of Huxley, Tyndall, and Beale among our own thinkers; as well as—if we have been rightly informed—of Brücke, Haeckel, and Schultze among the Germans; and of Buchner, Dujardin, and Lereboullet among the French leaders in science. If the new alone is the true, and the popular is also the oracular, then the prompter of the popular oracles of this day in the scepticism called positivism, is an old teacher whose prophecies have not certainly been improved with age and the semi-oblivion into which they had fallen. If the germ-thought of the philosophy of our time, which makes man no more than

"Chrystalline dust beneath the foot of force,
Complicate, full of law and full of light,
But only dust"—

is to be accredited to the proper first planter and original propagator, Hobbes is undoubtedly the father of the modern school of positivist thinkers, whether physical or metaphysical.

In 1635, when in Italy, Hobbes visited Galileo Galilei (who was born in the same year as Shakspere, at Pisa) one of the most famous of the *Lynxes*, as the Italian mathematicians and physicists named themselves; "as if they proclaimed that it was in their constitution still to see when it might be dark to others, and that their occupation of penetrating the recesses of nature, seizing facts that eluded the common search, and holding them as if in permanent excruciation within the fangs of their definite relations of magnitude, weight, and number, might be carried on when poets were asleep, metaphysicians jaded, painters poor and meretricious, and orators without employment." This illustrious man, of "wondrous brain, great thoughts, and cross-grained fate," was then living at Villa d'Arcetri, at a short distance from and on the south side of Florence, under restrictions imposed upon him by the Holy Office of the Inquisition, in his seventy-first year, with eyes yet clear and luminous enough to scan the sky and gladden a twin spirit. Their souls clave to each other, and they became fast friends. Hobbes speaks of him as the opener of the gate to a true natural philosophy; and he sympathized with him as the endurer of the brunt of that contest which new thought must always wage with old belief at the time when it ventures over the perilous edge of hypothesis, and claims to be regarded as the truth.

In 1636, while still resident in Florence, Hobbes issued a poem of 640 lines in Latin hexameter verse, entitled "De Mirabilibus Pecci," i. e., on the wonders of the Peak of Derbyshire, "the Alps of England," the main ridge of the watershed which parts the rivers which flow on the eastern side of the island from those whose course

is directed westward. This poem, though then first published, had been in MS. for a considerable time previously, and appears from internal evidence to have been composed about ten years prior to its issue. It is said to have been republished thirty years afterwards, and it is known that, in 1678, the Latin text was issued accompanied by a translation into English, of no great merit or accuracy, "by a person of quality." In the interval, 1681, Charles Cotton, translator of Montaigne's *Essays* and Izaak Walton's friend, published an English poem entitled "The Wonders of the Peak," but it has no connection with or reference to Hobbes' poem. The reason given for the translation is, that the Latin poem "hath got such a reputation that many English readers had a great desire to be acquainted with it." In 1637 he returned with his pupil and restored him to his mother and his country; at the very time when the "Condition of England question" was in the *ardor controversiæ* between prerogative and popular freedom, prelacy and puritanism; and progress and order were alike threatened and in jeopardy.

The peace of the kingdom was endangered, and Hobbes, who had seen and known in continental travel the havoc and disaster caused by civil strife—the battles and sieges, marchings and counter-marchings, famines and massacres, which a war, especially a religious war, involves, shrunk from the idea with horror of spirit. Two-thirds of "The Thirty Years' War" had run its course, and the threads of the craft of Richelieu had been broken by the sword and knit again by diplomacy. This vortex and whirlpool of interecine struggle Hobbes thought Britain was in danger of drifting into, by the alliances and intrigues in which it seemed to him inevitable the several parties, king and commons, would be sure to get entangled, and he, like all the great thinkers of the time, regarded *peace* as the greatest national blessing which could be had, and believed that due considerateness in the opposing parties would lead to an amicable truce of strife, as far as war was concerned, and a relegation of the debate to common sense and political arbitration. He little knew the force of passion and the might of excited patriotism; he had not felt the heat of blood and the heaving of the heart; he had heard of the difficulties between the king and the parliament as reports, he had not been in the stir of the conflict and the stress of the strain. To the philosopher it was a puzzling problem demanding patient investigation, to the patriot it was a practical difficulty requiring instant solution.

Moved with just grief for the calamities of his country, and not so anxious for "the maintenance of parties as for the establishment of peace," Hobbes bent the whole force of his thoughts on politics, thinking that "it might contribute to the public tranquillity if he composed an antidote against those pestilential opinions which began to prevail;" and this desire led him to register certain principles, observations, and remarks," which were subsequently incorporated in his work, "*De Cive*"—of which a few copies were

issued in 1642; and those opinions were afterwards amplified and systematized into the larger and more celebrated work, called "The Leviathan." "De Cive," however, was not definitely published till 1646, and while in Paris he had put into the press at London—where, thanks to Milton's noble advocacy, the liberty of printing was allowed—his treatises on "Human Nature," and his "De Corpore Politico." These constitute a *tripos*. "De Cive" is an exposition of moral and political philosophy; "Human Nature" contains his opinions on the constitution of the mind of man, and is the germ work of modern psychology; "De Corpore Politico" is a work on the nature of civil society; it is an enlarged reiteration of the opinions expressed in the "De Cive"—opinions which, with a more intense faith, earnestness, and persistency, he has elaborated in his main and mighty work, "Leviathan."

But we must return for a little to trace his life career up to this point. On 3rd November, 1640, Parliament opened—the Parliament in which Strafford was impeached and Laud was accused of treason. The turn which matters were taking in Scotland and in England appeared certainly, to Hobbes, to portend civil discord and an appeal to arms, and he determined to proceed to Paris to pursue philosophy. Here in the enjoyment of the friendship of Mersenne, Peter Gassendi—the most philosophic of literary men, and the most literary of philosophers—the versatility of whose talents and the variety of whose learning secured him a reputation as scholar, astronomer, naturalist, and theologian; Samuel Sorbière, historiographer of France, translator of More's "Utopia," Camden's "Britannia," &c., a man who, as Voltaire sarcastically said, had rubbed himself against several scientific personages, and had caught the infection of science slightly; and Anthony Arnauld, whom the Port Royalists called "the great," a very notable philosophical thinker, whose love for truth was a passion and a religion. Through Mersenne he also became a correspondent of René Descartes, author of the "Discourse on Method," then engaged upon his "Prima Philosophia," subsequently published at Amsterdam in 1644. In company, converse, and correspondence with these men, Hobbes thought out the scheme of metaphysics, politics, morals, and science, which had long been forming in his mind and stirring him to effort.

He was living among men who had determined on renewing the whole foundations of human thought. Paris was the vital centre of the movement for renovating the philosophy of the age. Authority had been shaken in the Church, in the State, in philosophy, in morals, and in science. Thought was in a ferment, and new system after new system was proposed, calculated to reduce the disorder of speculation, and to attain to sure, certain, and trustworthy conclusions. Every new thinker had his work eagerly perused by the reflecting, to see if in it there was any true guiding light for the world, any ground and ultimate discoverable, which could be recognised as lasting and unquestionable truth. Authority

had been succeeded by chaos, and no basis on which a durable superstructure of duty, life, and thought could be built, seemed to be attainable. Gassendi advocated trust in facts, Descartes in thought, Arnauld in reasoned faith, Hobbes in philosophy, in reasoning founded on the facts of nature and mind. They were all agreed that a clean sweep should be made of all hitherto accepted credences, and that a thoroughly new bottom should be found on which to rest the new and true philosophy of modern life. Religious dogma, scholastic logic, traditionary morals, hereditary politics, and science subsidiary to dogma and tradition were all to be set aside, and a new authority found in the inner recesses of a searched out fundamental truth, on which all else might find standing space and a building-firm position.

To different thinkers the investigation into the great need of the time assumed different forms. In the mind of Hobbes, who saw authority dethroned by Luther, Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes, it took the form of the question, what is the source, nature, and inner essence of authority—the motive power of life and the index of duty? If the place of man in the universe as a reasonable being is to be found—and found it must be before a brave and conscientious life can be led—it must be discovered by an investigation into the first and prime element of authority, what man must regard as authoritative, and therefore of power within him as regards personal, social, political, intellectual, and religious life. Authority or power must always be a requisite of human life; without it chaos must prevail, and anarchy destroy alike man's peace of mind and the peace of nations. In science, authority is found in *facts*; in philosophy, in reason in morals, in conscience in politics, in sovereignty (under any determinate form, monarchy or republic); in religion, in faith (properly regulated and reasonable). This is the grand theme of Hobbes. It suits sectarists and party men to make him a bugbear, and to accuse him of being a sceptic and a special pleader for tyranny. Though we repudiate many of his opinions and much of his reasoning, we deprecate unrighteous judgments such as these, and claim a re-hearing on behalf of a man maligned and misunderstood, sometimes in ignorance and sometimes in malevolence—the author of “The Leviathan.”

“The Leviathan” was published in London in 1652, during the time of the Commonwealth, while Charles the Second was an exile at Paris, and while Hobbes was at Paris also. The expatriated Royalists who surrounded Charles, many of them zealous Churchmen and scholars of the universities, read it with the strongest repugnance, and denounced it as an apology for Cromwell. Hobbes became the object of their bitter enmity, and was even forbidden to appear in presence of the young king, though he had previously officiated as his mathematical teacher. So violent was the enmity of the Royalists, that Hobbes was actually afraid that they would assassinate him; and he called to mind the fate of Dr. Doriolaus and Mr. Ascham, as ambassadors of the English Commonwealth at

the Hague and Madrid, who had both been murdered by Royalist assassins at those capitals. Such was his apprehension, that he, the loyal tutor of Charles the Second, found himself compelled to leave Paris immediately, and to seek protection under the Commonwealth of England. It was midwinter, the snow was on the ground; he had to undertake the journey at this inclement season, though he was then sixty-four years of age, with bad roads and a tumble-down horse. On arriving in London he reported himself to the Council of State, who did not in any way molest him. Every man in England, he says, might study or write what he chose, provided he was content to live *more loci*. His own account of these events, his estimate of the morality of the Royalists, and his idea of the character of the councillors by whom both Charles the First and Charles the Second were guided, is eminently curious.*

* From a paper by George Grote, in the *Spectator*, 15th April, 1839.

HOW TO AVOID ENGLAND'S DECADENCE.—If war is to be made by money and machinery, the nation which is the largest and most covetous multitude will win. You may be as scientific as you choose; the mob that can pay more for sulphuric acid and gunpowder will at last poison its bullets, throw acid in your faces, and make an end of you; of itself also in good time, but of you first. And to the English people, the choice of its fate is very near now. It may spasmodically defend its property with iron walls a fathom thick a few years longer—a very few. No walls will defend either it or its havings against the multitude that is breeding and spreading faster than the clouds over the habitable earth. We shall be allowed to live by small pedlar's business and ironmongery—since we have chosen those for our line of life—as long as we are found useful black servants to the Americans, and are content to dig coals and sit in the cinders, and have still coals to dig—they once exhausted, or got cheaper elsewhere, we shall be abolished. But if we think more wisely, while there is yet time, and set our minds again on multiplying Englishmen, and not on cheapening English wares—if we resolve to submit to wholesome laws of labour and economy, and, setting our political squabbles aside, try how many strong creatures, friendly and faithful to each other, we can crowd into every spot of English dominion, neither poison nor iron will prevail against us; nor traffic, nor hatred; the noble nation will yet, by the grace of Heaven, rule over the ignoble, and force of heart hold its own against fire-balls.—JOHN RUSKIN, LL.D.

Philosophy.

CAN HIGH EDUCATION COUNTERACT THE EAGERNESS OF THE SENSES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

As both writers on this topic have remarked, it is very essential that we should have a distinct understanding as to the intended meaning of the subject of discussion, as the adopted mode of expression appears to be slightly ambiguous. I take the expression, "the eagerness of the senses," to mean "the eagerness of the sensual appetites, of the animal passions, of the bodily lusts," and therefore shall consider the question, "Has high education any deterring influence in reference to the gratification of those sensual appetites which exist to a greater or less degree in every man's nature." And further, respecting the "high education" spoken of, I understand it to denote, not merely the knowledge of the classics, mathematics, &c., which is usually acquired at our colleges and universities, but a close, strenuous, devoted application to various branches of study. The man who makes himself acquainted, even in the most ordinary manner, with the subjects of education taught in our colleges may, in comparison with those whose only education has been received at one of our national schools, be said to be highly educated, but by mere compliment can it be said so; and such a man would, I think, hardly be called a highly educated man; and conceiving such definitions to convey the import of the question, we believe that high education does counteract the eagerness of the senses.

The circumstances in which a man is placed, and the influences brought to bear upon his mind, determine to a very great extent his habits, his character, and frequently his morality. There are, of course, exceptions to the rule, but such exceptions, if they prove anything, prove the rule. There have been men who have been born and bred in circumstances of great poverty, obscurity, and wickedness, who have risen pre-eminently above such an unfortunate lot, and there have also been others who, at their outset in life, have been in positions of opulence and respectability, and who have fallen, entirely in consequence of their own mode of life, to the level of the most degraded of the people. At the same time, the great majority of men are influenced by their surrounding circumstances. We find, further, that the least educated classes are generally those whose tastes, pursuits, and pleasures are most

closely allied with the gratification of the senses. Examine, for instance, the literature most eagerly read by such people, consider the amusements most extensively patronized by them, and such a conclusion must, we think, be inevitable. If, again, we look at the tastes, pursuits, and pleasures of the better educated classes of society, we shall certainly find that they are at the least of a more refined nature; and if any deduction whatever can be made from these facts, it must be that education has some effect on the minds of the people, and that the gratification of the senses or passions is not so eagerly sought after by the most highly educated of the community. These statements, I am well aware, prove but little, but that little may be useful in assisting us to form a judgment on the question before us. I would not for one moment believe that the vices of what we call the higher classes are less heinous than those of the lower, merely because they are devoid of the coarseness which characterizes the latter; nor would I believe that the wealthier classes have less inclination to gratify the sensual appetites merely because their pleasures may be said to be of a more refined nature,—rather the contrary; for beneath the equivocal *inuendos* and the easy address of polished gallantry there often lurks more poison than in the vile jest of vulgarity. Supposing that we take the higher classes of society as a whole, and, because they have had the advantages of a so-called higher class of learning than the middle classes, consider them the highly educated class, then I am afraid that little could be said in favour of the affirmative side of this debate; comparatively speaking, there are but few highly educated men, and it would be as unfair and as untrue to designate the wealthier classes as the highly educated, as to designate the middle classes as the poorly educated. Further, the men who have made their whole life one long term of earnest study have not, as a rule, sprung from the nobility or the aristocracy.

As Lord Lytton truly observes, "A very large proportion of those who in various ways have gained fame, have been the cadets of a gentleman's family, or the sons of poor clergymen, sometimes of farmers and tradesmen who have given them an education beyond their class." *

If we take history as a guide, we shall find almost innumerable cases in which men of studious habits have withdrawn themselves almost entirely from the fellowship of the world, who have had little or no sympathy with the pleasures that have engrossed the attention of those around them, whose eyes have been blind and whose ears have been deaf to the fascinations that have held in subjection their fellow-mortals. If we take into consideration the lives of the greatest poets, theologians, statesmen, and philosophers, who, since the dawn of creation, have enriched the world with their productions, we shall find them to be but to a small extent tainted with the sensual vices of mankind. We are well aware there

* Prose Works, vol. iii., p. 327.

are exceptions, and we think no one would be disposed to maintain that high education has, in every instance, counteracted the eagerness of the senses. We must, however, be careful not to confound genius with education. There are many men who have attained a very high reputation in the literary world, simply by the exercise of their genius, but such can hardly be considered highly educated men. The knowledge they have acquired has come to them, we might almost say, naturally; the mind has had but little exertion, the intellect has been developed, as it were, imperceptibly; and although there can be no doubt that such men are in a sense highly educated, they fail to come under the definition that we have adopted, and we regret to say that the characters, and, indeed, lives of many such men, are far from being irreproachable. Supposing, again, we ignore the history of the past, and notice the characters borne by most of the leading scholars of our own day—scholars in science, in philosophy, in theology, &c.,—we must, I think, be driven to the conclusion that high education has counteracted the eagerness of their senses. Or if we even regard the conduct and the deportment of those by whom we are surrounded in our daily intercourse with the world, our own friends and acquaintances, and select from amongst them those who are the most eager in the pursuit of knowledge, who are not satisfied merely with that which they have gained when they quit their school or college, but whose leisure time has been devoted to the study of one favourite branch of education or more, and if we place their lives, habits, and characters in contrast with those of men whose creed, as far at least as concerns education, may be summed up in the simple belief that when their college days are over they have had quite enough, and perhaps a little too much of it, I think we shall not long hesitate in arriving at a decision as to the side on which the gratification of the senses is the more interesting pursuit.

If we shut out from the question the consideration of the lives of men of the past and of the present, and look only at the subject on what may be termed independent grounds, it appears to us to be simply reasonable that such a result as the one we have endeavoured to maintain will be one effect of high education on the mind of man. As the mind and the intellect are developed, the tastes and pursuits of their possessor will be changed,—nay, even his very life will receive a coinciding impress. The interest attached to the games, the toys and baubles that engrossed so large a share of his attention during the earlier stages of his life, will dwindle into insignificance and nothingness as he reaches a more mature age, simply because his mind has received fresh sources of pleasure consequent upon its training.

I have carefully perused the article of G. P. on the negative side of this debate; and, from what I can learn, the writer appears to confine his attention to the higher classes of society, and not the highly educated classes only. G. P. says, "We note, in the first place, as affording ground for believing that high education cannot

counteract the eagerness of the senses, that certain vices are almost wholly characteristic of the higher classes,—those, therefore, who have had all the chances and advantages of high education." We grant they have had all the chances, but it by no means follows that they have availed themselves to the fullest extent of those chances, and enjoyed the advantages. G. P. further says, "Though drunkenness in all its grossness may not so largely prevail in the social life of the upper classes," &c. "The upper classes." For our own part, we do not see what connection the upper classes have with the question at all. Again, "There are other vices which fashionable people gild and refine as to their concomitants," &c. "Fashionable people" are not necessarily highly educated people. Again, "High education, too, very frequently adds the charm of the association of old legendary mythology, gracefully expressive classical poetry, and the glitter of felicitous phrases round the indulgence of sense. Memories of Hebe, and Venus, and Bacchus, and Joye, quotations from Horace, Catullus, and Juvenal, incidents from the classical drama, and ideas derived from the statues of the olden or the paintings of the modern time." Surely high education does not consist in memories of Hebe, Venus, Bacchus, and Jove, quotations from Horace, &c., incidents from dramas, and ideas derived from statues and paintings. An acquaintance with the classical writers cannot constitute high education, although it is perfectly certain that a man can hardly be considered as possessing a very high or complete education without some degree of familiarity with such writers, as the knowledge will of necessity be acquired in his studies; but I candidly dissent from our friend G. P. on two points,—viz., that his standard of high education, so far as may be inferred from his paper, is not what we should consider such, and that his opinion that the respectable and wealthy classes constitute the highly educated classes can hardly be considered as truly legitimate. I conceive a highly educated man to be one to whom the world has been but an academy, and whose life has been a study; and I believe that such a man will obtain a moral and intellectual tone which will make him less prone than his fellows to succumb to many of the sensual temptations that assail mankind.

H. SCOTT.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

GÖTTE makes this remark,—“One idea in ten languages is not so valuable as ten ideas in one language.” Although this may be very true, I am inclined to think that Goethe would have made a very different remark if *one sentence* gave forth ten ideas as to its meaning. Simple as the grammatical construction of the above philosophical question may be, yet the meaning, the true interpretation, and even the intention or view of the author of the present topic is exceedingly vague, and we are as those who are *in the dark*. Both

myself and my compeers are in a position similar to those to whom Goldsmith refers when he wrote,—

"Let schoolmasters puzzle their brain
With grammar, and nonsense, and learning."

I have indeed puzzled my brain to know the sense in which "high education" is to be taken. Our captain, G. P., has very truthfully said, "The main difficulty seems to be to get a common starting-point;" especially will this be felt by the critics who follow our leaders, for the negative and affirmative have grounded their arguments upon different standpoints. B. L. K. says, "There can be no doubt at all that high education, by employing the mind and developing the character, counteracts the eagerness of the senses." This can be said with equal truth and forcibleness of education; the question is not concerning the power and influence of education, but does *high* education counteract the eagerness of the senses? I believe it is admitted by all, at least by the wise and learned of the day, that education, if it is worthy of being called education, is capable of fortifying a man against the eagerness of his senses; by this I mean that if a man is physically, mentally, and morally educated, he has a power capable of controlling and guiding his senses aright; *ergo*, education cannot be the subject of dispute, or the point on which we differ. No; it plainly states "*high* education." According to B. L. K.'s views, high education is that which cultivates and elevates the mind, draws out the abilities, trains the faculties, and is a healthy exercise of man's capabilities. B. L. K. says (p. 14). "But if education does not protect men against the eagerness of the senses, but rather inclines them to find indulgence pleasant, it must be debasing. That cannot be high education which not only does not elevate, but actually touches the balance to the lower side." Can it be education at all, I would ask B. L. K., which is debasing? B. L. K. further states that he accepts "high education" in "the usual and obvious sense (?) as that sort of training which is given at school and college, which enables a man to enjoy with some relish the graces of letters, and the activities and results of thought." I maintain that this is only the true character of education. What B. L. K. has given for a definition of "high education" is only a very faithful outline of the meaning of education. If education elevates, why call it *high* education? To use "high education" in the sense in which B. L. K. interprets it would be tautology. In fact, the whole tenor of B. L. K.'s argument is based on the advantages of education. It is evident, I think, that the rendering of the term "high education" is different from that of B. L. K.'s, and is a matter of dispute, or, as G. P. has said, "it is not to be doubted that the subject is not only arguable but important." I think I have sufficiently shown that the subject is not education, upon the virtues of which I believe we have a unanimous opinion, but it is high education, of which the opener

for the affirmative has failed to give a correct definition, if it is a subject on which we have a difference of opinion; consequently, I consider the case for the affirmative as having, so far, fallen through.

The term "high education" I understand to be a phrase used by the aristocracy to denote a high, polished, classical, and "finished" education. That it is not education as a principle, but a modification of it. That it is a class education—high—the education of the "upper ten,"—an aristocratic and collegiate education, or *whatever* "society" condescends to call "high" education,—in which, by the way, "society," under the garb of etiquette, covers a great many vices.

"Was it for this that I these roses wear?
For this new set the jewels for my hair?
Ah, princess! with what zeal have I pursued!
Almost forgot the duty of a prude.
The king I never could attend too soon;
I missed my prayers, to get me dressed by noon.
For thee, ah! what for thee did I resign?
My passions, pleasures, all that e'er was mine:
I've sacrificed both modesty and ease."

The question which naturally arises is, Does what the upper classes call high and polished education counteract the eagerness of the senses? I shall give the following propositions in support of the negative of—Does high education counteract the eagerness of the senses?

1. "High" education, as a rule, is only the cultivation of the physical and mental capacities, and *not* the spiritual character of man; therefore it has not the power to counteract the eagerness of the senses.

Education, whether "high" or common, classical or general, must be—if it is to be sound and beneficial in its results—a food suitable for the welfare, nourishment, and support of the threefold nature of man. Man, as being the image of God, is a trinity: he has a body, a soul, and a spirit; the cultivation of which, if man is to have a sound mind in a sound body, must consist of a physical, mental, and moral education. If man's moral character is to be developed and strengthened, his education must consist not only of muscular exercise, study of books, &c., but also of a religious training; Christianity must exert its warm and healing influence upon his heart; for if the love of God changes his evil nature, he will be as a mighty warrior conquering and subduing the eagerness of his evil thoughts and imaginations; for—

"The powers of earth and air
Fled from the folding star of Bethlehem:
Apollo, Pan, and Love,
And even Olympian Jove,
Grew weak, for killing truth hath glared on them."

The higher classes, notwithstanding their position, wealth, the advantages of travel, and the highest schools of learning; although their daughters may have been educated at Continental and English colleges, their sons matriculated and holding a degree, either of Oxford or Cambridge Universities; yet many of the children of the aristocracy, with every advantage of a polished, high, and fashionable education, lack the teaching of religion at a "mother's knee." Religion with them has been of a formal and superficial character, it has been looked upon as a necessary study, like classics; the aim of all their studies, whether "religious" or mental, is looked upon and regarded as essential to a "high" and fashionable education, suitable for their "introduction into society." It is, therefore, not surprising that there are vices which are popularly denominated "fashionable."

2. "High" education, instead of controlling and guiding the senses aright, encourages, genders, and sharpens the eagerness of their sensual propensities.

It will not be necessary for me to give a graphic or glowing description of "London society" and fashionable education to prove my case. The "London season," with its flirtations in Rotten Row, —the "high" style of living, with its many dishes and late hours, —the formalities and "introductions" at the ball-room, the opera, or the theatre, all influence the nervous system of the body, excite the animal functions, and have led many who have been educated in our universities and colleges to become *private* drunkards, and votaries of "social vices." Could I not refer to poets and authors, men of the highest intellectual powers and abilities, men who have written on some of the most sublime and pathetic themes; yea, men of education, who have carried off the highest honours of an approving nation, yet who have fallen victims to the eagerness of the senses? But I refrain from mentioning any names; rather let "bygones be bygones," so far as relates to the dead. The Greeks and the Romans, when they had reached the highest pinnacle of fame, when they were the masters of the world, when civilization, science, and art flourished in their dominions, *then*, and then only, did they fall. If "high" education could ever have counteracted the eagerness of the senses, it was on its trial then; but it signally failed.

If "high" education, according to society's standard—if an education whose chief objects were a physical and mental training, has failed "to counteract the eagerness of the senses," as it did in the case of the Greeks and Romans,—I think it is a strong proof as well as a powerful argument that high education does not counteract the eagerness of the senses. For it was when the Romans had every advantage of learning and civilization, when their favourite capital was "mistress of the world," that they were the most licentious nation on the face of the earth, as the poems of Horace, Ovid, and Catullus too truly show, and as the Satires of Juvenal prove. Civilization and "high" education have their

accompanying vices. It is only the spirit of Christianity, with its divine and moral influences, that can counteract the eagerness of the senses. This the Romans lacked, and they were as those who built upon the sand, that when the flood of temptation came, their castles of intellectual glory and fame were washed away, and they became a total wreck and disgrace to the nations of the earth.

Education, or whatever may be called education, if it is *minus* a religious training, is unprotected against the eagerness of the senses. No human code of morals, however good, is infallible. Religion alone, which appeals to the heart, is the only infallible method in God's hands of counteracting the eagerness of the senses. Sentimental religion, a religion of forms and ceremonies—in short, Ritualism, is not the religious training which is calculated to counteract the eagerness of the senses. It may be fashionable to attend church, to have the form of godliness; but unless the vital truths of Christianity change the heart, no education, whether "high" or general, can counteract the eagerness of the senses.

"Tis religion that can give.
Sweetest pleasures while we live.
'Tis religion must supply
Solid comfort when we die."

GEORGIUS D. E.

National Education.

UGHT EDUCATION TO BE SETTLED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LEAGUE OR THE UNION?

THE UNION.—IV.

It is the bad custom of our country to make every legislative measure depend on the amount of agitation that can be got up about it; and whenever a loud cry is raised, to endeavour to stifle it by a sort of hush-baby effort at making a law to meet the demand. We go to legislate with the passions as near red heat as we can get them, and we generally legislate in haste to repent at leisure. The legislation of haste is, as a common rule, the waste of legislation. The thing has usually to be done over again, and patchwork takes the place of complete measures. There is a great danger that the Education question, like that of the Reform Bill and the Disestablishment of the Irish Church, will be gone on with,

not with legislative common sense, but in the wild excitement got up by agitators. The League and the Union have both set themselves the task of stirring up the country to a sense of its deficiencies, and each is desirous of making the best efforts it can to secure the approval of the measures each advocates by the public, in order that each may enforce, by the argument of numbers, the endeavours to be made to put the education of this country in an efficient state. But then their efforts are to be so employed as to neutralize the force evoked for or by the other, instead of acting entirely for the attainment of the proper object of the agitation, a well-educated people. This we cannot but think disastrous, and would have been glad to see some sign of common agreement for a common end. A fact has recently been made public which, in my opinion, goes greatly in favour of the Union, and greatly against the League, and that is, that the Union offered to the League to hold a conference on the debatable points, with the design of coming to some common agreement on the main matters in dispute, and pushing forward for these. But the League spurned compromise, and despised debate. The officials connected with it gave in this, I think, a very severe blow to their own character for consistency, integrity, and uprightness. It is not often in litigated cases that the one which is nearest right is the one most adverse to arbitration, or most deaf to a request to come to terms. Had the League not formed an overweening idea of the amount of public sympathy on their side, they would have seen the propriety of adopting some means by which waste of money and agitation might have been both avoided; and this would have been, in all probability, the result of a conference between the leading members of the League with those of the Union.

The League, again, may be asserted to make a most egregious suppression of the truth when they say that they desire non-sectarian schools. What school can be more sectarian than one which denies and ignores all that is holy and supreme, and confines all education to the gross and perishing things of time? The sectarianism the League proclaims is the sectarianism of infidelity and of worldliness. The League proclaims and establishes the principle that this world is the all in all to man, and puts on the side of secularism and socialism all the influence of the schoolmaster and all the power of the State. And if the Union asks but a permissive bill to educate the soul for something higher than the earth, it cannot be granted to them. It proclaims, Let the religious education of the country be left to the *voluntary* agencies, which have failed, as we affirm, to impart a proper training, and it will be efficiently performed; but while we can trust implicitly to that for the proper education of the immortal spirit, we cannot trust that or our own selfish interests to prepare children properly for the workshop, the factory, and the farm. We must compel and be compelled to set education to rights, and we must be soundly rated to make up leeway occasioned by our former supineness.

Is this great nation to proclaim secularism as its creed, and sink below the level of the France of revolutionary times. It apparelled Reason in the attributes of a goddess, and gave her worship; but we are about to set up and establish selfishness, and worldliness, and gold—the gauds and the glitter of success—as the one main purpose of our being. So far as the state is concerned, it is to be deliberately decreed that secularism is the only object of heed in this life, and that duty of a higher type than that established by Act of Parliament shall not only be henceforth a voluntary concern, but all attempts to teach it shall be opposed and stamped out, so far as the force, example, and power of bribery available to the state can go. Schools shall be unsectarian—that is, they shall not, by the permission or connivance of the State, teach anything more than concerns the temporal and innate life of man. This is really the grand point of difference between the men of the League and the members of the Union—the latter ask that the entire nature of each child shall receive some stated specific culture; the former determine that only that which concerns this world and time shall get any enforced attention. This may be seen at a glance by any one who will be at the trouble to compare the published statements of the two schemes.

I cannot but think that the advocates of the Union system deserved more courtesy, both from their opponents and the country, than they have got. From the statistics brought forward by M. R. (p. 116) it seems plain that the Unionists might justifiably say to the Leaguers, Go and do as we have done; produce your half-million a year, and the work will be well and efficiently done. And to the nation it might be said, You who affect to despise the voluntary offerings of the volunteers have not done among all your millions what our 195,000 have done. Just tax yourselves to a similar extent in the gross, Leaguers and sympathizers with the League, and you will be able to apply to Government without dread for compulsory powers over attendance, for you will then have a full and free supply of school accommodation, and a good and efficient staff of proper educators for the people. We have cried, Educate, and we have tried to educate, may the Unionists say;—but we have not stood idle in the market-place, exclaiming, Go to work, we have gone to work, and paid for the doing of it; but you have agitated to set people to work, and to get people to pay for it. You say Go, and we say Come. We have put our shoulders to the wheel, you have only cried, All hands to work, and all shoulders to the wheel, and never mind those fellows who are at it.

In this connection I think I would do well to call attention to a few remarks recently made at the annual meeting of the British and Foreign School Society, by Earl Russell, on education. These refer, first, to the views of the originators of that great voluntary educational association; and secondly, to the opinions entertained by that statesman on the compatibility of the union of scriptural and elementary education.

"It is now sixty-five years since the British and Foreign School Society was established, and this is its sixty-fourth report. It was begun under very happy and encouraging auspices. The Duke of Kent, the father of her present Majesty, took a warm part in its first proceedings. It received, too, the patronage and countenance of George III., whose conscientious attachment to the doctrines of the Bible no one will doubt. Among those who came forward to support it my father was one of the first, and many other persons of influence and position joined. I remember seeing at the first meeting of the society I attended, Mr. Wilberforce, the great apostle of the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery—a man whose memory must always live in the grateful recollection, not of this country only, but of all Europe, of all Africa, and of all America, as the man who was the enemy of slavery, and who pursued that fatal monster while he had life and breath remaining. I remember that at our meetings then and since we had sometimes present bishops of the church;—there was Dr. Maltby, Bishop of Chichester, afterwards Bishop of Durham; Dr. Stanley, Bishop of Norwich, father of the present Dean of Westminster, who has continued the reputation of the name of Stanley as amongst the brightest ornaments of the Church; and I remember, also, that we have had at our meetings various eminent members of the Dissenting communities, of whom I will only mention one—viz., the present Dr. Burnett, who always, with great eloquence and great force, advocated his own views; and when Dr. Stanley, as was usual with him, contended ably and zealously for the doctrines of the Church of England, said, 'Let them take the Bible, and all the Episcopacy in it.' The society has never contended *for* episcopacy or *against* it. We stand here for the support of that Christianity which should animate us all, leaving to the churches and chapels of the land to disseminate those views of Christian doctrine which they believe to be conformable to truth. For my own part, it has happened to me, and lately, to consult the various formularies of our various churches—those of our own Church of England, of the Presbyterian Church, and of the Roman Catholic Church,—but I find in none of them so good a sermon as the Sermon on the Mount. I find in none of them so plain, and so wholesome, and so holy a creed as that which was given by Jesus Christ to His disciples and to the world. It is that doctrine that we have given in our British schools. The children read the Bible, and there they obtain the lessons; and not only the lessons that Christ gave to the multitude in general, but the commands and directions which He gave to His disciples, the explanations He thought proper to give to His own apostles, are all open before us, when He said, 'Go, teach all the nations of the world.' The volume in which that lesson is contained is open to all the world, if they will but read it. It is in this view, and on this principle, that we have continued for so many years.

"For my part, I am not disposed to depart from the principles which have ever animated the British and Foreign School Society. I think every information ought to be given in our schools on subjects of general knowledge. I think every encouragement should be given to the exercise and play of the understanding; but I think all the instruction should be accompanied with religious knowledge; and that that part of man which every philosopher acknowledges is the most essential part of him—his soul—is not to be neglected in the education we provide. I do not say that the State—if there is a provision for rates or contributions by the State in one shape or another, or by some kind of tax or other, for school

purposes might not think it fit, and wisely think it fit, to allow of secular schools; but secular schools are not entirely deprived of religious information, because they are usually connected with some religious communion or other, the members of which, and the pastors of which, take care the children taught in them shall not be altogether deprived of religious instruction. Besides this, I trust that the denominational instruction which has hitherto been given in a large measure by the parochial clergy of the Established Church—the denominational instruction which has been given in a large measure by the religious teachers of the various Dissenting communions,—I trust that this religious instruction will not be lost sight of in any plan of education which the Government may think fit to introduce to Parliament; and that, while systematic education shall pervade the land, and while schools shall be established throughout it, we shall be permitted to give in them not denominational instruction, but that instruction in the Bible which has always been the mark and distinction of this Society.”

“Georgius” (p. 106) thinks religious education cannot be effectively conjoined with secular education; but as yet almost all the education that has been attainable in the world has been received in connection, some way or other, with religion, so that while “Georgius” has theory in his favour, we have all experience.

“Georgius” seems to think that there is no way of securing combined religious education, and hence he believes it would be better to get any education at all than go without it. Undoubtedly there may be much reason in his acceptance of the latter alternative, but is the alternative a proved necessity? The League, by its objecting to a conference, has prevented us from knowing on what terms the Union would have agreed to supply the instruction they have it in their power to give. “Georgius” argues disingenuously with regard to M. T.’s statement, that the League denies the necessity of teaching religion, when he says the League does not express any opinion on the subject. Would it be considered fair in any conversation with an infidel for him to reply to the assertion, “But you deny the necessity of religion,”—“I do not, I offer no opinion on its necessity at all.” Is not his ignoring of religion a most patent and pertinent way of expressing his opinion on its non-necessity?

Again, may not M. T. be fairly asked, If the religious teaching given in schools be really so defective and ineffective as he (p. 107) asserts that it is, why is the League so fearful of its effects as to seek its extrusion from the schools? “Neonias” affirms that “the people are not agreed on which religion is true!” (p. 109). Surely this is a great error! All religious bodies in this country profess Christianity. It is only the form of the worship and the nature of the creed on which they differ—they do not profess to differ as to the facts, and especially they do not differ concerning the moral law of Christianity. Let, therefore, the moral law, and the facts of Christianity, be taught in the schools, and by the use of a conscience clause exempt from the necessity of learning a particular catechism, and most probably the Union would be satisfied, and the

League and it could unite to educate the people, so that every parent, in the after times, could and would undertake the proper religious training of his own children, or voluntarily place him under proper religious training. Meanwhile, we do not think it would be wise for this great country to dechristianize its schools, and compel its teachers to uphold and enforce morality, not by conviction but by force.

P. O. S.

THE UNION.—V.

It is one of the difficulties of controversy that the holders of different opinions very seldom trouble themselves about getting an accurate idea of the opposite side. This is true not only of one but of both sets of thinkers. It is unfortunate, I think, that while the League has agitated almost the whole country, the Union has kept aloof from giving such full opportunity for considering and comprehending the matters at issue between the two great factions of educationists as could be wished. I regard with peculiar pleasure, therefore, the present debate, because it will give the chance of fixing the minds of the thoughtful on the points of agreement between them, and will thus show how easily on the whole the education of the country might be put on an unexceptionable footing. If men are indeed in earnest about this great and momentous topic there can be but little doubt that many will be found for the accomplishment of the purpose. But every purpose should be proceeded with in an open and straightforward manner, and words should not be preferred for the expression of a definite intention which are capable of being comprehended in two different ways. Such a use of the word "unsectarian" seems to me to be employed by the advocates of the League scheme; for this may mean religious, but not giving merely sectarian teaching; or it may signify "secular"—which, as being opposed to every sect, is in reality infidel. For my part I cannot see that education can be carried on without a defined statement of moral duty—a dogmatic and referable standard of the requirements of social and personal life. Every school must be governed by and conducted according to some recognised system of moral philosophy. It is admitted that, to say the least of it, the moral precepts of Christianity excel those of all other forms, and hence, even in a "secular" school, it seems to me they would be the best that could be adopted. But secularism is of this world, worldly, and prefers that no creed, catechism, or confession of faith should be taught because that is virtually infidelity. This seems to me a very notable point in the programme of the League—which seems, indeed, to me, to be different from the Union in its objects in this point only. It appears to define all religion to be sectarianism, and under this wide equivocation to claim its exclusion from the training of children in school.

Perhaps some of the readers of this serial may never have noticed how closely the two schemes of educational agitation concur upon

all points except this one. Those who have not are invited to do so.

The following table gives the programme of the National Education League and the National Education Union, so that the aims of both may be seen at a glance:—

LEAGUE.

Object.—The establishment of a system which will secure the education of every child in England and Wales.

Means, &c.—The cost of founding and maintaining schools to be provided out of the local rates, supplemented by Government grants.

Kind of School.—Unsectarian, defined by G. Dixon, M.P., as follows:—"No catechisms, creeds, or tenets peculiar to any particular sect shall be taught in any national school. The school committee shall have power to allow the use of the Bible without note or comment, and to grant the use of the class-rooms for religious instruction out of school hours, on condition that one sect is not favoured more than another."

UNION.

Object.—A complete system of national education, to harmonize with the existing framework.

Means, &c.—Voluntary contributions, aided by increased grants from Government. Vagrant children to be sent to industrial schools, maintained out of the borough rates. Special grants for technical or scientific instruction.

Kind of School.—Denominational. In which is carried out "the inculcation of religious and moral truth, whilst care be taken that denominational teaching be not imposed upon children without the assent of the parents."

It is plain from the above statement that there is very little in the League scheme which is not embraced and practised in the Union one, but that the League wants to delete from school teaching religious training, while it seeks to substitute nothing in its place. Now, I object to the League having it all its own way; 1st, because it is in opposition to the direct undertakings of the nation, which, through its officers, made those very regulations under which denominationalism has done so much for education; and 2nd, because the League has shown no practical earnestness in the question, by the erection and management of schools at their expense and upon their principles. The Union people have practised their plan, and have it on *terra firma*, in the shape of thousands of schools; the League project is yet in *nubibus*—a matter for speechifying about, but not one showing signs of earnestness, self-sacrifice, and patriotism.

I. I would like to call attention to the fact that Christianity is a life; is a vital principle acting in, on, and over every thought, word,

and action; and that it cannot be laid aside by the schoolmaster in the school like a church-goer's garment. His Christianity must mix with, leaven, and consecrate all his endeavours. To call upon him to omit reference to and conscientious government by the principles of the moral law, and to enforce on him by statute the necessity of treating his pupils as beings who have no souls to be saved, and over whose higher nature he is to exert no influence, is not certainly giving fair play to him, as compared with others who are not debarred by law from exerting any influence they can in their daily walk and conversation. And what of the pupil, who is to be held as soulless, and treated as if this world and its interests were all in all in school, while he is somewhere or somehow, if he and his parents like, to go and learn that he has a soul, and duties, and responsibilities? How is *moral* control to be made possible if reference to the code of morals is prohibited? and is the country prepared to confer the required right to enforce obedience by *physical* means? If the school is to be a minor state, with laws and magistracy, rewards and punishments, can Christianity be declared a nullity in it, and all reference to its laws be abrogated and abolished with good effect?

II. I would call attention to the fact that unsectarian teaching is an impossibility, unless we are to alter all our forms and ways of treating many subjects. What could a teacher of geography do in giving information about Bethlehem, Rome, Worms, Nantes, Utah, &c., if compelled to be strictly unsectarian? What would a teacher of history do in regard to Moses, David, Daniel, Herod, Mahomet, Gregory VII., Luther, Wesley, or such events as the deluge, the captivity, Constantine's conversion, the reception of the Koran, the Reformation, Richelieu's wars, the carnivals, the institution of Mormonism, &c., if he is to be held as a transgressor if he gives information on the causes, circumstances, &c., of these events? What shall a schoolmaster do who wishes to explain Chaucer, Shakspeare, Milton, Pope, Cowper, Wordsworth, Scott, Tennyson, &c.? must he eliminate and expurgate all references to creed and faith? If these things are to be, what discretion is to be left to the master, and how shall he guard himself against village actions for sectarianism, ending in dismissal or disgrace according to the strength or persistency of a faction, perhaps not primarily interested in any of these questions; but anxious to get rid of a man who, because growing old, might threaten to require a retiring allowance at the charge of the ratepayers?

III. I would ask the leaguers if they really believe that human beings can be adequately educated on the tacit assumption that there is no soul, no God, no responsibility to a higher Being, no future life, no revelation as to man's duty, destiny, and wants? I do not think—though many parents may have grown so seared in sin that they fail to lay these things to heart themselves—that they are willing that these ideas should not be impressed on their children. On what principle can lying, theft, profane lan-

guage, brawling, and fighting be checked and dissuaded from, if moral education is not to be founded on dogma in the first instance? How would a league moral philosopher proceed to demonstrate to a boy of nine, say, the wrongness of profane language?

IV. Would the separate provision of religious instruction obviate these difficulties? I believe not. It would intensify quarrels between children of different sects, quarrels in which, if the master were to interfere, he would be denounced as sectarian, and in which, if he did not interfere, discipline would be destroyed. A rancour of incurable virulence would be introduced into child-life, and this attempt to give a death-blow to sectarianism would be itself tilling and cultivating the soil in which it would grow weed-like in luxuriance and in worthlessness.

Taking these things into consideration, I do not think the League is justified in the opinion which S. W. R. ascribes to it, "that education pure and simple may be provided with as little sectarianism in it as there is sectarianism in a soup-kitchen or an hospital" (p. 18). Nor can we approve of the plan of "Georgius." "Let religious instruction be left to parents, ministers, and Sunday school teachers, to those whose duty it is to give it" (p. 107). We can only give a modified assent to the assertion of "Neonias," that "it is useless to teach children dogmas for the purpose of making them religious;" for we believe it is necessary to accept of and act on some dogmas by which to regulate the life of a child, and that these should be if possible religious dogmas. The dogmas are required for guidance, as well as for belief. It may not be as "Neonias" affirms "the duty of the schoolmaster to instruct the children in any creed," but it is necessary that he should conduct himself in accordance with some creed, and that he should have some principles, either as a creed or equivalent to a creed, at the foundation of his school discipline. On all these accounts, I prefer the Union solution of the educational difficulty to that of the League. As the religious question is the only real point of difference between the two schemes, I have, for brevity's sake, confined myself to that one topic.

S. H. E.

THE LEAGUE.—IV.

By the common consent of all parties, it has been determined that it is advisable to compel the acquisition of a certain amount of Education by every one who is held to be a subject of the State. Civilization has now so far advanced that unskilled labour and mere bodily strength do not suffice for the requirements of industrial life. By some industry or craft most men require to earn their bread in the sweat of their brow. And so it has come about, by the improvement of machinery and the development of art and science, that the necessities of life are only to be got by men who

have some comprehension of things. Seeing this is the case, and that necessity, which has no law, insists on education as an absolute essential to the gaining of wages and the preservation of life, men have begun to look anxiously on the condition of the people, growing up as they are in ignorance of common things and incapable of using the facilities for information and culture already available, because they have not acquired those rudimentary branches of school tuition which bring within reach of the most humble the thoughts of the greatest, and enable men to communicate their wants and their thoughts to others. So it has been determined that reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, spelling, &c., must be got diffused among all classes of the community.

Education has hitherto been conducted on the voluntary principle. It has been voluntary on the part of those who wished to establish schools, and it has been voluntary on the part of those for whom they were established, whether they would take advantage of them or not. Voluntaryism gave, as a sort of charitable dole, a certain amount of schooling and catechism, and it was then left to the inclination of the people of the district whether they would accept of and improve themselves by this provision of intellectual training and religious creed. In some districts voluntaryism was not strong enough to open and maintain a school, and in other places voluntaryism was not strong enough in the parents, and children to avail themselves of those which were established even when the competition of sects was most intense. Some rich people believed that education would induce disrespect to superiors and disregard for property; and some poor people believed that education and religion would not be pressed upon them if they had not some reference to being content with such things as ye have, and be obedient to those who bear rule over you—especially as the clergyman said emphatically—those who bear rule over you in the Lord. At both ends voluntaryism failed, and yet the necessity grew greater, and the State tried to bribe voluntaryism at the upper end, though it could do little at the lower.

It became evident to every thinking person, that education was a necessity, and that men must be coerced into getting it since they would not be cajoled. Whenever the idea of compulsion arose, there arose along with it the British idea of liberty. Compulsion is un-English in matters indifferent; but in matters of duty and necessity there is nothing un-English about it. We have compulsory taxation, compulsory attention to the distinctions between mine and thine, compulsory health of towns acts, &c., why ought we not also to have compulsory education laws? Because education has hitherto been mixed up with a subject on which compulsion cannot be used. This is a land of religious freedom; that has been decided long ago. Let the State remain within its own domain, but do not let it attempt to enforce any religious teaching; for if it do, the battles of the Churches will begin, and what religious earnestness can do

may be seen in the pages of history, under the words Reformation and Revolution. The League proposes then that the admixture of school and catechism should be dispensed with, and that school should be school, and church, church; that the State should compel in its way for its own ends, and that the church such induce in its own way for its own ends.

Nothing, as it appears to me, could be fairer than this. But M. E. (p. 115) asserts that this is grossly unfair, and that denominationalism has been badly used by the proposal to try education unadorned by catechism—just as we can try coffee unadulterated by chicory. M. E. thinks that an established wrong has a right to respect, on account of its age; and he advocates the connection of the middle ages between church and school and faith and figures. I think, on the contrary, that a hoary headed wrong ought to be quickly despatched, and that the union of school and catechism should be repealed. It is a bad and evil conjunction, because it forces dogma as mere words into the mind, and binds the spirit of a child in the bondage of the letter. This, again, leads to the idea that a form of sound words is a true faith, and that he cannot do or be wrong whose creed is in the right. All this is deplorable in act and fact. It makes lip-Christianity and creed-cram prevail over holy thought and action. The conjunction of the creed and the multiplication table does not make the one as trustworthy as the other; but both being learned by rote and rhyme together are made accepted facts in the conglomerate of lessons learned at school; and one gets trotted out on due occasions with just as much consciousness and conscientiousness as the other. That, in my opinion, is neither education nor religion. It is mere make-believe, and degrades religion to a sham.

One definite fact may be noticed, as quite a sufficient answer to M. E.'s remarks on the efforts made by denominationalism in favour of education. It is this—these efforts were not made directly or even primarily on behalf of education. They were made in behalf of the creeds and churches to which their supporters are attached. They were, in fact, a portion of the missionary and proselytizing agency of the sects. Deduct the amount of missionary money—cash given and employed primarily and specifically for the advancement of the church and creed of those who have instituted and support the schools—and you will make a large reduction in the sum quoted by M. E. The sums so employed have been given for schooling + catechism, and in many cases for catechism + schooling. One distinct and clear proposal will make this plain. Will the denominationalists devote this money entirely to education, if it be agreed that on any fixed day of the week the children shall have opportunity given them to attend religious instruction wherever they choose, the only restriction being that those who do not produce certificates of attendance on religious instruction shall be compelled to attend school?

This brings me to consider the objection of "Conservative" to a

one-day-in-seven religion (p. 114). To this we reply that God has been contented to give a religion in which one day in seven alone is required to be specially devoted to its teaching and worship. I do not, like Conservative, profess to be wiser or holier than God; but I can show that "a one-day-in-seven religion" is all that He demands for the interpenetration of the whole of the life of the week with a sense of the practical duties of religion in relation to this life. But I might retort the objection of Conservative upon himself thus: Do you think that a one-hour-a-day religion is a satisfactory one? If not, how is it that, as a general rule, the teaching of religion in schools is restricted to one hour? Or let him take any number of hours he likes, the same retort will apply; or else he is speaking about catechism, and not schooling; for if all the training-time is employed on religion, what becomes of the education professedly given?

It seems clear that justice, expediency, the progress of the nation, and the proper religious freedom of the people, all demand that the plan of the League should have the preference in any great state measure for the education of the people; and it is to be hoped that this may be speedily seen to.

M. S. A. B.

THE LEAGUE.—V.

M. T. has begun his paper with a very lofty definition, which would include all the possible forms of mental training, from that of the infant puling and mewling in its nurse's arms to that of the staid collegian aiming at a double-first and the don preparing for his class lectures; and therefore quite irrelevant to the subject. The League has no intention of dealing with anything else than the primary instruction of the country—what has been denominated as instrumental education. It seeks to see every child in the country able to read fluently and intelligently—so that the newspaper may not be a sealed book, and that the Bible may be studied with profit, under the direction of the spiritual teacher in whom he trusts or to whom he is entrusted; capable of writing so as to hold such correspondence as his necessities may require for family, social, and industrial purposes; and possessed of the power of making such calculations as may be needed by him in his domestic relations, his position as a workman, and his relations to the tax-collector. This is all the League has any idea of enforcing, and it wishes the whole power of the educational machinery of the country to be concentrated on the accomplishment of this purpose, in order that it may be managed in the shortest possible time, in the best possible manner, and with the highest possible results. In gaining the practical use of these elementary branches, the League contemplates that a certain portion of geographical, historical, and scientific information, especially such as relates to his own country and the colonies belonging to it, to their products and peculiarities, and to their political and social conditions shall be got. The great ambition

of the League is to deal with facts, and on this account it restricts its views and purposes to the inculcation of the indispensable and the indisputable. It is desirous of confining the enforceable education of the people to the minimum, because it acknowledges the freedom of the people in regard to all that is not absolutely essential to the proper performance of the duties of a citizen. All beyond that, all that is higher and nobler in education, all that is scholarly and refining, all that is speculative and debatable it puts aside as being beyond the sphere of governmental enforcement, and it proposes to leave these free to all the encouragements, and the aids, and appliances which the zeal of educators, the lovers of science and knowledge, the holders of opinions on speculative points, may desire to bring to bear on the voluntary culture of the inhabitants of the nation; and it agrees that Government may, in certain circumstances, encourage, by grants in aid, any extra and additional study which may be regarded as likely to benefit the whole body of the people.

The foregoing remarks show that M. T. opens on a mistaken view of the question he proposes to discuss. The League does not define education in bulk and entirety, it only defines the educational minimum of citizenship, the quantity and quality of training on the attainment of which the State has a right to insist, and for the acquirement of which it is its duty to make arrangements. The League is not obnoxious to the criticisms of M. T., founded on his grand definition, but he has himself most thoroughly and completely pronounced sentence of condemnation on the Union and its advocates by setting up so high a standard of comparison. Let any one who is acquainted with the average attainments even of the masters and mistresses of the schools of the British and Foreign School Society, the National Schools, and all those on that level and of that sort, under the management of which the Union approves, compare these acquirements with the standard of education contained in M. T.'s definition (p. 22):—"Education is the *leading out* of all the faculties and powers of a human being to their proper ends, in the best manner and to the production of the wisest results"—and he will easily see how preposterous is the claim set up on behalf of the Union; for even at its best the pupils cannot, on the whole, gain more than their teachers can impart.

In what school in the whole country is an attempt made to lead out "*all* the faculties of a human being"? Who has determined the *proper ends* of the faculties and powers of a human being?—is not this the very point on which sectarians differ and philosophers disagree? Who has discovered the *best manner* of leading out all the faculties and powers of a human being?—is not this the very ground of contest between rival educational system-mongers? And what class of men is that which is "certificated" to be able to lead out all the faculties and powers of a human being to the production of their *wisest results*?—are the wisest results which the human faculties can produce fixed and determined, defined and known?

Those who appeal to a high standard must be judged by that, and if M. T. meant anything by his opening definition, he meant to call attention to the inadequacy of the view of education entertained by the League and the adequacy of that held by the Union. Well, we can only say that the most ludicrous failure cannot but attend any endeavour made by M. T. to show that his definition of education is, even in shadowy outline, attainable in any of those schools which the Unionists have set up, and which they defend. We are afraid that were M. T. to affirm that they come up in any degree to the defined mark, it would be justly considered, without any attempt at a pun, an empty boast.

So much havoc have we made in the argument of the Union leader that we think it would be almost cruelty to proceed farther to open entrenchments against his outworks. If the foundation be destroyed what can the builders do?

He next asserts that the League regards *men* as *machinery*, and that they take only a political and industrial view of men as labourers. This he contrasts with the lofty and noble idea of the Union on man's responsibility and destiny. Is he not here again caught tripping. The League knows that it is man's first duty to "provide things honest in the sight of all men," and it remembers that "he who provideth not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, has denied the faith and is *worse than an infidel*." So it insists that each child shall acquire so much actual education as shall enable it adequately and properly to perform those duties which are essential to personal, social, and, if you like, Christian life. But this it does not propose as the whole or the ultimate; it recognises this as essential to begin with, and insists on its being got, while it leaves all the elevating, ennobling, doctrinal, and dogmatic teaching to be given as Jesus gave it—out of a full heart devoted to goodness and God, of his own free will, for the improvement of man and the promotion of the Creator's glory.

M. T. compares the League's *minimum* of enforceable education, as if it were all it thought requisite, with the *maximum* confessedly unattained, and perhaps scarcely attainable—at least certainly not in national schools—of the advocates of the Union, as if that were always accomplished by the Unionists; and so makes a false suggestion as well as suppresses the truth. He places before us a grand, vague, unapproachable, theoretical scheme—big as a blown bladder of ambitious dreams; and he compares, or rather contrasts it with the small aim and narrow bounds of the practical men who want to make sure of one step, instead of merely dreaming about twenty. "I have shown the possibility of aërial navigation by my experiments and experience. I am convinced that by and by we shall surmount all the difficulties, and produce speedy and sure locomotion for all through the bright spaces of the sky, instead of crawling insect-like upon the earth in carriages trailing along after a steam-engine; give us but time and arrest all other machinery and efforts except mine, and I

shall show you a triumph exceeding the combined dreams of all earth's conquerors. We shall stoke our engines with sunlight, and guide our course by electricity, and my chariots shall be driven by the steeds of heaven." "But," said Mr. Practical, "I don't want to buy green spectacles, like Moses Primrose; I want something useful now, and exchangeable for value received. I cannot work, conduct commerce, live in peace and security upon the dividends payable on debentures belonging to a company *in nubibus* and in the currency of dreamland; I prefer the actual to the possible, the reality of life to the promise of a dream." And Mr. Practical was right. Mr. Practical is the League, and Mr. Bombastes Balloon is the Union.

So much for M. T.; we must now direct a little attention to "Conservative," who favours the Union because "it upholds religion as its chief feature in education." This is highly amiable and praiseworthy, but so far as it is meant to imply that the League does not uphold religion as a chief feature in education, it is erroneous as a statement. The League has no feud with religion; but it doubts if it is expedient or even proper to make it a chief feature of a system of school education which must be enforced to be efficacious. Religion, like the mercy of which it is the messenger,—

"Is not strained;

It droppeth as the gentle dew from Heaven

Upon the place beneath; it is twice blessed;

It blesseth him that gives and him that takes;"

but it is not best enforced and compulsory, which both the Union and the League admit a certain amount of education ought to be.

M. E. fancies he hits the League hard by his brandishing the policeman (p. 117) as a terror. Did he forget that the Union proposes starvation as the *compulsitor*? "Those who do not work shall not eat," saith the Scripture; but the Union turns the scope of the passage thus:—Those who do not go to school shall not work, and those who do not work shall not eat; *ergo*, starvation shall be our grim seneschal to muster children to school. We confess we prefer the policeman, who may prevent any such need by taking time by the forelock and getting all the little girls and boys under tutorage before the time for the kindly, religious Union starvation law to come into operation. The Union wants to invert the proper method. The policeman says, Go as the League commandeth; and so the education is got; the Union says, Do as you choose, and let the evil ripen, and then says, You have not got what you were told to acquire—therefore the sentence of the law is, Be idle and starve! for you must neither beg nor steal, as the policeman whom we restrained from taking measures with you before will now lay hold on you. In what then is the Union preferable to the League in this matter? Does it not advocate the worse cause? These seem to me to make it plain that the League plan of primary education should be preferred to that of the Union. N. W.

History.

HAS THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY BEEN, ON THE WHOLE, JUST AND WISE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE financial policy of a nation is of very great importance—property, trade investments, wealth, and happiness are all affected by it. Finance and taxation are not exactly synonymous. Finance signifies the whole policy of a nation as concerns the management of money, or governmental action in regard to national wealth; while taxation is the name of moneys levied from the people by compulsory enactment and exaction for the royal treasury, or in other words, the revenue. In either sense it is highly important that every subject should form some definite judgment concerning the wisdom and justice of the policy which has prevailed in the money matters of the nation as they have been affected by Government. It is to this point our attention is directed on this occasion rather than to the amount and incidence of taxation, though these also are included in our theme.

When we take the question as it stands recorded as above, "Has the financial policy of the nineteenth century been *on the whole* just and wise," we see that we are not to descend to mere items of taxation or elements of finance; but that we are expected to hold to some definite reasons extending over and covering the entire question, granting that in some particular portions there may have been mistakes or inversions of principle. We do not require to declare absolutely and entirely for the justice and wisdom of the policy which has regulated our finance, but only for its general justice and wisdom.

I am inclined in the first place to believe that the financial policy of this century, *in this country* of course, has been in the main just and wise, because that in this century there has been a larger amount of investigation, thought, and public inquiry expended on finance than in any former period. When men know that every article of any proposal in regard to finance is to be keenly criticised by persons not only deeply interested in the questions as affecting their own interests, nor even by those who are directly interested in canvassing every proposal so made in behalf of those whom he represents in Parliament; but also by persons of acute mind and great general knowledge engaged in journalism, as well as by those who are stirred by the animus of party, they are not likely to propose any measure which is clearly unjustifiable or foolish; nor is it probable that they would attempt against such odds to foist into their proposals anything unjust or unwise, the discovery of which would

give advantage to those who were opposed to the measures proposed. On this ground I venture to think that there is a great antecedent probability that the financial policy of this country has not been knowingly unjust or unwise during this present century.

For the reader should note that every financial measure must be brought before the House of Commons, where government by party prevails; and that the whole interest of the best men on each side is thus engaged in behalf of the just and wise management of the revenue—the proposer to bring in nothing which will give his opponents a victory; his opponents to let nothing slip their criticism which affords opportunity of adverse agitation. But besides this, the whole of the proposals made are brought directly and immediately under the notice of men skilled in the art of seeing the consequences and incidence of such proposals, and who are directly interested in putting the public in possession of good wholesome and available advice concerning the affairs of the day in the reviews, magazines, and newspapers; while behind all these there is the public, who are to feel, and who do feel, the burden of any financial difficulty, with the right of petition, and the power of immediate access to the members of the Houses of Parliament, and to the heads of departments in the Government. With all these safeguards against the imposition of burdens more grievous than men can bear by our financiers, we think there is little ground for alarm lest the proposals made should be intrinsically unwise or unjust.

On this ground we think that Samuel's objection (p. 48), that "the restriction of the currency to that which *has*"—ought it not rather to be which *represents*?—"an intrinsic value" is an unjust and unwise piece of financial policy is probably a mistaken one. There have been many currency doctors, and they have promulgated theories on money and money matters; but few of these theorizers have convinced each other or many others of the accuracy and applicability of their schemes as solutions of the difficulty. Had the public in general, or journalists, or members of Parliament, been thoroughly convinced of the benefit of any of these theories, they would most undoubtedly have advocated them, and an agitation would have arisen which would have been irresistible. The same remarks may be applied to his observations on "the system of banking determined by legal enactments," as well as that of "the preponderance of indirect over direct taxation." When the country is definitely convinced by the reasoning of the best thinkers, and the experience which makes men wise, that these things are foolish and unjust, they must be altered, and until men are so convinced any change would be in all probability unjust and unwise as matters of financial policy.

I proceed now to notice some points which seem to prove that our financial policy has been on the whole wise and just.

1. The general simplification and uniformity which has been gradually introduced into our financial system gives one reason to suppose that it is growing more wise and just, while the publica-

cation of the accounts and the submitting of them to public scrutiny and criticism gives emphasis to this opinion. It is a very potent fact, that early in the century the state of confusion and intricacy in which the public accounts were kept made it almost impossible for any one to be sure of the relations of income and expenditure; for every book on finance affirms that it was so. Now this is all changed. And almost every almanac supplies long columns of financial statistics, which he who runs may read.

II. The gradual removal of vexatious and obnoxious imposts; the progressive reductions of all merely political fiscal arrangements, and the constant lessening of those which pressed most burdensomely upon the energy, industry, and commerce of the nation, all tend to show how the financial policy of the country has been growing more just and wise.

The repeal of the corn laws, of the navigation laws, of the timber duties, &c., the reduction of the duties levied on tea, sugar, &c., the abolition of many petty Custom-house charges, the reduction of stamp, fire, and insurance duties, and the many other taxes which have been consolidated and lessened, are all facts tending to this same conclusion—that our finance has been becoming more wise and just as the century has proceeded.

III. I note again that the management of the national debt has been simplified, consolidated, and rendered much more available, not only as a security, but as a transferable security. It is a remarkable circumstance that the borrowing power of our country has been sustained in the midst of all the shocks and changes of European politics; but it is not a less surprising fact that her paying capacity and her entire honesty as a creditor has been fully maintained. While repudiation has been advocated and exemplified on every side, Britain has neither been seduced to play false to its creditors, nor to extend the gambling spirit by lotteries of stock, &c. Year by year the management of the debt has been made more economical, and the operations in regard to its transfer have been simplified and made comprehensible by the multitude.

IV. I think no mean argument for the justice and wisdom of the financial policy of our century is to be found in the greater attention that is now paid to the moral effects produced, or likely to be produced, by measures of finance. Formerly, the maxim of the Treasury seems to have been very much like that of Macklin's Andrew Macsycophant—"Get siller, honestly if ye can, but at any rate get it"! In our day, however, the effects on the minds and habits of the people are made ground of judgment regarding proposals made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and if a good case can be made out in showing that the taxation proposed is likely to demoralize or debase the healthy feeling of the country, it is not only resisted, but is most frequently yielded. These moral considerations have been pressed more and more on the finance ministers of our century, and some of Mr. Gladstone's finance speeches are lofty ethical discourses. Sir Stafford North-

cote followed Mr. Gladstone in this excellent habit, and Mr. Lowe appears to be emulous of his rival and his chief. Indeed, it is principally on moral grounds that there has not been a far greater preponderance given to direct over indirect taxation, and it may be fairly concluded that, as the moral condition of the nation rises, the finance policy of the Government will grow more wise and just.

I am not myself deeply skilled in the mysteries of the finance of the Government, but I think that the recent extensions of the Post Office, dating from 1840, that the laws in connection with banks, and especially with savings banks, that the institution of life annuities, and all the other forms of benefiting the poorer classes, deserve commendation. Probably the railway system might have been largely improved under a proper financial system, but it may be that Government, as the directors of the Joint Stock Company of the nation, may yet absorb the working of the railways as they have done the telegraphs, and as they propose to do to the schools. We may thus, perhaps, soon see our way to pay off the national debt from the profits of railway travelling, telegraphic correspondence, and letter-carrying. If we use the Crown coal on the sea-board for the same purpose, we may have a finance system with little or no taxation. These, however, are either dreams or theories for the future. As to the past, I do think that there is every reason to believe that the financial policy of the century, so far as the nation itself was upright and sensible, has been just, wise, and beneficial, as becomes that of a great, glorious, and free country.

T. R. W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"We have, in the course of these twenty years (1842—1861), seen our financial system exhibited in all its bearings; and examples have been given of almost every kind of financial problem. We have seen how large surpluses have been applied, and how large deficits have been met; we have had peace taxation and war taxation; loans of various kinds, contracted upon different principles; successful and unsuccessful operations upon the interest of the debt; we have repealed an enormous mass of taxation with one hand, and have laid on a still larger amount with the other: we have revised our commercial policy, and, to some extent, our monetary policy also."—*Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Bart.*

It ought to be matter of congratulation to the readers of this magazine that a topic of such paramount and permanent importance has been brought before them for consideration as that which is now about to occupy our attention. Finance, as it is now administered, makes itself felt in the experience of every person, and the duties it imposes reach almost every creature in the country. From the cradle to the grave the fingers of the Chancellor of the Exchequer are continually busy in finding something in which he can have a share, whether these may be necessities or luxuries.

If we are not exposed to the plague of locusts, we are, at all events, not free from the pestilence of tax-gatherers; and there is,

probably, no commodity exchangeable, conveyable, or enjoyable, from which the Exchequer derives no replenishment. It would be a great and good deed, worthy almost of a pension, if not of a capital place, to persuade the readers of this magazine, and through them all whom they may influence, that the financial policy of this country, during this century, has been just and wise.

It is, of course, one of the difficulties in the treatment of this wide and intricately-ramified topic that the statement of the matters of fact made must be very condensed, that they may have a chance of being read, and that the arguments that may be founded upon them should immediately follow the statements which are reasoned upon; and hence a process of reasoning which is in reality cumulative, is, to appearance, cut into shreds and patches, and is exposed to be attacked bit by bit, while in truth it forms an integral whole of tessellated mosaic—fact forming ground for argument, and argument giving force to fact. Thus, for instance, if I affirm that as much is spent annually on the maintenance of a hopeless pauper here as would place him in a sphere of hopefulness and usefulness elsewhere, and argue that this is ruinous financial policy, I may be replied to by denying the expediency of emigration, or affirming the advantage of cheap labour, neither of which are financial questions.

If, again, one should endeavour to show that, had a proper and national view of trades unions been taken, and full consideration been given to the many questions which arise in regard to these organizations, we might have had these now transformed into co-operative banks for the working classes, rich and useful, lending aid to make industry independent, and so utilized as friendly societies, annuity associations, and small-loan offices, as to have made working men self-helpers, while it would have reduced the whole sum of the tendency to pauperism and wastefulness which multiplies the need for taxation both voluntary and enforced. This, which is a grave argument against our financial policy, in that it afforded no security and protection, still less encouragement and stimulus, to the savings of the poor, may be met with a diatribe against trades unions as a question of political economy, or as a matter of commercial class expediency. This is not a valid reply to the financial objection. The reply should hit upon the point to which the argument refers, and the criticism should be exerted on the argument in its relation to the question at issue, which is, *Has the financial policy—that series of government regulations which refers to national wealth—been just and wise?*

The financial policy of the nineteenth century has been frequently changed and marvellously varied, and it will be hard, we fear, to bear in mind the fact that it is the general drift and not the particular facts of that policy with which this debate concerns itself.

By the union of Great Britain and Ireland in 1799, an imperial financial policy became possible, and as that event wound up at once a century in time and an epoch in financial history, the limit

assigned to the discussion has been wisely chosen and properly fixed. The task given us to do is to determine by fair and honourable argumentation, substantiated by reference to facts, whether the financial policy of the British empire since its legally corporate existence as such has been on the whole wise and just? We find ourselves constrained, on the question as thus put, to assert that, on the whole, while remembering the many specific beneficial endeavours to change the incidences or lighten the burden of taxation, the policy pursued by the Chancellors of the Imperial Exchequer has neither been judicious nor impartial, has not been based upon just principles, or, as regards distribution, been fair and equal; and has not been determined in accordance with right reason and a due consideration of the facts of social and civil life.

The first Parliament of the united empire met 22nd Jan., 1801, at which time the number of the inhabitants of the British dominions amounted to about 16,000,000, and the revenue required for the proper maintenance of Government in the empire was about £38,000,000, or £2 7s. 6d. per head on an average—and this was a period of debt, incumbrance, and war. Under the pressure of war in 1820, the revenue was raised to £65,000,000, from a population of 21½ millions. This, in 1835, was reduced to £50,000,000, while in 1869 the revenue realized upwards of £72,500,000, in a population of 29½ millions, which is about £2 10s. per head on an average, in a time of profound peace. Here we have an absolute advance in the rate of taxation, although the area of the imposition is so vastly extended, and while the expenditure ought not to have increased in anything like the same ratio; for it is the rule in these matters that the greater the number to be supplied with anything the more cheaply per individual it can be provided. Here the opposite of this occurs, namely, the greater the number of individuals called upon to contribute to government and defence the more costly these things became. On the general question, then, we conceive that we have fully made out our case—that the financial policy of our country during the present century has neither been just nor wise.

The argument which we have just placed before our readers, and proved by the sternest of all evidence—figures, becomes all the more pertinent when we remember that this constant increase has been going on in the face of repeated agitation in favour of financial reform, and while all the parties in the State were professing prudence, economy, and retrenchment. To belie professions and to deny that which has been actually done is neither just nor wise—not just, because it involves dishonesty and hypocrisy; and not wise, because honesty is the best policy.

Another point which ought to be observed in connection with this argument is, that this increased national taxation has been accompanied by a continuous increase of local taxation, to such an extent as to occasion a collection of nearly £20,000,000, or something more than 15s. per head, as local taxes—a great portion of

which is employed, in fact, to release the imperial exchequer from expenditure which would otherwise have fallen upon it. This release comes from peace and from local payments, but no relief comes to the tax-payer, who is called upon to contribute a larger sum now than was required early in the century, when communication was far more difficult and expensive than it is now.

The finance of the nineteenth century was begun with an act of iniquitous injustice and excessive folly. Between the years 1798 and 1800 a sum of more than £56,000,000 had been borrowed, and the repayment of this sum was made a special charge upon the income-tax imposed by Mr. Pitt in the former year; and it was distinctly arranged that the tax should be continued until that debt was discharged. This was a fair and honest undertaking. Government proposed to raise the loan, the possessors of incomes in the country gave their guarantee for the payment of it by them. Yet, immediately on the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens, in 1802, Mr. Addington, who had succeeded Mr. Pitt, abolished the income-tax, and transferred this debt of £56,000,000 and its annual charge to the sinking fund, to be paid by the general community out of the general taxes, and thus released the wealthy from a just obligation formally undertaken, by putting the burden on the whole community, who had had their proportionate share of the taxation of the time to bear. Here, by a breach of faith, which is an injustice, the minister saddled all time coming with a debt, for the extinction of which, without pressure on the general community, provision had been made, while he foolishly burdened all future revenue with the charges thence arising, and spread distrust among the lenders of money as well as the tax-payers.

Another item of taxation, which has been handled with a great deal of dexterity to cover the deficit in revenue occasioned by the repeal of the corn laws, are the spirit duties. The spirit duties in England and Scotland have been raised since 1825 from 2s. 10d. to 10s., while in England they have been raised within the same period from 7s. to 10s. It is to be recollected that these products are in Ireland and Scotland what are called the national beverages, the use of which had become inwoven with the common customary life of the country; and as no corresponding increase of taxation was put upon the national beverage of England, while at the same time enormous reductions were made in the wine import duties on a commodity chiefly used by the rich, there can be no doubt that Ireland and Scotland were dealt with unjustly in this matter. My object in mentioning this case, however, is neither to make much of this favouritism to English customs, nor to enter upon the moral and social questions which arise when the spirit duties are spoken of, but to note the dexterity with which these have been manipulated, so as to replace upon the same class of society a burden in lieu of the taxation remitted by the repeal of the corn laws for the saving of the landed and propertied interests. It is in reality a corn-tax replaced on a corn product.

F. M.

Greek Days and Roman Nights.

No. I.—PLATO'S "PHÆDO."

III. The "*Dramatis Personæ*" of the *Phædo*.

The law of parsimony had great power over the Greek drama; the exigencies of the scene required to be controlled by the fact that good actors were scarce, and that complications of plot, how, ever admirable, would, to a simple Hellenic group of spectators, have been incomprehensible, if made more ravelled by a number of persons necessarily draped very much alike; hence it became a rule with the Greek Tragedians, that, however numerous the *mutes* or the *chorus* might be, the *agonistæ*, or players, permissible on the stage at one time as speakers, should be limited to three; when occasionally a fourth speaking-character was introduced, he was, according to Pollux, the Greek sophist and grammarian, a supernumerary or extra hand. One actor might perform more parts than one, but then the drama required to be so constructed that, while the stage was properly occupied by the other players, he should have sufficient time to retire and change his garments and properties. This law of parsimony was also imposed upon Roman dramatists by Horace, in his "Art of Poetry," "*Neo quarta loqui persona laboret*," 193—Let not a fourth character strive to speak. Poets who were desirous of contending for the prizes awarded to successful merit in the drama, had three actors assigned to them, *by lot*, so that the active personages of the drama, apart from the chorus, were in reality three, as a general rule. The principal character in a drama was called the *protagonist*, the second *deuteragonist*, and the third the *tritagonist*, these latter designations indicating subordinateness of character and importance. The *chorus*, which consisted in the early days of the Thespian art of one person only, was subsequently greatly enlarged, to gratify the love of the spectacular in which the Hellenic races delighted. The chorus took part or displayed an interest in what was passing on the stage, by dumb show or movement, dance and song, and occasionally shared in the action of the drama, through its chief personage, called the *coryphæus*. On the stage there were the *scenæ*, the *proscenium*, and the *parascenia* (or side-wings). At the back of the scene there were three doors on the stage, one in the centre and one on each side. Pollux describes the middle one as that generally of a palace, or the residence of the protagonist, that on the right hand as the one by which strangers enter, and that on the left as commonly the door of a prison.

The prison may be regarded as poetically suggestive of the body,
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and Socrates of the soul. As from the prison in which Socrates is immured escape for him is only possible by death, so is the soul enclosed in and clogged by the body; and as Socrates refuses to leave his prison on any other terms than those permitted by law, so is suicide forbidden to and rejected by the philosophic thinker, as a means of escape from the woes and trials of the life-imprisoning body. Socrates, as representing the soul, is surrounded by earth's interests and ties—wife, child, friends, disciples, &c.—and he is exposed to all the soul's trials—fear, love, gratitude, converse, and kindness—to make him long for life, dislike death, and recoil from the hour of fate. But Socrates possesses his soul in patience, while awaiting the unconquerable event; and so are we perhaps here taught the spirit of man ought to endure and to dare the oncome of the time, when the chillness of death shall pass over the frame, and the enfranchised spirit shall quit the prison of time and sense and body to pass into the new dawn promised by hope to the thoughtful mind. It may have been that Plato chose this prison scene as a suggestive *ensemble* through which to teach in parable the analogy of life to a prison, the soul to Socrates, and death to enfranchisement unto immortality. The parts of a tragedy, according to Aristotle, are, 1, the prologue; 2, the episodes or incidents; 3, the exode or *denouement*; and interspersed with these, 4, the choric parts; namely, (i.) *parados*, or introductory song, (ii.) *stasimon*, the set or steady byplay, (iii.) *kommi*, lamentations and interjected references. These preliminary observations may enable us to comprehend and trace the wonderfully artistic dramatic form of the Dialogue of the Death of Socrates.

First on the proscenium, here representing Phlius, we see the coryphæus, Phædo, and Echeocrates, with perhaps some others of the chorus, standing while the introductory interlocutions go on which place the circumstances and the time before us, and excite in us the plot-interest on which the dramatic dialogue is to rest. While Phædo speaks, the scene opens, and we are in presence of Socrates in prison; and Phædo, as the prologue, describes the dumb show of the situation, Xantippe's grief and retirement under the care of Crito's attendants, the offices of the jailer, the unloosing of the prisoner in the presence of, or by, the eleven, and thereafter glides away to his place among the chorus, which is now upon the scene. The protagonist is sitting on his prison-bed; Simmias and Cebes stand beside him, and scattered around are the chorus, in befitting attitudes and places, on one side the Athenian Socratics, Crito and Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigines, Ctesippus, Apollodorus, Æschines, Antisthenes, and Menexenus, &c.; and on the other the Foreign Socratics, Phædo, Phædonides, Euclid, and Terpsion, and perhaps some others. The *dramatis personæ* being thus arranged with due attention to stage effect, Socrates speaks, and the episodes commence. Our present business is, however, to tell who these are that occupy the scene; and first of the coryphæus

and his coadjutors, and then of the agonistæ of this drama of immortal life.

I. Phædo was a native of Elis, of noble birth, who having been, in the fortune of war, made prisoner, was brought to Athens and sold as a slave, while still but a slim youth, about B.C. 400. In his master's service he was compelled to follow evil courses. While listening to Socrates he was attracted with regard towards the great conversational controversialist, and by his look of keen interest in the discussions drew the attention of the Inquisitor of Truth upon himself. At the request of Socrates, one of the wealthy men, probably Crito, who heard him gladly, bought him and set him free. He became an intense admirer of Socrates, and was greatly beloved by him in return. There is much dramatic skill and *moral* propriety therefore in selecting one so young and so endeared to give an account of an event so tragic—one which would be certain to make a deep and lasting impression on the mind of the *protégé* of the sufferer; while the dialectic skill and subtlety attributed to Phædo as a philosophic instructor in Elis after his master's death, invest the dialogue with great *intellectual* pertinence. He wrote philosophical dialogues, but these are now lost. He was the founder of the Eliac school, the leading doctrine of which was, that all that is *good* and *true* results from reason and intelligence. Plato is reported to have visited him at Elis, and he is said to have expressed surprise at many things attributed to him in the dialogue. That Plato should have named his best philosophical composition after him, shows the high opinion he entertained of the thoughtful and loving disciple of the great master.

II. Echecrates, probably a native of Magna Græcia, and a settler in Phlius, in Achaia, who had been, according to Diogenes Laërtius, "a hearer of the Tarentine Pythagoreans, Philolaus and Eurytus." He expresses himself as one interested in and familiar with philosophy, and is represented as imbued with or inclined to Pythagorean opinions. There is in this probably a compliment to the Italic school, with whose speculations the dialogue has some affinity, and a hint that the fate of Socrates was a wound to philosophy felt by all schools and grieved for in all countries, an incident which excited wonder among men, and astonishment that Athens should have been guilty of such treason to truth and investigative thought.

III. Crito was a wealthy and worthy citizen of Athens, of the same age and belonging to the same district of the city, the Demus Alopecce, as Socrates (as well as that of Aristides the Just). Socrates and he were twin yet twain, in thought and heart, they were soul-friends. He is not a philosopher, but a friend who is willing to place his wealth and influence at the disposal of Socrates, not from discipleship but friendship. Socrates lovingly rallies him on his unphilosophic ideas of life and comfort. He had arranged for the escape of Socrates from prison, and had urged him to avail himself of the opportunity. He receives the latest instructions of

Socrates about his family, gets his last commands, and closes the eyes of the hemlock-dead thinker. Plato attributes a dialogue to him, and evidently thought him a true model of a true friend.*

IV. Critobulus was the son of Crito; he, with his father, had attended the trial of Socrates. The patriarch of Greek philosophy esteemed him highly as modest and thoughtful. Xenophon shows us that Socrates admitted him to a close friendship, and gives us a report of a conversation which Crito and Socrates held on that topic. Plato makes him a chief interlocutor in two dialogues. He was a handsome youth, and was known as a disciple of the imprisoned and condemned thinker.

V. Apollodorus was a native of Phaleron, in Attica, a great admirer of Socrates, and a constant attender upon him, a very devoted but not a very enlightened disciple. He was a man of moods and whims, enthusiastic but easily depressed. When Socrates was imprisoned, he kind-heartedly brought him a finer robe to wear than the threadbare cloak he had; but, with a stoicism of principle, Socrates refused to increase the comforts of his last hours on earth, lest he should increase also his fear of death, or his desire of life. He is a speaker in "The Banquet," and is mentioned by Xenophon with favour.

VI. Hermogenes was the son of Hipponicus and brother of Callias, the wealthy Athenian. But as his family were noted for their wealth, and he is mentioned by Xenophon as being in pecuniary straits, he was probably an illegitimate son. In "Cratylus" he is the chief speaker, and Xenophon quotes him as his authority for many of the particulars of the death of Socrates. Crito had a son named Hermogenes, but this was the son of the torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries.

VII. Epigenes, a sickly thoughtful youth in whom Socrates felt an interest, whose father, Antepheon of Cephisia, was present at the trial. Xenophon devotes a chapter in his "Memorabilia" (iii. 12) to a conversation on gymnastics and health, in which Socrates and Epigenes had engaged. Crito had a son of the same name, but commentators think that he was not the disciple meant in the "Phædo."

VIII. Ctesippus, a youth of the Demus of Pæania, as the "Euthy-

* Crito receives the following honourable testimony to his character from Xenophon. "Crito was also an attendant on Socrates, as well as Chærephon, Chærecrates, Hermocrates, Simmias, Cebes, and Phædonides, who, with others that attended him, did not seek his society that they might be fitted for popular orators or forensic pleaders, but that, becoming honourable and good men, they might conduct themselves irreproachably towards their families, connections, dependants, and friends, as well as towards their country and their fellow-citizens; and no one of all these, whether in youth or at a more advanced age, either was guilty or was accused of any crime."—*Memorabilia*, B. I., ii., 48.

demus" informs us, and a relative of Menexenus, as we are told in "Lysis." He seems to have been a Sophist, knowing enough to profit from companionship with the strong-minded apostle of philosophy.

IX. Menexenus, son of Demophon, of the Demus of Pæania. With his name Plato headed his satire on the Rhetoricians, in that parody of popular speechification which contains the funeral oration of Pericles. This dialogue is quoted from by Aristotle as authentic, though some deem it spurious. In it Socrates is exhibited as loving Menexenus dearly, and Menexenus is, for a Sophist, exceedingly deferential to the scourge of shams.

X. Æschines, the son of Lysanias, a sausage-seller in Athens an industrious and studious disciple of Socrates, as well as of the Rhetorical art. When he attached himself to Socrates, he is reported to have said "I am poor and have nothing to give—except myself, which I give wholly and readily." He migrated to Syracuse, and composed orations for parties in the law-courts, and took money for so doing: hence he is called a Sophist. He wrote dialogues, none of which however have come down to us as authentic. He seems to have excited great jealousy among his opponents, from which circumstance we should be inclined to infer that he was able and powerful, skilled and popular. Even Plato is reported to have entertained an ill-will to him, and to have credited Crito with the proposal and plan of the escape of Socrates, which was originally due to the ingenuity of Æschines. Timon, comparing his dialogues with those of Plato, so copious and graphic, calls him "meagre Æschines."

XI. Antisthenes, son of Antisthenes by a Thracian mother, was the founder of the sect of the Cynics—who had fought at Tanacore B.C. 426. He was first a pupil of Gorgias, the Sophist, and then subdued by the wisdom of Socrates, adhered to him as a disciple. He was unattractively austere, though intelligent and manly. Eccentricity, independence, and a sort of bold rudeness made him remarkable, and after the death of Socrates he taught in the gymnasium of Cynosarges a philosophy which set at nought the forms and usages of society. He despised speculative thought, and Plato as its chief cultivator. Independence was with him the main good. Virtue is self-sufficiency, and it is god-like to have no wants. Out of the principles of Antisthenes grew the more recent and more famous school of the Stoics.

Besides these enumerated, others are said to have been present whose names are not given. Among these, probably, Adimantus, Plato's brother; Æantodorus, brother of Apollodorus; and Chærecrates, brother of Chærophon, may have been, for they were present at the trial. Chærophon, who had been introduced by Aristophanes into "The Clouds," as what might be called the pantaloon of that play, was dead previous to the trial; Xenophon was absent on the "Expedition of Cyrus." Plato, though present

at the trial, was absent now there from sickness—the sickness of the stricken heart.*

Of distinguished Foreign Socratics, two are specially named as absent, in a sentence which from its tone appears to be intended as a rebuke—the clever, versatile, subtle, and not very trustworthy founder of the Cyrenaic School, Aristippus, who along with Cleombrotus, the Ambraciot suicide—both of whom having gone, during their master's imprisonment, on a pleasure excursion among the beautiful islands of the gulf of Ægina, believing as they did in the duty of self-indulgence as the chief end of man, and in the propriety of seeking the pleasurable under all circumstances, were traitors at once to Socrates and the Socratic faith.

Of the Foreign Socratics mentioned as present we have:—

XII. Phaedondes, a Theban of whom nothing is known but that he was a disciple of Socrates and a friend of Simmias and Cebes.

XIII. Terpsion, a Megarian, a friend of Euclid's, who is the bearer of the report of the discourse of Socrates in the "Theætetus" or Scientific Inquiry.

XIV. Euclid, founder of the School of Megara, in his native city. He had studied in the Eleatic school, and had afterwards sedulously attended the instructions of Socrates. Compounding the chief elements of each, he produced a dialectic of argumentation which has been called "Wrangling." He was a zealous debater, and was peculiarly skilful in the invention of rebutting arguments.

XV. Simmias was a Theban, a disciple of Philolaus of Tarentum. He was a favourite of Socrates on account of the boldness, honesty, and earnestness with which he sought after truth. He and Cebes are noted by Xenophon as among the most eager of the listeners to Socrates. Simmias is reported to have written dialogues, and Plutarch records that in his old age he gathered round him at Thebes a band of thinkers, to whom he retailed his old experiences, and expounded the philosophy he had learned in Athens.

XVI. Cebes, a Theban, the friend of Simmias, an acute and persistent reasoner, who rather prided himself on his controversial powers. He is said to have written dialogues, but the fine allegory of the "Picture," formerly attributed to him, is now believed to be of later date. He is noted as a Socratic by Xenophon.

XVII. Socrates, the master-spirit of philosophy in Greece, the inquirer of antiquity, the martyr for freedom of mind, the chief character in this dialogue, and the principal actor in the great historical drama of the evolution of reflective speculation. He is poor, tanned, weather-beaten, ugly, and imprisoned under sentence

* "I am sick of many griefs," says Brutus in "Julius Cæsar," and Brabantio in "Othello" says:—

"My particular grief
Is of so flood-gate and o'erbearing a nature
That it engulfs and swallows other sorrows,
And it is still itself."

of death, yet he is noble and lovable, and even in the extremity of fate he is neither forsaken by his friends nor his fortitude. His mind is—

"So various that it seems to be
Not one but all mankind's epitome."

He has attraction for the young Cebes, Simmias, Critobulus, and Epigenes; for the wealthy Crito as a friend, for the enthusiastic Apollodorus as a disciple; for the austere Antisthenes, and the gay Aristippus; for the self-exerting Æschines, and the self-indulgent Cleombrotus; for the amiable Hermogenes, and the wrangling Euclid; for Sophists, like Ctesippus and Menexenus, and mere lovers of philosophy and himself, like Phædonides and Terpsion; and he excites a sorrow not altogether incompatible with a noble pleasure in the very heart's love of Phædo; while to the eye of Plato as a literary artist, he affords the fittest personage to be the type of thinking man, the philosopher.

His threescore years and ten have been fulfilled, and yet he is strong, active, and alert in body, potent, skilful, dexterous, and noble in mind. He has lived on fixed principles, though ever engaged in ardent controversy, and he is not now about to change the colour of his life. He has been accused, tried, and condemned; he has been for thirty days looking on death steadily approaching, not apprehensively but patiently; he has refused to break the law, though about to suffer as a transgressor, and he has rejected indulgences offered by many friends—all indulgences except the sacred one of friendship—that he greedily enjoys to the last. He has suffered, it is true, but he has also enjoyed, for conscience has been witnessing to him of a good fight fought. He is in prison, but its doors are about to open for his freedom, because his soul is preparing to pass away from the prison-house of earthly clay, to a liberty to which nought is comparable. How singularly subtle are the links of pain and pleasure; and may it not be that after the present pangs of death the future freedom of a higher life may give as much distinct joy as the prisoner's leg, freshly released from its bonds, feels when the blood begins its gladsome flow, and the nerves are aglow with the sweet sensations of a pain the less become a pleasure added. In such mood sitteth the Hero of Inquiry, when the interlocution begins.

Toiling Upward.

THOMAS COOPER: SHOEMAKER, CHARTIST, AND POET.

CHAP. I.

To those who, by actual experience or observation, know something of the relations that formerly existed, and probably still continue, between employers and employed in the great hosiery districts of the Midland Counties, the problem of frequently-recurring political discontent among the latter presents no mystery. It is rather seen to be a natural result of that incessant and fierce commercial and manufacturing competition which bears witness to an overcrowded population, and to the imperfect degree and arrangements of even our boasted British civilization. The struggle for bare existence on the one hand, and for the profit necessary to social life and comfort upon the other, is itself, under modern conditions, sufficiently fierce—and, to all appearance, unavoidably so,—even where no desire is manifested upon either side for more than a fair proportion of the gains of industry and enterprise. But where, not content with securing the gain which is his due upon the capital invested and the thought and anxiety bestowed in business, the master, bent upon rapid enrichment, strives to pare down, on all pretences which he can seize, the already scanty earnings of the workers in his factories and at his frames, an element of tenfold bitterness is added to the strife. And yet, in such a case, in spite of strikes and combinations, those who depend upon daily or weekly earnings must sooner or later submit, as fresh numbers are added to the ranks of those who demand employment, and must take whatever offers even to secure a portion, however insufficient, of the coarsest sustenance.

But when to this state of affairs is added the disturbing and distressing influence of a glutted market, or a decrease in demand for the articles produced, both sections of the community suffer; though it is by the dependent class that the depression is first and most painfully felt. Obtaining, too often, at the best but the mere requisites of life, any further reduction of receipts lowers them at once, without fault of theirs, to destitution; and perhaps thousands are wholly thrown out of work and wages, and must either die of hunger, or resort to the insufficient provisions for poor relief or to private charity for support. And as for this no blame attaches to themselves, there need be little wonder if the deficiencies and inequalities of social organization are keenly scanned and bitterly discussed, or that remedies, however violent—since matters

seem so bad they can scarcely be made worse—are welcomed in presenting even a remote possibility of change.

It is no wonder, then, that social suffering begets discontent and political agitation among the masses who feel it most, amidst those who, by strength of sympathy or nearness of position and connection, ultimately realize the distress of their condition.

All these causes combined in the period which preceded the repeal of the corn laws to produce, not in the Midland Counties only, but throughout the manufacturing districts of Great Britain, a state of misery unparalleled in her industrial history.

Naturally enough, specifics were eagerly sought after, and as confidently propounded. Socialist schemes, plans for establishing universal order and harmony, methods for checking the rapid growth of the population, were rife. Most prominent and important of all the efforts made for removing the causes of the prevailing distress were—the great anti-corn-law movement and the Chartist agitation.

Discontent with the state of things was, as we have said, natural: there is no virtue in sitting down to suffer where cure may be sought and found. The League directed its untiring energies against one great source of the wide-spread destitution, and by the introduction of free trade in corn the depression by which that destitution was proximately caused was speedily removed. The Chartist movement originated more completely among the sufferers themselves, but attracted to itself many men of higher position in society, who sought to assist their humbler and weaker brethren. Its object was to secure a fuller degree of political power for the people, by which alone, it was believed, permanent emancipation from the state of misery and of almost serfdom into which the masses had fallen could be secured.

This agitation brought to the front a remarkable amount of natural intellectual power and cultivation, not usually supposed to arise or to be attained in the labouring classes, and in particular made prominently known, in Thomas Cooper—a man of indomitable energy, wonderful acquisitions, and real genius—one of the noblest examples of “toiling upward” the world has ever seen.

Thomas Cooper was born at Leicester, on the 20th of March, 1805. He lost his father during infancy, and his mother in consequence removed to Gainsborough, in her native Lincolnshire. She had to support herself and son by the labour of her own hands, and he gratefully records his early recollections of her self-denial. “I have often known her give me the last bit of food in her humble home while she herself fasted.” Their deprivations were very great, so that in the same passage from which the foregoing is taken* Mr. Cooper afterwards said, “I frequently knew, in childhood, what it was to go shoeless, and to wear ragged clothing.”

* “Address to the Jury at Stafford.”

The "Purgatory of Suicides," book iii., stanzas 4 and 7, contains a glowing tribute to his mother's memory, and from his repeated testimony to her early encouragement of his intellectual tastes she appears to have possessed an unusual degree of sympathy with the pursuits of mind and of foresight as to their moral value.

"No gilded verse
Tells how she toiled to win her child a crust,
And, fasting, still toiled on: no rhymes rehearse
How tenderly she strove to be the nurse
Of truth and nobleness in her loved boy,
Spite of his rags."

Thomas was sent to a dame-school in Gainsborough,* kept by one Gertrude Aram, or "Gatty," a septuagenarian clearly, of strongly marked character and much repute. But early and continued illness and its resulting weakness kept him often at home, and under his mother's wise care he found unfailing pleasure in reading, drawing, and music. "She frequently gave me her last penny for a circulating library book, or a sheet of paper, a pencil, or a piece of water-colouring, and, as I advanced in boyhood, she purchased me, with much self-denial, one of the old-fashioned but sweet-toned instruments called a *dulcimer*, on which I learned to play with considerable skill."

So, in poverty, yet "wrapt up in a happy attachment to books, and drawing, and music—often varied by a ramble on the hills and among the woods above Gainsborough in search of flowers"—a taste strong and active still, after the lapse of more than half a century,—the early part of Thomas Cooper's life was passed.

Torksey's Hall—a noble ruin on the banks of the Trent, seven miles from his home—was one spot of special attraction to him, and its dim memories and suggestions helped to quicken in him that vivid historical imagination and enthusiasm to which all his works bear witness. The "Old Hall" at Gainsborough was another favourite resort, remembrances of which joined with feminiscentences of Torksey's Hall to form the basis of "The Baron's Yule Feast," one of his future "prison-rhymes."

Many of these pleasant rambles were made in company with Thomas Miller, afterwards basket-maker, and self-educated poet, novelist, historian, and author of "A day in the Woods," and other pleasing country sketches, four years Cooper's junior, and during them it was the young enthusiast's delight to repeat to his younger friend the whole of Coleridge's "Christabel," with other poems in which he early learned to take delight.

"From fourteen," he says,† "I began to employ every mealtime in reading or study, book in one hand and cup or saucer in the other at breakfast; and even at my humble dinner, if the book were one that must be held up, I could dispense with knife and fork and use a spoon."

* "Captain Cobler," page 162.

† "Eight Letters," page 14.

The boy's avidity for knowledge was not wholly unnoticed, and many promises of patronage and help were made, but only to be broken; and at the age of fifteen his mother was compelled to place him with a shoemaker, by whom he was initiated into the mysteries of a craft from whose followers many notable and noble men have sprung. His hands were thus occupied, but his mind remained unemployed and found amusement for some time in poetical composition. A visit to Roche Abbey, near Tickhill, about this time, led to the writing of a poem, of which a humorous song—"The Miller of Roche,"—has been preserved in the "Baron's Yule Feast."

His historical reading had already been extensive and intelligent, particularly in the Grecian and English annals, begetting in him an earnest attachment to freedom which afterwards bore fruit. "I tell you, then, my lord and gentlemen of the jury, that I became a democrat at the early age of fourteen, while reading the history of glorious Greece; and that I became early attached to my country, but it was by learning that, in the legal enactments of our glorious Alfred and other Saxon monarchs—in our boasted Magna Charta and Bill of Rights,—in brief, that in all and sundry the civil and juridical institutions of my country, there were to be found the luminous traces of a broad and enlightened freedom."^{*}

When sixteen years old Thomas Cooper joined, or founded, a mutual improvement society, in which he gained the rudiments of his oratorical culture. Debates as to the characters of English kings, the relative value of the leading sciences, the comparative evil wrought by the miser and the spendthrift, and other familiar questions, were held weekly. The chair was taken by the members in turn, and the chairman of the evening submitted three subjects, of which one was chosen by the general voice for the following week's discussion, he being expected then to read an opening paper or give an introductory address. "I almost invariably *wrote* and *read* my essay; and the consequence was, the gradual formation of a style, and a consciousness of facility and copiousness of expression, compared with the members who always spoke extemporaneously."[†]

The reading of a memoir of Samuel Lee, Professor of Hebrew at Cambridge, another—

"Divinely-gifted man
Whose life in low estate began,"

led to the formation of a written resolution to acquire, in a given time, the elements of Latin and Greek, and of Geometry and Algebra, and to learn the whole of "Paradise Lost," with the seven best plays of Shakspeare.[‡] This resolve was in some respects exceeded, though in others not fully carried out. He went through

^{*} "Address upon Trial at Stafford." [†] "Eight Letters," page 28.

[‡] "Address at Stafford."

a course of geometry and learned something of algebra, committed to memory three books of Milton and the whole of "Hamlet" (all of which were retained twenty years later, at the time of his trial), and in addition to the Latin and Greek mastered the elements of Hebrew and French.

To the three books of "Paradise Lost" and the play of "Hamlet" he added some thousands of lines of Byron, Burns, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Scott, Keats, and others of our "count of mighty poets." But Milton remained "the prime mover of his soul." Long afterwards he wrote of him—in Book II. of the "Purgatory"—

"I joy that my young heart a covenant made
To take thee for its guide in patriot deed.—

O how the lesson of thy deathless toil,—
While my soul homaged thee,—in me did feed
The flame of freedom!

"Honour, all honour to thee, patriot bard!—
With whom I took sweet counsel in my youth :
I joy, that though my lowly lot was hard,
My spirit, raised by thine, forgot its ruth,
And, smiling, dared the dint of want's fell tooth :
I joy, that all enamoured of thy song,—
While simpletons esteemed my ways uncouth,—
I wandered, by day's dawn, the woods among,
Or did, with midnight lamp, my grateful task prolong.

"Poet of Paradise,—whose glory illumed
My path of youthful penury, till grew
The desert to a garden, and life bloomed
With hope and joy, 'midst suffering,—honour due
I cannot render thee ; but reverence true
This heart shall give thee, till it reach the verge
Where human splendours lose their lustrous hue ;
And when, in death, my mortal joys all merge—
Thy grand and gorgeous music, Milton, be my dirge!

The mode in which these attainments were made, while at the same time the day's long duties had to be fulfilled, and also a multifarious reading was carried on, will be best shown by another extract, to which, however, it should be added that the *memoriter* lessons in languages, &c., were repeated over and over again mentally while occupied with the awl and lapstone.

"In the summer mornings I used to rise at three or earlier, and walk miles among the woods and over the hills, reading every inch of the way, and returning to my labour at the hour of six ; not quitting my stall till nine or ten in the evening found me so far wearied with exertion, that I frequently swooned off my seat. In the winter, because poverty prevented my enjoyment of a fire, I used to place a stool upon a stand to rest my book, and a lamp upon it, and with a bit of old rug under my feet, and my

mother's old red cloak over my shoulders, I used to keep up a gentle darning kind of motion, so as to keep off cold and sleep at the same time. In this mode I used to pass the winter hours from nine or ten to twelve at night, and from three or four to seven in the morning, my mind being too enfevered after learning to permit my sleeping long, even if I had remained in bed. During those laborious hours, in addition to my pursuits in languages, I read over the productions of some of the most colossal intellects my country has ever produced—such as Hooker, and Cudworth, and Stillingfleet, and Warburton. Oh! those were happy hours, and I am proud of them!"*

His deprivations were still severe, his mother being often unable to work, and his occupation yielding him at most the scanty pittance of ten shillings weekly. But his determination to learn kept strong through all: he "toiled upward," and succeeded. "I would go through all again," he lately said to the present writer, "rather than be without knowledge."

His reading was wide: no subjects, apparently, being omitted from its comprehensive range. Even art was not neglected.

He early read, among other works, Rousseau's "Confessions," Volney's "Ruins of Empires," and Voltaire's "Philosophical Dictionary." These gave a deistical bias to his thoughts, and for two years he rejected Revelation. But the witness of holy life and self-sacrificing love in the "Memoirs of Henry Martyn," and of intelligent reasoning in Paley's "Evidences," overcame his doubts, and he fully and earnestly accepted the Christian faith and message of redemption.

Much of Thomas Cooper's study was carried on by means of close analysis in writing. Thus Paley was not only read three times, but abstracts of his arguments were made, until the whole substance of the book was fixed in his memory. At about the age of twenty-one Blair's "Lectures on Rhetoric and the Belles Lettres" were similarly treated, the analysis extending to fifty or sixty written pages. So were Dr. Samuel Clarke's great work upon "The Being and Attributes of God," and Chancellor King's "Inquiry into the Doctrines of the Primitive Christian Church."

Later on, a chronology of history—in ages rather than mere years—was drawn up by the indefatigable student; and afterwards a complete tabulation of Cuvier's Zoological system. These two labours he particularly recommends to be performed at an earlier age than that in which they were undertaken by himself. A further hint may likewise be of value to self-educating readers. "A note-book is of the first value to you. Do not make extracts upon loose sheets of paper. That was my error before I was twenty: and then, feeling restless until I had arranged and systematised these fragments, I began to enter them in a volume, but to transcribe the multifarious pile was too much for patience. . . .

* "Address to the Jury," page 13.

I recommend *one* general note-book to you, because I am sure you will find it much more serviceable and convenient than several note-books. When a young man discovers his own great blame, in having trifled away precious time, and awakes, with something like a passion, to the determination of having solid knowledge, he is in danger of systematising too far. I felt all this when I was about twenty-one; for although I had not trifled as some trifle, I felt that I had been very blameable in squandering many precious hours wherein rich knowledge might have been gathered. Not satisfied with *one* note-book, I began to form sectional books, for theological extracts, scientific extracts, philological extracts, and so on. But the systematising faculty once awakened, there was no end to the desire of re-arrangement, till I clearly saw that the *one* general note-book, with its regular index, was, after all, the best thing I could have."

It should have been noticed that at the age of twenty Thomas Cooper became a member of another debating club, in which deeper questions were considered than had been attempted in the earlier society, already mentioned.

"Much study" proved more than "a weariness" to the flesh, and brought on a long and serious illness, during which great attention, afterwards affectionately recorded, was shown to the prostrated toiler by the curate of Gainsborough, Mr. Hensley.

Thomas Cooper remained at his shoemaking until the age of twenty-three, when he was persuaded to forsake it for the more congenial occupation of a schoolmaster, in which for a time he succeeded well.

At twenty-four he became a Wesleyan "local preacher," and remained such until thirty; and to the practice in delivery which this work afforded he ascribes much of his subsequent success in public speaking.

The year 1833 witnessed his first venture as an author, in the publication of a small volume, of less than 100 pages, entitled, "The Wesleyan Chiefs, and other Poems," dedicated to James Montgomery. This is noticed in one of Montgomery's conversations as written by "a poor but pious Lincolnshire schoolmaster, who is starving himself to publish his own poetry, and kindly to aid others in doing the same." The latter reference is to his revision for the press, jointly with the Sheffield bard, of a volume of poems, written by a Mrs. Nicholson, who had been reduced to great distress by the desertion of her husband.

Cooper's own volume was very unassuming in form and "getting up," but showed considerable versifying skill, and some delineative power, particularly of mental states. Most of the pieces are intensely religious and (Wesleyanly) orthodox, but are not without the healthy freedom of rejoicing in the *Creator* God and in His works, from which this type of piety has been too often separated. They bear signs already of deep sympathy with and brooding upon the condition of the poor. The historical and antiquarian enthu-

siasm before referred to is also shown in apostrophes to Lincoln Cathedral, and to the Roman arch in the same city—

“Stern relic of the strength of sterner men.”

“The Backslider” was afterwards (with a justice and liberality by no means rare) applied to Mr. Cooper by the Rev. Mr. Holland, in a conversation with Montgomery upon the newly-published “Purgatory of Suicides,” as “illustrating his own fearful lapse from godliness” and “awful backsliding.”

Shortly before he attained the age of thirty Thomas Cooper removed to Lincoln, which city he appears to have already known, and established a school there. He joined the Mechanics' Institute, under the presidency of Lord Yarborough, then prospering greatly, and having Mr. John Boole (father of the late Professor) for curator.* He knew the Booles earlier however—the future mathematician as a boy of fourteen, “even then a prodigy,” nearly six years before his settlement in Lincoln; and married a cousin of the Professor's—the “lorn-dove” of his prison-rhyme, whose noble and intelligent companionship is still, after all trials, preserved to him. “George Boole was as good as he was great,” is the testimony Mr. Cooper bears.

At the Institute he conducted, gratuitously, Latin and French classes, and projected a choral society, of which he was for four years the devoted secretary. “My mind thus became familiar with the choral majesty of Handel, the sweetness of Haydn, the varied richness of Mozart, and the sublimity of Beethoven.”†

A casual question addressed to his bookseller led to Mr. Cooper's reporting some chemical lectures for the *Stamford Mercury*, and ultimately to a permanent attachment to the staff of that journal, first as local correspondent at a yearly salary of £20 (raised to £100), and then as assistant editor, at Stamford (whither he removed), upon £300 yearly. Some humorous, yet, from the character of the ultimate influence such scenes exert, painful sketches, written in this capacity, of a local quarrel between a cleric and his parishioners, leading to the existence and rivalry of two clerks, are embodied in “Wise Saws and Modern Instances,” under the title of “Signs of the Times.”

At length Mr. Cooper left Stamford, in consequence of some family troubles, and went to London, depending upon promises of influence on his behalf. Lincoln had then for M.P. a literary baronet, whose cause Mr. Cooper had effectively supported, and by the baronet's own request a romance was entrusted to his care. For some weeks it was retained on the pretence that it was in the hands of the baronet's own publishers. This afterwards proved to be false, and the manuscript was returned. Mr. Cooper subsisted for eleven months on such occasional work as he could obtain, in writing for the magazines and in copying at the British Museum,

* *British Controversialist*, Aug., 1865. † “Address to Jury,” p. 14.

and by the sale, volume after volume, of a choice library which he had gathered. Reminiscences of this period are vividly embodied in "London 'Venture,'" another sketch in "Wise Saws and Modern Instances."

It may be noted that the marriage of Queen Victoria took place on the 10th February, 1840. Mr. Cooper was then in London, and joined in the acclamations of the crowd as the youthful sovereign and her high-minded consort passed through Whitehall. To this he refers in book vii., stanza 7, of the "Purgatory," and in succeeding lines calls upon Victoria to remember and help her poor.

He was reduced to such straits that his cloak was about to follow his cherished books, when an offer came of the editorship of the *Greenwich Gazette*. Experiences in connection with this position were doubtless the basis of another amusing paper, entitled, "The 'Intellectual Lever' that wanted a Fulcrum."* His salary here was but £3 weekly, and the paper had sunk so low in point of circulation, that it soon proved hopeless to attempt its preservation. Another interval, happily short, of non-employment succeeded, suddenly terminated by the providential offer of a situation as reporter to the *Leicestershire Mercury*. Leicester was his birth-place, and would bring him nearer to his now aged and failing mother. The paper, too, was democratic, like his own principles. He therefore accepted the post, and settled in Leicester in 1840.

Early in 1841, Mr. Cooper was requested to report a Chartist lecture, by Mr. John Mason of Newcastle. Up to this time he had not knowingly seen or heard a Chartist in his life. But he found the views expressed by the lecturer to correspond with those he had held from early youth. In agricultural Lincolnshire the strife between master and man had been but little known, and he doubted the reality of the alleged distress in manufacturing parts. On this evening its intensity became better realized. The meeting closed at about eleven o'clock, and as, going home, he remarked, on hearing the whirr of the stocking-frames along the streets, the hour was late for such a sound, he was told that the people were glad to work so late if they could get employment, and that their average earnings were in the gross seven shillings, from which three shillings were deducted for frame-rent and charges. "Four shillings daily," Mr. Cooper said, "is not bad wages," but he was informed that four shillings per week was the intended meaning and the actual truth. From that hour he became a Chartist.

"'Twas gnawing hunger's pain

I saw your lank and fainting forms reveal—

Poor trampled stockingers!—that made me feel

'Twas time to be in earnest,—nor regard

Man's freedom merely as a theme for zeal

In hours of emulous converse, or for bard

Weaving rapt fancies in pursuit of Fame's reward.

* "Wise Saws," &c.

The Essayist.

THE POETRY OF JOHN KEBLE.

(Continued from page 66.)

WITHOUT waiting now to trace out the allusive beauty of this sonnet, let us proceed to direct attention to some of the principal characteristics which distinguish Keble as a sacred poet. Of these, one of the most marked and striking is the manner in which he blends and interfuses the lessons of nature with the lessons of grace, nature appearing to his eyes transfigured, as it were irradiated with the light of Christianity.

"He is pre-eminently the Christian interpreter of Nature. He sees glimpses of the infinite meaning of her various and changeful moods, and strives in living words to utter the thing he sees. He is a devout student of her many mysteries, and he stands humbled by her great and glorious presence :—

'Of the bright things in earth and air,
How little can the heart embrace!
Soft shades and gleaming lights are there,—
I know it well, but cannot trace.

'Mine eye unworthy seems to read
One page of Nature's beauteous book;
It lies before me, fair outspread—
I only cast a wistful look.

'I cannot paint to memory's eye
The scene, the glance I dearest love;
Unchanged themselves, in me they die
Or faint, or false their shadows prove.

'In vain with dull and tuneless ear
I linger by soft Music's cell;
And in my heart of hearts would hear
What to her own she deigns to tell.

'Tis misty all, both sight and sound—
I only know 'tis fair and sweet;
'Tis wandering on enchanted ground
With dazy brow and tottering feet.'

"It is to such reverent worshippers Nature unveils her hidden sweetness, and tells her holiest secrets. In all his poems we can easily see that Keble was remarkable for an overflowing, almost passionate affection for Nature; he yielded to her subduing influences until they penetrated and impregnated every thought. He could not be happy without her. He watched for the 'tender lights' which 'dawn or die,' on her beloved features, as fondly as ever enraptured lover gazed into his mistress's eyes. But it was not only for himself; he beheld, noted, and interpreted for us 'the stormy lights on mountain streams wavering and broken,' 'the richest glow which ever sets around the autumnal sun,' the tender flower—

'Embosomed in the greenest glade,
So frail a gem, it scarce may bear
The playful touch of evening's air.'

"In lines like the following we learn how capable the poet's gentle heart was of sympathising with the fiercest tumult of storms:—

'They know th' Almighty's power,
Who, wakened by the rushing midnight shower,
Watch for the fitful breeze
To howl and chafe amid the bending trees,
Watch for the still white gleam
To bathe the landscape in a fiery stream,
Touching the tremulous eye with sense of light
Too rapid and too pure for all but angel sight.'

'They know th' Almighty's love,
Who, when the whirlwinds rock the topmost grove,
Stand in the shade, and hear
The tumult with a deep exulting fear;
How, in their fiercest sway,
Curbed by some power unseen, they die away
Like a bold steed, that owns his rider's arm,
Proud to be checked by that o'ermastering charm.'

'But Keble was more than a word-painter of landscapes; visible and familiar scenes were, to him, types of spiritual, invisible realities. Through the medium of his imagination he beheld nature as a parable, rich with eternal truth, and attempted to expound the intimate connection of human emotion with the transitory or more permanent beauties displayed in the material world. Sometimes their lessons were a stern rebuke, at other times a glowing reflex of common thoughts and moods. The verses for the first Sunday after Epiphany give us a clear idea of the soothing influence exerted on the poet's own nature by what he so exquisitely depicts. It is said that the scenery described in this poem is that around Burthorpe and East Leech, two parishes of which he had the charge shortly after obtaining orders."*

* The *British Quarterly Review* (July 1, 1867), art. IV.—"Herbert and Keble."

In this poem, beginning with the line—

"Lessons sweet of spring returning,"

the lowly willow springing by the watercourse is made to teach a lesson of contentment.

"See the soft green willow springing
Where the waters gently pass,
Every way her free arms flinging
O'er the moist and reedy grass.
Long ere winter blasts are fled,
See her tipped with vernal red,
And her kindly flower displayed
Ere her leaf has cast a shade.

"Though the rudest hand assail her,
Patiently she droops awhile,
But, when showers and breezes hail her,
Wears again her willing smile.
Thus I learn Contentment's power
From the slighted willow bower,
Ready to give thanks and live
On the least that Heaven may give."

Again, the nightingale singing by the wayside—the bleak, barren wayside,—cheering with its notes the weary traveller on his journey—is made to teach a lesson of trust and thankfulness to the toiler on the path of life:—

"If the quiet brooklet leaving,
Up the stormy vale I wind,
Haply half in fancy grieving,
For the shades I leave behind,
By the dusty wayside deer,
Nightingales with joyous cheer
Sing, my sadness to reprove,
Gladlier than in cultured grove.

"Where the thickest boughs are twining
Of the greenest, darkest tree,
There they plunge, the light declining,—
All may hear, but none may see.
Fearless of the passing hoof;
Hardly will they fleet aloof;
So they live in modest ways,
Trust entire, and ceaseless praise."

Of this love of nature—nature contemplated in the light of Christianity—with which Keble's poetry is instinct, evidences abound in all his works. Everywhere are its traces discernible. To take a few examples as they occur. The following poem from the

"*Lyra Innocentium*," entitled "*May Garlands*," illustrates at the same time this characteristic and another noted trait—his yearning tenderness for children. Very touching is the sweet and plaintive melody of this simple lay:—

"MAY GARLANDS.

"Come, ye little revellers gay,
Learners in the school of May,
Bring me here the richest crown
Wreathed this morn on breezy down,
Or in nook of copsewood green,
Or by river's rushy screen,
Or in sunny meadow wide,
Gemmed with cowslips in their pride;
Or perchance, high prized o'er all,
From beneath the southern wall,
From the choicest garden bed,
'Mid bright smiles of infants bred,
Each a lily of his own
Offering, or a rose half-blown.

"Bring me now a crown as gay,
Wreathed and woven yesterday.
Where are now those forms so fair?
Withered, drooping, wan, or bare;
Feeling nought of earth or sky,
Shower or dew, behold they lie,
Vernal airs no more to know:—
They are gone—and he must go,
Go where all that ever bloomed
In its hour must lie entombed.
They are gone; their light is o'er:—
Ye must go; but ye once more
Hope in joy to be new-born,
Lovelier than May's gleaming morn.

"Hearken, children of the May,
Now in your glad hour and gay,
Ye whom all good angels greet
With their treasures blithe and sweet,
None of all the wreaths ye prize
But was nursed by weeping skies.
Keen March winds, soft April showers,
Braced the roots, embalmed the flowers.
So, if e'er that second spring
Her green robe o'er you shall fling,
Stern self-mastery, tearful prayer,
Must the way of bliss prepare.
How should else earth's flowerets prove
Meet for those pure crowns above?"

The poem from the same work entitled "*Vernal Mirth*" might indeed be scorned by critics of the cynical school, as mere

"childish prattle," "nursery rhymes;" yet is its seeming puerility redeemed by the sweet and pleasing moral which marks the close:—

"VERNAL MIRTH.

"What is the joy the young lambs know
When vernal breezes blow?
Why carol out so blithe and free
The little birds from every leafless tree?

"Why bound so high the boys at play
On grass so green and gay?
From nursing arms, his proper throne,
Why rings so clear yon infant's joyous tone?

"The life that in them deeply dwells
Of genial spring tide tells:
Of their own selves they see and know
To what glad tune the summer brooks shall flow.

"Be thou through life a little child,
By manhood undefiled;
So shall no angel grudge thy dreams
Of fragrance pure and ever-brightening beams."

Yet even spring cannot always bring gladness to the heart of the poet, and mingling with this "vernal mirth" a note of sadness may at times be heard, as in the following poem, where such a feeling finds very exquisite utterance:—

"Well may I guess and feel
Why autumn should be sad;
But vernal airs should sorrow heal,
Spring should be gay and glad:
Yet as along this violet bank I rove,
The languid sweetness seems to choke my breath;
I sit me down beside the hazel grove,
And sigh, and half could wish my weariness were death.

"Like a bright veering cloud
Grey blossoms twinkle there,
Warbles around a busy crowd
Of larks in purest air.
Shame on the heart that dreams of blessings gone,
Or wakes the spectral forms of woe and crime,
When nature sings of joy and hope alone,
Reading a cheerful lesson in her own sweet tone!"

Here we see how the poet's feelings as a *Christian*—ever living within him—revive from a momentary depression, and resume their sway, chasing from the mind as a thing unblest this thankless gloom.

'Like his great master and predecessor, Wordsworth, Keble was a lover of nature in her every mood and aspect: vernal scenes were his supreme delight, yet could he find pleasure in the sad and sombre scenes of autumn, and thence derive food for pious meditation. Thus, viewing Nature in one of her dreariest aspects—the fall of the autumnal leaf, that fades and withers no more to bloom, suggests to the poet a train of reflection upon the lot of man, as read in the light of Christianity—of him who indeed doth “fade as a leaf,” but unlike the leaf which knows no second spring, is apportioned to die and rise again:—

“Red o’er the forest peers the setting sun,
The line of yellow light dies fast away
That crowned the eastern copse; and chill and dun
Falls on the moor the brief November day.

“Now the tired hunter winds a parting note,
And echo bids good night from every glade;
Yet wait awhile, and see the calm leaves float
Each to his rest beneath their parent shade.

“How like decaying life they seem to glide!
And yet no second spring have they in store,
But where they fall, forgotten to abide
Is all their portion, and they ask no more.

“Soon o’er their heads blithe April airs shall sing,
A thousand wild flowers round them shall unfold,
The green buds glisten in the dews of spring,
And all be vernal rapture as of old.

“Unconscious they in waste oblivion lie,
In all the world of busy life around
No thought of them; in all the bounteous sky
No drop, for them, of kindly influence found.

“Man’s portion is to die and rise again,—
Yet he complains, while these unmurmuring part
With their sweet lives, as pure from sin and stain
As his when Eden held his virgin heart.”

These lines are instinct with the very spirit of poetry; their tones thrill like an inner music through the soul. What a depth of beauty and expression in the single line—

“And all be vernal rapture as of old”!

It is, as here, in the quality of *suggestiveness*—a few simple words, a phrase, sentence, or allusion, striking on some hidden chord of feeling, calling up old memories and associations—it is in this rare, this *inimitable* quality, that the true-born poet, the *calles*, is revealed. Thus this line may, perchance, bring home to some reader

"sweet sad memories" of vernal seasons past in childhood's happy days. The idea, however, obviously here suggested is the eternity* of nature's course—ever the same recurring process of decay and renovation. The leaves fall and strew the ground—"a sere and withered heap!"—and anon waves overhead a new and verdant succession. Thus one growth passes away while another takes its place, soon in *its* turn to pass away and be forgotten. Such is Nature's course—one endless round of change! This idea of the eternity of Nature's course—all her movements attuned to law—is very beautifully unfolded in a poem in the "Lyra Innocentium." In that poem nature is viewed as a system, of perfect order and harmony, subservient to Christianity—the material to the spiritual economy—the "reign of law" to the kingdom of grace:—

"O endless round of nature's wheel,
How doth thine untried course reveal
The universal spring
Of power and motion! Not in keen
And sudden startings, far between,
But smooth as sea-bird's wing,
Gliding unwearied, now in air,
And now in ocean,
As though life's only call and care
Were graceful motion.

"Such are your changes, space and time,
Dying away in softest chime,
With gentlest intervals
Aye lessening on the ear, and felt
As when into each other melt
The hues where evening falls.
Thus moon to moon gives silent place,
And bright stars waning
Gradual retire, while morn's still pace
On night is gaining.

"Thus or for increase or decay
The seasons wind their viewless way,
Nor but by word of man,
Or measure rude by man imposed,
Is known when day or year hath closed,
Summer or winter's span.
And ever onward as we go,
The wide earth rounding,
The horizon moves in gentle flow,
Not in harsh bounding.

"For why? the unseen Preserver's hand
Is nigh, to master and o'erawe
The creatures in their race,

* Cf. Eccles. i. 4, &c.

Our Collegiate Course.

THE BARD.

A PINDARIC ODE.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

(*Continued from p. 469, vol. xxxi.*)

A voice as of the cherub-choir,
Gales from blooming Eden bear ;

Asound as sweetas if it proceeded from the angel hosts, and carried with it the
very air of bliss-giving paradise in far-off harmonies, fades away as I listen and

(130 continued) "Shakspeare, dear son of memory, great heir of fame"—

"Soul of the age
The applause, delight, the wonder of our stage!

Of whom Hartley Coleridge has so eloquently said—

"Great poet, 'twas thine art
To know thyself and in thyself to be,
Whate'er love, hate, ambition, destiny,
Or the firm, fatal purpose of the heart,
Can make of man. Yet thou wert still the same,
Serene of thought, unhurt by thine own flame."

(131) Milton, the "poet of paradise,"—

"Bard of the mighty harp, whose golden chords,
Strung by th' Eternal, no befitting theme
Found among mortals and their love records,
But pealed high anthems to the throne supreme,
Or, thundering, echoed where the lurid gleam
Of Erebus, revealed the primal fall."

Thomas Cooper's "Purgatory of Suicides," ii., 9.

(132) John Milton, the sweet singer of *Paradise Lost* and *Regained*, Eden-harped Milton. Of him James Montgomery says, "The sublimity of his invention overawed the graces; and the severity of his taste made fiction itself as inflexible as truth. His Muse has the majesty of Juno to dazzle the eye, the wisdom of Minerva, to inform the understanding, but she wants the girdle of Venus to bind the affections. His poetry will be read for ever by the few, and praised by the many. The weakest capacity may be offended by its faults, but it would require a genius scarcely inferior to his own to comprehend, enjoy, and unfold all its merits." Hazlitt sums up his characteristics thus:—"He has sublimity in the highest degree;

And distant warblings lessen on my ear,
 That lost in long futurity expire.
 Fond, impious man, think'st thou yon sanguine cloud, 135
 Raised by thy breath, has quenched the orb of day?
 To-morrow he repairs the golden flood
 And warms the nations with redoubled ray.
 Enough for me; with joy I see
 The different doom our Fates assign, 140

dies down into silence in the ages of the coming time. Foolish, vain king, dost thou imagine that the blood-dyed vapours originated by the humid moisture of thy lungs has blotted out the sun? Next day he renews the ruddy radiance of his beams, and with twofold glow gives life-heat to the earth. What is sufficient for me, I perceive with gladness the diverse destiny awarded to us by the powers who rule events. Let hopelessness

beauty in an equal degree; pathos in a degree next to the highest fancy, learning, vividness of description, stateliness, decorum; sweetness and elegance."

(134) Dryden, Pope, &c., the long line of the illustrious bards, who would wake the lyre in after times, and prove, despite the cruel massacre Edward had made of "the truthful and the bold" minstrels of Britain, that poetry, being indeed "a thing of beauty," cannot fail to be "a joy for ever." In these lines, 125—134, how exquisitely have we realized for us, what Douglas Jerrold finely says:—

"Poetic heads of every generation, from the half-cowled brow of Chaucer to the periwigged pate of Dryden, from coroneted Pope to night-capped Cowper, fancy sees them all—all; ay, from the long, dead days of Edward to the living hour of Victoria; sees them all gathered aloft, and with fine ear lists the rustling of their bays."

(135-8) These lines have been so copiously commented on and excellently explained in a paper on "Poetic Diction," in the *British Controversialist*, February, 1865, pp. 85—87, that we need not here enlarge upon them. *Fond* signifies foolish, as in the lines in Phineas Fletcher's "Purple Island":—

"*Fond* man! that looks on earth for happiness,
 And here long seeks what here is never found!"

Sanguine is blood-dyed, as in Milton's "Lycidas":—

"Like to that sanguine flower inscribed with woe;" (106)

quenched, utterly destroyed, as in "Samson Agonistes":—

"So obvious and so easy to be quenched;" (95)

repairs, restores to its former condition, as—

"So sinks the day-star in the ocean bed,
 And yet anon *repairs* his drooping head,
 And tricks his beams."—*Lycidas*, 168—170.

(140) *Doom*, uncontrollable destiny; firm-fixed future, from Saxon *demon*, to determine and adjudge, as in Milton, Sonnet I:—

Be thine Despair and sceptred Care;
To triumph, and to die, are mine."

He spoke, and headlong from the mountain's height
Deep in the roaring tide he plunged to endless night.

and the anxieties of sovereignty be thine, be mine to vanquish your oppression, and to die free from thy fetters (or even thy mercy). Having uttered these words, the bard leaped forward from the rock's steep peak, and falling into the deep rushing waters (of the Conway), met fearlessly the martyr-suicide's irrevocable death.

"Hie the rude bird of hate
Foretell my hopeless doom" (9, 10).

As the passions delight in animating everything, Gray, whose genius is eminently picturesque, tries to make his words paintings of things, and perhaps, in general, he carries the trick of personification a little too far. Here, however, the recognition of the Fates, though a classical image is quite in keeping with the reigning passion of the bard, who blames on Destiny his intended suicide, and denies to Edward any real or personal glory in his greatness. Hence he gives the king as "grim chamberlains" despair and sceptred care, while he welcomes his doom with a poetic apotheosis, and transforms vanquishment into victory, which enables him to escape defeat by death. That the poem does not *justify*, or the poet *appears* to prove of suicide, we need scarcely note; as it is evident enough.

- (148) "Therein, ye gods, you make the weak most strong;
Therein, ye gods, you tyrants do defeat:
Nor stony tower, nor walls of beaten brass,
Nor airless dungeon, nor strong links of iron,
Can be retentive to the strength of spirit:
But life being weary of those worldly bass,
Never lacks power to dismiss itself.
If I know this, know all the world besides,
That part of tyranny that I do bear
I can shake off with pleasure."—"Julius Caesar," 1, iii.

(149-5) The closing lines of this finely sustained, exquisitely harmonious, splendidly-phrased and panoramically picturesque production, by their brief pith, form an excellent finish to a poem so artistically constructed. Nathan Drake, in his "Literary Hours," justly says that "over this inimitable ode, a tinge so wildly awful, so gloomily terrific, is thrown, as without any exception to place it at the head of lyric poetry." The opening and the conclusion are both grand. They have the abruptness of a dream. The bard appears suddenly—in *medias res*; and as suddenly disappears. No superfluous description is given at the beginning, and none detains us at the end. The dark curtain of oblivion is let down at once over the impassioned speaker, and no glimpse is offered behind—

"That curtain of obdurate woof,
Which limits mortal vision, whose dim folds
Perpetually do stir but never rise."

The Reviewer.

The Argument, a priori, for the Moral Attributes of the Supreme Being. By WILLIAM H. GILLESPIE. London: Houlston and Sons.

THIS brief and concise exposition of the argument, *a priori*, for the relative and complex attributes of the Deity, is the completion of what may be regarded as the main intellectual life-work of its author. An old writer says, "Better is the end of a thing than the beginning thereof." Able as we think this supplement, or rather complement of the author's great argument is, we hesitate to apply the proverb to the work, chiefly because we think his former book possessed of very high merits. That work had, however, several forerunners, but this is an entirely fresh development of argumentation *a priori*, and therefore may be regarded as indirectly, fundamentally better in its originality, as well as in the nobler height of the argument. But as the author is about to issue in a complete form the entire argument, in a fifth edition of his notable work, and, as we anticipate, at an early date, giving an epitome of the History of Arguments on the Being of a God, as an introduction to some account of this author, his life, and his writings, we abstain from further criticism at present, although we can confidently recommend this small cheap treatise as in itself worthy of perusal, and capable of exciting many ideas in the reader's mind of great value and consequence.

A Refutation of Mr. W. H. Gillespie's Argument, a priori, for the Existence of a Great First Cause. By R. H. B. London: Frederick Farrah.

An Examination of Mr. W. H. Gillespie's Argument, a priori, for the Existence of a Great First Cause. By T. S. B. London: J. Burns.

THESE are the titles of two tracts which have been brought under our notice in connection with the recent debate between Mr. W. H. Gillespie and "Iconoclast" (Mr. Charles Bradlaugh) recently mentioned in our pages by "The Reviewer." The aim of the author of the former is "to show, as far as he is able, that Mr. Gillespie has not demonstrated the necessary existence of such a being [as a Great First Cause], and to point out those *specific fallacies* in his argument which render his conclusions invalid,"—and the intent is pursued with some cogency, though with less metaphysical acumen than seems to be required to cope with the opponent against whom he has set himself. The latter is a more thorough-

going, a more talented, and a more ambitious undertaking, and its writer has braced himself well up for his conflict. He examines with analytic skill, and keeps his aim steadily before him. But we adjourn farther criticism here because we hope to make notes and comments on both these works, as well as on others, when we set to the consideration of "Metaphysical Theism—W. H. Gillespie."

Ancient Classics for English Readers.—Homer, the Iliad. By Rev. W. LUCAS COLLINS, M.A. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and Sons.

WHEN we saw the prospectus of this series of small books on great subjects, we thought it somewhat singular that the idea projected in our series of "Greek Days and Roman Nights" had taken hold almost simultaneously of the author and ourselves. On looking at the volume now before us we find that we shall, most probably, steer quite clear of each other. At any rate, our analysis of Homer's "Iliad," which has been in hand for two winters, need not hinder us from saying that this little work will amply repay reading. It is an able, intelligent, succinct, and elegantly composed scholarly essay on the chief and prince of epic poets. It cannot but whet the appetite to know more of the immortal work on which it treats, and cannot fail to give a reader the proper relish for the study of Homer, either in the original or in the many versions now attainable,—Chapman's, Derby's, Blackie's, Alford's, Dart's, Worsley's, or else Pope's or Hobbes's. Even those who content themselves with this small book will yet be able to comprehend some of the conjuration and the mighty magic of Homer as an exquisite stirrer of the soul and a quaint teller of tales, which cause the spirit to glow with the enthusiasm and ambition of being and doing something manly and noble.

The Christian Policy of Life. By Rev. J. B. BROWN.
London: Elliot Stock.

THIS is a book worthy of being taken into the heart. It is plain and easily understood, and yet the thought in it is subtle and deep-reaching. It is quite practical in its aim and teaching, and yet it is full of a generous theology and a spiritual fire and energy. There are, perhaps, in it phrases and opinions, to the entire acceptance of which we should hesitate to pledge ourselves; but to the spirit, the purpose, the inspiring intent of it; to the method of exposition, enforcement, and illustration, we give our hearty assent and consent. We would most earnestly beseech the members of young men's societies having libraries or book clubs attached to them, to procure this as one of the treasures of excellent, effective, gospel of good news treatises, which only a man in earnest can write. It is heartfelt, and thoughtful, and scriptureful. It glows with love and burns with anxious zeal for the promotion of a true and fervent nobility of life. It is altogether an invaluable addition to the prac-

tical, instructive writing of our day ; and if the young men of England lay its lessons to heart, they will make life a joy to themselves, a delight to others, and a glory to God—and to His Son Jesus Christ.

A Chronicle of the Principal Events in English History. By JAMES PEMBRIDGE. London: Longmans and Co.

ON the appearance of the first edition of this *brochure* we said, "This is a handy book for the use of schools, and will doubtless prove very acceptable to many self-educators and instructors of the young." We see every reason to reiterate our opinion. By the former class it may be used as a memorandum-book of historical events, and by the latter as a systematic series of definite statements, to be expounded and enlarged upon by *vis-à-vis* instruction; the book giving certainty, and the oral teaching interest and variety.

Sketches of Life and Character. By ALEX. WALLACE, D.D. London: Houlston and Sons.

THIS is a very cheap, very interesting, and excellent book, issued by the Scottish Temperance League, and dealing with great pertinence, variety, and ability, with the causes, consequences, and cure of the evils of the liquor traffic. While we commend a perusal of its pages to all, we would particularly direct the attention of those who interest themselves in the moral advancement of the people to this book, as admirably adapted for use at penny readings and social meetings. With many of the scenes, and even with some of the circumstances, the "Reviewer" is acquainted, and he can, therefore, affirm that the pen of the author is graphic, earnest, pointed, and instructive. It would be well for the country if its pages were well perused and well pondered over.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

877. Will some gentleman kindly inform us what is the price of W. C. Wells's Essay on Dew, and who is the publisher of it?—S. S.

878. Can you or any of your intelligent subscribers give me a list of the best text-books on the various subjects required at the matriculation examination of the University of London in June next, and also inform me if a certain numerical

number is attached to each question, and if such numbers are supposed to be *proportionate* to the difficulty of the questions to which they are attached? Will fifty per cent. of questions (taken collectively), answered correctly, pass a candidate, and will eighty per cent. place him in the honours division? A work on chemistry (neither Williamson's, Roscoe's, nor Wilson's) was lately published, having for its special object the matriculation examination.

Can you give its name? I remember it was reviewed as a "cram" book.—STUDENT.

879. Could any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* give any information as to the aim and character of "A New Pantomime," by Dr. Kenealy, and also any opinions as to its literary worth?—O. F. A. S.

880. Could you inform me where I could get cheap and useful editions of the old dramatists and the poets of the older time?—J. W. G.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

855. W. has helped "Samuel" to additional confusion, by identifying two Edward Bickensteths, uncle and nephew, viz., the late Vicar of Watton, Herts, and the present Archdeacon of Buckingham. It is the former who was the father of Edward Henry Bickensteth, the sacred poet. I say this of my own knowledge. But otherwise, the archdeacon, who graduated in 1896 could not be the father of the poet, who graduated in 1847.—O.

875. In Wesley's Sermon (xii.) on Dress we find the words "Certainly this duty is not a sin. 'Obliviousness is next to godliness.'"—S.R.G.

876. M. F. P. cannot understand how a man can have two eldest sons, and he inquires whether the following sentence be correct:—"I have taken into partnership my two eldest sons." Doubtless a man can have two eldest sons. If he have four sons, those two who have lived the greatest number of years must be the oldest or eldest of his sons, and therefore it is correct to speak of them as his two eldest sons, and of the others as the two youngest. Besides, if the above sentence be incorrect, how many more of a similar nature, which are constantly used by English speakers and writers, are incorrect also. Thus we speak of the two largest ships of war—the

two ablest statesmen now living—the two handsomest animals in all the collection. If two ships of war are larger than all the rest, they must be the two largest, and if at the Smithfield Cattle Show two animals are more handsome than any of the others, they must be the two handsomest.—S. S.

877. "An Essay on Dew, and several Appearances connected with it." By W. O. Wells. Edited with annotations by L. P. Cassells, F.R.A.S., and an Appendix by R. Strachan, F.M.S. 8vo., 6s. Messrs. Longmans & Co., London.—R. M. A.

880. The best and cheapest edition of the poets—as distinguished from the dramatists—known to us, is Bell's Edition of the English Poets, annotated; published by Griffin and Co., London, of which there are twenty-nine vols. published in good type in paper covers, at one shilling each (bound in cloth 6d. extra). These go back to Chaucer, and forward to Cowper, and are valuable, well-printed, and cleverly as well as usefully annotated. J. R. Smith's library of old authors is more expensive, but contains some not included in Bell's Poets. Of the old dramatists the cheapest and best edition yet published is Routledge's edition—which contains Ben Jonson, Massinger and Ford, Beaumont and Fletcher, Greave and Peele, Webster, Marlowe Congreve, Wycherley, Farquhar, and Vanburgh, in shilling parts (about ninety). Crocker's "Mermaid" series at 3s. 6d. promises well: Massinger and Marlowe are already issued. Of course there is the Globe Shakespeare and Routledge's Shilling Shakespeare. Of old literature generally, Murray, Arber, &c., are issuing reprints, which are moderate in price, e.g., Montaigne's Essays, 5s., Lyly's Euphues, 4s., &c. See also Larkyn's Handbook of English Literature, Routledge, 2s.—R. M. A.

Literary Notes.

ABOUT 700 ancient Sanscrit MSS. have been collected in Surat by Mr. Logan, sub-collector of Malabar.

Alex. Herten, Russian journalist and novelist (born 1816), died at Paris, 21st Jan.

Andrew C. Dick, author of "Church Polity," "The Nature and Office of the State," one of the earliest contributors to *The North British Review*, is dead.

Rev. J. S. Watson has just out Biographies of John Wilkes and Wm. Cobbett.

A Biography of Thomas Paine, Free-thinker, is in preparation by Judge A. C. Morton, of Columbus, U.S., who was a friend of and executor to the author of "The Age of Reason."

Of a cheap edition of Dr. W. E. Channing's works 14,000 copies were subscribed for in a few days.

Of Prof. B. Jowett's translation of Plato's Dialogues, three vols. are expected to be out shortly. He is also preparing a Greek text of *The Republic*—so excellently translated by Vaughan and Davies.

The correspondence of Uhland, the German poet, collected and arranged by the late Prof. Pfeiffer, and edited by Prof. Wagner (with a biography of Pfeiffer by Prof. Bartsch) has just appeared in Vienna. Translations of Uhland abound; would some of his admirers and translators favour us with a biography, and these and other letters done into English?

A translation of "The Lives of Illustrious Men," by Cornelius Nepos, made by the Italian poet, Boiardo, author of "Orlando Innamorato," is in process of publication by Prof. Luciano Sarabelli.

Prof. J. F. A. Berger, editor of "Proclus, with an exposition of his system;" "The Rhetoric of Plato;" Sophocles' "Dramas;" Cicero's "Tusculum Orations;" &c., is dead.

Dr. George Smith, secretary to the Congregational Union, author of several theological works, is dead.

Mr. Hensleigh Wedgwood's "Dictionary of English Etymology," greatly enlarged and thoroughly revised by the author, aided by Rev. J. C. Atkinson, is to be issued in a second edition at an early date.

The "Cobden Club Land Tenure Essays" were speedily bought up, and are re-issued.

Warton's "History of English Poetry"—a work which, if well edited and annotated, would be invaluable—has been published by A. Murray & Son, in a cheap edition.

George Hogarth, author of "The History of the Opera," &c., father-in-law of Charles Dickens, died 12th February, aged 87.

"An Introduction to the Science of Religion," being lectures delivered at the Royal Institution, London, by Prof. Max Müller, is to be published.

"Society and Solitude," a series of essays by R. W. Emerson—one half original and one half re-publications—is announced.

"The Religious Life of London," by J. B. Ritchie,—consisting of original and re-printed matter,—is announced.

To the many translations of Homer already published, William Cullen Bryant, the American poet, has added his.

James Pagan, historian of Glasgow and of its cathedral, died 11th February.

EPOCH MEN.

THOMAS HOBBS, OF MALMESBURY.

WHAT is the *fulcrum* on which authority should rest that its motive power may be steady, permanent, and effective in regard to results? That was the great question in England when the strong politic dynasty of the Tudors died with Elizabeth, and the Stuarts acquired, by bequeathment, what they had claimed by just inheritance. James and his successors sought to found their sovereign power on a divine right, a God-given indefeasible election and foreordination to bear kingly rule, and exercise dominion over the commonalty. Laud and his coadjutors in the episcopate attempted to sacerdotalize authority, and to rest supreme power on the sanction of the Church. Strafford's "thorough" policy set the foundations of the throne on force, and maintained it by strategies closely allied to fraud. Pym, Hampden, and Vane respected the legal tenure of the king, and insisted on constitutional authority having a legal basis. Milton and Cromwell endeavoured to establish authority on morality and religion, interpreted and determined by law, on the ground that "it is justly ordained by nature that he who invades the liberty of others shall, in the very outset, lose his own, and be the first to feel that servitude which he has induced. Hobbes, in harmony with the adage of Bacon, "knowledge is power," employed Reason as the examiner of the foundations of right. "He deduced the manners of men from human nature; virtues and vices from a natural law; and the goodness and wickedness of actions from the laws of States," which again "dependeth upon the knowledge of what is human nature, what is body politic, and what it is we call a law," and these are only explicable by and to the judgment and reason of mankind, by true ratiocination on the causes and effects of human conduct. The *fulcrum*, then, on which authority as a motive power rests, is reason. Those who have written of justice and policy in general have involved themselves in contradictions and errors, because they have not discriminated between the truth and the interest of men, the former of which is discovered by reason, while the latter is advanced and advocated by passion. To reduce the doctrine of justice and policy to the rules and infallibility of reason in an inexpugnable fashion, was the aim of Hobbes. We regard it as no unfair presumption that he proceeded as honestly as in his circumstances he could, and that he was in a considerable degree successful in his aims; that in his lifetime he was vehemently assailed by both parties; and that

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even now his armory of reasons supplies weapons alike to the monarchist and the democrat—constitutionalists founding their preference for a Conservative policy on grounds supplied by Hobbes, and radical reformers advocating change and progress on principles which have been laid down by the philosopher of Malmesbury.

The times in which Hobbes lived were peculiarly favourable for the suggesting, however adverse to the proper discussion of, such a fundamental question. Authority during the Tudor age had been alternately reposed on election, right, force, policy, and intrigue. The Stuarts acquired the crown by "a disputed settlement," many parties acquiescently receiving the facts of history and the logic of events, as, for the time being, better than any other perceptible method of fixing the principles of monarchy and defining a dynasty.

But the Stuarts did not appreciate their settlement as one of convenience for the nation, in the condition of parties within it and the state of affairs without it, then. They enforced the affirmative of Divine right by arguments drawn from sacerdotal sources, by traditions of legalism, by the intrigues of a cunning policy, and by the force of an army which did not then feel its aggregate strength, and was only beginning to be knit into a unity of efficient power. But the nation itself had been rapidly developing a theory of kingship, founded on the negation of divine right—a theory which agreed better with the facts of history, and was more in accordance with the interests of men—a theory which promised, in its own opinion, supremacy to each party, and hence excited hope in all. The controversy was waged, at last, under the name of "The Civil War."

While the state of the nation, under the "thorough" policy of Charles I., Laud, and Strafford, on the one hand, and the party of the Petition of Rights, the Covenant, and the Remonstrance on the other, was peculiarly fitted to suggest the question of sovereign prerogatives and civic rights, it was eminently unfitted to discuss the principles of social polity, for "passion ruled the hour." But Hobbes was most favourably situated for probing the secret of his age. He had seen the evils of civil and religious wars in France, and he had learned in Italy the spirit-deadening influence of sacerdotalism; he had felt the stir of the new philosophy in science, and he had been brought to consider the powerlessness of force to attain or maintain truth, and yet he had been so circumstanced as to have lived a life apart from the jars and passionate effervescences of his age and time. Not only, therefore, could events reflect themselves on the clear and level mirror of a calm mind, but he could, with less of the error of passion or interest, reflect upon them. He had been reserved in the position of a thinker, while most other men had been compelled to assume the position, either in art or part, of actors. The year 1639 brought with it the sense of the irreconcilability of the sovereign and the nation, unless some centre of concession could be discovered. This Hobbes essayed to find,

and circulated in MS. his "De Cive," the main object of which is to demonstrate "the absolute necessity of leagues and contracts, and thence the rudiments both of moral and of civil prudence." In this book he says, "I have also been very wary in the whole tenor of my discourse, not to meddle with the civil laws of any particular nation whatsoever; that is to say, I have avoided coming ashore, which these times have so infested both with shelves and tempests." This production, though not then printed, "occasioned much talk of the author, and had not his Majesty dissolved the Parliament, it had brought him into danger of his life." Hence when he saw the nature of the Parliament of 3rd November, 1640, "Mr. Hobbes, doubting how they would use him, went over to France, the first of all that fled, and there continued eleven years, to his damage some thousands of pounds deep."

In England, these eleven years were full of mighty commotion. Within their space were contained—the impeachment and execution of Strafford, the abolition of the High Commission and the Star Chamber, the civil war, the adoption of the Scottish league and covenant, the self-denying ordinance, the execution of Laud, the surrender of the king to the Scots, the trial and execution of the Sovereign of England, the abolition of the House of Lords, the dominion of the Rump, the proclamation and flight of Charles II., &c. The surges of the parties during this period are indicated by the battle names of Edgehill and Braddock Down, Wakefield and Chalgrove Field, Bristol and Gloucester, Selby and Marston Moor, Naseby and Kilsyth; and the flow of the tide is shown by the words Preston, Drogheda, Dunbar and Worcester.

Nor was the period much less eventful in France, where, on the death of Richelieu, Cardinal Mazarin became chief minister, and the party of the Fronde opposed the Queen mother (Anne of Austria), and Mazarin. These were the years of the wars of Turenne and Condé. The day of the barricades (26th August, 1648) was among them, and they saw in the peace of Westphalia the close of the thirty years' war, and the security, by Protestantism, of the freedom to worship God according to conscience, as the interpreter of Scripture. Louis XIV., too, was declared to be of kingly age.

Amid the contentions of Parliamentarians and Royalists on the one hand, and of Frondeurs and Imperialists on the other, Hobbes sat at the problem of his philosophy—what is motive power?—with diligence and equanimity, serenely calm and sedately self-confident, Euclidizing, as he thought, and as Mersenne asserts, science, politics, and morals, from one inductively gained postulate, that "the law of nature is the dictate of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted, for the constant preservation of life and members as much as in us lies." These objects are to be attained by peace only. Man by nature is in a state of war; he enters into a state of peace by a pact or covenant of mutual concession or resignation of rights, and so man passes from the state of nature into civil society, whose duty and inter-

it is to enforce the contracts implied in its incorporate being. "There is," he asserts, "a certain clue of reason whose beginning is in the dark; by the benefit of whose conduct we are led, as it were, by the hand into the clearest light. So that the principle of tractation is to be taken from that darkness, and then the light to be carried thither for irradiating the doubts." Under the investigations of right reason, "were the nature of human actions as distinctly known as the nature of *quantity* in geometrical figures, the strength of avarice and ambition, which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the vulgar as touching the nature of *right* and *wrong*, would presently faint and languish; and mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace, that unless it were for habitation, on supposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her inhabitants, there would hardly be left any pretence for war." As, however, we intend to present the reader with an analysis of *The Leviathan*, in which Hobbes has incorporated "his thoughts concerning Civil Doctrine," we think it scarcely advisable to try to epitomize this exposition of liberty, dominion, and religion.

As the error and terror of civil war increased around him, Hobbes more emphatically and enthusiastically engaged in his demonstration of the system of truth of which he held the clue, and very persistently held his own in argument against all comers. Hobbes is reported by Lord Clarendon, in his (controversial) "Survey of *The Leviathan*," as "a man of excellent parts, of great wit, some reading, and somewhat more thinking; one who has spent many years in foreign parts and observation, understands the learned as well as modern languages, hath long had the reputation of a great philosopher and mathematician, and in his age hath had conversation with many worthy and extraordinary men, to which, it may be, if he had been more indulgent in the more vigorous part of his life, it might have had a greater influence upon the temper of his mind; whereas age seldom submits to those questions, inquiries, and contradictions which the laws and liberty of conversation require; and it hath always been a lamentation amongst Mr. Hobbes' friends, that he spent too much time in thinking, and too little in exercising those thoughts in the company of other men of the same or of as good faculties; for want whereof his natural constitution, with age, contracted such a morosity that doubting and contradicting men were never grateful to him" (p. 2). The dogmatism of conviction is always strong, sometimes peremptory, and often disagreeable. To the charge of being confidently entrenched in his opinions Hobbes has made reference in the following terms:—"This I am sure is false, that any man living did ever hear me brag of my science or praise myself but when my defence required it. Perhaps some of our philosophers that were at Paris, and were acquainted with the same learned men that I was acquainted with, might take for bragging the maintaining of my opinions and the not yielding to the reasons alleged against them. If that be ostentation they tell the truth;" and, "if I added

that my acquaintance know that I am naturally of moderate rather than of boasting speech, you would not believe it; because you distinguish not between that which is said upon provocation, and that which is said without provocation, from vain-glory." "Truly I remember not an angry word that ever I uttered in all my life to any man that came to see me, though some of them have troubled me with very impertinent discourse; and with those that argued with me, how impertinently soever, I always thought it more civility to be somewhat earnest in the defence of my opinion, than by obstinate and affected silence to let them see I contemned them, or hearkened not to what they said."

In Paris he devoted himself very much to the study of Mathematics, holding intercourse on this subject with Descartes, Roberval, Hieronymus Verdusius. (an Aquitahian nobleman to whom in 1660 he dedicated his "Examinatio et Emendatio Mathematica.") Gassendi, Francis Nicero, Richard White, &c. Speaking of Mathematics, he had said in his "Human Nature," p. 72, 1640,— "To this day was it never heard of that there was any *controversy* concerning any conclusion on this subject; the science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the conclusions of most difficult and profound speculation. The reason whereof is apparent to every man that looketh into their writings; for they proceed from most low and humble principles, evident even to the meanest capacity; going on slowly and with most scrupulous ratiocination, viz., from the imposition of names, they infer the truth of their first propositions; and from two of the first a third; and from any two of the three a fourth; and so on, according to the Steps of Science." Though Mersenne names him often in his "Cogitata" with honour, and he acquired a fair reputation in Paris for mathematical ability, yet his own controversies on this subject are among the most bitter and the most disreputably conducted disputes in the records of the quarrels of authors. About the year 1645 he employed himself in an attempt at "the quadrature of the circle." "I have been asked," he says, "sometimes, by such as saw the figure before me, what I was doing, and I was not afraid to say that I was seeking for the solution of that problem; but not that I had done it. And afterwards being asked of the success, I have said I thought it done." He subsequently upheld his claim, dogmatically, to having successfully accomplished this feat in the face of the clearest refutation. His method of quadrature may be seen at the end of the fourth volume of his Latin works in Molesworth's edition. A. De Morgan says, "Longomontanus, (refuted by Pell), J. B. Porter, and Hobbes, (refuted by Wallis), are three names well known in other pursuits which must go down to posterity as having had distinguished success in false quadrature. The works of the last against Geometry and Geometers were the consequence of the mortification he felt at not being admitted to have succeeded in his attempt."*

* Article "Quadrature of the Circle," *Penny Cyclopædia*.

When, after the delivery of Charles I. to the Parliamentary Commissioners, it was thought expedient that Prince Charles should, under the care of Lords Capel and Hopton, take a journey to Jersey, whence he passed to Paris, "Mr. Hobbes had the honour to initiate him in the Mathematics," and then won both the esteem and affection of the heir to the hotly-assailed Crown of England. Lord Clarendon and Hobbes held several discussions on Political Philosophy at different times in his several visits to the City of Letters and Pleasure, and resolutely opposed each other's views. Here, though enduring "all the straits, necessities, and discomforts which are inseparable from banishment," the Duke of Newcastle, "a gentleman with all the accomplishments of mind which he wanted of body, being in all other respects a wonderful person," received and entertained the most intellectual company of Paris; and amongst others, Hobbes and John Bramhall, the Lord Bishop of Derry, who acted as his Lordship's chaplain. These two persons, the Bishop and the Philosopher, afforded great intellectual entertainment to the Earl by their controversial encounters and bickerings, and their eager polemical disputations.

As there is now little notice taken in our literature of this Archbishopal critic of Hobbes, though in his own day Bramhall was little less noteworthy than Laud, we may take a brief glance of his career and his works. He was born of an ancient family in Pontefract, in Yorkshire, in 1593, educated in the Grammar School there, and at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. In 1623 he became Chaplain to the Archbishop of York. He was prebendary of York and Ripon, and took his degree as D.D. in 1630. He was invited by Thomas Viscount Wentworth (afterwards Lord Strafford) who had been appointed Lord-Lieutenant, to accompany him to Ireland. Here he was made Archdeacon of Meath, and in succession to George Davenham (1634), Bishop of Derry,—in both of which offices he greatly enriched himself, and laboured diligently, and with some success, to induce the Church of Ireland to accept the Articles and Canons of the Church of England, under the influence of Laud. He was impeached by the Irish House of Commons in March, 1640-1, and imprisoned along with some others of the coadjutors of Strafford, but, by the interference of the King, he was released, though not acquitted. He retired to Yorkshire till Cromwell and his "Ironsides" had defeated the Royalists at Marston Moor, July 2nd, 1644. Then in the train of William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, he made off to the Continent. The exiles shortly afterwards found their way to Paris, and there they formed a sort of colony of Royalists. In 1645 Hobbes and the ex-bishop of Londonderry were brought into contact at the residence of the Earl of Newcastle in Paris, and there the talk having fallen upon Philosophical topics, and notably, of course, on those subjects which had been specifically treated of in Hobbes' book "On Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy," which, after having been circulated in MS. and much read and talked

of, had been, in May, 1640, dedicated to the Earl as "Governor to the Prince, his highness (afterwards Charles II.), and one of his Majesty's (Charles I.) most honourable privy council," and the still more recent work which Hobbes had written and published, being at Paris, "*De Cive*," of which Sorbière had written an epitome in French, for which Marsenne, Gassendi, &c., expressed a high admiration; and the English translation of which had been dedicated to Hobbes' patron, and the Earl's relative, William, Earl of Devonshire; the tenets contained in these works, though accepted by many clergy, did not gain the approval of Dr. Bramhall; and as Hobbes was very tenacious of his opinions, and not remarkable for yielding to the reasons alleged against them, even when urged mildly and calmly, much less when opposed in keen controversy, an exceedingly acrimonious disputation arose between the ex-bishop and the ex-tutor, in which the bishop wrote down some sixty objections to the Hobbesian philosophy;—besides these, a more aggravated and aggravating debate arose regarding Liberty and Necessity, in which, of course, Bramhall advocated the former, and Hobbes the latter. By the judicious advice of the Earl of Newcastle—considering that debates carried on by word of mouth in verbal conferences are apt to be passionate, and so subject to mistakes and mis-statements—the opponents were recommended to press home against each other, in writing, the arguments on which the strain of the discussion seemed most to rest. During the summer (April—August) of 1646, the written animadversions and contentions were placed before his lordship alone, and communicated thereafter to the respondents in either case. Hobbes in the meanwhile keeping hold of the Earl's friendship while controverting the opinions of his episcopal chaplain, by dedicating to him in MS. "A Minute or First Draught of the Optiques, in two parts. By Thomas Hobbes, at Paris, 1646," a written note of his ideas on a point which had formed the topic of discourse with his lordship about sixteen years previously at Welbeck. The first part of this tract, *On Illumination*, has not been published; the second part of it, *On Vision*, being "perfected" in Latin, has been incorporated into the treatise *De Homine*. The interest in the Philosophy of Necessity felt by a gentleman of Hobbes' acquaintance in Paris, who did not understand English, led to a request that Hobbes would permit him to see a copy of his notes on the question, that he might have them interpreted to him by a young Englishman. Hobbes, who was then, 1646, residing in Rouen, forwarded to his friend his copy of the matters he had written on the controversy with Bramhall, and the young Englishman who had been entrusted with the MS. having taken a copy, on hearing of the interest excited by the issue of the "*Leviathan*," had the treatise printed in 1652 to catch a share of the profits of notoriety. Hobbes published a proper edition of this work in 1654. Bramhall replied in "*A Defence of True Liberty*," in answer to Hobbes' "*Treatise of Liberty and Necessity*," which was

published in London in 1655. A Bishop Laney also engaged in the contest. Hobbes published an account of his controversy with Bramhall in 1656, and of that with Laney in 1670. Bramhall had issued a work entitled "The Catching of the Leviathan," in 1654 or so, and he now published a "Castigation of Mr. Hobbes' Last Animadversions, in the case concerning Liberty and Universal Necessity; with an appendix concerning the Catching of the Leviathan, 1658." Hobbes declares he had not heard of "The Catching of the Leviathan" till after Bramhall's death, so little stir had it made; and he published "An Answer to Dr. Bramhall's Catching of the Leviathan" a short time afterwards. Of the nature of the dispute between Bramhall and Hobbes an idea may be got from the following extract:—

"You shall find in this little volume the questions concerning *necessity*, *freedom*, and *chance*, which in all ages have perplexed the minds of curious men, largely and clearly discussed, and the arguments on all sides, drawn from the authority of Scripture, from the doctrine of the schools, from natural reason, and from the consequences pertaining to common life, truly alleged and severally weighed between two persons, who both maintain that men are free to *do* as they *will*, and *forbear* as they *will*. The things they dissent in are, that the one holdeth, that it is not in a man's power now to choose the will he shall have anon; that chance produceth nothing; that all events and actions have their necessary causes; that the will of God makes the necessity of all things. The other, on the contrary, maintaineth that not only the man is free to choose what he will *do*, but the *will* also to choose what it shall *will*; that when a man willeth a good action, God's will concurrereth with his, else not; that the will may choose whether it *will*, or not; that many things come to pass without necessity, by chance; that though God foreknow a thing shall be, yet it is not necessary that that thing shall be, inasmuch as God seeth not the future as in its causes, but as present. In sum, they adhere both of them to the Scripture; but one of them is a learned school divine, the other a man that doth not much admire that kind of learning."*

It is, we believe, generally admitted that in this controversy Hobbes proved himself to be an adept in the art of arguing, and that in his writings on this topic the self-determining power of the will is opposed with subtlety, depth, and penetration unsurpassed by any subsequent writer on the same side of the question. In it, indeed, we find the first clear, distinct, and unambiguous statement of the doctrine of philosophical necessity, subsequently wrought out so unhesitatingly by Charles Bray, of Coventry, in several able works. See *British Controversialist*, September, 1867. Dr. Bramhall was not a match for him in dialectics; but this controversy excited the learning and ability of Ralph Cudworth, whose vast and various powers were brought to the consideration of this subject in consequence of the interest felt in the problem it discussed.

* Thomas Hobbes' address "To the Reader," prefixed to "The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, clearly stated and debated."

Bramhall returned to England at the Restoration, and was made Archbishop of Armagh and Primate and Metropolitan of all Ireland, and died in 1663. His "Life and Works" were published at Dublin in 1677, and have been republished in the Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology at Oxford, 1842-5.

Though the licence of Paris was then, as now, proverbial, yet the "Liberty of Unlicensed Printing" was not attainable there. When, in March, 1651, after the news of Cromwell's success at Dunbar had reached the Court of Spain, Edward Hyde (Lord Clarendon) and Lord Cottington were dismissed from the Court of Spain, where they had been endeavouring to negotiate for aid to place Prince Charles on the throne. Lord Clarendon took up his residence in Paris with the exiled court. Hobbes and he met frequently, and the progress of the new work on which the author of "De Cive" was engaged formed the theme of discourse. This new book was printing in England then, and its author received a sheet weekly in proof to correct and revise. While it was still in the press Hobbes got a copy of it engrossed on vellum, in a marvellous fair hand, and had it presented to the Prince of Wales, his pupil, afterwards Charles II., through the prince's governor, his patron's relative and his own friend, the Earl of Newcastle.

"On the first leaf of the manuscript was that curious frontispiece, exquisitely drawn, which faces the Leviathan in this as in the earliest edition. We well remember our first gaze at that singular representation when its meaning was a mystery. Philosophy was then a spell, and our novitiate wonder. What a celebrated author would say on any metaphysical question, whether innate ideas or substantial forms, was rather an exciting affair—verging often on palpitation of the heart—

'The glory and the freshness of a dream.'

"By degrees, under the guidance of the great mystagogue himself, the enigmatical became plain. Rising, as it were, out of the centre of the earth, Leviathan, in human form, appears, towering above the hills. A crown is upon his head, a sword in his right hand, a crozier in his left. His person looks as if wrapped in a coat of mail; but, on nearer inspection, you find that it is covered with figures of human beings, who, in their multitudinous aggregation, compose the body of this wonder of the world—the artificial man. Beneath him is a city, in which a church is the most prominent object. His right hand represents the civil power, having supreme sway over castles, coronets, ordnance, arms, banners, and the strife of war; his left, power ecclesiastical—an episcopal autocracy—having at command mitres, colleges, thunderbolts of excommunication, and the logic of schools—the latter demonstrating, syllogistically, that the temporal and spiritual functions must be united in one sovereign head, or else that the commonwealth must be tossed on the horns of a dilemma, and, by the one or the other, gored to a miserable death. Such significance is there in that pictured page."*

* "Hobbes—his Life and Writings," in the *British Quarterly Review*, vi., August, 1847, p. 165.

The word *Leviathan*, in Scripture, signifies a great sea-monster, a whale, a crocodile, or saurian of immense size and terribleness. This, however, is not the meaning of the term *Leviathan* as used by Hobbes in his "Discourse of Commonwealth." It is there used as a name for "the *State*, in Latin *Civitas*, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the *sovereignty* is an artificial *soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates, and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial *joints*—reward and punishment, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the *nerves* that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the *strength*; *Salus populi*, the people's safety, its *business*—counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the *memory*; equity and laws, an artificial *reason* and *will*; concord, *health*; sedition, *sickness*; and civil war, *death*." "The multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth—that great *Leviathan*, or rather, to speak more reverently, that mortal God, to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence."

The title of the book runs thus:—"Leviathan; or, the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil." The Dedication bears the date Paris, April 15-25, 1651, and is addressed "to my most honoured friend, Mr. Francis Godolphin, of Godolphin" (or Godolcan, in Cornwall.)

Francis was the third son of Sir William Godolphin; his eldest brother was that Sir William Godolphin who, having been ambassador from England to the Court of Spain, became a convert to Catholicism, and left an estate in England, Spain, Venice, Rome, and Amsterdam, to the value of nearly £80,000 to his soul as his heir, giving in charge to his father confessors to make such a will, after his death, as should most benefit his soul—the result of which was a long-continued appeal to law in the different countries to show that a man's soul can lay no valid claim to the disposal or enjoyment of his mundane assets. His second brother was Mr. Sidney Godolphin, secretary to the Earl of Leicester while on his embassy to France, author of several English poems and translator of "The Loves of Æneas and Dido, from Virgil" (1538). He joined the royal army, and was killed in an encounter at Chagford, in Devonshire, in 1643, aged thirty-three. He admired Hobbes as a man and a student, and left him £200. "He was pleased," says Hobbes, "to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me with real testimonies of his good opinion great in themselves, and the greater for the worthiness of his person;" and again he says, "I have known clearness of judgment and largeness of fancy; strength of reason and graceful elocution; a courage for the war and a fear for the laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honoured friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin, who

hating no man nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civil war, in the public quarrel, by an undiscerned and an undiscerning hand."

Mr. Francis Godolphin was the father of the Sydney, Earl of Godolphin (born 1630), who served Charles II. in war and in peace, and who held high offices under James II., William III., and Queen Anne as one too honest to be bribed, too selfish to be left unemployed, and too useful to be done without. It is not improbable that he may be considered as a specimen Hobbist in the acuteness of his intellect, the caution of his habits, the calculating character of his morals, the personal worth that wanted the highest grace of patriotism and the trustworthiness of thorough conviction.

In the Dedication the author asserts for himself impartiality in these words:—"I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend on one side for too great liberty, and on the other side for too much authority, 'tis hard to pass between the points of both unwounded:" at the same time he confesses that "I am a man that love my own opinion." In a tract entitled "Considerations upon the reputation, &c., of T. Hobbes," written in reply to some animadversions of John Wallis, D.D., the mathematician, scholar, and divine, he affirms that he wrote and published his "Leviathan" far from the intention either of disadvantage to his Majesty or to flatter Oliver [Cromwell], who was not made Protector till three or four years after. . . . What was Oliver when that book came forth? It was in 1650, and Mr. Hobbes returned before 1651. Oliver was then but General under your masters of the Parliament, nor had yet cheated them of their usurped power. For that was not done till two or three years after, in 1653, which neither he (Hobbes) nor you (Wallis) could foresee. What title, then, of Oliver's could he pretend to justify?" It is no slight proof of his impartiality of intention, though it by no means substantiates his success in attaining impartiality, that while he was accused by the parliamentary party of favouring the sovereign against them, he was also accused by the Royalists of favouring the sovereignty of the people. In reference to the latter point he admits that Charles II. "was displeased for a while, but not very long. They that complained of and misconstrued his writings were his Majesty's good subjects, and reputed wise and learned men, and thereby obtained to have their misconstructions believed for some little time; but the very next summer after his (Hobbes) coming away, two honourable persons of the Court that came over into England, assured him that his Majesty had a good opinion of him; and others since have told me that his Majesty said openly, that he thought Mr. Hobbes never meant him hurt. Besides, his Majesty hath used him more graciously than is ordinary to so humble a person as he is . . . and testified his esteem of him in his bounty."

It is certain that even so late as 1662, ten years after its publication, he felt it necessary to present a "short apology" to t^h

king for his "Leviathan," and humbly to "beseech his Sacred Majesty not to believe so ill of him upon reports that proceed often, and may do so now, from the displeasure which commonly ariseth from differences in opinion."

This work, which was alternately attacked by either party, and required to be defended against both, consists of four main divisions, including in all forty-seven chapters, with a review and conclusion, supplies the fullest, the best, and the best known exposition of his views on mind, morals, politics, and religion. The topics of the four parts are: 1. The matter of the Leviathan and the artificer; both of which is *man*. 2. How, and by what covenants, it is made; what are the rights and just power or authority of a sovereign; and what it is that preserveth or dissolveth it. 3. What is a Christian commonwealth? and 4. What is the kingdom of darkness?

The first part—Of Man—consists of sixteen chapters.

(1) Of Sense. "Concerning the thoughts of man." "Singly, they are every one a representation, or appearance, of some quality or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object;" "for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original." "So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy, caused, as I have said, by the pressure; that is, by the motion of external things upon our eyes, ears, and other organs thereunto ordained."

(2) Of Imagination. "After the object is removed or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the things seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this it is the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the senses. But the Greeks call it *fancy*, which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another. *Imagination*, therefore, is nothing but *decayed sense*." "But when we would express the decay and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called *memory*." "Much memory, or memory of many things, is called *experience*." "The imaginations of them that sleep are those we call *dreams*." Imagination explains apparitions and visions. "The imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining, by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call *understanding*, and is common to man and beast." "That understanding which is peculiar to man is the understanding not only his will, but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech."

(3) "Of the Consequence or Train of Imaginations"—"that succession of one thought to another, which is called, to distinguish it from discourse in words, *mental discourse*." "Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently;" but "it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another." It is "of two sorts; 1st, ungridded, without design," "in which case the thoughts are said to wander." "Thought is quick;" 2nd, "regulated by some desire or design"—which also is of two kinds; (a) "when of an effect imagined we seek the causes or means to produce it;" (b) "when imagining anything, whatsoever, we seek

all the possible effects that can by it be produced;" "that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it."

"The discourse of the mind when it is governed by design is nothing but seeking, or the faculty of *Invention*." "And sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost." "This we call *Remembrance* or calling to mind; the Latins call it *Remiscentia*, as it were a re-conning of our former actions." "Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action." This "is called foresight, prudence, or providence; and sometimes wisdom; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious." "The *present* only has a being in nature; things *past* have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all; the *future* being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough." "A *sign* is the evident antecedent of the consequent, and contrarily the consequent of the antecedent." "As prudence is a presumption of the future, contracted from the experience of time past; so there is a presumption of things past taken from other things, not future but past also." "But this conjecture has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the future; both being grounded only upon experience." "Besides sense and thoughts and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height as to distinguish men from all other living creatures." "Whatsoever we imagine is *finite*. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call *infinite*"—we have "no conception of the thing but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive Him, for He is incomprehensible; and His greatness and power are inconceivable; but that we may honour Him."

(4) "Of Speech." "The invention of printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of *letters* is no great matter." "But the most noble and profitable invention of all other was that of *speech*, consisting of names or appellations and their connection: whereby men register their thoughts, recall them when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation." "The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words; the first use of names is to serve for *marks* or *notes* of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signify, by their connection and order one to another, what they conceive or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called *signs*. Special uses of speech are these: first, to register what, by cogitation, we find to be the cause of anything, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce or effect; which, in sum, is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that knowledge which we have attained, which is, to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills and purposes, that we may have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently." To these uses, there are also four correspondent abuses—viz., 1st, inconstancy in the signification of words; 2nd, the use of words metaphorically; 3rd, the use of words falsely; 4th, the use of words to grieve and injure. "In all which ways words are turned from their true use, and speech is abused." "Speech serveth

remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, by the imposing of names, and the connection of them. Of names, some are *proper*, and singular to only one thing, as *Peter*, and some are *common* to many things, as *man*, in respect of which it is called an *universal*; there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular;" "whereas a proper name bringeth to mind one thing only, universals recall any one of those many. And of names universal, some are of more, and some of less extent; the larger comprehending the less large; and some again of equal extent, comprehending each other reciprocally." "By this imposition of names, some of larger, some of stricter signification we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations." "When two names are joined together into a consequence, or affirmation;" "if the latter name signify all that the former name signifieth," "then the affirmation, or consequence, is *true*; otherwise *false*." "*True* and *false* are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither *truth* nor *falsehood*; *error* there may be." "Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations," and hence the propriety of settling the significations of words by definitions. "For the errors of definitions multiply themselves according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors." "In the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science; and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senseless tenets." "Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise or more mad than ordinary." "For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools." The Latins called accounts of money *rationes*, and accounting *ratiocinatio*;" and "they extended the word *ratio* to the faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word, *λογος*, for both *speech* and *reason*; not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech; and the act of reasoning they called *sylogism*, which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another."

Diversity of names may be reduced to four general heads, 1, of matter or body; 2, of accident or quality; 3, names of fancies or abstraction; 4, names of names or speeches. Names are (1) positive; (2) negative. All other names are but insignificant, new, yet undefined or contradictory, and inconsistent. Understanding is "nothing else but conception, caused by speech." "In reasoning a man must take heed of words; which, besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker."

5. Of reason and science. "When a man *reasoneth*, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from *addition* of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another." "In what matter soever there is place for *addition* and *subtraction*, there also is place for *reason*; and where these have no place, there *reason* has nothing at all to do." "REASON is nothing but *reckoning*, that is, adding and subtracting of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the *marking* and *signifying* of our thoughts; I say *marking* them when we reckon by ourselves, and signifying, when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to

other men." "The use and end of reason is not the finding of the sum and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions and settled significations of names, but to begin at these, and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last conclusion, without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations on which it was grounded and inferred." "When we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false, though it be commonly called *error*, it is indeed an *absurdity*, or senseless speech."

Absurd conclusions may be ascribed (1) to want of method in not beginning with and from definitions; (2) speaking of accidental as material properties and *vice versa*; (3) making use of analogies from things external to things internal; (4) using abstract terms as if they indicated realities; (5) speaking of accidental properties as mere words; (6) metaphorical speeches; (7) the using of non-significant names as significant. "To him who can avoid these things it is not easy to fall into any absurdity."

"Reason is not, as sense and memory [are], born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by industry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connection of one of them to another, and so to syllogisms, which are the connections of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it men call *SCIENCE*. And whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable, *science* is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another, by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like another time." "*Reason* is the *pace*, increase of *science* the *way*, and the benefit of mankind the *end*." "As much experience is *prudence*, so is much science *sapience*." The "signs of science are, some certain and infallible, some uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the science of anything can teach the same—that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another; uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove not as he says they must."

(6) Of the voluntary motions commonly called passions. "There be in animals two sorts of motions peculiar to them, vital and animal, otherwise called voluntary motion." "The imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion." "These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called *endeavour*. This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called *appetite* or *desire*." "And when the endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called *aversion*." "That which men desire, they are also said to *love*; and to hate those things for which they have aversion." "Those things which we neither desire nor hate we are said to *contemn*." "But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth *good*; and the object of his hate or aversion, *evil*: and of his contempt, *vile* and *inconsiderable*." "*Pleasure* or *delight* is the appearance or sense of good; and *molestation* or *displeasure* the appearance or sense of evil." "Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present, and those may be called *pleasures of sense*." "Others are pleasures of the *mind* of him that draweth those consequences, and are generally called *joy*. In the like manner, displeasures are some in the sense, and called *pain*; others

in the expectation of consequences, and are called *grief*. These simple passions, called *appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief*, have their names for divers considerations diversified."

[Here follow definitions of the several simple and complex passions according to the views entertained by the author, the communication of which would occupy much more space than we can allot to them in our epitome.]

"When in the mind of man, appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately, and divers good and evil consequences of the doing or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes, and fears, continued till the thing be either done or thought impossible, is that we call *deliberation*." "Will therefore is the *last appetite in deliberating*,"—the latest results of the exercise of all the intervenient desires or aversions, the conclusion to which the passionate nature of man comes or assents."

(7) Of the ends or resolutions of discourse. "As the last appetite in deliberation is called the will; so the last opinion in search of the truth of past and future is called the *judgment*, or resolute and final sentence of him that *discourseth*. And as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good or bad, is called deliberation; so the whole chain of opinions alternate, in the question of true or false, is called *doubt*." "When the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connection of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms; the end, or last sum, is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions; or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is OPINION." "When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are said to be conscious of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together." "When a man's discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing as the person, and the resolution is called belief and faith: *faith* in the man, *belief* both of the man, and of the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man, the other of his virtue."

(8) Of Intellectual Virtues and their Contraries. "By *virtues intellectual* are always understood such abilities of the mind as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves." "These *virtues* are of two sorts—*natural and acquired*." "Natural wit consisteth principally in two things—*celerity of imagining*, that is, swift succession of one thought to another; and *steady direction* to some approved end. On the contrary, a slow imagination maketh that defect or fault of the mind which is commonly called dulness, stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion or difficulty to be moved. And this difference of quickness is caused by the difference of men's passions; that love and dislike, some

one thing, some another; and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another." "As for acquired wit," "there is none but reason, which is grounded on the right use of speech, and produceth the sciences."

(9) Of the several Subjects of Knowledge. "There are of knowledge two kinds; whereof one is knowledge of fact, the other knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another. The former is nothing else but sense and memory, and is absolute knowledge." "The latter is called science, and is conditional." "The register of knowledge of fact is called history; whereof there be two sorts: one called natural history, which is the history of such facts or effects of nature as have no dependence on man's will." "The other is civil history, which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths. The registers of science are such books as contain the demonstrations or consequences of one affirmation to another, and are commonly called books of philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the matter."

(10) Of Power, Worth, &c. "The power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means to obtain some future apparent good; and is either original or instrumental. Natural power is the eminence of the faculties of body or mind; as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. Instrumental are those powers which, acquired by those or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more; as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good luck."

"The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such is the power of a commonwealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the power of a faction, or of divers factions leagued." "Worthiness is a thing different from the worth or value of a man; and also from his merit, or desert, and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy, which particular ability is usually named fitness or aptitude."

(11) Of the difference of manners. "Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter." "So that, in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death."

(12) Of religion. "Seeing there are no signs, nor fruit of religion, but in man only, there is no cause to doubt but that the seed of religion is also only in man." "And, first, it is peculiar to the nature of men, to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see, some more, some less; but all men so much as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune. Secondly, on the sight of anything that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin then, when it did, rather than sooner or later. Thirdly, "Man observeth how one event hath been produced by another, and remembereth in them antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things (for the causes of good and evil fortune are for the most part invisible), he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth, or trusteth the authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, or wiser than himself. The two first make anxiety." "That man which looks too far before him in the care of future time

hath no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep." "In these four things—opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics—consisteth the natural seed of religion; which by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another. For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they that have nourished and ordered them according to their own invention. The other have done it by God's commandment and direction; but both sorts have done it with a purpose to make those men that relied on them the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society."

(18) Of the natural condition of mankind. "Nature hath made man equal in the faculties of the body and mind." "From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends." "In the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second for safety; and the third for reputation." "During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man." "All other time is peace." "The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them; and reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the laws of nature."

(14) Of natural laws and of contracts. "The right of nature is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments." "A law of nature is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject used to confound *jus* and *lex* (right and law), yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consisteth in liberty to do or to forbear; whereas law determineth, and bindeth to one of them; so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent." "It is a precept or general rule of reason. First, that every man ought to endeavour after peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war." Second, "That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself."

"The mutual transferring of right, is that which men call contract." "All contract is mutual translation or change of right." "Signs of contract are either express or by inference." "The matter, or subject, of a covenant, is always something that falleth under deliberation; for to

covenant is an act of the will." "Men are freed of their covenants two ways; by performing, or by being forgiven. For performance is the natural end of obligation; and forgiveness, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that right in which the obligation consisted."

(15) Of other laws of nature. Third. "That men perform their covenants made." "In this consisteth the fountain and original of justice." "The nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants; but the validity of covenants begins not with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them, and then it is, also, that propriety begins." "Justice, therefore, that is to say, keeping of a covenant, is a rule of reason, by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and consequently a law of nature." Fourth. "That a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour that he which giveth it have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will." Fifth. "Complaisance, that is to say, that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest." Sixth. "That upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them repenting, desire it." Seventh. "That in revenges, that is, retribution of evil for evil, men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow." Eighth. "That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare hatred or contempt of another. The breach of which law is commonly called contumely." Ninth. "That every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride. On this law dependeth another. Tenth. That at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest." Eleventh. "If a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature that he deal equally between them." Twelfth. "That such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in common if it can be, and if the quantity of the thing permit, without stint, otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right." "But some things there be that cannot be divided, nor enjoyed in common. Then the law of nature, which prescribeth equity, requireth, Thirteenth, that the entire right, or else making the use alternate, the first possession, be determined by lot." And therefore, Fourteenth, those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor undivided, ought to be adjudged to the first possessor; and, in some cases, to the firstborn as required by lot." Fifteenth. "That all men that mediate peace be allowed safe conduct." Sixteenth. "They that are at controversy submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator." "Seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, Seventeenth, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause." "For the same reason, Eighteenth, no man, in any cause, ought to be received for arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other." "And, Nineteenth, in a controversy of fact, the judge being to give no more credit to one than to the other, if there be no other arguments, must give credit to a third, or to a third and fourth, or more, for else the question is undecided and left to force, contrary to the law of nature." "The laws of nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acceptance of persons, and the rest can never be made lawful." "The science of these laws is the true moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing

else but the science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind.

(16) Of persons, authors, &c. "A person, is he whose words and actions are considered either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction. When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person; and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person." "Of persons artificial, some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person is the actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the author; in which case the actor acteth by authority." "A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular." "And because the multitude naturally is not one, but many, they cannot be understood for one, but many authors; of everything their representative saith, or doth in their name." "And if the representative consist of many men, the voice of the greater number must be considered as the voice of them all." "Authors conditional, are generally called sureties."

[Here endeth Part I., and we must adjourn further analysis till another opportunity comes round.]

WHAT BECOMES OF BOOKS?—These come out in legions, season after season, representing, in addition to an enormous amount of labour of different kinds, a considerable accumulation of actual material; of paper, of metallic types, of ink, of millboard, of cloth, of leather. What becomes of all this matter? What sort of proportion do the number of books that are sold bear to those that are brought out? And again, of those that are sold, what becomes? Those that we see on the shelves of libraries, or even lying about upon tables and chiffonniers, are but a small percentage of the number continually issuing from the press. What becomes of the thousand-paged novels which appear, in great numbers, in the course of every season? How does it happen that our rooms are not entirely surrounded with full bookshelves, or that there exists in any apartment, hall, or passage, any vacant portion of flat space, unoccupied by books, on which to put things down? Hundreds of thousands of volumes are cast upon the world every year, and have been since one is afraid to say when. Where are they all at this present writing? The booksellers' shops furnish an account of some, the librarians of others, and some the trunkmakers and the buttermen know about; but the rest, where are they?—*All the Year Round.*

Religion.

ARE THE SACRAMENTS ESSENTIAL TO SALVATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IT is from no desire to foment or advocate Sacramentarianism that we feel ourselves called upon to maintain the affirmative of the question which has been put before the readers of this Serial for controversial consideration. It is because we feel and are convinced in our inmost heart that the observance of the sacraments of the New Testament is incumbent on Christians and essential to salvation—unless there are exceptional circumstances in any special case which hinder the due and proper engagement in the rites and ceremonies, simple and solemn as they are, which each of the sacraments requires. It is true that the Sacramentarians do affirm that certain sacraments are essential to salvation; but they also assert that there are other secondary ones which are not generally necessary for salvation, though some of them are highly valuable in themselves, their graces, and results. The opener on the negative of this question took an ingenious method of acquiring credit for liberality of sentiment, exhaustiveness of statement, and pertinence of debate, combined with ease of victory, when he took the word in its most comprehensive sense, and treated the discussion as one referring to sacraments of all sorts; for he thus secured that among by far the larger proportion of his readers he would have five-sevenths of his case, at least, granted to him without any contention, however ineffective his arguing might be. We do not think this a fair way of putting the query. All Protestants—except, perhaps, the members of the Society of Friends—agree that the sacraments of the New Testament are two, and two only—Baptism and the Lord's Supper; and though in the Church of England certain forms of ritual which are, by Romanists, regarded as sacramental, are retained, they are retained by the large majority of its officiating ministers as religious observances fit and convenient, by their solemnity, to impress and improve, but are deprived in their usage of them of their sacramental character. The Ritualists in the Church of England only go so far as to recommend, not to enforce, a belief in the Romanistic sacraments; and even the Church of Rome itself does not declare that the Seven Sacraments are, to all and each, essential to salvation. In this way it is easy to gain an apparent victory, but it cannot be a real conquest in argumentation. It sweeps a vast field, it is true, with the warfare of words; but it comes in contact only with the forces of the opposition at two points—those of the Lord's Supper and of Baptism.

We not only do not defend, we oppugn and deny, the so-called sacraments of Penance, Confirmation, Holy Orders, Matrimony, and Extreme Unction; and, besides, we do not approve of Sacramentarianism in its affirmation and advocacy of the sacraments being, in themselves, possessed of the power of conferring a real interior grace upon the recipients—even though they be not faithful and repentant. Neither do we think it requisite for the effective and beneficial administration of the sacraments that they should be communicated or imparted by persons who acquire a spiritual fitness for the instrumental conferring of them by being in some way divinely authorized and commissioned to impart or employ them. Although, therefore, we dissent very widely from the Sacramentarians in their opinions, we yet believe, as we think most members of Christian communities do, that the sacraments are essential to salvation; and we propose to advance a few arguments in favour of this view of the question.

And we would first of all affirm that the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper are *memorial* ordinances or institutions.

It seems to us that to be a Christian, and that is, to those who have heard of our Lord and Saviour, essential to being saved, we must remember and obey Christ; not only His character, but His law, not only His sacrifice of Himself, but the ceremonials by which He desires that these may be commemorated. Jesus has given two simple and expressive institutions, capable of universal adoption and easy of observance, as bequests to His Church in all time coming, and both of these are in their essence memorial. He who most graciously said, "Suffer little children to come unto Me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of heaven;" and who has also affirmed that, unless we become as little children, we cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven, has instituted and ordained a simple and significant symbol to indicate our becoming the children of His kingdom—a rite of naturalization or adoption into the family of those who profess to have received Christ. This is the ordinance of Baptism, an institution which Jesus adopted from His forerunner, John the Baptist, as peculiarly suggestive of the cleanness of heart, purity of nature, regeneration of life, acceptance of and trust in a purification imputed or imparted to us, and not our own, which are implied in becoming Christians; for "by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body; whether we be Jews or Gentiles; whether we be bond or free, and have been all made to drink into one Spirit" (1 Cor. xii. 13). Hence there is "one Lord, one Faith, one baptism" (Ephes. iv. 5).

Jesus commanded His apostles to "teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt. xxviii. 19). Paul represents Ananias as saying to him, when he had been called to repentance, "And now, why tarriest thou? Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord" (Acts xxii. 16). It is evident

that Jesus gave His commandment to be obeyed; that Ananias thought it was a duty, and that Paul acquiesced in his interpretation of the commandment as binding on Christians. As a memorial of Christ's mediatorial work for us, Baptism is essential to salvation.

In the institution of the sacrament of the Eucharist we have an express injunction of Jesus to "Do this in remembrance of Me." It is clearly a memorial feast, and those who have received or profess to be animated by the Spirit of Jesus cannot but admit that they ought to "do this as a memorial of their Saviour; that if they willingly fail to do this "in remembrance of Him," then they are despising His commandment, neglecting to show their faithful remembrance of Him; and are, in fact, either forgetful or defiant of Him. Those who do so can scarcely be regarded as in the way of salvation. They are "gone aside;" they are "children of disobedience." Wherefore I argue that the observance of the sacraments at right, proper, and suitable seasons is essential to salvation.

God has always manifested Himself in symbol in accommodation to the weakness of the minds of men, and in accordance with the associative capacities of their understanding. The Sabbath is appointed as a holy day to induce in us habits and thoughts of worshipful holiness. He instituted the rainbow as a memorial of mercy; making it, in fact, the visible Sabbath of the sky. The Passover was given, not only as a memorial, but as a type—a memorial of mercies passed, and a type of the sure mercies laid up in Jesus Christ for all who believe on His name.

The sacrament of Baptism is representative of the new heart or new birth, the spiritual regeneration or entire change of the principles of our life which the adoption of the Christian faith implies. It is a simple and striking symbol by which to speak to the soul of the perennial commandment of God, "Wash you, make you clean, put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well" (Isa. i. 16, 17).

It is a fact that "Christ our Passover was sacrificed for us" (1 Cor. v. 7); and in the Lord's Supper we have a symbol of the broken body and shed blood of our Lord presented before us, and we partake of the symbols of strength and of joy to indicate that Jesus Christ is "the strength of our heart and our portion for ever," and the joy of the whole earth, the whole heavens. That we should have realizing views of the work and character of Jesus Christ is essential to salvation; and, as the appointed means by which this is to be done, we contend that the observance of these sacraments is also necessary to salvation. It is thus that we are to show, figure out to ourselves, the Lord's death till He come.

Again: the sacraments are witnessing ordinances. By partaking of them we give public, potent, and patent testimony that we are Christ's—that we have made our election of the way of life, and that we have pledged ourselves before Heaven and in the eyes of men to be true and conscientious followers of Him whom our sins

have pierced. It will surely be acknowledged by all that we ought to give evidence of our faith, that we should acknowledge with gratitude of spirit the Lord who bought us, that we should neither shirk nor shrink from duty. "Whosoever," saith the very Lord Himself, "Whosoever, therefore, shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my Father which is in Heaven; but whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in Heaven" (Matt. x. 31, 32). It seems to me incredible that any one who has read this passage can believe that the observance of the sacraments is not essential to salvation. His disciples forsook Him and fled is said to their disgrace—how much better are we if, when His table is spread for His erring children, we absent ourselves from the seats at the Lord's table? Are we not faithless friends, forsaking the assembling of ourselves together in the hour of witnessing and proof? Are we not virtually denying our Lord? and, if we deny Him, He will deny us (2 Tim. iv. 12). Baptism is a witnessing to the Church that we have forsaken the world; and the Eucharist is a testimony given to the Church and the world that, as for us, whatever others may do, we will serve the Lord, and have no more fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness henceforth, but have our fellowship with those who assemble in God's house for God's service, and who endeavour to be mindful of His commandments.

Jesus has promised that by these sacraments, rightly partaken of, He will apply certain blessings to our souls. "As many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ" (Gal. iii. 27). "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved" (Mark xvi. 16). In the Lord's Supper the *bread* is "the Communion of the body of Christ," and the *wine* is "the Communion of the blood of Christ" (1 Cor. x. 16, 17); and Jesus has said, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, ye have no life in you" (John vi. 53).

I think it may safely be affirmed, then, that the tenor of the teaching of the Gospels is to the effect that the sacraments are essential to salvation; and that, though those who, having faith, have not had opportunity to engage in them, may, and indeed we should say, will be saved; yet those who, having faith and opportunity, abstain or refrain from their observance, are verily guilty; for unto whom much is given, of them shall much be required. Jesus did not refuse to undergo the baptism of John that He might fulfil all righteousness; nor did He refrain from engaging in and partaking of the feasts of the Old Dispensation, though He was the reality of which they were but the shadows. Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made unto the fathers" (Rom. xv. 8). In the presence of such an example of sacramental observance, who shall venture to gainsay the statement founded on it, that the sacraments are essential to salvation?

ECCLESIA.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

CHRISTIANITY is a real, substantive religion, a *bonâ fide* faith in God, through Jesus Christ, leading and binding man to obedience, love, and true sanctity; a system of moral and spiritual truths, designed for the highest welfare of man. But it is not a stiff, hard, unbending, arrogant system of institutions, ceremonies, and observances, full of outward form and imposing ritual. God is a spirit, and those who worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth; in spirit, because it is the spirit that quickeneth, the outward form profiteth nothing; in truth, because God is a God of truth, and we are to be Godlike. The repetition of creeds, the signature of articles, the adherence to prescribed forms, do not constitute the ordinance of worship. It is not the ritual of any denomination of Christian fellowship, but the word which Jesus speaks to the individual soul which are spirit and life. These words Christians are to keep with reverential care, treasuring them as sacred, and guarding them from corruption by others or degradation by ourselves. Every deviation from the instructions of Jesus regarding His will and the will of the Father is wrong, and all things which lead the heart, mind, habits, and inmost spirit of man from Christ to symbols or ceremonies constitute deviations, and are injurious to the spirit of man. Hence we say Christianity is not a religion of types and shadows, of observances and ritual, but a substantive religion—one in which Mosaism is abolished, and the typical is displaced because the truth has come.

Christianity is a new covenant. The Mosaic law was a school-master to bring men to Christ. It was an outward compelling force, and was full of forms for the training of men, but the religion of Jesus is an inward impelling force, and is free from ceremonial. "There is verily a disannulling of the commandment going before for the weakness and unprofitableness thereof" (Hebrews vii. 18); and redemption is offered unto us by a great high priest, "who is made not after a carnal commandment, but after the power of an endless life" (Hebrews vii. 16). We are justified by faith, not by observances; the just not only do live but shall live by faith; "faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." The very spirit and life of the Christian does not lie in things seen and temporal, but in faith in the unseen yet eternal realities of God in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself. Outward ordinances are shadows, but the true Christian is a member of a holy priesthood, whose duty it is to offer up spiritual sacrifice, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ. Hence we conclude that outward ceremonials, such as the so-called sacraments, are not essential to salvation; that true faith in Jesus Christ, followed by its proper consequences—repentance, love, endeavour to obey God rather than man—are alone essential to the soul's supreme welfare.

The great aim of our Lord's instructions while on earth was to withdraw men from reliance on the ceremonial observances of

religion, from resting in and upon them, as possessed of efficacy; and to impress on them that religion was a thing of the heart and life. Was He then likely to institute any observances in His Church which should have the same tendency to concreate themselves into priestly ceremonial and mere ritual observance, and so repeat and reproduce the same effects in His new-covenant Church as had occurred in the Old Testament one—Pharisaic ceremonialism? Assuredly no! Christ our Passover was once slain, and that once for all; the bread to be eaten by believers was the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth—the very nature of Jesus; the wine which was to be partaken of was the wine of His kingdom—the joy in the Holy Ghost which He communicateth to them who believe.

When He said "My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed" (John vi. 55), did not He speak of "the spirit which they that believe on Him should receive?" (John vii. 39). These considerations incline us to think that P. S. A., when he interprets man's duty as being to receive the Sacraments (p. 94) as oaths to and witnesses for God, has made a mistake; for faith is the pledge we give to Christ, followed by the answer of a good conscience, to all the duties of holiness and truth, which His law demands in order that we may be like Him. He is not a Christian, any more than he is a Jew, who is one outwardly. He is only so who is one inwardly—rites and ceremonies, passovers and circumcisions, baptisms and communions in this matter avail nothing, but a new life.

Baptism is spiritual. That only is baptism into Christ's kingdom which is done by the water which Jesus shall give, as "a well of water springing up into everlasting life" (John iv. 14)—even "rivers of living water" (John vii. 38). "Jesus himself baptized not" (John iv. 2); think ye if baptism had been essential to salvation Jesus would have neglected to fulfil all righteousness?—would we not have had an account of the baptism of the apostles?—but all that they boast of is being baptised into His death, and that was a baptism with which neither they nor we are able to be baptized except through His grace in imputing it to us, and making us partakers in it.

Nowhere is the communion supper represented as being of general institution binding on Christians. Jesus had many disciples, but none of them were present at this feast. Only the apostles partook of it—and one of them was a traitor, so that even in this one significant fact we see that it was not essential to salvation—nor indeed endued with saving grace.

Faith in Jesus Christ is essential to salvation; nothing else really is. Let us get this, and do not let us trust in the priestly sacraments or the outward ceremonials of institutions. Let us be sacred in heart and in life; and may we have the spirit of Christ within us.

A. T. H.

National Education.

UGHT EDUCATION TO BE SETTLED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LEAGUE OR THE UNION ?

THE UNION.—VI.

THE singular case of the Fasting Girl of Caermarthen has occupied public attention, and excited a perfectly “umbrageous multitude” of leaders from the common leaders of public opinion, and these have stimulated the Government into a prosecution of the parties implicated in the starvation of the poor misguided martyr of fraud or mistake. But how many multitudes of human spirits, all instinct with high powers of thought, have been compelled to fast from the true diet of the soul without one compunctious word or unctuous leader, till it became a political question and a party cry! One case of starvation in the streets of London will fill next day’s papers with sensation articles; but the existence of multitudes of starving and starved minds occasions little surprise, and few strong, stinging expostulations with the State and the Church against such waste of manhood and spiritual power.

“How many a rustic Milton has passed by,
Stifling the speechless longings of his heart
In unremitting drudgery and care!
How many a vulgar Oato has compelled
His energies, no longer tameless then,
To mould a pin or fabricate a nail!
How many a Newton, to whose passive ken
Those mighty spheres that gem infinity
Were only specks of tinsel fixed in heaven,
To light the midnights of his native town!”

If we ask who it was that saw and strove to remedy this waste of vital thought and mental energy divine—who endeavoured, not only to awaken sympathy, but succeeded in eliciting effort that such things should be no longer, it would only be common honesty to answer and admit that they were and are those who hold the principles of the Union; and I think not a little confusion of face ought to suffuse the cheek of the League and its advocates when truth compels them to assent to the accusation that not to them is due the endeavour and the effort which have been exerted to remedy the educationless state of England.

The League has started on the principle that education has become a political and industrial necessity—that we require some means to tame our masters, the newly enfranchised; and that we

must have an educated set of workmen to enable us to compete in the wealth-making markets of the world. It is not primarily in the interests of education, but of political safety, of Parliamentary partizanship, and of commercial progress and middle-class money-making that they have become such sudden converts to and enthusiastic supporters of State education. For years on years the advocates of education as a necessity of the human spirit, as the true training of a man's life, have been labouring to secure the spread of education. They have established Sunday schools, the British and Foreign School Society, the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, the Home and Colonial School Society, the National School Society, the Sunday School Union, and all the various developments of which these have been the sources; they have founded Normal Schools and invented systems of education, and they have enlisted on the side of education a large amount of active sympathy and pecuniary support. That they have not been able to cope with the whole extent of the evil, and so may be said partially to have failed in fulfilling their design, and supplying the whole wants of the nation, has not been their fault, but the fault of those who now accuse them of failure; for it is certain that, had the so-called patrons of education enlisted under the banners of the League, done their duty as the voluntaries in education have done, the whole land would have been by this time in possession of a complete machinery for educating the entire population. But there have always been people to whom the reproof might be addressed, "Ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne, and ye yourselves touch not the burdens with one of your fingers." It may safely be said that it was not Secularists, but Christians, who have built, maintained, and spread over England such schools as it has; and that the Christian efforts of those who have done such earnest work in the past have a right to recognition in the present, inasmuch as their labour has proved itself sincere, while the League has only been writing beautiful and perfect schemes on paper, and all the while withholding their own hands, and encouraging other people to withhold their hands, from the practical duty of the brave and the true.

The League tauntingly says to the Union, Bring forth your reasons, even your strong reasons, wherefore we should not dismiss from educative influence all that Voluntaryism and Christianity have done; and the Union may justly retaliate with the question, What have ye done that education should be handed over to you for management; you who have left undone anything you could in regard to education? But the claim of the educationists, who have so long striven to give training such as hath "the promise of this life and of that which is to come," has strong reasons for its being granted. £492,941, in addition to the performance of all the local duties connected with the management of schools, is a pretty good set of reasons, and forms tolerably good evidences of earnestness; and this sum, large as it is, does not wholly exhaust the amount

paid among voluntaries for education. A threepenny rating, it is estimated by Mr. Forster, would yield about a million and a quarter; so that, in truth, the maintainers of these schools have been voluntarily paying—though they do not form a hundredth part of the population—more than a third of what the League proposes to raise by rates; while they have elicited, in school pence, as much as half the sum proposed to be levied by rates. This is an actual gain, as it gives evidence of the value attached by the people themselves to the education received. From these two sources the party at present engaged in conducting education already realize as much as the League proposes to raise by its maximum rate.

M. S. A. B. asserts (p. 196) that Voluntaryism has failed at both ends in securing the education of the people; and yet he thinks that, though Voluntaryism is not good enough for the inculcation of reading, writing, history, geography, and arithmetic, it is quite good enough for the teaching of religion, the fourth R being quite inferior in importance to the traditional "three."

M. S. A. B. has advocated a principle that he does not carry half far enough. If school should be school, and church church, ought not shop to be shop, and field field; market market, and fair fair? Then how simply everything will go on! In church we shall each, as far as we have opportunity, "love our neighbours as ourselves;" but in the market we shall play the game of "beggar my neighbour;" in church we shall abstain from "rioting and drunkenness;" but in the fair we shall leave the church and its foolish superstitions behind us, and "eat, drink, and be merry;" in the church we shall mete out to each other with even balances; but in the shop we shall act so that to each article sold it may be said, "thou art weighed in the balances and found wanting;" in the church our rule shall be, "Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbour: execute judgment and peace in your gates;" but in the field we shall not hesitate "to remove our neighbour's landmark." This would come of carrying out the principles of M. S. A. B. to their full; and we fear that the secularization of thought, training, feeling, and impulse will very truly tend to produce such a state of things.

An attempt has been made by some of the advocates of the League scheme to carry away the minds of some of the more active and earnest of the religious bodies, *e.g.*, Wesleyans and Congregationalists, by the fallacious cry of "religious equality." The League, however, advocates no such thing; it advocates *irreligious* equality. The secularization of rate or State supported schools is, in reality, the State and rate endowment of infidelity: is the use of the influence and power, the prestige and the money of the special parish and the entire country for the advancement of infidelity. It cries out against religious uniformity, but it really means *irreligious* uniformity. It claims religious enfranchisement; whereas it in truth aims at the establishment of *irreligious* conformity. The education it claims is to be in, for, and of the world; it is to be

adapted to and to make man a thinking animal, not a thinking spirit. It is compulsory State infidelity which it seeks, while it merely and mildly calls it unsectarianism. It resembles a scheme for making honesty compulsory and theft impossible by the abolition of private property; it is not what it *seems*. Does it not indicate a defect in perspicuity that the more extreme Dissenters are allowing themselves to be led into opposition to the Education Bill—not through dislike of education, but through jealousy of the Established Church, thus allying themselves with the natural enemies of all religion in preference to giving their deliberate voice for the religious training of the young in the essentials of gospel truth?

It may be a triumph of sectarianism to expel all sects from the schoolroom; but is such a triumph cheaply or dearly purchased by the expunging of religion, not only from the schools, but from the hearts and lives of the pupils? Is educated heathenism so valuable in the eyes of the members of Christian denominations that they would prefer the universal endowment and State patronage of infidelity—under the name of unsectarianism—to the moderate, conscience-saving measure of religious teaching which the Government Bill proposes and supposes? We do think that the strange spectacle of the most earnest and conscientious believers in Christ and Christianity, and of the most thorough and unhesitating opponents of Jesus and His claims, forming a confraternity in opposition to the moderate and wise scheme of education brought forward by the Government and accepted by the Union, ought to make men pause before they adhere to the League, which has brought about such a state of matters. Shall we make our schools the propagators of infidelity and secularism; and, while we offer to respect the consciences of all, shall secularism, armed by the State, override our consciences and compel us to give, and to receive, and to pay for, the irreligious education of the young, and to compel them to grow up without any fear of God before their eyes? Hitherto religion has been incorporated with education; henceforth infidelity is to be made compulsory and religion voluntary, in order that irreligious equality may be established.

I do not think it is necessary to repeat the arguments employed by former writers. It is quite certain that, if the plan of the Union were adopted, there would not be in one parish out of a hundred any hesitation about the use of the Bible in school; nor any objection made to the appointment of a Christian schoolmaster or schoolmistress; and it might easily be arranged in the odd one here and there to give the use of the schoolroom at stated hours for the religious lessons of the sects which saw fit to assert the right of making the school the scene of sectarian squabbles. Local taxation and imperial taxation are both heavy enough. The League advises us to throw away a million of money and much work, as well as many buildings, and to begin anew by putting the supply of education on the rates and taxes; but the Union, wisely arguing that a

bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, recommends us to keep and use the money we have, and try to get more. The League, in fact, desires the public endowment of secularism, the public repudiation of Christianity, and the general advancement of worldliness. This would deform wisdom into craft, and intellect into a curse of selfishness. Hence we approve of the Union, and disapprove of the League.

W. L.

THE LEAGUE.—VI.

NATIONAL Education, as a subject of political debate, now occupies so prominent a place among the topics of public interest, and is so profoundly agitating the minds of men, that it is not unreasonable to imagine we are destined to witness, at no remote period, a verification of Mr. Bright's striking prediction that in less than three years after an extension of the suffrage a complete system of national education would be established. The nation is becoming divided into two great sections or parties, which division is the necessary result of the diversity of thought prevailing on the education question. That scheme which enlists on its side the clearest and the strongest current of public opinion and sympathy will eventually receive legislative sanction from the imperial Government. Practical and concrete legislation is necessarily preceded by public controversy, and as that legislation will be based, in the main, on the principles which receive support from the people, it is deeply important that our views on this question of education should be as sound and as practicable as possible. P. O. S. speaks disparagingly and contemptuously of popular agitation on great political questions, and affirms that "we generally legislate in haste to repent at leisure." Unquestionably, modern legislation is distinguished from the legislation of a more remote period by its closer and distincter sympathy with the opinion and feeling of the people. Can P. O. S. point to any express instance in which, by passing a political measure in consonance with the popular will as expressed by public agitation and discussion, we have "legislated in haste to repent at leisure"? The legislation of the last thirty years has indisputably been in the right direction. It has secured for us a wider expansion of popular liberty, and greater material prosperity as a nation. With regard to the two great questions to which P. O. S. alludes, the Reform and Irish Church questions, I deny that we legislated in haste to repent at leisure. On the contrary, is it not notorious that nearly every eminent living statesman has expressed his surprise that they should, by successive administrations, have been allowed to remain unsettled for so long a period? I deny that there is—as the argument of P. O. S. goes to show—any necessary connection between hasty and ill-considered legislation and popular agitation. The people can only be made to comprehend the nature of the questions before them by those questions being agitated and discussed; and I apprehend that both the League and the Union have contributed immensely

to the formation of just and enlightened opinion on the subject of education, by the diffusion of information and the exposition of opposite views and principles, in which their labours have mainly consisted.

According to one well able to treat of this subject, the two schemes of education presented to our view in this debate are of "essentially opposite principles." We conceive that this is chiefly true of the two rival systems in their treatment of the subject of religion. Both systems recognise the principle of receiving support from the Government for the purpose of securing educational provision where it is required; they both recognise the principle of "direct compulsion," though the League appears to advocate a more stringent and effective application of the compulsory principle than the Union; and they both affirm their object to be "to secure the education of every child in the country." We apprehend, therefore, that the fundamental principles and objects of the Union and the League are the same in respect to the question of secular instruction, and that they differ only when they approach the consideration of the religious element in the educational question. It is undeniable that the real and essential difficulty is the "religious difficulty." The extinction of this would be the extinction of the line of demarcation which indicates the antagonism of the two schemes. Mr. Vernon Harcourt, in a recent speech, propounded this question,—*"Can the State teach religion?"* The object of the question was, we suppose, to show that the incapability of the State to teach religion goes to prove that it should not attempt to teach it. In answer to such reasoning it may be urged that the State can teach religion in the same sense as any branch of the Christian Church can teach it. Religious truth is taught by means of teachers. This is the only method, so far as we can discern, of inculcating the truths of religion, and this method being within the reach of the State, we humbly conceive that the power of teaching religion is also within the reach of the State. The question, then, is not—*Can the State teach religion?* but—*Ought the State to teach religion?* If it be maintained that it is incumbent on the State to profess and propagate a religious creed, we think it but just and legitimate that those who object to the State religion should not be compelled to contribute to the teaching of a religion to which they are conscientiously opposed. Absolute justice demands that Episcopalians only, and not the adherents of other creeds, should be made to pay for the teaching of Episcopalianism. In any measure of education which provides that the established religion shall be taught in purely State-supported schools, we do not see how this injustice of compelling nonconformists to contribute to the teaching of a religion to which they do not adhere can be prevented. Under the scheme of the League, which releases the Government from the responsibility of directly imparting religious instruction, nonconformists would not be subjected to the injustice we have alluded to. By leaving the religious education of the

child to the minister of the denomination to which it may belong, no favouritism is shown to any particular sect, but all are placed on a perfectly equal footing. Dr. Magee, in his ingenious speech delivered a short time since, stated the objection of its being "a very unjust thing to ask a man to contribute to the teaching of another man's religion," but he did not satisfactorily answer it. He follows up the statement of the objection by asking, "Is it a good thing to ask a man to contribute to the teaching of another man's irreligion?" Who proposes to teach irreligion? Is it teaching irreligion to teach geography, history, or arithmetic? If not, then the implied charge of teaching irreligion against the advocates of unsectarian education is false and misleading. This indictment of teaching irreligion, which is preferred against the League, is as crude as it is untrue, and it would never have been advanced if men would but learn to appreciate the distinction between that which is *per se* irreligious, and that which is simply distinct and separate from religion.

There is one objection to the scheme of the League which has not, as yet, been conclusively answered. It is this,—that by delegating the religious education of children solely to the ministers of religion, the great mass of vagrant scholars, who, more than any other class, require to receive the elements of both religious and secular instruction, will be kept entirely destitute of religious education. It is not a sufficient answer to this to say that they will receive a knowledge of religion at the Sunday school, because it is extremely doubtful that they will ever attend Sunday school. They may possibly obtain religious instruction in the manner suggested by the League, viz., from the ministers of religion at the time and place appointed for the impartation of religious instruction. There is, however, a clear possibility that, from the supineness and indifference of the parents, the child might grow up without obtaining any but the crudest and most imperfect knowledge of religion. To this uncertainty we are not aware that the League has proposed any remedy. We do not entertain the opinion that this uncertainty is irremediable under the League system. We deem it possible to adopt some practical arrangement by which religious education might be secured to the children belonging to the lower strata of society, without compromising or impairing the leading features of the League scheme. For instance, it might be required that the parents should express—if necessary in a declarative form—their preference as to the religious sect in the tenets of which the child should be instructed. By this means, those qualified to give religious instruction in any particular creed could ascertain what children were dependent on them for their religious education. The various religious bodies would not be slow in perceiving that they could only maintain their position by attending to the religious education of the children committed to them, and they would therefore have a very powerful motive—their own religious well-being as a sect—for promoting the religious education of children.

P. O. S. writes as follows:—"The League, again, may be asserted to make a most egregious suppression of the truth when they say that they desire nonsectarian schools. . . . The sectarianism of the League is the sectarianism of infidelity and of worldliness." What the League means by nonsectarian schools is, schools in which no tenets or dogmas peculiar to any religious sect are taught, and as against schools in which such tenets or dogmas are taught; the schools which the League proposes to establish are clearly unsectarian. They are unsectarian in the sense that they do not profess to inculcate the dogmatic theology of any religious sect. We doubt not that P. O. S. will admit that a sectarian school, religiously speaking, is a school in which the tenets of one particular sect are taught. A school, therefore, to be allied with the sectarianism of infidelity and worldliness, should be a school in which the tenets and opinions of infidels and worldlings are definitely taught. In the schools which the League proposes to establish the opinions of infidels will not be taught, and it cannot therefore be asserted that the "sectarianism of the League is the sectarianism of infidelity and of worldliness." The League can no more be said to represent the sectarianism of infidelity than any Christian Church in the country can be said to represent it; and the allegation of P. O. S.—for it really is a mere allegation, and not an argument—is, as we think we have shown, utterly groundless.

"The League proclaims and establishes the principle that this world is the all in all to man. . . . So far as the State is concerned, it is to be deliberately decreed that secularism is the only object of heed in this life, and that duty of a higher type than that established by Act of Parliament shall not only be henceforth a voluntary concern, but all attempts to teach it shall be opposed and stamped out so far as the force, example, and power of bribery available to the State can go." Now we humbly submit that the advocates of the principles of the League do not believe or contend that "this world is the all in all to man;" neither do they maintain that the higher duties imposed by religion and morals "shall be opposed and stamped out so far as the force, example, and power of bribery available to the State can go." So far from the State setting itself in opposition to religion, it is provided, under the League scheme, that the schools supported by the State shall be at the service of the ministers of religion who wish to give religious instruction. The League maintains that the State shall not directly teach religion, but will afford every facility for teaching to those who wish to teach it. It is therefore manifestly unfair to represent this as an irreligious scheme, or as a scheme inimical to religion. The question is not, as our Union friends seem to think, whether there shall be religious teaching by the State, or no religious teaching at all, but whether such teaching shall be undertaken by the State, or left to the various Christian churches whose special and characteristic function it is to bestow that kind of instruction. There is this to be said for the League scheme, that it is complete

and unequivocal in its provisions, and its adoption would secure the education of every mind in the nation. The Union has laid down the general principles on which the education of the people should be based, but it has not propounded a plan for effectually supplying the educational wants of the age at all comparable for clearness and precision to that of the League. The establishment of the League system would rapidly dissipate the clouds of ignorance in which a great part of society has too long been enveloped; and, under its beneficent operation, it may be hoped that the cultivated intelligence of the nation would not be unprolific of

"The enduring produce of immortal mind."

SIMONA.

THE LEAGUE.—VII.

"Then Ambrose said, 'All those shall die,
The eternal death who believe not as I;'
And some were boiled, some burned in fire,
Some sawn in twain, that his heart's desire
For the good of men's souls might be satisfied,
By the drawing of all to the righteous side."—LOWELL.

THE real point at issue in this debate appears to me to be, "Shall education be secular or not?" Other matters there may be connected with the subject, but they are comparatively so trivial that to those who wish to strike vitally there can be no doubt but they must thrust with their best lance at this point. Much might be adduced to prove that the system hitherto in vogue has totally failed to accomplish that which its advocates professed at the outset to achieve. Little, however, would be the gain in such a procedure. In all cases, whatever the matter may be which is to be discussed, the best method to adopt is to seek principles, and having found them, to argue therefrom as to whether the result of certain actions would be beneficial or otherwise. Now, religion is of such vast importance that a man may well stand aghast at the thought of a religionless world. I say "religionless," for to many who have been carefully nurtured under the wing of a Christian pastor, the world must inevitably become so, unless some consecrated or "God-raised" apostle has the direction of the youthful generation.

Important subjects are generally difficult to comprehend, and in this case the study is pre-eminently so. Hence the attempt to instil into a child's mind such matters appears the greatest folly. It is, as it were, to introduce the lunar theory to a beginner in mathematics, or one of Shakspeare's plays to a child who has not mastered the elements of the language. To the method which has hitherto prevailed is due, in a great measure, the enormous amount of learned ignorance on religious matters. The mind has been loaded with indigestible materials—or rather, solid matter has been given to the child ere the digestive organs have been sufficiently developed, the result being that dyspepsia has becom-

chronic. One has but to turn over the leaves of a newspaper to be assured of the fact that the knowledge of religious truth is very vague indeed. To those who are behind the scenes, to parents who are accustomed to question their offspring on such matters as relate to Biblical studies, the glaring falsehood of the system must be apparent. That the method must be an injurious one, is palpable to those who reflect that, in many instances, children even when of very tender years, are compelled to learn by heart long creeds which men of great intelligence declare unintelligible, and mumble passages on abstruse topics, such as regeneration, salvation, original sin, &c. The subject also has, as many have, a ludicrous aspect as well as a serious one. Not many weeks back the writer had heard a long address on the Christian graces. He put the question to a youth, "Which are the Christian graces?" The reply was certainly as startling as quick:—Teddy, Gilbert, and Freddy. I may explain this as alluding to the three celebrated cricketers of the Grace family.

In the majority of schools as now conducted, the religious instruction is given by the master, or by his senior pupil-teachers. The former may be competent, the latter can scarcely be. In the case of the former, from the multitudinous studies connected with his craft, he can ill afford to devote sufficient time to Biblical research. So he either extemporises after the manner so common to local preachers, interpreting the words literally to the horror of every educated man, or he shirks the matter, allowing the pupils to blunder through the chapter, leaving them at the conclusion groping in Cimmerian darkness. In either case valuable time has been lost. The time is but short that many of our juvenile peasants have to spend in book learning, it is therefore essential that not one moment should be wasted, for wasted it is when employed in listening to teachers who are pretending to instil knowledge which cannot be understood, and dogmas which in after years will not let the soul rest till they are sent to their well-merited limbo.

But it is not the teaching of religious truth which the prime movers of the scheme for a religious education are striving to obtain. Such may be the ostensible desire; but drag away the mask, and clerical supremacy will be found hidden behind. When I hear a clergyman say, "My friends, our teaching must have a religious basis," methinks I hear the chains clanking as plainly as though he had said, "Ye must be my slaves." The priesthood see the sceptre of authority being wrested from their hands; they know that already the devotees have an inkling of the secret stairs by which they ascend to proclaim the mysterious words of the oracles, and they are anxious that the surmise shall not grow into knowledge. What an opportunity for good has been let slip, by these so-called teachers of religion! Had they fulfilled their proper duty to the young of their flock by inculcating virtue in its simple form, by teaching probity, that is, fair dealing in all matters with one another, by showing them what love is, by his own affectionate conduct to them, and

abstaining from all theological teaching; had they been faithful to their trust, earth would remember them with love and joy: and O, far better, God would not forget, for He who settles freedom's principles writes the death-warrant of all tyranny. O that they would learn that the soul owes allegiance to none but God, that they who would trammel the heavenward aspirations of man are doing no true service to their God!

What this country wants is, not that its children shall be taught a particular creed, but that fraud, and wrong, and baseness may be shivered; that there shall be seen the open, keen eye of truth, where the scowling cunning orb of falsehood was lately present, aye, even now is present. It wants the soul to be taught, to be educated, not metaphysically, but through the medium of its companion, the body; so that it may not require a so-called knowledge of God to appreciate the works of His hands, but that nature may lead us unto God. It wants, by putting knowledge within the grasp of its youth, to assist them in overcoming difficulties, and thus making life more cheerful and happy, to lessen the chances of sickness, and thus make the heart more in unison with its God, instead of feeling bitterness of soul and hatred for the God whom theologians make to appear aught but a loving one. But if religious teachers were anxious that those whom they instruct should receive the utmost good from their labours, why are they so blind as not to see that educated listeners would be more apt than those who are absolutely ignorant. Life has many enigmas, but this is surely one of the strangest, that they who account themselves so wise should prove so foolish.

The old system has proved unable to perform the work set it. In such a case why should we not say, "Cut it down, why cumbereth it the ground." The time is ripe, "rotten-ripe for change." True, some always dread the future, dread mankind's instinct, though they magnify its merits in animals of a lower scale. What though a parchment more or less be torn, will the heavens split asunder? and if in the present and future new paths be trodden out, will the celestial system experience a change as though influenced by a "thunder-fit"? One would suppose so, after listening to the outcries and many prophecies uttered by the stand-still party. "Warm-nestled in the down of prejudice," it is difficult to take wing on the winds of progress. But the truth is gaining ground that—

"All nations have their message from on high,
Each the messiah of some central thought,
For the fulfilment and delight of man.
One has to teach that labour is divine;
Another freedom; and another mind;
And all, that God is open-eyed and just,
The happy centre and calm heart of all."

A. J. G.

Philosophy.

CAN HIGH EDUCATION COUNTERACT THE EAGERNESS OF THE SENSES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WHEN I read the announcement of this debate as one belonging to the department of philosophy, I had no difficulty in my own mind in attaching a meaning to its terms, and I think the difficulty of understanding it, noted on the part of both openers of the discussion and by H. Scott, arises, not from the ambiguity of the term, but inattention to the fact that this is a metaphysical question in connection with intellectual and moral philosophy. Certain opinions have always been held by philosophers on the moral effects of education, and these have been by the adherents to a certain form of religious creed almost as strenuously and universally denied, and the question seems to me to suggest in strict philosophical language that old debatable topic, "Do morals and civilization proceed *pari passu* with education?" or,

Can wisdom's bless'd control
Banish all vice, all error from the soul?

It is a trite saying that education makes the man, that habit is second nature, and that if we wish to have good children we must train them well. Pope has said,

"Tis education forms the common mind:
Just as the twig is bent the tree's inclined;"

and a saying something similar has been attributed to the great Roman satirist, Juvenal; in speaking of the training, example, and correction of children, he observes that, whether they turn out good or bad,

"Twill all depend upon thy forming care:
Just as the shoot is pruned, the tree will bear."

Here, then, is a distinctly prevalent idea, common enough in the minds of many, that if men are educated, they will acquire a mastery over their passions and appetites, cease to love the gratifications of the senses, and learn to derive pleasure from the contemplation of

goodness and the practice of holiness, will even learn to consider abstinence a delight and continence a joy.

Here is a passage in which the topic is discussed in this point of view. It is taken from "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," by the *late* Professor Thomas Brown, one of the most profound thinkers who has occupied the chair of Morals in the University of Edinburgh:—

"In the lowest ranks of life, at least in the greatest part of civilized Europe, it means nothing more than the training of the hands to a certain species of motion, which forms one of the subdivisions of mechanical industry. In the higher ranks it implies, in like manner, a certain training of the limbs to a series of motions, which are, however, not motions of mere utility, like those of the artisan, but of grace; and in addition to those bodily movements, a training of the mind to a due command of certain graceful forms of expression, to which, in a few happier cases, is added the knowledge, more or less extensive and accurate, of the most striking truths of science. When all this is performed, education is thought to be complete; to express this completion by the strongest possible word, the individual is said to be accomplished; and if graceful motions of the limbs, and motions of the tongue in well-turned phrases of courteous elegance, and a knowledge of some of the brilliant expressions of poets and wits and orators of different countries, and of a certain number of the qualities of the masses of the atoms which surround him, were sufficient to render man what God intended him to be, the parent who had taken every necessary care for adorning his child with these bodily and mental graces might truly exult in the consciousness that he had done his part to the generation which was to succeed, by accomplishing at least one individual for the noble duties which he had to perform in it. But if the duties which man has to perform, whatever ornament they may receive from the corporeal and intellectual graces that may flow around them, employ the operation of principles of action of a very different kind; if it is in the heart that we are to seek the source of the feelings which are our noblest distinction,—with which we are what even God may almost approve, and without which we are worthy of the condemnation even of beings frail and guilty as ourselves; and if the heart require to be protected from vice with far more care than the understanding itself, fallible as it is, to be protected from error, can he indeed lay claim to the praise of having discharged the parental office of education, who has left the heart to its own passions, while he has contented himself with furnishing to those passions the means of being more extensively baneful to the world than, with less accomplished selfishness, they could have been? . . . In what they term education, they have never once thought that the virtues were to be included as objects; and they would truly feel something very like astonishment if they were told that the first and most essential part of the process of educating the moral being whom heaven had consigned to their charge was yet to be begun in the abandonment of their own vices and the purification of their own heart by better feelings than those which had corrupted it; without which primary self-amendment, the very authority that is implied in the noble office which they were to exercise might be a source not of good but of evil to him who was unfortunately born to be its subject." [In the *Lectures* there follows

here a passage from the Satires of Juvenal, in Latin, and of these we present the sense in Hodgson's Version, XIV., 50—60.]

"So Nature rules, and vices quicker come
When foul corruption first begins at home;
Our parents' crimes with reverent eyes we see,
And shelter sin behind authority.
Some nobler youths the base example scorn,
Some few beneath a glorious planet born,
Formed of a purer clay, and largely blest
With all the Godhead glowing in their breast.
But the vile mob, by guilty sins misled,
In the same path with grovelling manners tread."

(*Lecture 87, p. 586.*)

There is a large party in the State, too, who have doubts of the efficacy of education. They grudge to hear of the toiling millions being educated—or at least strive to keep their education down to a minimum, in case they, being over-educated, should be raised above their station, and be led to become too clever by half—more vicious, more vile, and more dangerous. Here is a fair opening for a debate without ambiguity, and one or two remarks may be allowed us on the topic as thus presented.

This view of the effects and the effectiveness of education shows that it is quite a debateable philosophical question, and one, too, of very great importance. The manner of stating the subject brings out very clearly the nature of the point in dispute to be, Does education civilize man?

I remark, in the first place, that education multiplies a man's enjoyments, and so emancipates him from total dependence on the senses for delight. Secondly, it opens up to his view, and brings within his reach, enjoyments of a higher, a nobler, and a more ennobling sort than the senses can yield, and so disinclines him to rest in and be contented with the gratifications of the senses. Thirdly, it supplies a loftier ideal of life, and makes that ideal more imperatively to be striven after than the pleasures of the senses. Fourthly, it encourages and increases self-control, and that preserves men from becoming slaves to their senses and the joys they afford. Fifthly, it brings before the mind the example of the great, the noble, and the good of former ages, and stirs the spirit with an ambition to become like them: it excites the mind to a comprehension of the great delights which the experience of the noble makes certain, and so overpowers the cravings of sense by the desire of fame.

"Fame is the spur which the clear spirit doth raise,
To scorn delights and live laborious days."

There can be no doubt, therefore, that education has a civilizing effect on man; and this opinion, which theory suggests as probable, history amply substantiates. It is the idler and the inane that become the stupid votaries of sense and sensualism, and not the man whose whole nature has been trained to work, think, plan, practise, and perform.

A. B. C.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

HIGH education is a very indefinite term. It may signify a great many different things to a great many different minds. Every man forms his own ideal of education. If education means a complete and thorough training and development of the peculiarities, powers, passions, and propensities of his nature,—bodily, mental, and moral, then the eagerness of the senses must be cultured along with the other properties of a man; and in so far the powers and capacities of the senses must be augmented and increased, and the delights they afford in their use must be more intense and gratifying. The eye of the painter is quickened by use and culture, and he finds a far higher degree of joy in the sight of beauty of form, colour, or scene, than any ordinary onlooker would do. The ear of the musician is refined and intensified by practice and culture, till he can detect and feel far more minute and exquisite harmonies and dissonances than the common rank and file of those who hear so many of the sweet melodies of the earth as though they heard them not. Even the sense of touch can be so trained that a perfect enchantment and entrancement of tactual delight may be experienced by those who have given themselves this sybaritic education. The sense of smell may be so heightened in its power that it can make far nicer distinctions than are usually made. I may refer to the statement made, I think, by Coleridge, that no fewer than seventy-nine scents, not all of them perfumes, are perceptible in the city of Cologne, so celebrated for its odorous *eau*. We know that men who take snuff, and men who habitually smoke tobacco, can become so critical and nice, that they can tell the various species of the weed from which the material is manufactured; and I have seen it stated somewhere that there were epicures in wine who could tell the vintage and the place of growth from the acuteness of their perception of the aroma peculiar to each special sort of grape, and each speciality of the year in which the vines were fermented. All these facts and statements go to prove that a high education does not counteract but cultivate the eagerness of the senses, does not blunt or stale their charm, but gives the added charm of connoisseurship to the ordinary and common sensations, which they are calculated to afford, and imparts the greed of habit to the greed of sense.

Anything that is educated gains greater skill, dexterity, habitual recurrency and attractiveness. The culture it gets imparts eagerness to the desire for exercising it. The eagerness of the dram-drinker's palate for a repetition of the stimulation for which it has cultured a desire is well known; the terrible commanding intensity which the smoker's favourite occupation exercises over him is thoroughly unmistakable as a proof of the statement made, that the eagerness of the senses is increased by culture, exercise, and habit. It is the same in all other forms of sensational or sensual delight. The playgoer is fascinated, the admirer of the ballet is

enchanted, and the sensualist is brought into a state of semi-despair or madness under the strong impetuosities of passion. These and a thousand other evidences crowd upon one when one endeavours to form any idea of the over-mastering power which the senses acquire over any one who has given himself up to the indulgence of the appetites and sensitive framework of the body; and we see in the waifs and strays of social life the sadly blighting effects of the power of sensualism over those who cannot apply self-denial to their sensuality. The foregoing argument refers to high culture bestowed upon the senses themselves, and has regard to the practices and habits acquired through the education of the senses; but it holds also where the education is applied to the whole nature; for it is the direct tendency of education to quicken and to make more excitable, more active and more claimant for exercise or gratification. You cannot easily restrain an astronomer from stargazing, a botanist from being interested in flowers and plants, a geologist from observing strata and formations, and making guesses at the causes of the phenomena he perceives; so neither can you keep senses that are educated to seek the joys of sensation from desiring that sort of enjoyment, and devising means for the gratification of those desires.

But I find that the openers of the debate on this topic have taken a different reading of the question from that which I have taken, and I suppose it will be expected that I should follow their lead, and discuss the question from the point of view laid down by them in their papers, as they have, I suppose, the right to posit the question so as to suit themselves. B. L. B. asserts that "the senses are but the servants of the thinker;" implying, I suppose, that they are the masters of the non-thinker. But is every educated man a thinker? or is every thinker an educated man? If educated man and thinker were convertible terms, perhaps there might be some truth in the phrase, which I confess sounds prettily and flatteringly. But while our friend refers to Newton, "whose soul was like a star, and dwelt apart" from sensationalism; he gives us no hint as to Bacon, whose fingers were "contaminated with base bribes;" of Coleridge the opium-eater and winebibber; of De Quincey, almost as guilty of culturing sensational delirium; of numberless instances of great thinkers, like Porson, Shelley, Godwin, &c., being very much devoted to the pleasures of the senses. I am not sure that a different principle comes in here altogether, and that the loftier the intelligence the more signal the descent from thought to sense. The law of contrast which gives heightening to opposites, as in Goldsmith and Burns; in Thorwaldsen and in Byron; in Galileo and in Erasmus, has a very strong hold in morals; and it not unfrequently happens in connection with these things that the greatest relapse into passion and sense occurs just after the highest flights and the grandest aspirations,—so Milton left his dreams of paradise to scold, and, if some tales be true, to chastise, his grown-up daughters.

Lord Jeffrey, the staid critic and the precisian of the press, the parliament and the bar; John Wilson, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh—author at once of "The Isle of Palms," and of the *Noctes Ambrosiana*, "Christopher in his Sporting Jacket," and the "Lights and Shadows of Scottish Life;" W. E. Aytoun, writer of the "Lays of the Cavaliers," and of "My First Spec in the Bigglewades;" and even Professor Ferrier, the Platonist of Scotland—if report belies them not—dearly loved "high jinks." It is currently reported that there is in connection (or rather as a small [P] satellite connected) with the British Association a Red Lion Club, where wine and mirth have their hour and power. Dr. Whewell and Dr. Daubeny were not only grave thinkers, but they were riotous squib-makers, and could extract conundrums out of mathematics, jests out of geology, and acrostics out of astronomy. The eagerness of the joy they took in these means of delight arose greatly from the fact that they were so opposite to the general occupations of their lives. Now we are inclined to think that the same law holds in sensation, and that long-continued studiousness is in all probability followed by a reaction in favour of gratifications to the senses and of self-indulgence.

I do not attempt to charge the eminent and excellent men named in the foregoing paragraph with vice or crime,—very far indeed from that. I look upon them as men of pure and stainless life; but I use the analogy of their love of the contrast of serious thought and social glee, to show that such a law reigns in the mind, and therefore is likely to operate in other directions, so that it is not quite certain that high education does counteract the eagerness of the senses.

Besides the analogy above noted, and the action of the law of contrast in the soul of man, we may remark that education often leads men to studies which increase their temptations, and educated men are often brought to entertain ideas which help to develop their sensual nature. There are books of highly-cultured minds in which the seductions of vice are glozed over and made attractive, and these are read and pondered and criticized by scholars—they being all the while full of moral poison destructive to the spirit. I do not think that if we could bring statistics to bear upon the question, we could prove that education counteracts the eagerness of the senses for enjoyment, and having in view the biographies of the learned and the records of their follies and their sins, we doubt much if we can do otherwise than give our voice in the negative of this serious and important question.

W. A.

Coiling Upward.

THOMAS COOPER: SHOEMAKER, CHARTIST, AND POET.

CHAP. II.

(Continued from page 224.)

THE Reform Bill had been passed in 1832, while Mr. Cooper was quietly pursuing the avocation of a schoolmaster at Gainsborough, and was employed besides in his manifold studies and in the composition of his early poems. In the strenuous agitation which preceded the passing of that measure, the so-called "lower classes" had taken an effective part, induced thereto by the hope and expectation that, as soon as the full measure of middle-class enfranchisement had been secured, with the aid of those whom they then helped to victory, the further extension of political power to themselves would quickly follow. In this they were disappointed, and loud complaints were soon raised, charging the "Reformers" with unfaithfulness and betrayal.

In the manufacturing districts, too, as already stated, widespread distress existed; and, by the excluded classes, much of this was traced to the action of one-sided laws, affecting them vitally, yet in the discussion and enacting of which they were by compulsion silent and unrepresented.

To the influence of these feelings was due the formation, in London, shortly after Victoria's accession, of a society called "The Working Men's Association." Its leading object was to secure to the people, as such, an influence in Parliament proportioned to their numbers. Membership was confined to men in the industrial ranks, by the rules of its constitution, though some of the then radical M.P.s attended its meetings and assisted in the preparation of its manifesto. A new bill was drawn up, embodying the six points deemed essential to perfect freedom and genuine representation: Manhood Suffrage, Annual Parliaments, Abolition of the Property Qualification, Vote by Ballot, Payment of Members, and Equal Electoral Districts. This scheme became known as "The People's Charter," and gave to the movement its common designation. The leading principle of the Association was thus officially and forcibly expressed:—"The man who evades his share of useful labour diminishes the public stock of wealth, and throws his own burden upon his neighbour." In the opinion of its founders—to destroy the supremacy of the propertied and capitalist

* Gammage's "History of Chartism," page 15.

classes, and to give to labour its proper power in government through a righteously-adjusted parliamentary system, so that class legislation might cease, and the good of *all* become the one purpose sought by the elected and collective wisdom of the country, was the only possible mode of removing the great social miseries which disgraced the boasted civilization of Great Britain.

Numbers of political clubs were at the same time formed elsewhere. The leaders of the metropolitan association, Messrs. William Lovett, Henry Hetherington, Henry Vincent, and others, also organized a kind of missionary plan, and called meetings and spoke and lectured with energy and success in various towns throughout the provinces.

The "Birmingham Political Union," under the leadership of Mr. Thomas Attwood, adopted the "charter" as the expression of its aims; the "Northern Political Union," of which Thomas Doubleday was the secretary, did the same; the Scottish radicals became active; and soon a mighty force of opinion and effort in its favour was aroused. Newspapers for its advocacy were established; notably the *Northern Star* at Leeds, by Fergus O'Connor, an Irish barrister of some fortune and fair position, who had become a power among the working men of the North, the *Northern Liberator* at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, the *Operative*, conducted by James Bronterre O'Brien, a man of great attainments and literary power, and the *Charter*.

Great meetings in favour of Reform upon the basis of the Charter were soon held: one attended by 200,000 operatives at Glasgow, another of 80,000 at Newcastle; others at Sunderland, Northampton, Birmingham, and elsewhere. A smaller but influential demonstration was held in Palace Yard, Westminster, on the 17th September, 1838, at which were present W. J. Fox, Ebenezer Elliott, the Corn Law Rhymer, Colonel Thompson, Feargus O'Connor, &c. Many of the speeches at these meetings were culpably exciting and unwise, though some were characterized by sobriety of judgment, force of moral earnestness, and much intellectual ability. Some of the agitators, and those often such as had no excuse in their own circumstances or experience of poverty and suffering, advocated the wildest measures of physical force. For some there was that excuse; such as, for instance, Richard Marsden, of Preston, described as naturally humane, generous, and filled with the spirit of benevolence, who yet had been driven to conclude that society could be regenerated only through Civil War. He had been thrown out of work, and his family was reduced even to starvation. With a suckling infant, his wife was compelled to go without even ordinary nourishment, until at length the babe could draw nothing from her breast but actual blood.* Many friends and prominent advocates of the cause, however, strongly deprecated a resort to anything beyond peaceful agitation and moral force.

* Gammage, p. 119.

A "National Petition" (which had been drawn up by Mr. Douglas, of Birmingham) to the House of Commons, in which five of the "six points" were embodied, was universally agreed upon, and a general subscription commenced to defray the expenses of the campaign. Delegates were chosen to represent each local society in a central "Convention" or representative body, which sat in London for some months during the parliamentary session, William Lovett being the secretary. Torchlight meetings began to be held, especially through the factory districts, and the harangues at these increased in violence, until at length a royal proclamation was issued, setting forth the illegality of such assemblages, and pointing out the penalties incurred by their promoters and attendants.

A Rev. J. R. Stephens, Wesleyan minister, one of the most energetic and extreme propounders of physical force doctrines, was arrested at Manchester for sedition; but, after examination, released on bail. He continued his addresses, however, as before; and some months later was tried at the assizes and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment. Henry Vincent was arrested at Newport, tried at the Monmouth assizes, and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. Many other influential advocates of the Chartist policy speedily met with a similar fate. Meanwhile an appeal had been made to the entire people to support and carry out the proposals of the Convention, the principal of which were—a universal abstinence from exciseable articles, by which the "supplies" of the ruling powers would be cut off, exclusive dealing with supporters of the Charter, general arming, withdrawal of money from the banks, and total cessation of labour for a month. Simultaneous meetings to consider the scheme were held in all the larger towns.

At Birmingham a meeting in the Bull Ring was attacked by a body of police, led by the magistrates, and a temporary riot ensued. A larger assembly then met upon Holloway Head, partially armed, but the crowded meeting was dissuaded from further action by the Chartist leaders. The Convention, which was then sitting in the town, passed some strong resolutions, condemnatory of the action of the magistrates; and these, signed by Mr. William Lovett as secretary, were speedily made public. For this step Lovett was arrested, together with many persons who had participated in the disturbances. Meetings were soon renewed, and then the whole town was placed under martial law. A number of people were again attacked by the police in order to effect their dispersion, but this time in vain; and a serious outbreak resulted, in which the shops of some obnoxious dealers, situated in various parts of the town, were gutted and set on fire. Many further arrests were made in consequence. Great excitement was occasioned throughout the country, and the Chartists warmly denounced the interference with the right of public meeting which led to the troubles at Birmingham, while in many places a rising was determined upon

in case of proceedings being taken against the body of representatives which had met as the "Convention."

The "National Petition" had been signed by 1,200,000 persons. It was presented in June, 1839, to the House of Commons by Mr. Thomas Attwood, and he was permitted to speak in its behalf. A month afterwards, Mr. Attwood formally moved that the House should go into Committee for its consideration. His motion was opposed by Lord John Russell and most of the Whig party, and it rejected by a majority of 237 against 48.

The Convention again assembled in London; and, as soon as the result of the motion on the petition was known, met specially to consider the propriety of proposing the "sacred month," or universal and simultaneous abstinence from labour. Great divisions had already existed among the delegates upon the physical force question, and they extended to this subject also. Some thought that its adoption would paralyse the Government; others more wisely contended that, unless the people were everywhere prepared for its adoption, which they denied was the case, it could not be properly carried out, and a partial strike would be to their own injury alone.

William Lovett's trial came on; he had been taken prisoner along with John Collins the printer, and they were sent to Warwick gaol for a libel on the police; and he, with many more, was sentenced to imprisonment. In Warwick gaol Collins and Lovett wrote their memorable work "Chartism: a Plan for the Education and Improvement of the People." New arrests were made for alleged sedition. O'Connor, Bronterre O'Brien, and many less prominent men, were apprehended, but released upon security being given. Meetings were again held; and, when these were prevented, the Chartists showed their numbers by marching to the churches upon Sunday,* first notifying their intention to the clergymen, and recommending them to preach upon selected texts, such as "The husbandman that laboureth shall be first partaker of the fruits." Rumours became rife that Henry Vincent and his fellow-prisoners were ill-treated, and a scheme was arranged for their release. The Newport Chartists, headed by Mr. John Frost, one of the borough magistrates, rose in a body and attacked the military, but were fired upon with fatal results. Mr. Frost was at once apprehended, along with Zephaniah Williams, William Jones, and many of their companions, and a special commission was appointed for their trial. He and several more were found guilty upon the capital charge of treason, with a recommendation to mercy, and were condemned to be hanged, drawn, and quartered, according to the usual form. The sentence was commuted, on petition, to transportation for life; but, not long ago, Mr. Frost received a free pardon, and returned to his former position in society.

* Washington Wilks's "History of the Half-century" 1800—1850, page 280. Gammage, page 166.

Affairs continued in the same state of agitation for a time, but O'Connor and O'Brien were sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment, and multitudes of their followers and helpers to shorter periods; and, in consequence of the loss of its leaders, the Chartist body became partially disorganized. Its representative press suffered greatly, at least seven or eight journals ceasing to exist. But it was soon reanimated and remodelled, under the title of "The National Charter Association;" and, as the terms of confinement of the leaders expired, or were cut short by their release, its strength was speedily regained. New efforts were proposed, and the lectures and meetings were resumed.

At this time it was that Mr. John Mason delivered the lecture at Leicester which led to Mr. Cooper's adhesion to the movement, as already described. Thenceforth Mr. Cooper's history is intimately connected with that of Chartism, as his enthusiasm and ability soon placed him in the front rank of its supporters. In his address to the jury at Stafford he gave some harrowing particulars of the privations which some of his own friends had endured, and forcibly asked, "Can you wonder that such beings become Chartists? or that a man of my nature became a Chartist while beholding such wretchedness?"

It must be borne in mind that the middle and upper classes and the legislature appeared to look with apathy upon this destitution; or, at least, seemed to take no sufficient steps to remove its causes, while they had rejected a proposal even to consider that means of relief which the sufferers themselves propounded and believed to contain the principle which would correct and remove all the errors and miseries of the body politic. Help, and liberty to help themselves, being thus alike refused, while distress became every day more intense—some pictures of its intensity in Leicester may be found in "Wise Saws and Modern Instances"—a despairing frenzy seemed to possess the multitudes, and they naturally began to look towards compulsory measures as the only course open to secure relief and the possession of their proper freedom.

Mr. Cooper at once began to write and lecture in advocacy of the Charter; and, leaving his employment upon the *Mercury*, was about to return to London, when his friends at Leicester begged of him to remain and to conduct their weekly paper, the *Midland Counties Illuminator*. "I consented to stay," he said afterwards;* "and, if I know my own heart at all, my consent sprang from the purest and most devoted self-sacrifice for the cause of the oppressed." A large number of the working classes united as "The Shaksperian Brigade of Leicester Chartists"—the room in which they met having previously been called "the Shaksperian room" (it was attached to an amphitheatre), and the name being a favourite one with so passionate an admirer of the early poetry of England as Mr. Cooper. At first in humour, he was

* "Address to the Jury at Stafford."

called the "general" of the "brigade;" but the appellation could not afterwards be shaken off. He opened a shop for the sale of coffee and of Chartist publications, worked hard to sustain the *Illuminator*, and began to deliver Sunday evening sermons, religious and political, in the large market-place, to audiences numbering many thousands.

As the general election of the summer of 1841 approached, hostile influence was used to stop the printing of the *Illuminator*, and no other press could be found to undertake its production. With much difficulty some old types were obtained; and a half-penny paper, with the diminished title of the *Chartist Rushlight*, was issued for a time. At the election, Mr. Cooper was proposed as the "universal suffrage" candidate, and obtained the show of hands at the nomination; but, of course, was not supported by the voters at the poll. A huge tin extinguisher, intended to convey the idea that he would soon be "put out," was exhibited by the Whig party before the hustings; and he thereupon, in defiance, changed the name of his little journal to the *Extinguisher*, under which it was conducted to the end of the year. He began to urge the enrolment of members in the "brigade," until there were 3,000 names upon its register, and for this end he divided Leicester into districts. His addresses in the market-place were continued so long as the weather permitted, and were afterwards delivered in the "Shaksperian room."

As the winter deepened, employment ceased in Leicester for thousands more, and the suffering became worse than ever. What Mr. Cooper could do for its relief with bread and money, and by supplies on trust, he did, until he became heavily indebted to his baker. He also started a Sunday school, in which Scripture history, Channing's "Self-Culture," and political tracts bearing upon the condition of society, were studied by many scores of members. Sometimes the "Shaksperians" assembled, and, headed by their "General," marched through the streets, singing their favourite hymns, but abstaining carefully from violence. A hymn-book had already been provided, of which 2,000 copies, the first edition, were soon sold. The second edition is now before us. It was edited by William Jones, in Mr. Cooper's absence at Stafford Gaol. It commences with the grand "Old Hundredth"—

"All people that on earth do dwell"

Two only of the hymns are Mr. Cooper's, of which one opens thus:—

"God of the earth, and sea, and sky,
To Thee Thy mournful children cry;
Didst Thou the blue that bends o'er all
Spread for a general funeral pall?"

Nearly all the others were written by J. H. Bramwich and Wm. Jones, both Leicester working men. A deep religious spirit runs through the book: a fervid appeal from the tyranny of men to the trusted and longed-for justice and love of God.

1870.

Its closing lines are—

“O Lord our God, arise,
Convert our enemies,
Who us enthrall:
That tyrants cannot bind
The freedom of the mind,
May all our captives find—
God bless them all.”

To the differences among the Chartists upon the subjects of physical force and the cessation of labour had been added dissensions concerning a proposal of combined action with the middle-class associations for the extension of the suffrage. So strong remained the impression of Whig perfidy to the people on the minds of many that they even helped the Tories to expel the Whig ministers from office. Mr. Cooper's adherents were of the O'Connor or hostile section, as distinguished from that headed by O'Brien, which favoured a union with the middle-class reformers, and supported a Convention for mutual aid, of which Mr. Joseph Sturge and Mr. Edward Miall were prominent members,—which ultimately took the form of The Complete Suffrage Movement in 1842. The latter party had some representatives in Leicester, forming a distinct society, who were looked upon as traitors to the Cause by the more numerous body, and were pursued with some animosity and more unfairness. Their meetings were anticipated, and crowded with Cooper's obedient followers, so that they were effectually converted into O'Connorite demonstrations. Mr. Henry Vincent was in this way prevented from lecturing, and O'Brien was once denied a hearing, while even Mr. Sturge received scanty courtesy from the “Shakspearians” and their “General.”

In justice to Mr. Cooper, it should be stated that he afterwards apologized for the manner of his opposition to the advocates of union. Thus, in the *Plain Speaker* of June 30, 1849, he wrote to the men of Leicester:—

“Experience and reflection produce healthy changes in a man, and I avow at once that the course I pursued while an inhabitant of your town I am incapable of now, and could not repeat it in many of its injudicious details.”

And in another letter: *—

“For this reason” (to prevent a schism in the Chartist ranks) “I opposed O'Brien, and I regret that my opposition was not enacted in the fairest spirit. I have since apologized to him, and have also publicly intimated to the Leicester people that I considered we did wrong towards him. . . . With regard to Mr. Sturge, I think it is pretty generally known that I long ago confessed my regret at being misled to say one word against him. I have lived to receive proof of his kindest personal friendship, and believe him to be one of the best of human beings.”

* *Gammage*, page 446.

The *Extinguisher* itself went out in a short time; and was, after an interval, succeeded by the *Commonwealthisman*, which lasted for a few months. Though their several careers were brief, these papers were useful in strengthening the movement and bringing cases of oppression to the light.

Meanwhile, the Chartist leaders had, notwithstanding their disputes, again promoted a monster "People's petition" to the Legislature. Its signatures are said to have numbered 3,300,000. A large procession accompanied it from the offices of the managing Committee to the House of Commons, on May 2nd, 1842; and it was formally presented to Parliament by Mr. T. S. Duncombe, Radical M.P. for Finsbury, who asked that its supporters should be heard before the bar of the House in favour of its prayer. On the following day his proposal was opposed by Mr. (afterwards Lord Macaulay,* in a speech characterized by much misrepresentation and exaggerated fear; and it was negatived by a majority of 207 against 49 in its favour.

Agitation was again renewed. Much opposition was shown by Chartists to the Anti-Corn-Law League, which they accused of labouring in the interests of the masters only. Distress extended, particularly in the factory districts of the north-west. Great excitement resulted, and strikes began; while many of those who struck, forcibly compelled others to follow their example. Violence was used, and met by violence, at Preston, Ashton, Stockport, Blackburn, and many other places. As the factories were usually stopped from working by the removal of plugs from the boilers of their engines, this phase of the prevalent disturbances became known as "the Plug Plot."†

An extensive, but so far peaceful strike, existed among the Midland colliers. Mr. Cooper was invited to address them, and he spoke to large assemblies at Wednesbury, Bilston, and Wolverhampton. At Wednesbury, 30,000 persons were present at one time, and all held up their hands in favour of a resolution pledging them to keep the peace. At Stafford he was closely watched, but by ironical speaking both secured his own purpose and baffled the authorities. In a letter to his faithful brigade at Leicester he thus described his proceedings: ‡—

"Great fears were entertained that I would be apprehended if I dared to stand up in the market-place that night. However, when seven o'clock had struck, there I was, mounted upon a famous long bench procured by the friends. The superintendent of police then took his station close at my right elbow. The Tory gentry and ladies threw up their windows to listen and hear the rebel Chartist commit himself, and to see him pounced upon and borne away by the dirty claws of the raw lobsters. But no! I showed how excellent it was to have a 'sweet little silver-voiced lady,' and to pay one million and a quarter yearly to support herself and her estab-

* Speeches: people's edition, page 122. † Gammage, page 234.

‡ *Ibid.*, page 248.

lishment. I demonstrated that loyal Chartists knew the land would be ruined if the civil lists were not kept up; and that working men would all weep their eyes sore if Adelaide were to be bereft of her £100,000 a year. I denounced any ragged shoemaker (Stafford, like Northampton, you know, my brave Shakspeareans, is a famous shoemaking town) if he dared to talk about his aged grandmother being in a bastille, and vegetating on skilly, while the Dowager had three palaces to live in."

Mr. Gammage adds,—

"The satire completely blunted the talons of the blue bottle. His hard face relaxed; his teeth separated; and at length he grinned outright, while the host of shopmates burst into laughter."

The cold spirit of mere literary criticism applied to utterances like this will fail in comprehension, and pronounce them to be mere expressions of demagogic malice. But that they were free from any taint of self-seeking, either of the coarse kind which strives for substantial reward, or of that subtler temper which courts popularity for its own sake, Mr. Cooper's whole course of life has shown. Stern necessity seemed to ordain the agitation; and the duty, once entered upon, impressed all agencies into its service. Sarcasm and humour found their place even in this struggle, but were made grim by the aspect of the terrible evils they strove to overthrow.

On the day after this address at Stafford, Mr. Cooper went to Hanley by request, and found that most of the Chartists there, were, like himself, teetotallers; and that, so far from being violently inclined, whenever the Newport riots or the Northern disturbances were mentioned, it was with expressions of disapproval. Next day was Sunday, and he spoke three times; at Fenton and Longton in the afternoon, and upon the Crown Bank, Hanley, at night. At the last-named place his text was, "*Thou shalt do no murder*," and he applied it, not only against the wars of the rich and powerful, but to all violence on the part of his audience themselves. On the following morning he was called for again, and he addressed the men on strike, both then and in the evening. Having some moneys to collect, and being kept waiting for a conveyance which after all failed to appear, he did not leave Hanley until after midnight; and then, fearing arrest if he continued longer in Staffordshire, the magistrates for which county were treating all Chartist meetings, however quiet, as illegal; and wishing to catch a morning coach for Manchester, in order to be present at a conference there, he started for Macclesfield on foot. At Burslem he was taken before a magistrate upon suspicion, and examined by that dignitary as he sat up in bed, but was permitted to depart. He walked to Crewe instead of Macclesfield, and completed his journey by train.

At Manchester he was apprehended as a member of the Conference, together with Feargus O'Connor and George Julian Harney.

Meanwhile news had arrived of an outbreak at Hanley. The colliers had been excited by Mr. Cooper's addresses; and, notwithstanding his exhortations against violence, had broken into rioting.

These at Longley attacked the residence of an obnoxious clergyman, reached the cellar, and drank there to intoxication. They then set fire to the house and to other dwellings. The whole district was soon in a ferment, and repressive measures had to be adopted. The Stafford authorities held Mr. Cooper responsible for the outbreak, and issued a warrant for his arrest. He was already in durance at Manchester, to the disappointment of the York Chartists, who expected him at a great meeting upon the race-course there.

The Stafford assizes were first held, and Mr. Cooper was placed upon trial on the charge of arson in October, 1842. It was in conducting his own defence before Sir Nicholas Tindal as judge, that he made his celebrated speech to the jury, from which several passages have been already quoted. It opened as follows:—

"My lord, and gentlemen of the jury,—I have never, except for a brief lapse of time, in my life, lost my confidence in Providence. And, perilous as my circumstances may now seem, I do not even now lose my confidence in the goodness of that Almighty and Fatherly Power which has superintended and controlled the events of my life.

"I am proud of my country: proud of the name of Englishman. It is not because the liberty I love has been left without restraints in the land that gave me birth,—it is not because the advocates of freedom have been left unpersecuted and unoppressed, that I hold it matter for just pride to say that I am an Englishman. But it is because my country has produced men who, while they suffered, and suffered deeply, knew how to suffer with dignity in the cause of human freedom, that I am proud of my nation."

He then quoted Raleigh, Latimer, and Algernon Sydney, and their characteristic sayings in the face of death; and declared that it was not for him, in circumstances of such peril, either to deny his Chartism or to defy and denounce his judges. He had been a democrat from boyhood, and—

"With such convictions—the growth of a whole life—what wonder was it that, twenty months ago—and it is but twenty months since I first heard a Chartist lecturer—what wonder was it, with these growing convictions, that I began to openly profess the principles of the People's Charter? That document, as far as my understanding enables me to judge, is neither more nor less than an embodiment of the principles contained in the theory of the British Constitution. It provides that Englishmen shall be *fully, fairly, and freely* represented in their own House of Commons; in other words, that they shall be *governed by their own consent*, and that *taxation shall be co-extensive with representation*. The document, then, is a constitutional document. So far from the People's Charter containing one syllable aiming at the abrogation of the monarchical power, or the hereditary privilege, it simply regulates and preserves the due weight of the Commonalty in the constitution."

Appealing to the judge's own opinion given in favour of the people's right to meet for political discussions, and claiming his share in such a right, he continued,—

"I do not claim a right to urge my opinions to the injury of my fellow-creatures: I never taught such a doctrine in my life: I have been ever opposed to violence: my whole life will show it; and, with your lordship's leave, I shall briefly detail the circumstances of that life, after I have made a few observations explanatory of my recent visit to the Potteries, and also a few remarks touching the evidence of the witnesses who have to-day appeared against me."

He then described the circumstances and events of his visit to Hanley and elsewhere, as they have already been recounted, and keenly criticised the testimony for the prosecution. He acknowledged his advocacy of cessation of labour, and admitted—"In reference to the People's Charter I have again and again said, 'Give me but one million of combined human wills, and the Charter shall, in one day, be law in England!' Thus undisguisedly have I spoken, gentlemen of the jury; but I have always deprecated force."

Mr. Cooper argued from the details of his previous life that he was "utterly unlikely, through habits and associations long and deeply formed, either to commit violence and outrage himself, or to urge on others to the same insane and guilty course." After the passage formerly cited referring to his early study of the works of Hooker, Cudworth, and other master minds, he asked, "But, gentlemen of the jury, could I gather any disposition to spread destruction and disorder from breathing the atmosphere of intellectuality in company with spirits such as these?" The same question recurs, with much rhetorical force, after each passage of his history.

In conclusion, he solemnly averred that he was not present at the riots, and that he had neither counselled, aided, nor abetted any acts of violence; and he said, "I cannot promise that I shall cease to be a Chartist if I receive your acquittal, for I cannot act contrary to my heartfelt convictions; but I will say that, if Providence delivers me from this danger, I shall take care never again to be found in circumstances where there is the least danger of violence being enacted."

The address was a manly, earnest one; fearless, but without bravado, and full of a chaste and noble eloquence. It excited much attention, and was shortly afterwards published by request.

The verdict was "Not Guilty," and Mr. Cooper was acquitted of the charge of arson, but remanded upon two other indictments. His escape was a narrow one. Others were condemned—some upon shamefully insufficient and un-trustworthy evidence—to transportation and imprisonment.

Upon the remand Mr. Cooper was set at liberty on bail, and returned to Leicester and political activity. Under the auspices of Mr. Joseph Sturge another conference was held to promote united action between the middle and the working classes. The "Complete Suffrage Association" drew up a "Bill of Rights," and this was accepted by the representatives of the former party; but the Charter was proposed by the others in opposition, and carried.

Mr. Sturge and most of his friends thereupon retired, and left the Conference to be continued as representative of the Chartists only.

Mr. Cooper then presented a plan for the organization of the entire Chartist body, very comprehensive in its scope, and likely to consolidate and strengthen the cause he had at heart. It was agreed that it should be submitted for popular approval, and that another convention should meet in London in the April following. By that time Mr. Cooper was in Stafford gaol, and the scheme was dropped in favour of one propounded by Feargus O'Connor.

In March, 1843, the Lancaster assizes were held; when Cooper, O'Connor, and more than fifty others, were charged with inciting to disaffection and hatred of the laws. Though most of the defendants were found guilty, they were released upon a legal point raised by their counsel, after entering into recognizances to appear when called upon for sentence, and no further step was taken in the matter.

But Thomas Cooper had yet the remaining charges at Stafford to answer, and was tried there in the same month. Finding that the unfair course was pursued by the prosecution of raising the old questions as to aiding and abetting the arson at Hanley, under cover of the new indictment for conspiracy, he resolved to give them as much trouble as he could possibly devise. His one case lasted ten days. Conducting his own defence, he cross-examined the witnesses at great length—sometimes for five hours uninterruptedly.* Unsympathetic and hostile county papers complained of his "insolent daring" in thus, by his persistency, confusing the whole business of the assize. Proof was again attempted of his presence at the riots and fire; but, by the admission of both judge and jury, it utterly broke down. He was found guilty, and called up in the Court of Queen's Bench, before Lord Denman, Sir John Pattison, and Sir John Williams, to receive sentence. Sir William Follett, who had had charge of both the Stafford prosecutions, "again used his decaying strength; and, the hour before judgment was passed upon us in the Bench, pointed to me with an austere look, and said, 'This man is the chief author of the violence that occurred, and I conjure your Lordships to pass a severe sentence upon the prisoner Cooper.'"[†]

Mr. Cooper inflicted another speech, of eight hours' duration, upon his judges, and was then condemned to two years' imprisonment, which he suffered in Stafford gaol. This, with the time already spent there upon the first charge and trial, made up a total incarceration of two years and eleven weeks.

* "Letter to Working Men of Leicester," March 12th, 1845: written from Stafford gaol.

† Preface to the "Purgatory of Suicides."

The Essayist.

THE POETRY OF JOHN KEBLE.

(Continued from page 292.)

ANOTHER characteristic of Keble is his exquisite tenderness and pathos, his intense sympathy with humanity in all its moods and phases of emotion,—

“Whatever stirs this mortal frame”—

the appropriation, in fine, and adoption, on *Christian* principles, of that time-honoured sentiment of heathen philanthropy—

“Homo sum, humani nihil à me alienum puto.” *

This is indeed a prevailing characteristic of his poetry; but, as a *special* instance, we would give the beautiful lyric entitled “Bereavement,” which goes yet further to illustrate the trait before noticed—that love of children which lay deep in the heart of the poet—all childless as he was. A simple, lowly incident—the death of a little child—can draw from the poet’s lyre music sweet, as in the following strain:—

“BEREAVEMENT.”

“I mark’d when vernal meads were bright,
And many a primrose smil’d,
I mark’d her, blithe as morning light,
A dimpled three years child.

“A basket on one tender arm
Contain’d her precious store
Of spring-flowers in their freshest charm,
Told proudly o’er and o’er.

“The other wound with earnest hold
About her blooming guide,
A maid who scarce twelve years had told:
So walk’d they side by side.

“One a bright bud, and one might seem
A sister flower half blown.
Full joyous on their loving dream
The sky of April shone.

* Terence.

"The summer months swept by: again
That loving pair I met.
On russet heath and bowery lane
The autumnal sun had set:

"And chill and damp that Sunday eve
Breath'd on the mourners' road,
That bright-eyed little one to leave
Safe in the saints' abode.

"Behind, the guardian sister came,
Her bright brow dim and pale;
O cheer thee, maiden! in His name,
Who still'd Jairus' wail!

"Thou mourn'st to miss the finger soft
That held by thine so fast,
The fond, appealing eye, full oft
Tow'rd thee for refuge cast.

"Sweet toils, sweet cares, for ever gone!
No more from stranger's face
Or startling sound, the timid one
Shall hide in thine embrace.

"Thy first glad earthly task is o'er,
And dreary seems thy way;
But what if nearer than before
She watch thee even to-day?

"What if henceforth by heaven's decree
She leave thee not alone,
But in her turn prove guide to thee
In ways to angels known?

"O yield thee to her whisperings sweet:
Away with thoughts of gloom!
In love the loving spirits greet,
Who wait to bless her tomb.

"In loving hope with her unseen
Walk as in hallow'd air.
When foes are strong and trials keen,
Think, 'What if she be there?'"

How beautifully is the bright vernal morn, with its smiling meads and primrose flowers, here contrasted with the sad autumnal eve, when Nature lies forlorn and desolate in her season of decay, picturing thereby childhood, with its tender graces, its fresh innocent charms, consigned to an early tomb,—fading, swiftly as spring passes away with all her flowers! Very beautiful also, in a

poetical point of view, is the idea of the infant spirit, as an angel-guide, hovering in her turn around the bereaved sister's path through life!

As a companion piece to the above, we may cite the poem entitled—

“ORPHANHOOD.

“Oft have I watch’d thy trances light,
And longed for once to be
A partner in thy dreams’ delight,
And smile in sleep with thee;
To sport again, one little hour,
With the pure gales that fan thy nursery bower,
And as of old undoubting upward spring,
Feeling the breath of heaven beneath my joyous wing.”*

“But rather now with thee, dear child,
Fain would I lie awake,
For with no feverish care and wild
May thy clear bosom ache;
Thy woes go deep, but deeper far
The soothing power of yonder kindly star:
Thy first soft slumber on thy mother’s breast
Was never half so sweet as now thy calm unrest.

“Thy heart is sad to think upon
Thy mother far away,
Wondering perchance, now she is gone,
Who best for thee may pray.
In many a waking dream of love
Thou seest her yet upon her knees above;
The vows she breathed beside thee yesternight
She breathes above thee now, winged with intenser might.

“Both vespers soft and matins clear
For thee she duly pays,
Now, as of old, and there, as here;
Nor yet alone she prays.
Thy vision (whose chides may blame
The instinctive reachings of the altar flame)
Shows thee above, in yon ethereal air,
A holier mother, rapt in more prevailing prayer.

“’Tis she to whom thy heart took flight
Of old in joyous hour,
When first a precious sister sprite
Came to thy nursery bower,

* How different in feeling, though echoing in expression, Byron’s lines!—

“A sharer in thy fierce and far delight,
A portion of the tempest and of thee.”

And thou with earnest tone did say,
 'Mother, let Mary be her name, I pray,
 For dearly do I love to think upon
 That gracious Mother-maid, nursing her Holy One.'

"Then in delight, as now in woe,
 Thou to that home didst turn,
 Where God, an Infant, dwelt below:
 The thoughts that ache and burn
 Nightly within thy bosom, find
 A home in Nazareth to their own sweet mind.
 More than all music are the soothings dear
 Which meet thee at that door, and whisper, 'Christ is here.'"

What, of the kind, can for charm surpass this poem? It is so ineffably touching in its tender grace,* in its pathetic loveliness—a very gem. How simple, yet how exquisitely musical, each line as it were vibrating to an inner harmony! Who, when the morning of life is past, and as years advance, has not breathed, or been tempted to breathe, the aspiration contained in the opening stanza?

Akin to the foregoing characteristic is the sanctity with which he invests common things, the every day incidents and concerns of life. Sacred and holy in his eyes are man's common duties, sacred as the means divinely appointed for the training and discipline of the spiritual life. Chargeable as he is with holding, or being inclined to hold, some of the peculiar tenets of the Church of Rome, yet he seems to have had but little sympathy with her *asceticism*, that which, to minds of a certain cast, forms, it may be, one of the strongest attractions towards her communion, even as less spiritual tempers are attracted by her showy and pompous ceremonial. Not so was it with Keble, the subtler charm lured not him, impervious to the grosser:—

"We need not bid for cloister'd cell,
 Our neighbour and our work farewell,
 Nor strive to wind ourselves too high
 For sinful man beneath the sky:

"The trivial round, the common task,
 Would furnish all we ought to ask;
 Room to deny ourselves; a road,
 To bring us, daily, nearer God."

We may compare with this George Herbert's simple poem, "The Elixir," embodying the same truth,—

* We view it simply in a *poetical*, not a religious aspect.

"Teach me, my God and King,
In all things Thee to see,
And what I do in anything,
To do it as for Thee.

"All may of Thee partake,
Nothing can be so mean
Which, with his tincture, 'For Thy sake,'
Will not grow bright and clean.

"A servant, with this clause,
Makes drudgerie divine;
Who sweeps a room, as for Thy laws,
Makes that and th' action fine.

"This is the famous stone,
That turneth all to gold;
For that which God doth touch and own,
Cannot for less be told."

The absence of the *ascetic* tendency referred to may, in Keble's case, have been primarily owing to those deep home affections by which he was habitually swayed and animated—affections seemingly incompatible with such a tendency. "With him, loyalty to home was hardly less sacred than loyalty to the faith. These two influences were so intertwined in the inner fibres of his nature that it would have been to him very death to separate them." . . .

Yet, notwithstanding these home affections, thus deep and inherent, he could feel and realise in all its intensity the truth of the essential loneliness of man—yea, even in the very bosom of the domestic scene,—a truth of almost awful solemnity. This idea is expressed so beautifully that no apology is needed for quoting the lines, familiar though they may be—

"Why should we faint and fear to live alone,
Since all alone, so heaven has will'd, we die,*
Nor even the tenderest heart, and next our own,
Knows half the reasons why we smile and sigh?

"Each in his hidden sphere of joy or woe
Our hermit spirits dwell, and range apart,
Our eyes see all around in gloom or glew
Hues of their own, fresh borrow'd from the heart.

"And well it is for us our God should feel
Alone our secret throbbings, so our prayer
May readier spring to heaven, nor spend its zeal
On cloud-born idols of this lower air.

* "Je mourrai seul." Pascal.

"Her to one heart in perfect sympathy
 Beat with another, answering love for love,
 Weak mortals, all entranced, on earth would lie,
 Nor listen for those purer strains above.

"Or what if heaven for once its searching light
 Sent to some partial eye, disclosing all
 The rude bad thoughts that in our bosom's night
 Wander at large, nor heed love's gentle thrall?

"Who would not shun the dreary uncouth place?
 As if, fond leaning where her infant slept,
 A mother's arm a serpent should embrace:
 So might we friendless live, and die unwept."

With this compare Aubrey de Vere's beautiful and philosophical lines on

"REALITY.

"Love thy God, and love Him only,
 And thy breast will ne'er be lonely:
 In that one great Spirit meet
 All things mighty, grave, and sweet:
 Vainly strives the soul to mingle
 With a being of our kind;
 Vainly hearts with hearts are twined,
 For the deepest still is single:
 As impalpable resistance
 Holds like natures still at distance:
 Mortal! love that Holy One,
 Or dwell thou for aye alone."

As a prose rendering of the same sentiment, we subjoin the following passage from the pen of an eminent writer and preacher:—

"Once more the Redeemer's soul was alone in dying. The hour had come; they were all gone, and He was, as He predicted, left alone. All that is human drops from us in that hour. Human faces flit and fade, and the sounds of the world become confused. *I shall die alone*—yes, and alone you live. The philosopher tells us that no atom in creation touches another atom—they only approach within a certain distance; then the attraction ceases, and an invisible something repels—they only *seem* to touch. No soul touches another soul except at one or two points, and those chiefly external,—a fearful and a lonely thought; but one of the truest of life. Death only realizes that which has been fact all along. In the central deeps of our being we are alone."*

In contra-distinction to poetry of the religious class generally, that class to which it pre-eminently belongs, Keble's poetry—"The

* Sermons by the late Rev. F. W. Robertson.—"The Loneliness of Christ."

Christian Year " taken as a type—is marked by three special and peculiar characteristics in addition to those already noted—characteristics imprinted, as it were, on its very *essence*. "It is the many words, simple yet deep, devoutly Christian yet intensely human... scattered throughout its pages, that have endeared 'The Christian Year' to countless hearts within the English Church, and to many a heart beyond it. The new elements in the book are perhaps these—First, it translates religious sentiment out of the ancient and exclusively Hebrew dialect into the language of modern feeling. Hitherto English devotional poets, with the exception perhaps of Cowper, in some passages, had adhered rigorously to the scriptural imagery and phraseology. This, besides immensely limiting their range, made their words often fall wide of modern experience. Keble took the thoughts and sentiments of which men of the present day are conscious, expressed them in fitting modern words, and transfused into them the Christian spirit. Secondly, there is visible in him—first, perhaps, of his contemporaries—that which seems the best characteristic of modern religion,—combined with devout reverence for the person of our Lord, a closer, more personal love to Him as a living friend. There were, no doubt, rare exceptions here and there, but, generally speaking, religious men before spoke of our Lord in a more distant way, as one holding the central place rather in a dogmatic system than in the devout affections. The best men of our own time have gone beyond this. The Lord of the Gospels, in His divine humanity, has come closer to their hearts, and made Himself known in a more intimate and endearing way. In none, perhaps, was this change of feeling earlier seen, or more strongly marked, than in Keble. Thirdly, there is the close and abundant knowledge of Scripture, with a fine and delicate feeling for the beauty of its language. Without confining himself to the imagery or language of the Bible, he everywhere shows his intimacy with it, and interweaves its words very naturally and gracefully with his own." Many examples illustrative of each of these characteristics, or of all combined, will readily occur to every reader of "The Christian Year." Of the *second*, that surpassing one, a striking exemplification is to be found in the well-known "Evening Hymn," and the fervour of devout affection which inspires its utterances—such rapture-breathing strains as:—

"Sun of my soul! Thou Saviour dear,
It is not night if Thou be near;
Oh! may no earth-born cloud arise
To hide Thee from Thy servant's eyes."

Or again, the prayer which follows, so touching and full of pathos:—

"Abide with me from morn to eve,
For without Thee I cannot live:

Abide with me when night is nigh,
For without Thee I dare not die.*

As a beautiful instance of the manner in which the poet brings his varied lore all in unison to bear upon and illustrate that religion which formed ever the one grand central theme of his inspiration, we would cite in this connection the two opening stanzas of another hymn or poem, where the classical and the scriptural elements interblend in exquisite harmony:—

“Father to me thou art, and mother dear,
And brother too, kind husband of my heart.’—
So speaks Andromache in boding fear,
Ere from her last embrace her hero part;—
So, evermore, by faith’s undying glow,
We own the Crucified in weal or woe.

“Strange to our ears the church bells of our home,
The fragrance of our old paternal fields
May be forgotten; and the time may come
When the babe’s kiss no sense of pleasure yields
Even to the doting mother: but Thine own
Thou never canst forget, nor leave alone.”

How inexpressible the charm that breathes, like sweet sad music, in the holy tenderness and grace of these lines!

Such are some of the characteristics of Keble’s poetry as must strike and fascinate every reader of taste, feeling, and piety, to whatever school of religious opinion he may belong; nay, there is much here that even the mere lover of *poetry* must perforce admire. The peculiar notes which distinctively mark his poetry as the exposition of a certain *class* of religious tenets, the badge of a sect or party—those notes, viewed with special reference to that memorable movement in which he played so prominent a part, would afford abundant matter for further consideration.

This question, however, the *ecclesiastical* one, of grave interest though it be, it is not our intention here to enter into, as we love not the thorny paths of controversy, to which the consideration of such a question would inevitably lead. Not thus would we take leave of our poet and his strains—strains whose “loved cadence” echoing haunts the “enchanted ear:”—

“Even as the close of some grave melody,
Hovering and lingering in the moon’s still ray.”†

* Cf. Faber’s “Hymns.”—“The Length of Death:”—

“Ah! death is very, very wide,
A land terrible and dry:
If Thou, sweet Saviour, hadst not died,
Who would have dared to die?”

† “*Lyra Innocentium*.”

Not thus, truly, would we part. Fain rather would we think of him with ever grateful remembrance as the sweet singer, "the author of 'The Christian Year,' the 'one thing' which he did; which, with all its faults, he did so well; which has been so long accepted with gratitude for its true poetic genius, and its true religious sentiment; which has brought music into many hearts, light into many minds, and guidance into many lives; and which has set the name of John Keble on a high and sacred eminence among the names which the people of the land and the Church he loved so truly will not willingly let die."*

We shall cite, in conclusion, from the "Lyra Apostolica," a poem of rare beauty and pathos, written by Keble on occasion, we believe, of the death of his early friend, Hurrell Froude;† a poem which might with equal if not greater propriety be conceived to have been the heart-breathed utterance of some sorrowing friend on occasion of the poet's own death:—

"I thought to meet no more, so dreary seemed
Death's interposing veil, and thou so pure,
Thy place in paradise
Beyond where I could soar;

"Friend of this worthless heart! but happier thoughts
Spring like unbidden violets from the sod,
Where patiently thou tak'st
Thy sweet and sure repose.

"The shadows fall more soothing: the soft air
Is full of cheering whispers like thine own;
While memory, by thy grave,
Lives o'er thy funeral day;

"The deep knell dying down, the mourners pause,
Waiting their Saviour's welcome at the gate.
Sure with the words of Heaven
Thy spirit met us there,

"And sought with us along the accustomed way
The hallowed porch, and entering in beheld
The pagent of sad-joy,
So dear to faith and hope.

"O! hadst thou brought a strain from paradise
To cheer us, happy soul, thou hadst not touched

* *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* (October, 1867), Art. IV.—"John Keble."

† "The exquisitely beautiful lines in the 'Lyra Apostolica' (No. 4) on the 'Burial of the Dead,' worthy to be placed beside the noblest portions of the 'Christian Year,' were written on the death of his beloved sister Mary Anne."—*The Contemporary Review*, June, 1869.—"The Life of Keble."

The sacred springs of grief
More tenderly and true,

"Than those deep-warbled anthems, high and low,
Low as the grave, high as th' eternal throne,
Guiding through light and gloom
Our mourning fancies wild,

"Till gently, like soft golden clouds at eve
Around the western twilight, all subside
Into a placid faith,
That even with beaming eye

"Counts thy sad honours—coffin, bier, and pall;
So many relics of a frail love lost,
So many tokens dear
Of endless love begun.

"Listen! it is no dream: th' apostle's trump
Gives earnest of th' Archangel's;—calmly now
Our hearts yet beating high
To that victorious lay;

"Most like a warrior's to the martial dirge
Of a true comrade, in the grave we trust
Our treasure for a while:
And if a tear steal down,

"If human anguish o'er the shaded brow
Pass shuddering, when the handful of pure earth
Touches the coffin lid;
If at our brother's name

"Once and again the thought, 'for ever gone,'
Come o'er us like a cloud; yet, gentle spright,
Thou turnest not away,
Thou knowest us calm at heart.

"One look, and we have seen our last of thee,
Till we too sleep, and our long sleep be o'er;
O cleanse us, ere we view
That countenance pure again,

"Thou who canst change the heart and raise the dead,
As Thou art by to soothe our parting hour,
Be ready when we meet
With Thy dear pardoning words."

B. C. H.

The Reviewer.

Iphigene. By ALEXANDER LANDER. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

WHAT a might of vitality is there in old Homeric and Bible stories! To each of these sources the plot of this poem is fairly traceable. The brief, graphic, simple narrative of Jephthah's daughter has won by its beauty not a little notice, and the fable of "Iphigenia" is one of the most famous in the Trojan cycle. The legend itself is post-Homeric in its most tragic incidents—those which the genius of Euripides has invested with such impressive gloom and such intense dramatic interest. Nearly two centuries ago Racine gave the story a lasting place in the classic drama of France, and nearly eighty years have elapsed since Goethe embellished it with his poetic art and skilful power. Nor has the subject failed to attract the splendid pen of Tennyson. To be greatly daring is itself a poetic qualification, and in this at least we may acknowledge that Alexander Lander has not hesitated to bend the bow of Apollo, and deserves the credit due to a lofty aim and a strong effort—as any one will admit who knows what has been done in the shape of achievement already, and culls the simple yet striking incidents of the original story. Who does not remember that Agamemnon, to propitiate the favour of the gods, vowed to offer up the most beautiful of all that should be born in his kingdom, and that, though horror-struck to find that the lot fell on his own daughter Iphigenia, yet he was forced by the priests to "perform his vow?"

The story of Jephthah is the older, and surrounded as it is by early association with Hebrew memories, presents yet more of pathos than the tale of classic lore. Mr. Lander has chosen the Bible version as more congenial to modern thought, and, from the few bare incidents there recorded, has wrought out a sweet little poem, in which glowing descriptions of Eastern scenery and vivid portraiture of tribal life in the early days of the Hebrew theocracy abound. It should be noted that the author has no misgivings as to the truth of the pictures presented in the book of Judges. Jephthah and his daughter are real, living personages to him. The dwelling of the son of Gilead, the exile of Mizpeh, is thus described:—

"The hoary walls of Job outvie,
The clouds that fleck the azure sky;
Grim fastness of the chief whose name
Thrills Ammon's warriors with shame.
Fit eyrie for a man of prey!
Great porphyry boulders guard the way,

Vast rocks, as if in combat hurled
By giants of the early world.
Here and there an opening glen,
Rings with the laugh of armed men;
Retainers met in boisterous sport,
Apt courtiers of so grim a court.

As storm-clouds rush to Lebanon,
His battlemented cliffs the tower
To which the scattered tempests run,
Assembled there regained their power;
So there the routed wreck of war
Must round Jephthah from afar
Retrieve their strength as they obey
His lofty will and mighty way."

To him in his mountain home in utter helplessness, but burning for vengeance, hie those who were once his persecutors, to entreat his aid against the common foe. There is a rugged grandeur about the scene which stamps the writer a man of vivid conception, and makes the incidents related stand out in bold relief. Like some of Flaxman's models, it were to be wished, often, that more pains had been taken with the finish; but it is thus surrounded and besought by seer and priest, that he at length consents to be their leader against the conquering Ammonites.

"How grand to see a mighty soul
Awake to kindle and control;
Thrilling with energy of fire
A weary nation's dead desire;
When the great King of kings draws nigh,
Armies of angels passing by,
And takes a human instrument,
To wield and work his own intent."

In the next canto the scene changes, and Iphigene, the heroine of the story, is introduced. There is much of quiet beauty in the following lines:—

"The evening's golden splendour shone
A halo o'er the maiden's face;
The light impatient to be gone,
Yet lingering wrapt in last embrace
A form of such transcendent grace."

"A youth reclining at her side,
Gazed on her lucent loveliness,
With face averted sought to hide
The passion he could ill repress."

Thus she addresses him:—

"Lo, Reuel! like a golden sky,
The light is ebbing rapidly;

Its noiseless ripple silvering o'er
 Night's dark and fast appearing shore ;
 Lo! Hesperus lights his kindling ray,
 Now gleaming in the rosy grey ;
 How oft we lingered to behold
 His radiant gleam from skies of gold.
 Oh ! Renew, shall we e'er forget
 Those happy days for ever set ?
 Nay, Iphigene their memory lingers,
 Like the scent o'er withered flowers ;
 They rise like music when thy fingers
 Wake the silent psaltery's powers.
 How swift our happy childhood fled,
 Like almond blossoms early shed ;
 Life's lovely morning hastes away,
 Expanding to the earnest day."

The next canto shows the insurgent forces mustering. The following is to our mind a beautiful sketch of early morning:—

"Along the dawn's entrenchments grey,
 The vanguard legions of the day
 Assault with piercing bolts of light,
 Where wavering darkness breaks in flight.
 The morning clouds like pennons flee,
 In gold and crimson blazonry ;
 As from the Orient leaps the sun,
 And Day's stern purpose is begun."

"Prolong the hours, thou radiant king !
 The memories of the past we bring ;
 Stay us on Gibeon's crest to-day,
 While Gilead sweeps upon his prey ;
 Oh ! mellow moon, thy cheering rays
 Shine with the light of ancient days,
 When Israel in strength arose,
 Omnipotent above his foes.
 Again the trumpet sounds afar
 Its silver summons to the war ;
 The tented hosts are side by side,
 Each by the banner of his tribe ;
 The ancestral ensign and the spear
 Before the chieftain's tents appear."

There is true poetry and spirit-stirring verse throughout this canto. The address of the leader and the battle scene are given with great vigour. But the crisis approaches, defeat threatens. Then comes the fearful vow, the rally, the last charge, the triumph, the return and the meeting of father and daughter in the gate of the city, the horror of each as the vow is disclosed, and the utter despair of the youthful lover thus reveals itself:—

"Forget thee, maiden! when the sun
Is shrouded in oblivion.
Thou art life's morning star to me,
Bright in the dawn of memory;
Our lives have grown as fig and vine,
That in yon orchard arbours twine;
The interwoven chords of life,
Oling on defiant of the knife:
All dead or withered or in flame,
The rigid tendrils clasp the same.
From childhood so our lives entwine,
And love of thee gave strength to mine."

At length Iphigene rises into the martyr-heroine, consenting to be the sacrifice for God and country.

How strangely this idea of human sacrifice mingles with all sacred and classic literature. How wide-spread the thought of vicarious offering. Everywhere it presents itself as in the highest degree meritorious. From the delta of the Nile to the shores of Hindostan, from the plains of Troy to the distant islands of the sea, in the pages of history, and in the poetry of the bards, among all people, and in all lands, this theme of "*man suffering, dying for man*," is the culminating point of all mystical and religious teaching. It was thought no strange thing by the father of the faithful that God should command him to offer his only son Isaac for a burnt-offering; and now, though long centuries have passed away, here in this mountain fastness of Mispeh, we see this outlaw and chief avenger willing to repeat this typical form of propitiatory sacrifice (like the Agamemnon of Euripides) upon the person of his own beloved child. But here, as in the classic story, the catastrophe is moulded to modern thought by turning the more tragical *dénouement* into something akin to the vow of perpetual virginity, and so shrouding her fate in perpetual darkness and seclusion. The poet accepts the situation, and after describing with great pathos the maiden's preparatory sojourn in the solitudes of Lebanon in lines of mournful melody, thus speaks of her return:—

"They come! the maiden and her train,
Her father at her bridal rein,
Clad in sackcloth. On his head
Dust and ashes, lo! are spread;
He walks with bare and bleeding feet,
Leaving the blood-prints on the street.
How sickly pale, and lined with woe,
That cheek which blanched not at the foe."

"In garments white and pure arrayed,
Crowned with flowers as for the altar,
She looked around on the sobbing crowd."

"Sorrow had left its refining grace
O'er each lineament of her face;
The spirit looking from her eyes
Seemed some bright seraph in disguise;
And expectation fondly clung,
Waiting heaven's accent from her tongue."

We have only space for the following :—

"Midnight shrouds the sleeping city,
Closed in, sleep the eyes of pity;
As from his palace-gate proceeding,
Appears the mournful ruler leading
The ass, whereon tradition saith,
His daughter rode to meet her death.
Through the streets so still and dismal,
Through the darkness so abysmal;
Where the wakeful curs are prowling,
O'er some filthy offal growling;
Where the drowsy watchmen waking,
The night dews from their garments shaking
At once in wonder and dismay,
The chieftain's silent sign obey,
Down the rugged roadway wending,
Into the valley's gloom descending;
So that father broken-hearted
With his lovely child departed.
The crescent moon obscured her light,
The cock crew from the distant height,
A bitter rose with frightened scream,
Down by Jabbok's distant stream."

"The weird young moon was on the wane,
When Jephthah came to his home again;
Returning at midnight, and alone,
Whence he came remains unknown;
He staggered silent through the gate,
Haggard, weary, and desolate.
None ever inquired the maiden's doom,
Some say she is not in the tomb,
But serves in Shiloh's courts divine,
Delivered by Jehovah's sign."

We must draw these lengthened quotations to a close, strongly commending the volume to all lovers of true poetry.

A word to the young author. Our commendations must be understood as an incentive to greater care and condensation of style in his next production. There are many things for him to avoid, some few to learn. Poetry is not only a divine gift, but an art of the highest order; to be perfect, severe study must be added to great skill. If Mr. Lander plies these, he will be of no mean mark among the hierarchs of song.

Greek Days and Roman Nights.

NO. I.—PLATO'S "PHÆDO."

IV. *The "Character" of Socrates in the Phædo.*

THE Socrates of Plato is idealized as well as dramatized. The faithful, affectionate, and historic Xenophon has indeed shown, by many proofs and illustrative facts, that mere human reason has but rarely, if ever, risen to a nobler elevation of ethereal thought and practical morality, of purer speculation and clearer dialectic system than that of Socrates, as a thinker and actor in the development of ancient and uninspired philosophy. That soldierly and practical, yet profoundly thoughtful historian and memoir-writer, does not conceal the oddness of the personal appearance of Socrates, his peculiarities of manner, mien, and speech, his dialectic acuity and earnestness, even when most securely and serenely drawing on his antagonist to impalement on dilemmas or refutative arguments. Even the comedian Aristophanes, in his *Clouds*, could not altogether hide the moral beauty and intellectual worth of the thinking spirit which had been so singularly encased in a frame fitted for a Silenus rather than a Sophist. These two authors give us glimpses of a real Socrates—talkative, thoughtful, tricky in argument, ironical in conversation, jesting in manner, coarse-featured and heavy-bodied; but Xenophon seems to be writing as an apologist for Socrates against Aristophanes, and admitting or concealing much that was strange and *outré* in his hero's aspect and mode of life, while explaining somewhat fully his opinions and practices, as against an endeavour to refine away and elevate into the region of fancy the philosophical speculations and the personal characteristics of the living Socrates. Xenophon's polemic appears to be double, against his enemies with Aristophanes as one extreme, and against his idealizing and idolizing disciples with Plato, as the other extreme. Aristophanes gives us Socrates in caricature somewhat distorted and exaggerated as to his appearance and speculations—Socrates travestied. Xenophon paints for us, in the brusque of realistic styles, the Socrates of common life, seen by one in whom eyesight had not been translated into insight; one who knew rather than appreciated, and loved rather than comprehended, the best talker and the noblest thinker in Athens. Plato presents to us Socrates dramatized by an artistic mind, adapted to the purpose of a delineator of speculative thought in such a form as might impress and gratify the cultured literary taste of his times. Hence the anachronisms studiously introduced by Plato, anachronisms which while they covertly aided the development of his dialogues, also covertly indicated the ideal of the scenes and the speculations which

appear in the *Sæpararoi λόγοι*, or Socratic fictions which he composed with so much elaboration, so many enrichments of thought and embellishments of fancy, embracing the humour of comedy in one form, and in another the organization of tragedy.

In the *Phædo*, the Platonic Socrates displays power and subtlety of mind, a felicity of phrase and idea, a fecundity of abstract reasoning and illustrative allusiveness, which, while consonant to the character of the actual Socrates, appear to be intensified, amplified, and effectively raised and refined to be in harmony with the imaginative nature of the portraiture of the Athenian sage as the hero of a philosophical drama founded on, and in a large measure true to, fact, but touched with the enchanter's wand—dramatic realization—and raised to the height of the great argument which the author intends to advance and advocate, that "Death is nought but the soul's birth."

In the Athenian prison-house, the man who it was said had scandalized the popular religion, and corrupted, as had been alleged, the youths of the city, is exhibited as a pure, fervent, eloquent spirit, too noble to break the law, too self-possessed of soul to court or fear death; frank, blunt, plain-spoken and brave, who has thought on life till it seemed but an illuminated scroll, and reflected on death till the very mystery of it had been translated into poetic thought and philosophic insight. And yet withal, he is homely, and loving, and humorous, and patient, endued with patience and endowed with hope. In the day when he is about to pass from earth, Socrates is shown to be more than a demolisher and a confuter; he is the architect of a splendid argumentation, he is not a controversialist merely, but a prophet, a seer, and an unfolders of the certainty of dawn after sunset.

The Topic.

SHOULD THE CENSUS OF 1871 BE TAKEN IN REGARD TO EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND REVENUE, OR CONCERN ITSELF ONLY WITH POPULATION?

AFFIRMATIVE.

THE great cost which, every ten years, is expended in issuing and collecting the Census returns, ought to be utilized as far as possible. We think it would be well to see how far this could be accomplished, now that another Census time has come round. The statistics of education are in a notoriously untrustworthy state; and if we could

discover the truth regarding that matter it would greatly contribute to beneficial legislation. The state of the revenue, which is now so much dependent on Land and Assessed Taxes, the Income Tax, and Licences, might be materially improved, if we had correct statistics regarding the items involved in it, which a judiciously compiled and simple set of Census tables might

supply. Controversies regarding churches and sects might easily be brought to the test of figures if the Census papers were got to include this element as well as that of population. Indeed, to me, it appears of very small consequence to know how many people dwell upon the surface of the land of England or plough the seas under its flag. But it is of much consequence to know how many people are educated or are in process of being educated; how many can and do pay taxes; and what proportion of the population so far recognise religion as a part of life as to be definitely connected with some place of worship; and these items, I think, should be taken up in the Census papers.—L. W.

There can be no doubt that great advantage would accrue to the country if the Census could be made the means of collecting the fullest possible information regarding the social life of the people. Few questions are exciting so much interest at present as education, finance, and religion; and on few subjects is it possible to get so little reliable information. To know the true position in which we stand on education, for instance, would greatly conduce to proper and beneficial legislation on that subject—a subject on which statistics are not only vague but conflicting. On finance, again, many things might be gathered up by a proper Census which would aid in reducing the excessive cost of constant assessing, inspection, and detection, in connection with it, for instance, of acreage under culture, houses liable to taxation, licenses, &c., and these too might even be used as a check on the Revenue officers. As to churches, there is no ground of quarrel so intense as the progress and power of sects. To know the truth—the plain truth—concerning these mat-

ters would put an end to bickerings and heart-burnings. On the whole, we think that the Census tables should be made as full, complete, and extensive as there is any possibility of getting them made.—M. A. R.

We think, in the taking of the Census in 1871, education, religion, and revenue should be taken along with population; we see no good reason why it should not be so. We think it would satisfy a legitimate desire of all true lovers of their country to know the real state of these questions, and it is the only way in which we can get a thorough knowledge of them. Some object to giving their religious denomination; but we think this a wrong way of looking at the question; as well say they have no right to ask us our age or our nativity, &c. Information on these matters will help on the progress of the world. And when there is such a commotion on the education question, what could be more desirable than a correct and cumulative return, so that reformers of all shades should have a knowledge of the material they have to deal with.—R. R.

Extravagance is one of the vices of Government. They never think of the disadvantage of paying twice over. I think, in arranging for the taking of the Census, they ought to include every possible heading on which statistical information is required. Taking, as we do, narrow views of things, we are too anxious to pare down everything to apparent cheapness; but there is no real cheapness in appointing commissions to take education statistics when this could be done through the Census papers. It is the same with revenue and religion.—B. B.

NEGATIVE.

Inquisitorialism is the besetting sin of Governments. This is a qua-

original by the inimitable arrangement of its spoils. He is among poets what Cellini is among artists; ornament is less the accessory grace than the essential merit of his designs." Of Gray's odes, Lord Lytton (from whom and from Thomas Campbell the foregoing observations are chiefly compiled), has said that "as poems of exquisite harmony, splendid diction, and picturesque imagery, they must rank among the most fascinating productions in the language." *Picturesque*, indeed, is "the proper epithet to apply to the genius of Gray. His poetry opens, in every winding of its involved sweetness, to such images and prospects as should serve to kindle the sister art. More than any writer of his age he makes words the paintings of things." "By curious art," however, they are too finely wrought, the mark of the tools is seen on the tracery of his edifices, and the glare of the colours lies confused on his pictures; he wants the high and perfect art to conceal art—a fault due to the fact to which we have called attention, viz., that Gray is an imitator, not an originator. Gray might have written of himself as Horace did—"Operosa carmina fuigo" (I elaborate carefully wrought out verses). His extreme polish and perfectness were the result of immense labour and diligent care, patient retouching and studious revision.

As an imitator he is, however, as nearly perfect as possible. His ambition was to be the British Pindar. His friend Mason, who knew this, writes,—

"No more the Grecian Muse unrivalled reigns,
To Britain let the nations homage pay;
She boasts a Homer's fire in Milton's strains,
A Pindar's rapture in the lyre of Gray."

Talfourd says Pindar "is chiefly remarkable for the gigantic boldness of his conceptions, and the daring sublimity of his metaphors, which stamp him as the Æschylus of lyric poetry. The flights of his imagination are not, however, like those of the great tragedian, mingled with the intensity of human passion, which, while they carry us beyond ourselves, still come home to the heart. He has the light without the heat; his splendours dazzle, but do not warm us. There is little of human feeling in his works; they are little more than exhibitions, which excite our surprise, but not our sympathy. His compositions have something hard and stony about them—the sublimity and nakedness of the rock. The sunshine glitters on the top, but no foliage adorns the declivity. . . . His conception is so ardent that he cannot wait to develop his metaphors, he often but half unfolds them, and suffers them to blend with the literal descriptions, and form part of the subject; and hence, it appears to us, the obscurities so frequently complained of in Pindar have in a great degree arisen.* These are precisely the characteristics which Gray has caught, and perhaps overwrought. But while he was "gathering classical flowers from the Arno and the Ilyssus," and revealing glimpses of barbaric grandeur amidst the darkness of Eunic mythology, sketching his statuesque personifications and colouring with the rich hues of fancy his splendid imagery, he neglected the observation of nature, and gave but little play to the nerves and sinews of the soul. "Ambition never allured, pleasure never intoxicated, love never

* The Lyric Poets of Greece, in "History of Greek Literature," *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, p. 160.

engrossed him;" so that Pindar's rapture never really lived in the lyre of Gray—for Gray never knew what the rapture of poetry was.

"The Progress of Poetry" may be regarded as containing in essence the ideas likely to have been embodied in a work which Gray—taking up an unaccomplished project of Pope's—had planned, viz., "A History of English Poetry." The task was, in some sort completed by Thomas Warton, though on a different plan. Pope and Gray both designed to arrange the poets in schools or classes; Warton saw that cross-division was, in this plan, unavoidable, and he relinquished that as impracticable. It was finished in 1755, and published, along with "The Bard," as the first-fruits of Horace Walpole's Strawberry Hill press. Though they were two compositions at which the readers of poetry were at first content to gaze in mute amazement, they were favourably reviewed by the "poor monthly critic of the 'Dunciad,' Oliver Goldsmith (September, 1757), and his opinion has outlived the severer censorship of Dr. Johnson." "They are," as Goldsmith said, "poems in the perusal of which the reader must largely partake of the poet's enthusiasm in order to taste of his beauties."

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

881. In a notice of Henry Green's "Shakspeare and the Emblem Writers" in the *Saturday Review*, mention is made of Shaksperian commentators, "from the learned and judicious Douce to the accomplished scholar of our own day who so well adopts in practice the motto of his ancient house—Gang Forward." May I ask which Shaksperian commentator is indicated in the latter part of the quotation?

D. M. S.

882. Who is the author of the following remark?—

"Ah, vain is the belief
That the sequestered path has fewest
flowers."

S. C.

883. I have seen the following statement given as a quotation:—"There are three sorts of anger—natural, holy, and sinful anger: "who is its author, and what is the distinction made by him as to the several sorts?"

S. C.

884. Can you tell me anything about Gilbert West, LL.D., who has been spoken of in my hearing as a soldier, a statesman, and a divine?

S. C.

885. Is it true, and, if so, was there any good reason for the circumstance, that "rare Ben Jonson" was buried bolt upright?

P. S. N.

886. I have heard that a poem entitled an "Essay on Reason," after the manner of Pope's "Essay on Criticism," has been written. Is it so? and, if so, who is the author, and what is the character of the poem?

P. S. N.

887. Can any reader of the *Controversialist* recommend to me a cheap work on the Huguenots; and (2) is Mr. Smiles' work the best on the influence of that party on England?

J. F. B.

888. Which was the first periodical literary miscellany, and where shall I find an account of it?

J. F. B.

Literary Notes.

PROF. ALEX. BAIN, of Aberdeen, has in the Press "Logic, deductive and inductive," which will include all the recent extensions of the syllogism, and will besides furnish a logical view of the sciences somewhat after the Comtean plan.

Rev. D. J. Reichel, of Cuddesdon College, has nearly ready an English translation of Dr. E. Zeller's "Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics," a work which commends itself not only to scholars but divines.

H. W. Wilkins has translated into English the speeches contained in the history by Thucydides. This will advantage both scholars and historians.

Comte de Montalembert, author of "A Free Church in a Free State," "The Political Future of England," "The Monks of the West," &c., died 18th March, aged 60.

Prof. A. O. Fraser is nearing the completion of a great work, the 4th vol. of his edition of the works of Bishop Berkeley, for the Clarendon Press, Oxford, is in the press; he is to spend the summer in the preparation of a biography of the philosophical prelate. Besides the editor's prefaces and notes, and his account of Berkeley's life and philosophy, it contains much hitherto unpublished matter from the Bishop's MSS., which have been supplied by Archdeacon Rose. The work will be illustrated with an engraving of a fine portrait got from America. The *Athenæum* very mistakenly avers that the Bishop has hitherto been appreciated in Germany and neglected in England. Professor Ueberweg, of Königsberg, has lately published a German translation of Bishop Berkeley, which, however, is more a class-book than a philosophical edition.

Dr. Karl Mayer, a Swabian poet, died at Tübingen, aged 84, 25 Feb.

The annual prize offered by the Lord Rector of the University of St. Andrew's for the best essay on a subject proposed by himself has been awarded by J. A. Froude, Rector, to Mr. W. W. Tulloch, son of John Tulloch, D.D., Principal of St. Mary's College, for an historical essay on the subject of the "Gowrie Conspiracy." The subject proposed by the Lord Rector for the ensuing year is "The influence of France on Scotland."

Mr. William Brough, journalist, essayist, and dramatist, died March 12th, at the age of 44, after a lingering illness of some months.

Rev. Alex. Williamson, agent in Northern China for the National Bible Society of Scotland, has in the press two vols. of *Travels, Discoveries, &c.* during the course of eleven journeys in that region.

Dr. W. Cox Bennett, author of "Queen Eleanor's Vengeance," has many letters of Miss Mitford's, which it is proposed should be issued as a small volume, supplementary to her life and letters.

A translation of Catullus in the metre of the original is to be given to us by Prof. Robinson Ellis, of University College, London.

Kepler's complete works are to be published in Paris.

Osanistry is likely soon to get an addition to its literature in Keble's "Letters on Cases of Conscience."

William White's "Life of Swedenborg" has been issued in a second edition in one volume revised.

Mr. Goldwin Smith is engaged in writing a popular history of England for American readers.

Great expectations are entertained of a new volume of poems by Mr. Dante Gabriel Rossetti.

Mr. Swinburne is also at work upon a volume of political and other poems.

Modern Metaphysicians.

ARNOLD RUGE—THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM.

BY JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING, LL.D.,

Author of "The Secret of Hegel," "The Philosophy of Perception," &c.

ARNOLD RUGE has sent us the fourth volume of his late work, "*Aus Früherer Zeit*,"* the subject of which is "Philosophy and its Emancipation." Both the man and the work are of such mark, that it concerns the interests of our readers to know something of them.

There is an island in the Baltic named Rügen, the largest of all the German islets there. Probably originally part of the continent, it is now separated from it by a narrow strait only some mile broad. The sea has so eaten into it, that it may be almost said to be made up of peninsulas. Naturally, its scenery is of a very romantic character; varied as it is by rock and water, barren sands or peat-mosses, and the most fertile corn-fields. It belongs now to Prussia, and is a favourite summer resort of its afflicted bureaucrats in search of health. Tradition also lends a charm to it; for it was here, according to Tacitus, that the goddess *Hertha* was worshipped. Bergen is, so to speak, the capital, with some 3,000 inhabitants. These, as those of the island generally, are remarkable for industry; they are sailors, fishermen, tillers of the soil, breeders of cattle, makers of cloth, distillers, &c. A notable peculiarity of the island is the number of noble families it possesses: it is, as it were, sown with the castles—or, shall we say, simply the houses—of nobles.

In this island, and in this Bergen, it was—and the fact, taken in connection with the career, is very remarkable—that, in the year 1802, Arnold Ruge was born. He studied philology and philosophy at the University of Jena, where the influences of the teaching of Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel; of Krause, Oken, and Paulus were felt; and where many of the most distinguished of the professors in Germany had acquired academical training and honours. It was the head-quarters of what has been called the *New German Party*, which was opposed to absolute government. The first notable incident in his life was his imprisonment of six years' duration, one at Kœpinick and five in Colberg, for his participation in the movement known as that of the *Burschenschaft*,

* "*Aus Früherer Zeit*" (From Earlier Days), von Arnold Ruge. Viertes Band. Berlin: 1867.

an association of young, hot-headed, inexperienced students for political purposes, which in some cases degenerated into conspiracy and rebellion. While a prisoner, he devoted his involuntary leisure to a zealous prosecution of the philosophical studies which he had begun at the University; attaching himself in especial to the system then dominant—that, namely, of Hegel. His first literary productions, however, were, as is usual with the young, poetical: a translation of the “*Œdipus Coloneus*” of Sophocles, and a tragedy on the subject of the heroic Schill, a patriot chief of the *Tugendbund*. On liberation from captivity he qualified himself as a *privatim docens* at Halle. Here he lectured on Criticism and Philosophy, and not without success; for he had the name of being the first “to introduce the youth of Halle into the depths of the Hegelian system;” still, and though he had published a work of mark on “*The Æsthetics of Plato*,” 1832, he was unable to make good for himself the fixed position of a professor. His marriage, however, set him above want (though speedily broken up by the death of his wife), and he could feel independent. This feeling of independence could not, in so very ardent a nature, remain simply of a passive character; it became active, and involved him in various unpleasantnesses, especially with the University. In these circumstances he entered eagerly into his friend Echtermeyer’s proposition to start he “*Halle Year-books*,” and became their most active contributor. This periodical, at first mainly philosophical, and in this character valuable, became gradually more and more political, and withal more and more extreme. This necessitated in 1841 (they were started in 1838), a retreat from Prussian territory to the refuge of Dresden. Here the extreme “*Halle Year-books*” became, naturally, only the more extreme “*German Year-books*,” and were at length, as naturally, in the year 1843, finally suppressed. Ruge betook himself on this to Paris, but failed in an attempt to continue the propagation of his radicalism in the “*German-French Year-books*.” From Paris he passed to Switzerland, from Switzerland back again to Germany, and for some time now (since 1850) he has been settled at Brighton, in England. Ruge evidently is a man of such fierce intellectual keenness, and sees *his own* in a light so intense, that he has neither patience nor understanding—perhaps hardly credence—for difference, and difference of light, in another. Nothing can surpass the fiery openness of his belief and his unbelief, his love and his hate. The expression of his heterodoxy is no less extreme and honest than that of his radicalism; and from this it is that the usefulness of Ruge has fallen far short of his talents and capabilities. All the talent in the world, and all the earnestness in the world, even united with unflinching wit and irresistible humour, will never reconcile a temperament so hot and self-willed with the due social relations, either public or private. Detested by his enemies, he has proved unbearable to his friends, and seems left alone. His life appears to have been, in search of peace and his sphere, but a series of leaps from discontent to dis-

content. This fate of a nature so full of talent, so strong, so noble, and so honest, is peculiarly melancholy and deeply to be lamented. Before passing to his works, we may mention that Ruge was editor of the *Reform*, first at Leipzig, and then at Berlin; and that he sat for some time in the Frankfort Parliament, as one of the representatives of Breslau. When Archduke John of Austria was elected by a majority of 525 out of 700, Ruge left the Frankfort parliament, and went with the party whose cry was for Republicanism, to Berlin, where 175 representatives formed a convention for the regeneration of Germany. Here he mixed himself up with an insurrectionary movement, which made flight necessary. He has been an active collaborateur with Ledru Rollin, Mazzini, &c., in their European propaganda of democracy. He has delivered several courses of lectures in London, Brighton, Birmingham, &c. In his "Lodge of Humanism," "The Religion of our Age," &c., he affirms that "a positive humanism lies at the root of the scientific system of German philosophy, and of all past religious systems;" and that the task of to-day is "the humanizing of humanity."

By far the most important portion of the literary productions of Ruge is contained in the Halle Year-books. In these he had for fellow-workmen, besides Echtermeyer, who has been already mentioned, Feuerbach, Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Edgar Bauer, Georgii, Bayerhof, Biedermann, Vatke, Köppen, Vischer, Nauwerk, &c. The general course of these Year-books can be described as a swift retrocession from the Hegelian centre or right to the extremest radicalism and heterodoxy—that is, to the extremest anti-Hegelianism. At first, philosophy and the dogma differ only in form; the possibility of the existence of the absolute in Christ is believed in; the Church is defended against Rothe; positive religion against rationalism; and religion generally against Heine and Feuerbach; even Deists and Jews are declared heretics. The political creed was at the same time equally Hegelian: the monarchical constitution was unhesitatingly declared the best possible; and Prussia, as example of such, was expressly complimented. Long before the Saxon or even the Prussian government had interfered with their career, these Year-books, however, had changed all that; and the reader can conceive no extreme doctrine, either democratic or heterodox, that was not supported by them. This complete revolution of opinion, this absolute change of colour, was in Ruge, him who had challenged demonstration of a single point in which he differed from Hegel; him who, of them all, was the most active contributor, more glaring than in the rest. The general indications which have been given above, will, for exemplification, perhaps suffice here, however. In 1839 appeared Ruge's romance of "The Novelist;" but it excited little attention. At Leipsic, in 1845, his "Two Years in Paris" was published; which, as in prosecution of his democratic solidarity, recklessly trampling under foot all sentiment of patriotism, gave great offence. In 1846 the publication of his Collected Works (Mannheim, 10 volumes) was commenced. In

1860 Ruge translated Buckle's "Civilization in England," and of about the same date are his "Autobiographical Sketches," the fourth volume of which we presume to be constituted by the work before us. These sketches prove, as Erdmann declares, Ruge's spiritual relationship with the *eighteenth* century.

The volume under review, entitled, as has been already said, "Philosophy and its Emancipation" (published in 1867), consists of four parts: 1. Historical; 2. Systematic; 3. Critical development of philosophy; and 4. The Suppression of the Year-books. The last two parts for the fugitive observations which alone are possible at present, we take first, and together; for in matter they can hardly be separated. They constitute, indeed, but a history of Ruge's *critical* labours and consequent experiences.

These Year-books, no doubt, as the phrase is, *made epoch* in Germany: they broke up the Hegelian school, and placed its extreme *left* in triumph for the time—a triumph which, on the whole, however, has now crossed over to Hegel's own avowals, and the *right* which represented them. Such men as Erdmann, Rosencranz, and Schwegler, must now be allowed to be the truest representatives of the spirit of Hegel. Ruge himself, indeed, nowhere denies that this amounts to: he is perfectly frank in his admissions of an absolute difference of opinion from Hegel in regard to Christianity and political principles. By way of example, we may here quote such expressions as these:—

"We have thus, then, with the completion of the philosophical evolution, reached the point where this grandest enfranchisement of the human spirit voluntarily flings itself into the bondage of the unspiritual, wholly unmoved despotism, and of the dead and no longer functioning Lutheran dogma. It wanted to ennoble despotism by the idea, and help theology to thoughts whereby it might solemnize a resurrection of the old dead conception of the absolute. But in this Hegel over-estimated the power of philosophy. He was just as little able to revive the old and antiquated spirit now, as, in their time, Plato's Republic and the Politics of Aristotle. . . . By his apostasy, through influence of forms of the past, Hegel had put himself in crying contradiction with the public spirit. . . . I have never for a moment thought of receiving this highest emancipation of the human spirit as a religious and political strait-waistcoat in order to oppose the spirit of the nineteenth century, as did Hegel and his school. . . . The philosophers had made their business that of the Jesuits—the restoration of Christianity. . . . The unity of philosophy and Christianity—that was the evangel of the old Hegelian school. . . . The reconciliation of thinkers with the absolute State and with the Christian dogma was formally and solemnly sealed. . . . If they were philosophy as restoration, we were philosophy as revolution. . . . We ourselves were not quite free from this obscuration of the German spirit—only our own criticism it was that cleared ourselves up. . . . I find Hegel's theological accommodation defended by myself. . . . This essay is in complete agreement with Hegel's loyalty towards despotism and Christianity. . . . We were not to be supposed opposed to Hegel; rather we ought to be reproached with our excessive Hegelian orthodoxy. . . . We were

not only Hegelian Christians; we were, even to Prussia, politically orthodox. . . . Neither theological philosophy, nor belief in Prussia as the Protestant and philosophical State, was hypocrisy and mere pretext; we were rather carried away by Hegel and the scientific liberality of such men as Altenstein. . . . Though, then, we were Hegelian Prussians and Hegelian Christians, . . . we were in the beginning really loyal to Prussia and Christianity."

These sentences will suffice to show, from Ruge's own mouth, the state of the case. Hegel's object was that of religious and political reconstruction; Ruge began with the same object in both directions, but ended—and in diametrical opposition to the dearest views of Hegel—in the wildest radicalism and the most absolute infidelity. It is useful to point out this to Englishmen, who generally confound Hegel with rationalists and free-thinkers, precisely the men whom Hegel, all his life, directly and constantly fought.

Ruge's narrative of the fate and fortune of his critical Year-books is exceedingly interesting, and contains some noteworthy anecdotes. Here is one, for example, that somewhat lively illustrates what the reading of Hegel is even to Germans.

"My father-in-law, the Kammerrath Nietzsche in Dresden," says Ruge, "belonged to the ultra-reactionary party. A political essay of his, which bore the title, "The State in the light of the government of Frederick Augustus the Just," he had, with a view to a complete revision of it, handed to me to be corrected generally, but in particular to have its style touched up. This I undertook in all honour; but advised him, before going to press, to read his predecessors, Plato's "Republic," Aristotle's "Politics," Fichte's "Rights of Nature," and Hegel's "Philosophy of Right." With this last, accordingly, he at once laid himself on the sofa (Hegel had still a good name then). He sprang very soon up again, however, exclaiming in astonishment, "Why, I don't understand a single word of all that, and yet it's German!" His predecessors being so hard to read, he let his manuscript lie."

Ruge, we see here, does not show much compunction for having been a leading agent in alteration of that good name of Hegel.

Ruge's other anecdotes in this place, and his history in general of the critical enterprise, are principally interesting for the light they throw on his own character. The first glimpse we get of the earnest, never-doubting, simple, enthusiastic man, is, as it ought to be, in his class-room, and actually engaged in the lofty duty of introducing his students into the depths of the Hegelian philosophy. "Once as I concluded the Logic," he tells us, "greatly moved, I realized anew to their souls the whole grand process; and they were indeed so seized that they escorted me home in a body, one of them saying to me as he left, 'This day, Herr Doctor, you have surpassed yourself!'" Equally naïvely characteristic is the story that immediately follows, where Ruge tells us how cleverly he cured a conscience-stricken studiosus of the fixed idea of having "eaten a whole ha'penny roll at once." Still discontented with himself, on the

whole, and especially with the fate of his little book "On the Comic," he had begun a translation of the whole of Aristotle's Works when Echtermeyer burst in upon him with the proposition of the "Year-books"—a proposition that swiftly led to the resolution, "we must go to Leipsic to-morrow." Leipsic was gone to on the morrow, a bargain struck with a publisher, and a tour arranged for Ruge among the universities in search of co-operators. The adventures of this tour Ruge very pleasantly relates to us: "If I did not always make out," he says, "who *would* work with us, I was never at a loss as to who would *not*." His interviews with the various professors on this tour are most amusingly and lively described; we have interesting glimpses of Ottfried Müller, the Grimms, Dahlmann, Ewald, and others; as also elsewhere of Altenstein, Göschel, &c.; and we are always impressed with a sense of ready wit on the part of Ruge, as well as of a certain provoking, altogether indifferent, cool piquancy of retort, and general frank imprudent heedlessness of speech with him. Having mocked and jibed the professors all the morning, he is delighted with the laughter of the *privatim docentes* that rewards his satirical revelations in the evening. "The *privatim docentes*," he says, "invited me to a merry meeting: they, who as yet only would be Hofraths, were mightily amused with my stories, and promised me descriptions of the University and a complete dusting-up of the old perukes!" With such glimpses before us, we are not surprised that, Hegelian as they were, the Year-books from the first were reckless and offensive. "The element of the revolution in us was shown by this, that we summoned universities, states, and sects before our self-constituted tribunal; and letters of withdrawal on the part of contributors flew from all sides in upon us. With this one it went against the Herrn Christus, and with that one against the Herrn Minister, and before 1838 was ended, all the adherents of the Middle Ages, or of times more ancient—from my old friend and patron, Karl von Raumer to the wondrous child, Karl Witte—had retired from the enterprise." "This," says Ruge, "lay in the order," and we cordially agree with him. Moreover, we can see that there was something in the very position that tended to induce the Year-books to throw themselves out of all bounds, and fairly stand up malcontents—malcontents at everything that society regarded as received and established. Accordingly, their career was that of a mere meteor that rushes from heat to yet intenser heat and—the blackness of sudden darkness. From Hegel and der Gott-Mensch, Ruge halts not till he reaches Feuerbach and der Mensch ist was er isst ("man is what he eats"). And yet, no; Ruge remains ever a believer in the *Idea*, and far removed from the absolute scepticism of that *propos* of Feuerbach's. Nevertheless, the opposing extremes of the beginning and end of the Halle Year-books, and the little time that separates them, are, without declination into actual despair, remarkable enough. It is not more certain that they opened with Hegel than that they closed with

Feuerbach; though, in the opinion of Ruge, this door is only truly named "the emancipation of Germany at the hands of the writers of the Halle Year-books." The simple, unmisgiving zeal of Ruge is well exemplified in this opinion, as well as in his conviction that the instrument of liberation consisted in what, under the name of evolution, appears to him as a sort of application to history of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel shall have been untrue to his own principle, and it was for Ruge to carry this principle out—out into a radicalism of destruction that disgusted society, and spared not his own self. Ruge is, perhaps, the only man who will not see this; what his naïve singleness of view alone will see is "the idea gives itself its own death-blow when it throws itself away on the torpid forms of the past; the idea, when it realises itself in freedom, rouses into mortal combat against itself every existent prejudice." Accordingly, it is with pride he records that, "from the very beginning the Year-books were branded as evil-doers." It is really curious, with what unconscious simplicity, and yet with what point and ready wit, Ruge tells his story, revealing in every word the innocent, mistaken fervour of his own rash, headlong, honest character. He is glad there is no German word for such a Prussian idea as "insubordination!" When Meyer remarks that surely he, as only a *privatim docens*, would not presume to criticise the whole University, he saucily responds, "What is the difference between a Professor in ordinary and a *privatim docens*, unless that the one is paid, and the other not? and does payment, then, bring superior wisdom with it?" At Halle and at Dresden all the adventures he recounts but tell the same story. He becomes a citizen with a scoff that stuns his examiner. Elected town-councillor, the *tic* of alteration and reform drives him into raids against every nuisance, bad pavements, bad smells, bad water, bad monopolists, and bad inhabitants generally. In these he condescends to instruct masons in the use of their own plumb-lines; and, able to succeed only in reference to certain university promenades, proposes the bomb as the only certain instrument of a radical reform. He summons sleeping laws into wakefulness, and gets up the boldest political petitions. He is quite astonished at the un-success of invincible logic, and calls mere slaves of tyranny those who forsake his plans, and sink into the prudence of their own affairs. He is called "fool-hardy," declared a "demagogue," and regarded as "obnoxious." On occasion of one of his unsuccessful plans, he naïvely exclaims:—"Such things never thrive at second hand: I should have done it myself: it was the same thing with the Year-books; nobody could carry them on when they were taken from me, for nobody else had any understanding of evolution or a free interest in history, and that is to say because the idea failed; for nothing is practical without the animating and creative idea." This was at Halle; and at Dresden everything ran the same course. He is in perpetual strife; but, despite the incision of his ever ready *mots*, never brings anything in his disputes to an unbearable extreme, for

he "does not easily lose humour." He proposes new universities, and is wished at Geneva—or Banff, as we say in Scotland. He gets up reading-rooms, and deftly makes good the retaining of the *Times* and the support of the English. He stands up for Jews, redresses railway grievances, and is called an impracticable cosmopolite. He is made a commissioner of police, and finds frequent occasion to do service to the State, as in the providing of "droshkies (cabs) at a *single reasonable* fare for *all* distances within the town and the suburbs."

The history of the Year-books is but the history of their redactor. They are in constant hot water, and in constant process from bad to worse. They have troubles with the universities, troubles with the censors, troubles with the Ministry, troubles with the Crown Prince, troubles with this king, and troubles with the next. Twenty-four professors, wearied of personalities, subscribe a declaration that Ruge is a disturber of the peace; he is otherwise called an incorrigible makebate and a meddler, and prohibited from writing critiques and epigrams on his colleagues. They (the Year-books) declare war on Jacobi, Hamann, Jean Paul, Schlegel, Tieck, and especially Novalis and Schelling. They break with Altenstein, with Leo, with Göschel, with Hengstenberg, with Varnhagen von Ense. They throw out Bauer and Heine; they lose Strauss; and they even take exception to Feuerbach. Nay, Echtermeyer himself, in the end, leaves them and—recants! They are driven from Prussia, they are suppressed in Saxony, and in vain seek resurrection in Paris. To throw the "whole truth as a *ferment* into the world" shows thus but as a hopeless enterprise. The Year-books perished, stung to death by a whole aroused hive. Governments, universities, journals, religious interests, political interests, *littérateurs*, young Germanism and old romanticism, their own contributors—all were against them, and combined to destroy them. The world seemed determined to affirm that "Philosophy is *not* Parrhesie" (licence of language). After all it was fated not to prove true that "the *aufklärung*, which he had so long fought, had vanquished Hegel." What threatened the overturn of Church and State absolutely failed to recommend itself. It could not be understood how thoughts were only to be revolutionary thoughts. Even rationalists were unable to discern rationalism in mere negation. It is almost comic to watch the earnestness with which Ruge would explain to us that the result was not due to the power of historical *evolution*, as we might be inclined to object, but to "the force of the anti-historical, the mediæval, the heretic-condemning spirit." "Remarkable perversion of the first principles of law and justice! discussions were suppressed which would have exercised the most healing influences, and which were incapable of success in any other hands!" There is a touching innocence of exclamation here—a *naïveté* of pathos that goes at once to the heart.

So much for the Year-books: we turn now to the more important portions of the work. Ruge prefaces the whole with an address to

his countrymen—" *An die Deutschen*." He congratulates himself on the acceptance of his labours at the hands of his countrymen, but intimates that he is now to offer them something different from those his former easy contributions, that were "gelaüfig (current) to all." Considering the recent political advances of the Fatherland, we have little difficulty in excusing Ruge's somewhat too grandiose speech here: "thus something great succeeded with me!"

"What I have now to communicate," he says, "is of other sort. It is indeed the same spirit of the time in evolution, but concentrated in its highest and last point, in the creative idea, in the principle of the all-controlling science of philosophy. Before its forms the masses shrink with fear; they have decried these forms, for they minister only to the happiness of labour and production, not to the enjoyment of the exertionless apprehension of feelings and phantasies beautiful and already known. What now if I should avoid these immortal forms; and, of the divine Plato, and his great disciple, as of our all-embracing German philosopher, speak only in such words as will be intelligible even to women and uninitiated minds, learned or unlearned? The interest is so great, the exposition of this evolution so important and seasonable at present, that I must not let myself be appalled by the apparently insuperable difficulty. And the solution of the problem will be an honour to me. . . . I accept the admonition (actually to show the Plato and Hegel he names so often). *He who knows not German and Greek philosophy knows not our own time.* But you (Germans) have to ascribe it to yourselves, if I make 'available' for you things which hitherto you have never carried to your mouths; things which will at first taste sour to you; things, however, which, when you have digested them, will pour a healthier blood along your veins. . . . The time is now so far advanced, that philosophy is recognised to be the sun which illuminates it; only in the light of philosophy is it that we see all as it in truth is. And to be taught this, it is well worth our trouble to spend some hours at the feet of Plato and Hegel."

Accordingly, Ruge proceeds now to a condensed exposition of nearly the whole of the Hegelian system, but preceded by a rapid and exceedingly spirited *aperçu* of general philosophy, both ancient and modern. Taking up, as they do, some 430 pages of Ruge's volume, it is impossible for us to attempt to convey here either *aperçu* or exposition: we must evidently content ourselves with remarks only.

The introduction to the historical *aperçu* conducts us at once to Ruge's key-notes. They are Hegel and Evolution; or, in view of what Evolution is to Ruge, perhaps we had better just sum them up at once as Hegel and Revolution—political and religious revolution. A strange concatenation surely! The man who lived only for construction is claimed as exclusively for destruction. As we have seen already, Ruge admits that Hegel himself would have disowned the association: "We know very well that he would have declared against us if he had lived to learn *our* understanding of his philosophy." Of candour, indeed, there is never any want on the part of Ruge. His is a perfectly loyal nature, and he is alw

chivalrously genuine. However much he differs from Hegel on politics and religion, he never grudges to give him his whole due—his whole due, and even perhaps a little more; for the truth is, the board has not yet sat that is to verify Hegel. What Kant did, we see and know. Fichte and Schelling, too, are clearly before us. With Hegel it is otherwise. He was the toughest worker that ever lived, perhaps, and this in the most solid and genuine of interests; still his toughness was not less shown, it may be, in what was not solid, in what was not genuine—in the forcible construction of an artificial system on a merely external receipt, with, consequently, merely external effort, and out of merely external motive, but with most deliberate, and determined, and irresistible self-will. If this be really so, then the system alluded to can never be worth the pains which the difficulties imposed by the artifice exact, notwithstanding what excellence it possesses otherwise. Indeed, this excellence itself will never receive its due meed of recognition till the cement of artifice being withdrawn, the system tumble into its constituents, of which only the solid and genuine will not crumble out of sight.

Of any suspicion of this kind in regard to Hegel there is no sign on the part of Ruge. Though Hegel's philosophy, he says, "in its rigorous form, the systematic evolution of its individual parts, cannot be the possession of all contemporaries—no, not even of all the lettered representatives of the nation," yet it alone, as the greatest good in existence, he enthusiastically recommends to universal mankind. With reference to "the most important of Hegel's works, those in which he treasured his youthful power and daring, the 'Phenomenologie,' the 'Logic,' and the 'Encyclopædia,'" he tells us that in them he found again "the well-known thoughts of the Greeks, but on native soil and as if new-born."

"For," he continues, "they were treated by this master and completer of dialectic, no longer, as with Plato and Aristotle, in separate and partial expositions which cohered indeed thus or thus, but sprang not as a whole out of each other; here there lay the entire universe of nature and the soul expanded before me in *one grand evolution*. Awed and astounded, I recognised that in this great enterprise much more was accomplished than I had ever dreamed it possible to attempt. What had never been attempted yet, the one all-embracing evolution, was made the principle: unresting notion developed itself from notion; and, in a sublime work of art—the system of thought, of nature, and the soul—there appeared in its completion the idea; but not, nevertheless, as something closed, fixed, at rest, and done with; but as what ever re-created itself and its other in the eternal circle of its movement and self-development. . . . My gratitude to this great liberator was and shall be this, that I unclothe this sole true revelation of the secrets of nature and the soul ever again afresh to the whole world. . . . The idea is the truth, and all that is true is idea; that must be proved, and the *systematization of the idea into the world, as necessary unveiling, as revelation demonstrated*. This problem of philosophy, by which alone science becomes science—this it is which Hegel has resolved. . . . These are not bran-new inventions of a single isolated individual; they are

the thoughts of all veritable philosophers that ever were, wrought out with astounding erudition, all rigorously developed, and each in its due place; and there is thus provided us a critique of pure reason to which only Plato and Aristotle furnish any parallel, and beside which no other thinker has set any work that is equal. . . . Never has anything equally great been achieved. To find the true form of evolution was already much; but much more is the conducting of this form throughout the whole material which nature and history offer us in still unconquered guise. The Greek and all other valuable and veritable philosophy of the past presents itself in Hegel to us only in essentially developed and consequently better form."

So it is with scorn that Ruge exclaims, "The English and many degenerate Germans declare the Greek and German philosophy to be an intellectual aberration. ('Greek philosophy was a failure,' says an English historian of philosophy. Only fancy, Lewes a success and Aristotle a failure!) the French have only lately begun to work along with us in this field (the book of the Scot, Stirling, on Hegel, is a great advance in English philosophical literature)." Still, all this admiration is no impediment to Ruge speaking his mind, with absolute self-conviction, without the shadow of a shade of misgiving, on Hegel's terrible apostacy from himself, in politics and religion!

"Hegel," he says, "did not keep true to the Greeks, but deserted them for the Macedonian Alexander and the fables of the Syrians. . . . This same philosophy, the Hegelian, which wins for the soul of man the highest worth, that of absolute completion and freedom, *lives, however, during the counter-stroke, on the part of the spirit of the day that has gone forth against liberty, political and intellectual.* It cannot now, indeed, give its principles and its evolution into service of this counter-stroke; but the man himself who is the instrument or vehicle of this philosophical process—it is quite possible for him, and *almost all his disciples*, to be found deserting to despotism and the dogma, apostate from the Republic and philosophy itself; and we have lived to witness with horror how zealously they could labour to convince us that in this respect the universal spirit of the age and their own agreed. . . . But Hegel literally died from this apostasy from himself."

And so here, again, we come upon the two cries of Ruge, the cries into which every other note of his must give itself up and terminate. We shall bestow a word of discussion on these cries presently, and in their reference to Hegel; but in the meantime it will be enough to know them. They are expressed in this place in such sentences as these:—

"The Hegelian philosophy appeared contemporaneously with the great French Revolution, *which makes the free man in all his forms the State's object.* This philosophy does the same thing; it shows . . . through complete evolution of all thoughts, that *free personality* is the only realization of the absolute spirit. . . . In this exercise of its thought the spirit surmounts all its obstacles; it does not decree that it shall be free, it becomes so. After this rescue into the heaven of freest thought, the rights of man in America and France may indeed, as inscriptions, be hacked by the axe of the carpenter from the monuments of the City of Paris; but

the axes and all the cannons in the world are impotent, now that they are received into its temple, to drive them again by external violence, out of the spirit of humanity. . . . Philosophy, in its pure evolution, free from Oriental phantasy, belongs to the Greeks and the Germans—in principle indeed to Hegel, but in full purity only to his critics (i. e., in the Year-books). As universal form and political principle we find this spirit in the French *aufklärung* and revolution. *Aufklärung* and revolution are liberty and humanity *without* metaphysic; the German spirit is humanity *through* metaphysic. . . . Some oppose to philosophy the ancient faith which the Syrians have imposed upon them. . . . The Alexandrians are the scholastics of Paganism, and supply the Christian Scholastics as well as Christianity itself with those dogmatic phantasies in which all science and reason perish."

When one hears such a thorough philosophical adept as Ruge is, thus roaring out the commonest free-thinking trash and radical bunkum of a Mr. Thomas Paine, one can no longer take it ill of one's countrymen that, to this very day, for the most part, they regard the deep, solid, all-knowing, all-considerate, the wisely, liberally conservative, the sincerely devout Hegel, who was the mate of Aristotle and the mate of St. Paul, as but a shallow German rationalist and low radical infidel.

As was only possible to him, Ruge, in his *aperçu*, passes at once to Greek philosophy, and gives no account of the Oriental. He runs over very briefly, but very suggestively, the whole of pre-Socratic philosophy, and is most instructive and interesting, probably, on Heraclitus. Here, no doubt, he has the advantage of the lamented Lassalle's admirable book; but there is that in Heraclitus that recommends him to Ruge, quite independently and without call for commentator. It is the opinion of Heraclitus, says Ruge, that "the universe was made neither by God nor man; it was ever, and ever will be,—an ever-living fire, that through its own law kindles and extinguishes itself." Naturally, too, Ruge succeeds, when he treats of the Eleatics and Anaxagoras. Those, with that of Heraclitus, are the great names of the pre-Socratic philosophy, "As Heraclitus lies already in the Eleatics, so is he himself pregnant with Anaxagoras." Even in these tracts of philosophy and history we can see, then, that Ruge contrives, every now and then, to find himself the consolation of his peculiar and relieving cries. "Ay, even those oldest philosophers could tell their minds to the *fable-fabricators* that lead the herd by the nose." Or again:—

"The absolute is neither the Greek, nor the Jewish, nor the Christian God; compared with the idea, these are all coarse, sensuous imaginations; Hegel, however, allows himself to be frequently misled into the insertion of his Christian conceptions, professedly in explanation, really in obscuration of thought; . . . this pollution of philosophy with Asiatic or Christian phantasies is what is scholastic in him, and that by which he becomes his own apostate."

Ruge is very well worth reading on Plato, whom he has certainly seriously studied for himself. He has clearly learned from him

that "the dialectical revolution and composition of ideas is the chief business of the philosopher." Probably, however, he places Plato's merit in this too high, and believes the Platonic principle to have been more, which it scarcely was, than the formal universal, the generic idea. His very illustrations in support are curiously untenable. It is thus he is seen consciously to seek to raise the generic notion into "Idea," into "living thought."

"The notion *bench* is no longer any wasting or perishable bench; the river, when it is the notion of the river, is no longer a mere something that is here and there at once; for its 'here and there' are no longer the external topical here and there, but that it is here and there at once; that it is at once in one and the same point and away from it; that this point is at once here and not here—that is, eternally equal to its own self, the thought or notion of the river; which is nevertheless movement, but not external movement, no, thought-activity; which is a veritable *Beint*, at rest in itself, withdrawn from external becoming."

Are stools and benches, then, Rhines, Rhones, and Thameses, to be expected as constituent furniture in the supersensible world? Is it not to breed fearful confusion in that world, to insist on throwing into it our generic notions of such inconsiderable empirical objects? Is it not to make a farce of the "ideas" to tell us the generalized thought of a bench is one, and that such thought is capable of being glorified into an inhabitant of the celestial upper world? A commodity for the ischiatic protuberances, the nates, of man simply as a crouching animal!

As usual, however, it is Hegel that here, in what concerns Plato, is still the prominent figure:—

"Such thinkers are Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. Aristotle gives not his thoughts in dialectical form; he evolves not, in the true sense of the word, he schoolmasters. The greatest philosophical artists or dialecticians are Plato and Hegel. . . . Only from and through the Hegelian dialectic do we understand the Greeks and all their great thoughts. Hegel completes the Platonic dialectic notionally, and the system of science artistically (in the philosophical sense). German philosophy is unintelligible without the Greek, and the Greek without the German. . . . Hegel carries into the whole grand structure of Plato the shining torch of his deeper knowledge of all the great secrets of philosophy; and no greater enjoyment can be found than this transfigured aspect of the immortal affords, and no greater task than its communication. . . . To take up the dialectic movement of the ideas where Plato left them, this great deed of philosophy was reserved for Hegel. . . . Hegel's dialectical advance beyond Plato is comparable to the process of life, which calls itself into action, and is the *uninterrupted* self-evolution of the idea."

It is in this portion of the historical *aperçu* that we have a warm eulogium on the celebrated "Heraclitus the Dark" of the lamented Lassalle. "Lassalle's book is at once a philosophical work of art, and with all its depth of matter, the easiest and most readable work in all our learned literature." "It was only the understand-

ing of our immortal Hegel, as Lassalle possessed it, that could again bring a Heraclitus completely into light."

We shall remark finally here that the notice on Plato has amply its own share of the characteristic cries:—

"The exclusion of Homer and the other poets from Plato's Republic is the repudiation of the Greek Bible, and implies that poetical fiction, that inartistic, unbridled, mythical phantasy—and all religions rest so—has no business to meddle in the quest of truth. . . . All religions, from the oldest to the newest, that of the Mormons, possess a poetry . . . from which their priests construct sacred, that is, inviolable books, and exact acceptance of all manner of fables as the keys to essential problems, and as revelation of the truth itself. . . . We must shake off the lamentable results of Jewish phantasy, which have not even poetical form or æsthetic merit (!) . . . reduce to the sovereignty of philosophy the old Jewish usurpers of authority in the intellectual world from Rome to London, from Edinburgh to Washington!"

Politically, Ruge is scarcely more content with Aristotle than with Plato and Hegel: he, too, as they, tends to the abomination of conservatism! Nevertheless Ruge has deeply studied Aristotle in this reference, and inclines to regard his theory of a State as essentially realised in America. "Aristotle's polity," he says, "that is, a democracy controlled by law, *but with work now for its object, as organized civil society*, THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA—this is the highest point which man in his political history has yet reached." On the whole, Ruge does great justice to Aristotle, especially to his politics, all the leading principles of which are indicated either for praise or for blame. Here, too, Ruge cannot refrain from his usual passionate expression of love for Hegel:—

"Dialectically to unite Aristotle's separate individual distinctions, due to the mere dianoetic or understanding's form of his logic—to bring this logic into flux—to see his speculative depths to the very bottom: in that, it was only the Hegelian philosophy that first succeeded—an immortal achievement in enfranchisement of thought from the fetters of fixed and stiffened forms. . . . When, in his reformatory indignation at the Hegelian Scholasticism, Feuerbach will not have Hegel called the Aristotle but the Proclus of our time, the hit is not quite undeserved, for Hegel certainly endeavours to introduce the myths of Christianity into philosophy, and even to refuse him the title, 'the Aristotle of our time,' is not without its reason. Hegel rather is the new-birth of the entire Greek philosophy, as well of that of Heraclitus and Plato, as of that of the sage of Stagira; and he is more still, for he is the philosopher of *our* epoch—the epoch of profounder natural inquiry and of men becoming men."

Ruge has little to say on the philosophy of the Schools or on that of the Neo-Platonists. The latter had again only obscured the idea in the mist of phantasy, though it is to them that Christianity and the middle ages owe their dogmas. Ruge only passes to the middle ages, indeed, to declare the word but another term for

Christianity, which has been the enslavement of the soul, and has cost man the loss of a thousand years of progress.

"The stages of the modern philosophical movement are stages of emancipation from the middle ages and their spirit—Christianity. Only in the French *Aufklärung*, and then in *Humanism*, and the purified Hegelian philosophy, is there complete spiritual freedom reached; and only here science conquers the mastery of superstition, recognising it as it is, and exhibiting it as it is."

There is a point here in which, as in reference to Hegel, we must do Ruge the justice to declare our agreement with him. Hegel says, "the mass of men must stand by belief, or the sensuous form of truth," and Ruge, in controversion, remarks, "When the philosopher ceases to seek truth in religion, public opinion ceases also to do the same." This, on the part of Ruge, is undoubtedly true, but then, on the part of Hegel, it must also be said that it is undoubtedly true that the mass of men at least *do* stand by belief, while he (Hegel) for one never ceased to seek truth in Christianity, and this we shall see still more clearly yet. It was certainly not Hegel's opinion, and we may certainly say that it still remains to be proved that—

"Only now, that it is fully understood, is Christianity digested; and only the spirit of our age is the free one, which takes stand actually and purely in thought and in science, and regards all other forms of development but as steps to its production and realisation in knowledge and in the State—which sublates religion into science, no longer can enjoy it as but a barbarous, oriental form of self-satisfaction, and replaces it *in earnest by thought and in sport by art.*"

In this, as it appears to us, Ruge is wrong—wrong by a simple neglect of *all* the elements in the *concrete*. This, however, is the very focus of what we may name the *heresy* of Ruge to Hegel, and is expressed in his book in a thousand forms, as in this immediate neighbourhood thus:—

"The Middle Ages are this unblessed schism, that *Man and his world, his thinking and his acting*, are rejected; and, as what is the truth, there is set up instead a delusive heaven, an ultramundane, unreachable world of phantasy, the crude opinion, the faith, the tradition of the orient. The man of the Middle Ages castigates himself, scourges himself, seeks as monk or even anchorite to withdraw himself from the world, and cheats himself of what alone gives redemption, alone gives bliss—work, and man's special work, thought. The idea that emancipates has place neither in life nor in philosophy. Only with the downfall of the Middle Ages and of Christianity—both are essentially the same—do men turn themselves again to the conquest of nature and the development of mind, to unconditioned philosophy; and only science, which relies solely on itself, and banishes all religious and oriental phantasies from the domain of truth, as Plato banished the fabricators of Greek religion—only *it* is the true mediation of the spirit with itself, and the casting out of the unhappy consciousness of the Christian, who rejects himself and the world."

With all this we say we wholly disagree, and shall have to remark on it at full again.

As regards the history of modern philosophy before Kant, Ruge lays stress almost solely on the contributions of the English for rejection, and on the *aufklärung* and revolution of the French for acceptance. Ruge's peculiar bias strikes so radically, so engrossingly, into him that he can see in Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz nothing but their theology—their orientalisms! Descartes comes back, he complains, only to that horrid theology, "and, in this lack of full intellectual liberty, remains the father of all that follow him, even to Hegel, who with his *double* metaphysic (his logic and his *scholastic*), fairly knocks the bottom out of the tub!" It is the French encyclopædists, then, that Ruge can alone hail with rapture here. "It is the French *aufklärung*," he declares, "that first with resolute boldness opposes despotism and Christianity;" it is to it we owe "the affirmation of reason as absolute, and the realization of *liberté, égalité, and fraternité* in the State."

On ourselves (the English) Ruge is exceedingly hard. Bacon is a mark of constant scoff with him, and it fares no better with Hobbes, or Locke, or Berkeley, or Hume. "Lord Bacon of Verulam is the unphilosophical father of the modern unphilosophical English." Having exclaimed of Locke, "Welch' ein Quaal!" he continues,—

"After him comes George Berkeley, Bishop of the English Church Establishment in Ireland. This sharp-sighted man of God seeks now to show that as well the *essential* qualities of things, which Locke had still granted, are only *Perceptions* (*i. e.*, Ideas). 'Things are nothing but perceptions,' he says; 'for when I withdraw all that I perceive in them, there remains nothing of them over' (he means in thought, but this is to be accomplished as if it were done with the axe, or by means of a chemical process, whereby naturally this form of things no longer remains, but still "all remains that I withdraw," for assuredly it is by no means annihilated by the withdrawal;) 'but those things, which are perceptions, God makes; our own conceptions, on the contrary, which are not things, we ourselves make.' In this way the Herr Bischof contrives to philosophize, and at the same time to find rescue for God; not like Locke, through inconsequent reasoning, but by means of the possible perplexity that we might confound our ideas with those *which God made*. Through these surprising conclusions, which lug his High Reverence out of the heresies of Locke, the whole world becomes only all the more decidedly 'a miracle of God,' and the Herr Bischof only the more safely ensures his loaves and fishes from the sceptics, as he himself declares to us. But David Hume, by express name the Sceptic, follows him directly at the heels, and rises out of him."

But Hume "is as little a sceptic as Berkeley an idealist." Hume "is a diplomatist of the Tory party, and holds all its royalistic dogmas; and just as little as he doubts of king and lords does he doubt of God, the King of the universe. Baron Holbach once at Paris," &c. So Ruge concludes,—"*Philosophy, as Hegel says*

rightly, could not sink lower; and this holds equally good of every one of the five English philosophers we have mentioned;—they are the Kotzebues of philosophy.” “Only the other day did Hegel find entrance among them (Stirling, the ‘Secret of Hegel,’ a book which has veritably digested Hegel’s philosophy).”

How eminently characteristic all this is of Buge, one can see at a glance. But would it so certainly follow, then, that the English must be despicable if they are, in their own way, Kotzebues? Thomas Carlyle has expressed the opinion that, once on a time, when he had nothing better to do, Goethe wrote his ‘Hermann und Dorothea.’ It is questionable, for all that, whether Goethe ever wrote anything better than his ‘Hermann und Dorothea.’ The apothecary, the priest, and the girl are simply insupportable. But Hermann and his mother, as also his father, have the breath of nature about them, and interruptedly elsewhere in Goethe we really find notes of nature. Nevertheless that is not the rule, and the genius of Goethe is rather expository than artistic. Mature reflection, and much amenity of form, there certainly are in Goethe. In midst of the game of life he suddenly stopped, became conscious of it, looked at it, and developed himself into one of the richest-spoken men that ever lived. Still he knew himself to be expository—to have produced a waxwork mainly, anatomical preparations which stood apart from the wires that supported them, showing these. So it is, we believe, that he recognised in Kotzebue an element of spontaneity—spontaneous plot, spontaneous incident, spontaneous speech—natural *growth*, for which he would have willingly bartered his whole fame of expository *artifice*. Compare Kotzebue’s naturally facile *Kleinstädter* with the laborious artifice with which Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meister* is led up to the pulling out of Norberg’s billet with Marianne’s handkerchief. We do not say that Kotzebue is a greater man or writer than Goethe. Far from it. That being the reference, there are *then* many elements to be taken into account. Goethe said, in reference to Tieck, “I am as high above Tieck as Shakspeare is above me;” and thereby very fairly named his place. Tieck, compared with Kotzebue, was also rather expository than artistic. Still Goethe might, not incorrectly, have substituted Kotzebue for Tieck. Nevertheless the point remains. Goethe is principally manufacture; in Kotzebue there is an element of spontaneity, of natural growth, which Goethe must have envied. All in Shakspeare *grows*; all in Goethe is *made*—is *ein Gemachtes*. As with Goethe in comparison with Shakspeare, or even with Kotzebue, so it is with the English philosophers as compared with the German. Whatever there may be in the former, it is at least spontaneous and a growth; in the latter, even in Kant, the leading element is manufacture—artifice. So much is this the case that we make bold to say the most valuable contributions of the German philosophers will yet be found to lie in the matter caught up, as it were, in the mere interstices of their form; which form, on its side, will yet, for the most part, disappear.

The English philosophers are not, then, to be supposed merely done away with by the word "Kotzebues." That word has its own praise. It is all very well to point out the real proportions of Bacon; he will still remain great. Hobbes is rich, and very rich. Locke is the beginner of that solid, substantial structure of common sense which yet gives the privilege of ultimate decision to the English. Berkeley has his own merit of candour, honesty, erudition, ingenuity. And Hume is the father of all modern philosophy, the German being *very expressly* included.

Ruge, all the same, is a man of talent and genius, and every word he utters here has its weight. It will be well for us in England to know these utterances of his on Bacon and Hobbes and Locke and Berkeley and Hume. We are disposed, as times are, especially to signalize his view of Berkeley. In the "Siris" of Berkeley there are many deliverances as regards philosophy (as such) valuable in a general sense. Elsewhere, too, he has notable points, as in reference to general ideas, where, however, he is wrong; or the theory of vision, where he is in great part right. But on the whole, the industry of Berkeley reduces itself to the single proposition:—Things being only sensations (or perceptions), must be *as felt* and *where felt*; that is, *phenomenal* and *within*. It has come out of late, however, and so far as we know only of late, that this proposition of Berkeley tends to prove—if it tends to prove anything—too much. Berkeley's whole object is (to use that expression) "the glory of God." He would do away with the very possibility of materialism, and place us, as spirits, in the very bosom of God. But how does he manage it? Whatever we know, he says, must be known within, and consequently *is* within. But this amounts to saying nothing *can* be known without. It is very evident that a knower, take him as you may, constitute him as you may, place him as you may, must in ultimate instance know *within*. Whatever he can know must be in his consciousness. If Berkeley had been asked to consider the general problem of knowledge, he would have been obliged to say that it is impossible to constitute a knower so that he shall know even an *outer* object otherwise than *within*; that is, he would have found to his astonishment that if he had been asked, Can God make knowledge of an external object otherwise than within a knowing subject? he would have been obliged to answer, No. In ultimate analysis, then, what Berkeley says is but a flout to God; this flout,—Show me a subject whom you assert to know an outer object, and I will prove to you that this object is not outer but within. This whole argument, indeed, is but a bias—is but a one-sided taking advantage of the *problem of knowledge as knowledge*—is but a word-trick. This whole argument, then, maugre its speciousness, is utterly destitute of any validity; for in its despite there *is* an external system—an external system the independent existence and particular relations of which we can prove by innumerable processes of rational inference. Our mouths cannot be shut up by—You only *know* within, and therefore what

you know *is* within. Yet it is astonishing how many mouths have been shut up even so; and the influence of the mere Berkeleyian word-trick must be pronounced immense. Hume, without belief in it, played with it a moment, as he saw that, however it might be situated in reference to the "glory of God," he could turn it, as he turned all things, against the glory of the priests. The vigorous, honest common sense of Reid was for an instant staggered by it. Brown adopted it by half, but ruined it by the half he pieced to it. Hamilton, hating Brown, struck at him with the nail of a virago, but at times condescended to speak well of Berkeley, quite oblivious, as was usual with him, that at other times he had spoken of him altogether differently. Mr. Lewes only knows *within*, and consequently the without, so far as it is known, is but *distortion*. Mr. Grote, to whom truth is always only your truth, or my truth, or his truth—always only the man's truth, or the dog's truth, or the rat's truth; never your truth and my truth and his truth—never the God's truth—Mr. Grote is rather taken with Berkeley, and all the more that Messrs. Mill and Bain, his own father-confessors, lift hat to him,—the former gravely mounted, thin, earnest, sincere as a Don Quixote or a Robespierre, on his asparagus-bunch of possible sensations; and the latter, no less grave, on the wooden horse of his own biceps,—both riding into space! Nay,—certainly gods to all these last—Carlyle and Emerson were at first both Berkeleyian; by whom inspired Ferrier did not hesitate to rekindle the fire of idealism in Scotland, where, indeed it is still supposed fitfully to flicker. Kant could not rub out the mark of Berkeley which he bore, and from him both Fichte and Schelling had to accept it at second hand. Only Hegel it was who put an end to all this *unfug* (nonsense) by his absolute generalization—an absolute generalization, all the same, that was named absolute idealism; and now the modern school of philosophical empiricism in Germany, Ueberweg at its head, actually proves us to know—what we have all along simply known ourselves to know—a veritable external system of material things, which, so far as the individual subject is concerned, is independently existent.

In good truth, the word-trick of Berkeley has had its own consequences. Of these, the most amusing and complete assemblage was witnessed, perhaps, in the person of the now defunct Thersites Smith. Some of us doubtless recollect him at school, where the singularity of his indomitably gay imperviousness, his indomitably *naïve* stupidity, made him not less interesting than remarkable. There was that suppleness, that caressingness in his manners, too, which, with the very innocence of his astounding blunders, rendered him not disliked. Wither the quick-eyed, sharp-featured, thin, weak little lad had that craft and vindictiveness about him that led unconsciously on the part of others to a certain surprised circumspection in his regard. When the strife for prizes came, he could help and he could hinder, and in such strange, straightforward, unhesitating manner, that the spe-

was left with a problem in his hands, to which it was impossible for him to decide whether he should apply the key of craft, of venom, or of sheer stupidity. Thersites had literary ambition with all this: he wrote and spoke incessantly, utterly impassable to any check, and attained to an equivocal fluency in both. He walked indefatigably with his elders, with some of whom subjective idealism was then in vogue. Before these—*obstupuit*; his admiration was simple stupefaction. "What! all those trees and hills and houses are not out there, but here, and within me? That is philosophy;—to know that is to be a philosopher!" His astonishment was unbounded. Sometimes he would eagerly ask, "I am walking on my own self, then, when I think I am walking on this road. That hillock, and the two boys I found behind it when I came up to it, were all the time within me, were they?" No speech about *esse-percipi* could at that time penetrate him; all demonstrations about sensations and perceptions fell from him like hail from the rock. Nevertheless, as it afterwards appeared, *esse-percipi* was to prove his fate. An actual missionary of subjective idealism, he is said to have visited the whole earth; his eye, for the most part, glazed now only with the gleam of the single-minded visionary, the rapt enthusiast, and his plain name of Smith ennobled to Smythe—Thersites Smythe! Poor fellow! he died at St. Petersburg, just at the moment that he saw within reach the summit of his ambition—access to an Imperial Evening. It is a melancholy pleasure to know, as was seen from the dead body, that he had had the consolation to depart this life with the court silk stockings on. His valet brought home—all that survived him—a mass of manuscript. That respectable periodical the *Howl-for-our-Zion* took to this manuscript, which unfortunately, however, so sank on its stomach that it fell into deliquium—a deliquium from which the strongest stimulants failed for long to rouse it.

From sympathetically following the fate of Smythe, we must now, however, return to the lesson. It is shortly this: That philosophy in crumb "doth work like madness in the brain" of the simply obtuse; to all such it is but "the insane root that takes the reason prisoner." The philosophy of Thales, for example, is a philosophy in crumb: it consists of a single proposition. Now some time after the death of Aristotle, there was a poor Barbarian who gave some trouble to the Greek schools of the day, by a claim to know and definitively judge Aristotle, in not one of whose impracticable and innumerable works could he construe a single sentence! "He was a follower of Thales," he said; "he saw clearly that all was water, and he could argue it out with any man. He was a philosopher, then, and knew philosophy. The works of Aristotle were not difficult or abstruse. That excellent lecturer, on the contrary, was eminently clear—clear and easy: on every page he had no object but to prove, as Thales did, that all was water." Hereat the juniors objecting (while the seniors only stared and laughed),—"Why, you know no Greek," had to stare and laugh

themselves at the ready rejoinder, "See, I *write* it;" which he did—*manually*! There are circumstances here not altogether dissimilar from those of Thersites Smythe. It is in all cases tangling to the world to be put out of place by such irrational and inapplicable missions, which at the same time are certainly no unmixed blessings to the missionaries themselves. Whilst *they*, that is, must take the cuff with the bite, the first picturesqueness of their half-crafty, half-unconscious stupidity speedily bores *us*. Peace to the ghost of Thersites Smythe, nevertheless, and may it never rue the cranny through which the Berkeleian proposition, with such unheard of difficulty, at length made its way—a light before which all else, if else there was, sank into darkness! This darkness, it is true, poor Smythe was wont, ostrich-like, to hide from himself, fondly deluding himself with the belief that his blunders were viewed as eccentricities and he himself gaped at as a mysterious philosopher. In his vocation, let us say, he was good natured—free from gratuitous malignity and preposterous vindictiveness.

As already intimated, Ruge passes from contempt of the English to enthusiasm for the French:—

"The French spirit went to the roots; it abandoned the Middle Ages completely and without compromise. . . . Till this movement neither the English spirit, nor, in due extension to the people, the German one, went as far. . . . The great Frenchmen advance infinitely beyond the English; and, from their appeal to nature and spiritual freedom, draw consequences before which even now every genuine Englishman recoils with as much horror as the 'sceptic' David Hume before the atheists at Holbach's table. . . . The *Materialists* take Spinoza and the English at their word, and say *all is Nature*. After the long abandonment of nature, everywhere 'Return to Nature' became the want and the demand."

And here Ruge has reached his own countrymen:—

"Critique of ideas—that is now the requisite. . . . The French *aufklärung* had ideas, but did not get as far as *metaphysic*. . . . This is the task that has been given to the Germans since Kant."

Ruge does not give much space to Kant, however; Kant was probably too theological for him.

"Who thought no further, learnt from Kant only the *independence* of thought on experience, and that of the will on sense, which certainly was an advance on Locke and Helvetius. For the rest, the freedom of thought and will was entangled for Kant in an inextricable tissue of contradictions. The Rationalists, Kant's spiritual progeny, had indeed good enough will to be free and to give reason its own; but the limits of our faculties opened the door anew to the fables of Revelation, which from all sides streamed in again. . . . It was the contradictions that were now the problem to be solved. . . . Fichte solves now these, and stands for the *absolute* freedom of man. . . . 'The determinations of things,' says Fichte, 'are determinations of the thinking subject.' All true *being* is *knowing*. The substance of the universe is not *ungeist*, *widergeist* (un-spirit, contra-

spirit), the union of which with spirit were never comprehensible, but spirit itself. No death, no lifeless matter, but everywhere life, spirit, intelligence: a spirit-realm, and utterly nothing else. Once more: all veritable *knowing* is *being*, involves absolute reality and objectivity; or the *subject* is *substance*, and constitutes the matter of every reality. . . . Later, Fichte himself sets 'God' in the place of the 'Ego,' and the world in the place of the 'non-ego:' he ends as an Oriental—he that was the first freeman! . . . He, Fichte, falls back into the drivel of our grandmother theology! . . . This drivel, as we have seen, however incompatible with all philosophy, still keeps the mastery of all our modern philosophy, with the exception of certain French *enlighteners*."

Ruge is particularly hard on Schelling:—

"Schelling and the Romanticists take their point of departure from this apostasy of Fichte's from his own self, and patch up out of it a fantastic and arbitrary system, dominated on the whole by Christianity. . . . In Schelling and the Romanticists the spirit of the Middle Ages once more concentrates itself, with restoration—yet again before the door shuts—of the ancient tyranny over thought of faith, vision, ecstasy. . . . Here Schelling plays the Pope. . . . Hegel it is that is the true *continuator* of the philosophy of Fichte."

So once more in sum:—

"Kant declared the contradictions of pure reason insoluble; Fichte made solution of these his principle, and disclosed the method by which it was to be accomplished. He had reached Freedom, the Absolute; he had demonstrated the unity of substance and the subject, of being and knowing in self-conscious, thinking humanity; but he was able to complete neither the system of the universe nor the system of intelligence on this principle of idealism. The logical, physical, and moral order of the universe which he proclaimed required still to be expressed, deduced, and scientifically demonstrated as a completed system. This achievement, in Fichte's sense, and according to the method so accurately signalised by Fichte, is the Hegelian system."

And having thus arrived within sight of the "New Atalantis," we shall leave our further discussion with Ruge till another occasion. The reader will, we think, see, however, that we have no call to apologise for what we have communicated thus far. Ruge is a man of unusual peculiarity; but he is also a man of deep, tenacious study, and of valuable insight. We feel sure that the preceding pages contain many true glimpses of what in philosophy is most precious at present.

(To be continued.)

Religion.

ARE THE SACRAMENTS ESSENTIAL TO SALVATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

CHRISTIAN duty and obligation are as requisite as Christian faith. "Faith without works is dead." There can be no doubt that the observance of the sacraments is an essential result and completion of the Christian's faith—are the overt acts by which we witness a good confession. Outward though the acts are, they are the signs of inward change. As the Church catechism distinctly affirms in its answer to the question, What meanest thou by this word sacrament? which is, "I mean an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given unto us." On this account it was that, when, on the great day of the Pentecostal outpouring of the Holy Spirit, the hearers of the Apostles cried out, "What shall we do" [to be saved?] "Peter said unto them, Repent and *be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost*" (Acts ii. 38). We read thereafter that "they who gladly received his word were *baptized*, and that "they continued steadfastly in the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and *in breaking of bread*, and in prayers."

In this narrative we perceive (1) that faith came into the heart by the influence of the Spirit through the preaching of the Word; (2) that faith requires to be followed up by repentance or a turning away from the love and practice of sin; (3) that a sign of repentance and renewal of nature is required, as a personal act of renunciation binding on the individual's conscience, and as a token, to the fellowship of believers, that membership had been claimed by and given to the person; (4) that the blessings of Christ, as remission of sin and the graces of the Spirit, were subsequent to and consequent upon faith, repentance, and baptism; (5) that, as a sign of continuance or perseverance in the faith and fellowship, the sacramental "breaking of bread," &c. was required. This was the witnessing act which showed that "the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul;" and that "great grace was upon them all."

That baptism was the received and common initiatory rite by which entrance was obtained into the Christian Church in Apostolic times is quite evident from the conduct of the "eunuch of great authority under Candace, queen of the Ethiopians," who had informed himself as thoroughly as he was able, while in Jerusalem to worship, in regard to the new doctrine, and was anxiously

pondering the way of salvation. He, on feeling conviction in his heart, immediately exclaims, "See! here is water; what doth hinder me to be baptized?" (Acts viii. 36). In this we notice that he speaks of baptism as an established rite, well known and regularly practised as an initiation into the fold, faith, and fellowship of Christ. Philip elicited from him a good confession; and he accordingly administered the ceremonial of induction and introduction, so that the eunuch "went on his way rejoicing" because he had been numbered among such as should be saved, if they continued steadfastly in the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship.

The fact noted by S. S. in his able article—which contains many valuable observations, as do others of his papers, in the midst of many vagaries, if not perversities of speculation—that St. Paul affirms to the Corinthians that Christ did not send him to baptize, but to preach; and that the Apostle of the Gentiles thanked God that he had baptized few of them, is wide of the present debate; and does not justify the inference S. S. would draw from it—of the worthlessness of baptism. Paul was a stirrer up of men to faith, repentance, love, and new obedience. He was a peripatetic missionary of grace and the gospel. He introduced the thin edge of the wedge into the hard and stony hearts of his hearers, and he left the administration of the dew of grace and the signs of fellowship in the gospel to the settled agencies of the Church—because they were the fixed, settled, and ordained institutions of his Lord while he was a pilgrim and a stranger for God and His Christ in the present evil world, going whithersoever the Spirit bent or sent him to preach the glad tidings of good news to man—salvation through a risen Saviour. But the special object of his thanksgiving was that he had kept himself free from misconception. "Lest any one," says he, "should say that I had baptized in my own name." But this shows the importance he attached to baptism, and the universality of baptism in the early Church; for his query—"were ye baptized in the name of Paul?"—assumes that, though he had baptized so few, yet *all* the members of the Corinthian Church were baptized. He commends them that they kept the ordinances as he had delivered them; and affirms, "by one Spirit are *we all baptized into one body*" (1 Cor. xii. 13). It seems plain, then, that Paul regarded baptism as an essential to salvation, and attached a supreme importance to it. See what stress and importance he lays upon it in his splendidly argumentative chapter when he says, "Else what shall they do which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not?" (1 Cor. xv. 29). If baptism were the unimportant matter which the negators in this debate assert that it is, the whole argument of the Apostle would lose its power, and "ineffectual fall."

Baptism as a sign of a covenant, and that a covenant of grace, cannot be worthless, however apparently insignificant the form of it may seem. The ark of Noah was a sign of the ark of God; the rainbow of promise was the sign of the promises of the gospel; the sign of circumcision was indicative of the purity of the heart; the

blood sprinkled on the door-posts of the houses of Israel shadowed forth the blood of the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sins of the world. Even Jonah the prophet, in his dreadful burial-baptism, was a sign of Jesus, the dying and risen Redeemer, as Jesus himself affirms. The manna in the wilderness showed forth the bread of life—Christ the new life of the Spirit. All these were signs, but they were not worthless, yea rather they had much worth because of that infinite prototype and antitype of which they were the types. So is it with baptism, it is only a sign, but it is not a sign to be despised. It is one to be valued. It is true as S. S. observes, that we have instances of people being saved without baptism, but then, as worthy old Fuller has said—

“God freely doth attend
His ordinance, but will not be confined
Thereto; when 'tis not neglected or despised
They that want water are by fire baptised;
Those sanctified that ne'er were circumcised.”

Of the importance justly attached by the Church to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper or the Eucharistic feast, St. Paul is a witness. This sacrament, which S. S. affirms to be a non-essential of Christian faith and practice (see p. 102) was made the subject of express revelation from God to him (1 Cor. xi. 23; xv. 3; Gal. i. 11—16). Do S. S. and his coadjutors imagine that a matter of no importance, as they affirm the Eucharist to be, would be made the topic of special and specific revelation; and that, too, for the “edifying of the Church”? If any lingering doubt hang on the mind of any one as to the essential nature of the Eucharist, this may disperse it like a cloud before the light of the Most High.

“Baptism,” S. S. says, “is a figure, and only a figure”—basing his argument on 1 Peter iii. 21. So was circumcision; so was the Passover—even Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us (1 Cor. v. 7); so was the Tabernacle (Heb. ix. 6—11); so were Adam (Rom. v. 14); Isaac (Heb. xi. 19); David, &c.; and these would all come, as figures, under the condemnation which S. S. passes on figures as worthless and unreal; yet he might have paused in his contemptuous estimate of figures and similitudes on considering how frequently they have been employed by God for spiritual purposes, and how requisite they are to enable men to realize the communion of God with man; for how else than by visible or other outward signs is man capable of comprehending the mysteries of spiritual grace?*

* “It may seem strange, at first sight, that Almighty God should use material substances at all for this purpose. Why not impart spiritual gifts without any medium whatever? Why use the elements of a fallen world; and, to some extent, a world lying under a curse, for this end? The most obvious reason, and one which at once presents itself to our apprehension, is that of *similia similibus curantur*. We have a body formed from the dust of the earth, as well as an animating soul; therefore

A. T. H. asserts that "baptism is spiritual" (p. 266)—a proposition which no one, we presume, is likely to deny; but is it nothing else? What are the words of our Lord himself on this subject?—"Except a man be born of *water and of the Spirit*, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (John iii. 5). Baptism is here not only a spiritual gift, but an outward symbol—an act done and a process effected. It is the sign of admission into the church of the firstborn, who are written in heaven. It is through bap-

a sacrament is formed on a like principle, and is adapted to things with a material and an immaterial substance, body and soul. This is true; but it is not the whole truth. There is a reason that lies deeper than this. The earth shared in the curse of man's fall. All creation, groaning and travailing in pain, is made subject to vanity; but it is in the hope that it shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, and transformed into the kingdom of God. Earth, with all its creatures, animate and inanimate, shared in the curse of the fall. 'The trail of the serpent is over them all.' Man lost his dominion over the creatures of God's making, and an alien power succeeded in his place. Satan is the 'Prince of this world,' the Prince of the powers of the air. But what the first Adam lost, the second Adam is to recover; what man forfeited, man is to regain. Consequently, animate and inanimate nature is to share man's redemption as it shared man's fall. Hence the rite of sacrifice, the consecration of matter living and matter lifeless, to God. Temples, altars, sacrifices, mean more than mere shadows of the Atonement—they form a part of it. Whether natural instinct or Divine appointment instituted sacrifice, matters little. It has Divine sanction. Altars, at least, are as old as that which is offered thereon. When the angel's foot touched the ground, consecration followed. 'Take thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place where thou standest is holy ground.' 'How dreadful is this place! this is none other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven.' The altar on which a victim was offered was no less holy than the victim itself. The grove that Abraham planted at his altar was the primitive temple of God. The altar was holy; it was a portion of the before-cursed earth, snatched from the power of the Prince of this world, and redeemed for God: an earnest of the whole earth in future ages to be again blessed. The mount on which God descended in great majesty is the holy mount, the hill of God. And when, under divine direction, the grove gave way to the Tabernacle, and the simple mound of earth to the brazen and the golden altar of the Tabernacle; when vessels of gold, silver, brass, were dedicated to God; when the wooden boards, the curtains of skins, of wool, of linen, formed the habitation of the presence of God, a further step was made in the consecration of material things to His divine service. When the stone and cedar temple of Solomon stood on the place where the earthen altar of Abraham had before been raised, and the glory of God filled that Temple, it became the house of God; and the very city in the midst of which it stood became, consequently, the Holy City; nay, the whole land trodden by the feet of the Incarnate God is known as the Holy Land. All became, in some sense, sacraments, outward signs of a Divine presence; and thus were made the firstfruits of the promised redemption of the whole."—*Tracts for the Day. The Seven Sacraments: edited by Rev. Orby Shipley, M.A., p. 4.*

tism that we are able to call God truly "Abba, Father!" and become the children of God. Baptism is the mark of our adoption into God's house.

In regard to the Lord's Supper, S. S. affirms "that not the faintest intimation is in any part of the Scriptures given of the necessity of the Eucharist to salvation" (p. 102). This, of course, depends on the reply to the question, "How readeest thou?" I read that "the Word," Jesus Christ, was made flesh and dwelt among us; that He said, "My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed;" that, having blessed the Communion elements, He says, "This is My body broken for you" (in figure), and "this cup is the new testament in My blood, which is shed for you" (Luke xxii. 20); and the same divine voice has also said, "*Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, ye have no life in you;*" but "Whoso eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day; for My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed; he that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood dwelleth in Me, and I in him" (John vi. 53-56).

The testimony of Jesus Christ, of the apostles Peter and Paul, of the evangelist Philip, and the example of the early Church, all agree in proving that the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharistic Supper are essential to salvation. It is at the peril of Christian life that participation in them is neglected; for they are "the ordinances of divine service" which our Lord hath instituted, and it is a Christian's duty to "walk in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord blameless."

P. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE whole gist of this question depends upon the construction we put upon the word "sacraments." The definition we should give to that term would be a very different one to that proffered by either of the openers of this debate. It would be the realization of the original meaning of "*sacramentum*," indeed "an oath; a pledge to be true and faithful unto death; never to desert, disobey, or fail in duty." To the sincere disciple of Christ there is only one real sacrament—viz., "the new birth;" that act by which the child of the world becomes the child of God; by which he ceases to live a life of selfishness and devotion to earthly purposes and ends, and commences a life of devotion to Christ and His interests alone. Henceforth he is "dead unto the world, and alive only unto Christ." He hath been "baptized with the Holy Ghost and with fire." He hath "eaten of the body and drunk of the blood of Christ;" and hath already commenced the life immortal. He may apparently live the same outward life in this world, and pursue the same occupations he had pursued before, but with a very different purpose. Whatsoever he now does "he doth it unto Christ." He may even transgress the commandments of the Decalogue as frequently as before his conversion; but he is truly "faithful r

death," for it is not he which doeth these things "but sin which dwelleth in him." We opine that this is the only true sacrament, this sinking of self into Christ, and that this includes all the sacraments. Thus understood, not only is it *necessary* to salvation, but forms a very integral portion of that transaction. There is indeed no salvation in any instance without the baptism of the Holy Ghost, or without the drinking of the cup of the blood of the Son of man.

But the openers on both sides have not taken this spiritual view of the sacrament. They both simply treat the question in relation to the outward ceremonies which pass under the name of sacraments in the churches of the present day; and as we suppose that is the view that will be taken by most writers on the subject in this magazine, we most unhesitatingly and uncompromisingly range ourselves on the negative side; for not only do we deny that these "*sacraments*" are in any way essential to salvation, but we go much farther, and deny even that their *observance* is in any way binding on the Christian of the nineteenth century.

The argument taken up by S. S. is so self-evident that it is need less for us to go over the same ground again. Briefly and syllogistically it stands thus—

If the sacraments were essential to salvation, they could not be dispensed with in any instance.

The Scriptures furnish instances of persons having been saved without observing them.

Ergo—they are not essential.

This argument, we think, is so strong that it will much puzzle the upholders of ritualistic salvation to disprove it. Yet there remains a great deal in the argument of P. S. A. and "*Ecclesia*," viz., that "the sacraments being holy ordinances of Christ," all those who truly love Him will keep His commandments; and therefore those who neglect the observance of His ordinances negatively prove their want of love to Him. And we suppose no one on either side of this controversy will deny that any who willingly and knowingly live in open want of obedience to the commands of the Great Shepherd can hardly be sheep of His fold, or else would "they know His voice and follow Him." But we do not believe that Christ commanded or intended His followers to continue these outward ceremonials He is supposed to have instituted; and if we can prove that He did not, we shall at once dispose of P. S. A.'s and "*Ecclesia's*" arguments, and also of the very question itself.

First, then in regard to *Baptism*. This word, like many others of frequent occurrence in the New Testament, is therein used to express two extremely different ideas; the first and literal being the baptism by water, as practised first by John the Baptist, and continued by some of Christ's disciples. The name given to this outward ceremonial was often used by Christ and His apostles to represent that spiritual regeneration and washing away of sin dependent on salvation through Christ: the baptism of the Holy

Spirit. The only difficulty arises when we confound these two most distinct meanings of the word ; and it is all the more singular that this should ever be done, because in the symbolic language of the Bible the name of the substance is so frequently taken from the shadow—of the antitype from that of the type. Thus Christ is called “the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world,” “an High Priest,” “the second Adam,” and many other names taken directly from the objects of which He was the antitype. We never hear now of any one mistaking and confusing these ideas. The Jews of old may have looked for a Messiah who would be a temporal as well as a spiritual David ; but no one now reads in Revelation that “the Lamb in the midst of the throne shall lead them,” and thinks of the Mosaical sacrificial lamb. And yet most illogically the majority of nineteenth century Christians persist in confounding the seen and the unseen, the natural and the spiritual, whenever they think of the sacrament of baptism.*

The origin of baptism by water seems to be very obscure, it having been performed occasionally by the Jews, as well as many

* We add, from a paper by W. O. H. C., for the whole of which, as it is uncontroversial, we have not space, the following passage in relation to the question of baptism.—Ed. B. C. :—

“If one passage or one class of passages stands in bolder relief from the sacred page than another, it is those which proclaim the tidings of salvation, and the one among them which has perhaps obtained the greatest prominence of all is the often quoted, but never to be hackneyed, answer to the Philippine jailer’s question ‘What shall I do to be saved.’ The answer, ‘Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved’ stamps at once the character of the salvation sought.

“Another and perhaps equally prominent passage is the words of Jesus Christ, ‘He that believeth on Me hath everlasting life.’ The fact that the thief, crucified with the Saviour, went to Paradise simply by virtue of his belief and acknowledgment that Jesus was the Son of God is again decided and plain. Some of the last words of the Saviour were an injunction to go into the world, preaching the gospel to every creature, ‘He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned.’ This passage has excited some difficulty in my mind ; but I think that not only do some of the instances I have cited set it on one side, but that baptism is not essential to, but simply a result of belief (which is synonymous with salvation), is clearly shown by the fact that non-baptism is not represented to be essential to damnation.

“The sixth chapter of Romans, a part of that masterpiece of profound reasoning by the Apostle Paul, clearly and simply expounds the whole of baptism, showing it to be the public acknowledgment by the Christian of his non-identity with the world, and his position as dead to it and to sin and alive unto God ; at the same time, I believe, typifying the washing from original and previous sin which he has already undergone by virtue of his belief in Christ’s atoning work.

“There is certainly a distinct baptism, which was practised by John, but that this is not similar to the baptism subsequently practised is evident from Acts xviii. 25 and xix. 3.”

heathen nations, with varying significations. As instituted by John the Baptist, however, it had a very special intent. John proclaimed himself to be a messenger coming before the Messiah "to prepare the way of the Lord and make His paths straight." All who were awakened by his preaching and teaching to a realization of their sinful position before God, and announced themselves to be penitent, were passed by him into the new society he was forming by the initiatory rite of baptism by water. This seems to have been looked upon as an outward sign of the renunciation by the baptized one—whether Jew or Gentile—of his former views, and his taking up the position (at any rate externally) of a follower of the new gospel. Under this same sense the rite seems to have been performed by some of the disciples both of Christ and of John. But its importance never seems to have been urged upon the convert by any one after the close of its founder's ministry. In fact we are told that "Jesus baptized not," and St. Paul "thanked God that he had baptized" no more than he had done, which would hardly have been the case had the ordinance been looked upon by either of them as a very important one. Necessarily at that time the rite was only performed on those who believed the new faith, and upon their households, who, according to the Jewish and Roman ideas, were presumed to have no views but in accordance with the head of the house. A family once baptized into the new faith the ordinance lost its significancy, their descendants of course being *born* nominally Christians and not requiring an outer rite to make them so; and though, with the human love for deeds and ceremonials, water baptism has been kept up by Christian Churches till the present day, it is not in any way more *necessary now* than for negro children born in freedom to have writings made out to prove that fact, because, forsooth, their ancestors some ages ago lived in a state of slavery. Looking at the ordinance as now administered we should think it exceedingly doubtful if it is not far more injurious than beneficial in its tendency, and instead of its being in any way binding upon a Christian now, we believe that it would long before this have been entirely given up by all the most intelligent Christian bodies had it not been for the unfortunate confusion of ideas about the baptism of water and the baptism of the Holy Spirit to which we have referred. Though how it can be possible to do so after an unbiased perusal of the New Testament it is very difficult to comprehend. From John the Baptist, who pointed to Christ as "He who should baptise with the Holy Ghost and with fire," in contradistinction to his own formality; and Christ himself, who proclaimed that all "who believed and were baptized should be saved;" to St. Paul, who teaches "One Lord, one faith, one baptism;" again, "By one Spirit are we all baptized into one body," and again, "As many as are baptized into Christ have put on Christ"—they one and all clearly infer that the real binding and essential baptism was spiritual, supernatural, and divine. Alas that ever such essentially differing ideas should be confounded! but still more melancholy the fact that

some of our blinded teachers should even seek to *substitute* the shadow for the substance, and by exalting the rite degrade the very idea of one of the holy mysteries of God! Oh! may we pray! pray! pray! for more light and discernment; that we may all—keeping to the Scriptures as our guide and rule of faith—see clearly and understand the there revealed “truth as it is in Jesus,” and never wrest it to our own destruction.

Of the observance of the ceremonial Eucharist we need say very little. The arguments we have been advancing respecting baptism apply to it with a tenfold force. It does seem almost incredible that Christ should be mistaken by any one when he says, “My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed;” and again, “Whoso eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life;” “Do this in remembrance of Me.” Do what? Eat bread and drink wine blessed by a priest, or unblessed by a parson, either in small portions—homœopathic doses—as is the custom to-day, or in inebriating quantities, as appears to have prevailed with the poor Corinthian Church? Does *this* give eternal life? or does Christ mean that those who *live* in spiritual dependence upon Him—who have His very Spirit infused into their spirits—are they who have the true life within them? Verily, whosoever drinketh of *this* wine shall thirst again, but whoso drinketh of the wine that Christ shall give him, it shall be in him a well, springing up unto eternal life. Thou Bread of Life! thou Fountain of living waters! illuminate our minds and souls, that seeing we may perceive and understand, and that the wayfaring man, though a fool, may not err in the comprehension and application of Thy own eternal truth!

HIAWATHA.

THE GOSPELS.—As the four Gospels were originally intended for diverse circles of readers, so at present may one reader prefer to peruse this evangelist and another that; and just as the first three appeared sooner and the fourth later, so also is it advisable (for those who would read the Gospels one by one) to begin with the first three, and afterwards to advance to the fourth. For this purpose they have been intentionally placed in the order in which they now stand. In point of fact, the Gospel of St. John is in some degree more for advanced Christians, by which, however, we do not mean persons of learning so much as persons who have some sense and relish for the fellowship of Jesus Christ. The other three are in some measure more for beginners in Christianity. Just, however, as even the earlier Christians were not satisfied with the single Gospel which first came into their hands, but made a collection of the whole four, because they wished to possess and to use them all, so ought we also, in the special use we make of them, to advance as far as John, and learn aright from him the life that is in Jesus, as from the Son of God, who both is the life, and has it to bestow; and partly also in general ought we to peruse all the four Gospels contemporaneously and proportionally—or, in other words, in harmony,—because only in this way can the complete image of Jesus be formed in our souls.—*W. C. Barth's "Bible Manual."*

Philosophy.

CAN HIGH EDUCATION COUNTERACT THE EAGERNESS OF THE SENSES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

It is to be regretted that the several writers who, up to the present time, have taken part in this debate are not agreed as to the precise meaning of the terms in which the question is couched. Each succeeding writer expresses his dissatisfaction with the significations given to the terms by those who have preceded him, and proceeds to discuss the question from that point of view indicated by his own definition of the points in dispute. Georgius objects to B. L. K.'s definition of the meaning of the expression "high education;" but we strongly suspect he has not succeeded either in proving it to be erroneous and untenable, or in advancing a more correct and comprehensive definition. Georgius defines high education as being "a phrase used by the aristocracy to denote a *high*, polished, classical, and 'finished' education." For our part, we much prefer the definition of B. L. K. to that of Georgius. We are of opinion that high education is distinguished from general education not so much by a difference in principle as in degree. B. L. K. defines high education to be "that sort of training which is given at school and college, which enables a man to enjoy with some relish the graces of letters and the activities and results of thought." Georgius criticises this by remarking that "this is only the true character of education." So far from endorsing the opinion of Georgius, we contend that the words of B. L. K. express, not only the true character of education, but also the true character of high education. The mind which has received a high education must necessarily be more complete in its culture, and possess a wider range of attainments, than the mind whose education has been conducted on a narrower scale. To us, it is inconceivable that a man should be highly educated, without having first become master of that area of knowledge which is comprehended in a common or general education. High education is a completion of general education—it is, in fact, general education reaching a fuller development and a higher perfection. We conceive, therefore, that in proportion to a man's growth in high education will be his capacity to enjoy "with relish the graces of letters and the activi-

ties and results of thought;" and it is evident that the description of B. L. K., which "Georgius" affirms to be true only of education, applies to high education with peculiar force. Reverting to "Georgius's" own definition, we would ask what is meant by a polished, classical, and "finished" education? We presume that a man who goes through the mental training required in the attainment of this polished and classical education will, as a result of that training, be better qualified to enjoy the "graces of letters and the activities and results of thought." Hazlitt, speaking of a classical education, says :—

"It gives men liberal views; it accustoms the mind to take an interest in things foreign to itself; to love virtue for its own sake . . . and to fix our thoughts on the remote and permanent instead of narrow and fleeting objects."

Hazlitt, with his "keen sense of the beautiful" and his intense love of letters, may possibly have given a slightly exaggerated description of the effect of classical studies on the mind. But, without accepting what he says as literally true, we venture to think that a classical education, which "Georgius" states to be one of the elements of a "high education," is calculated to expand the intelligence, and to increase a man's sympathy with all that is sublime in thought and beautiful in art. "Georgius" admits, in the opening part of his contribution, that education gives a man the capability of "controlling and guiding his senses aright," and says that "education cannot be the point on which we differ." We confess our inability to reconcile this admission with the opinion expressed in the closing sentence of his paper, which runs as follows:—"Unless the vital truths of Christianity change the heart, *no education, high or general*, can counteract the eagerness of the senses." In one place he admits that education enables a man to control and guide his senses aright, and in another place he asserts that "no education, high or general, can counteract the eagerness of the senses." This is clearly a contradiction! Further, as regards the position assumed by "Georgius," that no education can counteract the eagerness of the senses, it is perfectly evident that education is the point on which we differ, for we, on the affirmative side, maintain that education can check the eagerness of the sensual propensities.

There is an important distinction which, in this discussion, should not be forgotten or ignored. It is, that high education, while it does counteract, does not absolutely destroy the eagerness of the senses. The animal propensities form a very essential part of the mental constitution of man, and their gratification is necessary to attain the ends for which he was created. The exercise of all his powers, physical, moral, and intellectual, is the fundamental condition of a true and harmonious development of the nature of man. The intellectual and the moral should control and regulate the gratification of the animal faculties. When the activity of t^h

animal propensities is greater than the activity of the moral and intellectual powers, the man is living in violation of natural laws, and a normal condition of life must be induced by the restoration of the intellectual and moral feelings to their rightful supremacy.* High education supposes a cultivation of the intellect, which cultivation confirms and strengthens the intellect itself as a regulating principle in the mind. The education of the intellect, and the education of the moral sense, often proceed *pari passu*, and this education of the moral and intellectual relatively lessens the power of the animal. The force of these observations is not nullified by pointing to a highly educated mind that is deeply tainted with vice and sensuality. This proves, not that high education cannot counteract the eagerness of the senses, but that in this instance it has not effectually done so. There may, in the case of a lofty but sensual mind, exist peculiar conditions of organization, by which its inclination to the sensual is explainable. We do not deny that the man of cultured mind may be "sore given to revelry and ungodly glee," but we maintain that, without education or culture, his addiction to the pleasures of sense would have been still more decided. As a generality, we maintain the truth of this proposition,—That the less educated the mind, the greater value will it place on the pleasures of the senses; and, conversely, that the higher the education, the less will be the value placed on sensual pleasures. This receives striking confirmation from actual experience. The men distinguished for their intellectual superiority—as has been stated by a former writer in this debate—have generally been distinguished also for their comparative freedom from indulgence in carnal pleasures. We are aware that W. A. has taken the

* As related to this topic we quote, with permission, a paragraph of a letter from the pen of S. N. containing an important and useful distinction of thought:—"Moral education is training in the regulation of manners, conduct, and behaviour, from a sense of duty by the determination of individual will; in habitual considerations of what is truly just and honourable, proper and kindly. That is not a moral act in its inner nature which is done through outward pressure or by the incidence of rule, precept, and law upon the mind. Morality springs from the spontaneous activity of our own nature, and is the exertion of the faculties of our spirits in constant subordination to recognised principles and ever-present conscientiousness of soul. Moral duty (*Mos*) differs from public duty (*Jus*) and religious duty (*Fas*) not only in its area and level, but in its very essence. Public duty may be performed from mixed motives of fear, prudence, imitativeness, &c.; religious duty through formalism, love of doing like others, &c.; but moral duty—to be really entitled to the name—must issue from conscience, and must make principle the guide of life, interpenetrating every thought, feeling, speech, and act. That hypocrisy of morals called fashion and etiquette, the surface veneering prevalent in the social circle, holds no place in any moral code; and tact, managingness, suavity, polish, and *patelinage* lie quite beyond the region of morality pure and simple."

trouble to signalize a number of exceptions to this opinion; but it were easy to select an array of names on the opposite side, and in support of our theory.

The immediate and direct result of high education is, that it provides a man with a greater variety of pleasurable pursuits than he could possibly enjoy without it. It enables him equally to wander with delight amid the flowery paths of poetry, and to thread the intricate mazes of philosophy. As Robert Hall has well remarked,—

“Knowledge in general expands the mind, exalts the faculties, refines the taste for pleasure, and opens numerous sources of intellectual enjoyment. By means of it we become less dependent for satisfaction upon the sensitive appetites, the gross pleasures of sense are more easily despised, and we are made to feel the superiority of the spiritual to the material part of our nature.”

The animal propensities are sure to grow and become active, whether the intellect is cultivated or not. The education of the intellect, therefore, strengthens a counteracting or balancing element in man's nature, which prevents the animal passions from obtaining absolute sway. It evokes the consciousness of the enjoyment of pleasures which are distinguished from the pleasures of sense by being at once more lasting and satisfying. No rational mind would think of questioning that education is a good thing in itself, or that “by means of it we become less dependent for satisfaction on the sensitive appetites.” Now, if education does elevate the soul, and make a man less dependent on the pleasures derived from the gratification of the “sensitive appetites,” surely *high* education must, in a still greater degree, have the same effect. *Ceteris paribus*, the higher the education the more easily will a man be able to resist the allurements of the senses. There is but one way in which this inference can be eluded, and that is by denying that the effect of education in man is to counteract the eagerness of the senses. If the writers on the negative maintain this opinion—and “Georgius” seems to do so—we think they are chargeable with writing in defence of a proposition which no man, except by some “strange perversity of thought,” would attempt to defend. The most superficial acquaintance with the constitution of the human mind should be sufficient to save any man from defending a proposition so paradoxical and absurd. It is generally admitted that education of the least pretending character increases a man's range of ideas, and qualifies him to enjoy pleasures in which the illiterate cannot participate. Accordingly, education is clearly instrumental in counteracting the eagerness of the sensual appetites, inasmuch as it excites and secures pleasures and activities by which the mind is itself ennobled and lifted high above the region of purely sensual enjoyments. Consistently with these views, education is demanded by enlightened thinkers on the principle that it will tend to diminish crime, poverty, and immorality.

and insure the safety of the State. Ignorance, we are told, is the great source of the evils with which society is afflicted; and, by natural sequence, the remedy pointed to is education. There can be little room to doubt that some of the most prevalent of existing evils spring from a perverted and ill-regulated activity of the senses. The only effectual means by which these evils can be mitigated or destroyed is a completer and more efficient education of the minds of the people; and all efforts made to diffuse and spread intellectual light in order that minds which are now wandering in darkness may be illuminated, are founded on the conviction that the diffusion of that light will result in the elevation of the life and character of the people.

We agree with W. A. in the opinion that the education of the senses increases their power, facility, and delicacy of function. We also agree with him in thinking that a true and complete education of man requires that all his faculties—bodily, mental, and moral—should be trained and developed. When the education of the senses is partial and incomplete, it is absolutely inevitable that the senses which are trained and exercised will become so eager and powerful as to prevent the other senses from receiving their due share of gratification. It is worthy of remark, that the faculties and propensities which attain to a full activity in all men, are those which for their training and exercise are least contingent on intellectual culture. The other powers of the mind being imperfectly educated, these lower propensities are unchecked in their exercise by opposite mental forces, and the consequence is, that they become more and more powerful by the increased frequency of their gratification. High education, in its intellectual aspects, does not incite the lower propensities to greater activity, but educes the latent energy and talent of higher faculties, in the frequent and well-directed exercise of which a man may find immense enjoyment and satisfaction. High education, therefore, according to W. A.'s conception of it, is highly effective in interposing a salutary check to the imperious demands of the sensual desires, by calling into action other faculties, the gratification of which is productive of greater intellectual than sensual delight. Instead of leaving a man with his lower propensities only cultivated and in activity, it develops and unfolds any capacities he may have for music, painting, sculpture, or literature. We claim, therefore, that the argument of W. A., in its integrity, is a very powerful, and, to us, irresistible argument in support of high education—accepting his own comprehensive idea of what high education implies—as counteracting the eagerness of the senses—that is, the eagerness of those instincts and attributes the unrestrained and immoderate activity of which is synonymous with the most debasing sensualism. "Education," writes W. A., "often leads men to studies which increase their temptations, and educated men are often brought to entertain ideas which help to develop their sensual nature." This may be perfectly true, but, as an argument, it is founded on a mode of reason-

ing which may be employed with equal force in favour of education. For it may be said, and truly said, that by education men are often brought to entertain ideas which help to develop their higher nature: education, in fact, consists mainly in the development of the higher nature. There are, we admit, books in which the "seductions of vice are glozed over and made attractive," but there are also books in which the "cherub-hydra" is depicted in all its hideous deformity. We would here point out, that the books in which the foeler aspects of vice and immorality are often concealed under the glowing language of poetry are generally well known to and well perused by the comparatively uneducated. An acquaintance with such books is not peculiar to the highly educated, who, possessing a cultivated literary taste, are, as compared with those whose education is narrow and stunted, more likely to read the productions we are speaking of more for the sake of intellectual than sensual gratification. "Culture," says Emerson, "is all that gives the mind possession of its own powers," and, depend upon it, the mind in fullest possession of its own powers is the most securely protected against the seductions of vice and sensuality.

It strikes us that the arguments intended to prove the negative of the question we are discussing really go to prove the inefficacy, not of high education merely, but of all education that is directed to the improvement of the understanding; and the position taken up by "Georgius" in this debate is strikingly illustrative of this opinion. The salutary effects that can be shown to result from education as such can be shown equally to result from high education. If the education of his mind gives a man a finer appreciation of the beautiful; if it inspires him with loftier aspirations, and higher hopes; if, by unfolding his powers of thought, it enables him to find delight and satisfaction in intellectual occupations and pursuits; if it gives him a truer conception of his own nature, and the responsibilities which the possession of that nature involves,—is it possible to deny that high education, by producing these effects and impressions in a still higher degree, does counteract the eagerness of the senses?

A. B.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

HAVE not the majority of the writers on the affirmative of this question mistaken culture for education? Steele, in the *Tatler*, says,—“One might wear any passion out of a family by *culture*, as skilful gardeners blot a colour out of a tulip that hurts its beauty.” But this involves a repeated process of selection and special care, passing through several generations, and does not refer to that which can be done in a single individual. We know, of course, that there is a very general confusion made between these two terms, but we rather think that culture includes more in it than education. It is only when speaking metaphorically that we use culture for

education, as in the apocryphal book of 2 Esdras it is said,—“Give us seed unto our heart, and culture unto our understanding, that there may come fruit of it.” Culture, however, in its best usage signifies the care and skill bestowed by the cultivator in forwarding and improving any product, so that it may reproduce a better and more valuable product than it was, upon which the care had been exercised. It supposes seed, soil, care, and reproductive power and plenty. But education has not this implied meaning. The notions of training and of care are indeed united in it; but the educator's skill and efforts are confined to the single individual whose faculties he is called upon to develop, and lead forth into activity and exercise.

“Education,” says the ‘judicious’ Hooker, “and instruction are the means, the one by use, the other by precept, to make our natural faculty of reason both the better and the sooner to judge rightly between truth and error, and good and evil.” If this is a proper idea of education it is plain that it has little to do with the counteracting of “the eagerness of the senses.” The educator educates, but the cultivator produces; the former makes the best of what he has before him, the latter does the best with what he has before him to induce or bring about a better thing in succession to that on which he exercises his skill. Considerations such as these have led us to think that the writers on the affirmative side of this debate have taken the question in the sense of “Can high *culture* counteract the eagerness of the senses?” instead of “Can high *education*, &c., where *culture* seems to pass in its effects beyond the individual, while education appears to be confined within the one person who is the object of care and training. If this is not the case, the use they have made of the language they employ has not been so accurate as it might have been, or the present writer has been less able to follow the reasoning used than he supposes he is in the habit of doing; at all events, we have here signalized a possible fallacy in the terms of the discussion.

Few, we suppose, would deny that in the course of generations culture would so improve and better the race which was subjected to it as to make it less inclined to sensual indulgences, and more capable of finding delight in higher and nobler enjoyments. But it may well be questioned if, the endowments of the person being taken for granted, it is possible by education to lessen the amount of pleasurable sensation with which the person will be satisfied. It might however, we think, perhaps, be possible to divert, by high education, the direction of the sensational enjoyment craved. This, however, is doubtful. We find most men born with their specific natures, dispositions, tendencies, and bias, so that we can pretty accurately know what kind of pleasures affect them most. The sculptor, the painter, the draughtsman, the engineer, the architect, the gardener, &c., are all more or less the inheritors of their peculiar bent, and they can scarcely ever be diverted, in the long run, from pursuing the avocations thus ingrained in their natures.

My own impression is, then, that though the senses cannot be counteracted in regard to the eagerness with which they pursue their destined course of activity, they can be accelerated in their aptitude and directed in their course so that they can be educated to activity, though they cannot be educated into quietude and passiveness.

It seems to me that "H. Scott," in the quotation which appears on page 181 from the prose works of Lord Lytton, has quite admitted the distinction I have endeavoured to point out between culture and education; while in the subsequent paragraph he neglects to separate the inclination of nature from the influence of education.

The training implied in effort and toil, in self-control and moral action, is the noblest education; but it seldom effects much for those who undergo it. It is the succeeding generation that benefits by it. It is from this fact that the other noticed by H. Scott results—that "the men who have made their whole life one long term of study have not, as a rule, sprung from the nobility or the aristocracy." The reason is obvious. The nobility receive education, but they have not this culture; and education fails to supply them with the virtuous habits and the strength of mind which come to those who have gained the blessings derived from culture. On the other hand, those who have been born under the influences of such a form of life as is equivalent to culture, display that form of indomitable earnestness in the pursuit of their plans and aims which their culture induced, and so do not become the mere slaves of passions and sense, as so many of those do who may be said to drift along life with no motive but self-enjoyment.

I throw out this suggestion as one not unlikely to meet the approval of a thoughtful reader who knows how little the influences of education have had on himself to retard the growth of evil passions and habits. He knows that, on the whole, he remains very much about the same creature, though he may have had his course of action diverted a little. Counteractive education we doubt is a misnomer. We have the faculties of sense up to a given measure of activity, and thus far they will exert themselves. Guiding education is a different matter. The senses may be so guided as to employ their eager energies in a different way, even though on precisely the same objects, and so a connoisseurship in time may be exchanged for a drunkard's habit, or an epicure may take the place of a glutton, or legal may be substituted for illicit amours; but these are all rather guidings and special excitements than counteractions of the sensual appetites. Counteractive education leads to monkery, but directive training tends to the due and proper moral activity of the natural inclinations. It is a profound moral question, which we are unable to treat of properly, but which, we think, is highly worthy of discussion. C. B. A.

History.

HAS THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY BEEN, ON THE WHOLE, JUST AND WISE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE opinions entertained by different classes with respect to taxation, and the fair apportionment of it, must be conflicting. The landowner is likely to regard realized property, and particularly landed property, as very much overtaxed, and too tyrannously grasped by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He thinks that trade and its profits afford a far more excellent field for the operations of the financier. The merchant, on the other hand, looks on taxation as the fetters and bonds of trade, tying up capital and restricting resources, and as taking too deep a dip into the uncertain and unrealized income of the trafficker. The tradesman groans under the pressure of income-tax and poor-rates, and the working man feels his pleasure saddened by the chill of the hand of the fiscal claims made on beer and spirits, tobacco and tea. The comfortable classes grudge to pay, and the uncomfortable classes grudge to pay; and both look on the Chancellor of the Exchequer as their natural enemy. This is a wrong state of matters; but it is, nevertheless, a correct statement of the general impatience of, and dislike to, finance as an infliction.

The finance question has of late years acquired a great deal of importance; and the future is likely to be one in which the questions that have their foundation in finance shall become more and more important and absorbing.

In the year 1800 the taxation levied on the country amounted to about £38,000,000; while the produce of the Budget of 1869-70 amounts to nearly double that sum. In the same period the population has held about the same ratio; for in 1801 it amounted to about 16,000,000; and now it may be computed to be about 30,000,000. These two facts put together make it evident that the financial pressure has not increased per head on the average; while the wealth of the country and of the individuals comprised in it has much more increased than population and taxation. Then again, a great many elements of expenditure have been added on to the Governmental outlay than were in the beginning of the century considered to fall legitimately on the Imperial Treasury. Education, sanitation, factory, poor law, and lunatic asylum inspection, &c., now make claim, to a large extent, on the taxation, so that a greater amount of effective Government is to be had by the people for less per head than in the early portion of the century. In this way it is proved that the financial policy

pursued by the successive Chancellors of the Exchequer (of whatever party) has been, on the whole, under the guidance of an enlightened public opinion and thoroughly reasoned-out political economy, both just and wise; just, as tending to equity, economy, and effectiveness; and wise, as controlled by the desire to promote the peace and welfare of the world and the happiness of the home community.

The principles of taxation which have been followed during the present century have not been uniform; because the state of the country has been much perturbed. The war against Napoleon, in which we had engaged, as I think, in a mistaken view of international politics, left not only a terrible legacy of debt, but a more terrible legacy of impolitic policy, to the century in which we live and with which our debate is concerned. The policy is scarcely chargeable to our century, and all the evils brought upon us by that unfortunate anti-French crusade form an exceptional part of the conduct of affairs, and the complications of our financial policy which it implied and produced, ought really to be regarded as exceptional—if not exceptionable—embarrassments brought on the country by the forefathers of those who now endure. I grant, not only that that policy was a mistake, but the cause of great misfortune and much suffering; but I point to the splendid fact, that—though the finances of this nation were disturbed by the war policy demanding an expenditure during the first fourteen years of the century in the departments of the army, navy, and ordnance only, of £630,000,000, and by all the difficulties arising from the resumption of cash payments—we have been taken through the ordeal safely under the skilful pilotage of our Chancellors of the Exchequer.

Much of the pecuniary embarrassment of the country, too, is due, not to the financial policy of the century, but to the political impolicy of the classes in power. Between 1788 and 1800 a sum of £56,000,000, if not somewhat more, was borrowed upon the express understanding that the aristocracy were to be specially charged with the liquidation of that debt by an income-tax. After the signing of the Peace of Amiens the aristocracy repudiated their engagement, and threw the burden on the general community by charging it against the sinking fund. Mr. Addington, to conciliate them, consented to this nefarious proceeding, and so began the embarrassments of the century by a mistake in general policy and blunder in economics. An almost similar act of perfidy on the part of the aristocracy was committed in 1816, when they rejected the income-tax bill of that year, and refused to implement the understanding upon which the war expenditure was undertaken—that the income-tax should be continued till the war-debt was liquidated. The financial policy of this country, though burdened thus by two traitorous acts, was successful in keeping up the credit of the nation, and the greed of the aristocracy only increased the intensity of the demand of the people to extend the representation

as widely as the area of taxation was extended. The Reform agitation came out of the treachery of the noblesse.

The financial policy followed in the Napoleonic wars was just and wise because it stipulated that the rich should bear the expense, and see it thoroughly and honestly cleared off. The policy of the aristocracy in repudiating their solemn engagements was neither just nor wise. But the entire tendency of the taxation of this century has been to press as tenderly as possible on the lower classes, and to put the heavier burdens of the State upon the aristocracy. Since the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, which was itself mainly a protestation of the middle classes against the imposition practised by the aristocracy on them in the matter of taxation, the greater portion of the ingenuity of the Chancellors of the Exchequer has been employed in discovering the means by which trade and commerce could be unfettered from the fiscal burdens and revenue restrictions placed upon it, and in gradually taking from the back of industry the heavy loads of imposts which it had been forced to bear. One favourable tendency, too, has been to put those taxes which it falls to the lot of industry to bear upon such articles as may be regarded as non-essential to healthy life, and therefore capable of being escaped from by the poor at their option through not using the taxed articles; as spirits, tobacco, &c.

One wise and just measure has been introduced into finance since the power of the aristocracy was lessened by the Reform Bill of 1832, namely, that we should pay for our wars ourselves. This was only partially done in our early Chinese, Persian, and Afghan wars, but it has been pretty successfully insisted on in the Crimean, the Indian, the recent Chinese and Persian, and the Abyssinian wars. This has the good effect of inducing caution in getting into quarrels, and of testing the principle and earnestness of the people during its continuance. Our Crimean war cost about £80,000,000, and our Abyssinian one about £9,000,000. Both perhaps were foolish wars, and certainly they cost a great deal of money; but with the finance policy of the aristocracy—the policy of loans—they might both have been carried on much longer, but at a much more extravagant rate. Few things are so carelessly used as borrowed money; few circumstances induce so much meanness as the staving of debt, and hence the trader's plan of making the year bear the year's expenses is a wise and just one, unless in exceptional circumstances, such as the introduction of telegraphic postal communication and the reduction capable of being made on taxes bearing prejudicially on trade, commerce, and progress, especially educational progress.

H. K. has so fully enlarged on the subject of free trade in his excellent and elaborate paper, that it is quite unnecessary for me to enter into that matter. I think "Samuel" has mistaken banking for finance under his first heading, and arrangements entered into for the convenience of commerce instead of revenue. And he has,

in fact, forgotten or neglected the important reality that the finance policy of the Chancellors really enlarges the currency by the issue of exchequer bonds and other securities. Again, the Bank Charter Act is rather a trade than a finance measure; and to our mind the only relevant argument adduced by "Samuel" is the preponderance of indirect over direct taxation. On this I would observe, 1st, that it is highly advantageous that some indirect and optional taxation should be capable of being used by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and 2nd, that as far as possible in wisdom and with justice direct taxation is being adopted. On the whole, then, I think I may consider myself justified in concluding that the *financial* policy of the century has on the whole been both wise and just, considerate and commendable.

A. P. L.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

I RESUME the argument which, from pressure of space, as some intelligent readers may have observed, was, under editorial necessity, somewhat abruptly broken off at page 208. I there affirmed that, though the corn laws had been nominally repealed, the tax had virtually been reimposed on the same product by the high taxation levied on spirits and malt liquors. The highness of the tax on spirits is undeniable; but there has been a dispute in Parliament since my paper was written, in which Mr. Feilden, member for the West Riding of Yorkshire, affirmed that the cost of the malt-tax amounted to 70 per cent., while Mr. Gladstone admitted that it was five years ago 20 per cent. This latter statement gives only the tax on malt, but it does not include the tax on beer. For the purpose of my argument, however, the latter statement is quite enough. I affirm that that system of finance is unjust which levies 20 per cent. on the poor man's beer, while it contents itself with imposing or demanding only 5 per cent. on the rich man's champagne; and which, while nominally abolishing a corn-tax, virtually reimposes it on the same class as a malt-tax, a beer-tax, and taxes on spirits of various sorts; and this at a time when the taxes on wines have been made all but nominal. Brewers' licences, publicans' licences, &c., are other items in connection with this reimposition of the food-taxes under the form of beverage-taxes on the working classes of the empire.

The principles of finance have frequently, I am afraid, been sacrificed to the necessities of the financier. It has often been the lot of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to require to "get money" without any very well-defined principle for levying it except the principle of doing his duty by providing for the exigencies of the time. In this way and on this account financial operations have fallen into moral disrepute among men, and the idea of expediency rather than principle has come to be attached to the means by which the fiscal levies are made. From this public opinion in regard to the want of fixed principles in the allocation of taxation we derive the trick-suggesting term for the management of money—

difficulties—"to finance," and the semi-alang connotation of the verb "to financier" as applied to the management of limited liability companies, &c. On this account we think it is a very legitimate inquiry which has been put before us in the present debate—Has the financial policy of Great Britain during the present century been, on the whole, wise and just? This brings directly into view the idea of principles as opposed to expediency, and opens up to our minds at once the proper theoretical basis of taxation and the practical application of these principles, so as best to effect the purposes of Government at the least possible cost.

I hold as a principle that taxation, to be just, ought to be fairly, honourably, and judiciously imposed. It ought never to be forgotten that those who benefit most from the institutions of Government and all the means taken for the stability of things as they are, are the rich. The poor can scarcely, under any circumstances, be made much worse than they are—working at low wages, exposed to many vicissitudes of life, and scarcely ever able to hope to rise beyond a passing fair supply for the wants of the body. Change of government; nay, even revolution itself might benefit, it could not very materially alter for the worse, the condition of the poor. But the rich—to how much change and evil would they be exposed if the policy of things were changed, and Government to become unstable or property insecure. Therefore it is that the rich ought to bear the superior weight of taxation; they get the greater number of the blessings of peace and the enjoyments of prosperity. It behoves those who have the management of the finances to see that trade is not checked and prosperity is not brought to a halt by the injudicious imposition of the burdens of the revenue. We believe that the taxation of the country has not been thus judiciously levied, and hence we are inclined to deny that the financial policy of the half century has been just and wise.

The financial policy inaugurated by the passing of the new Poor Law was not only unwise, but unjust. It was unwise because it recognised pauperism as a permanent burden upon society, but brought the pressure of the support of the poor far more heavily upon the poor than upon the rich; thus crushing the poor down into the grade of pauperism, and making resistance to the rushing on of want like an armed man upon the homes of the poor cease to be regarded as virtuous or politic. It was unjust too, inasmuch as property had always been regarded as the proper almoner of destitution. Indeed, the ancient institutions of property were regarded as apportioning the rights thereof to be fourfold—one-fourth for the Sovereign as an acknowledgment, and in lieu of feudal service, one-fourth for the Church and the charities of the Christian faith, one-fourth for labour, roads, &c., and one-fourth for the personal portion of the owner as the holder of the property for the behoof of the State and the interests of the State. Thus we have retained a residuary population of the useless and often the degraded as the pensioners of society, while the enterprising and the

useful have been compelled to "hive off" by emigration because the duties of the landed gentry had been allowed to lapse, and the State undertook in its financial policy to make the general population pay for the maintenance of the poor to the relief of those upon whom the burden had formerly lain. This casting of the support of the poor on the poor, this stigmatising of poverty as a crime and the erection of poor law bastilles as workhouses for its punishment, gave a great impetus to Chartism, which even the make-weight of the penny post could not materially lessen. That the limit of taxation had been over past was made evident by the failure of the Revenue in 1837-8 a million and a half; in 1838-9 half a million; in 1839-40 a million and a half; in 1840-1 two millions; in 1841-2 two millions and a half in round numbers. Our financial policy had brought trade to a state of stagnation, and spread a distress which gave Chartism power, increased the hatefulness of the poor law bastilles to the poor, and the burden of the poor laws upon the struggling. Here in the failure of recuperative finance we see that the taxation had been pushed to its utmost. This was particularly seen in 1840, when Mr. Baring, in his endeavour to secure an equilibrium between revenue and expenditure, increased the duties on almost every article; and gained, instead of two millions, less than a quarter of a million. By the logic of facts he was compelled to resort to the opposite method; and he then proceeded to propose a general reduction of customs duties.

In the emergency of finance Sir Robert Peel made his "earnest appeal to the possessors of property" to adopt and endure an income tax, in order that he might attempt some commercial reforms, and endeavour to re-stimulate industry. This was a just and wise proposal; but it was neither justly nor wisely carried out. It was decreed that every person having an income of more than £150 should be taxed on that income; but (1) no distinction was drawn between an earned and certain income secured by existing property and an unearned and uncertain income, exposed to all the fluctuations of commercial life and the risks of wealth; (2) the tax was imposed without graduation—a similar sum being charged in bulk on the whole income; whereas it is certain that, on the lower incomes which lie close upon the confines of poverty, the tax should have been light, and the heavy portion ought to have fallen on the superabundant cash and capital of those who had large incomes; (3) it was so imposed that, while it was nominally levied on the propertied, it was really levied on the industrial classes, because it was imposed upon industrial and earned incomes, as well as on unrealized and unlaboured-for receipts. It was thus unjust and unwise.

But the case has become much worse since Mr. Gladstone has reduced the level of the incidence of this tax to £100, for the class which receives such an income is in no sense a propertied class; but are often an over-burdened class, having graver difficulties and distresses than the members of the working classes. Nothing car

make the income tax just and wise which does not recognise large exemptions on the ground of pressure upon income—which does not distinguish between income derivable from property, and that resulting from toil—and which is not so graduated as to fall lightly on the poor man's income of £100 and the rich man's income of £50,000 or £100,000. On the former the cost of living necessitates pressure up to the last farthing; on the latter it does not necessarily do so. Besides that, nearly on the margin-line, not only is the pressure of the direct taxation severe, but the incidence of indirect taxation is as hard upon the small-income payer of direct taxation as on the non-payer, whose income is practically larger, because paid at more frequent intervals, and therefore able to be used with greater economy. The £100 income-tax payer, who gets his salary quarterly or half-yearly, loses, in interest of money and in charges for accommodation, a large amount of even his small income, which a man receiving weekly wages does not require to do.

Besides, see how the promises of financiers fade almost as soon as made. I have already instanced the engagement of the rich to bear the burden of the anti-revolution war debt. I have also noted the speedy change of the incidence of the income-tax from £150 to £100. Sir Robert Peel proposed to exempt Ireland from the income-tax; but, in lieu of it, raised the spirit tax that it might be equalized with that of England, and increased the stamp duties in Ireland for the same purpose. Now Ireland pays not only the increased spirit and stamp duties, but the income-tax as well. And again, the income-tax was proposed as a temporary expedient—promise has been frequently made of its speedy extinction; but ever the future bears the promise, the present never reaps the result.

In 1835 Sir Robert Peel warned the agricultural party against changing "the light pressure of a malt-tax for the scourge of a property-tax," but we have now to bear both; we have to do penance by scourging under the latter, and we have to suffer minor evils by heightening of price and interference with industry through the former. These are instances in which the financial policy of this country has been undoubtedly neither just nor wise.

Indeed, the fact is that the greater part of our financial legislation has been gone into at haphazard; and nothing is so singular as the series of elaborate mis-calculations which most of our great budgets show. The long array of figures which tell of expectations formed, contrasted with the equally long array of figures proving that these expectations have not been realized, is very singular. We have deficits of half millions anticipated, and surpluses of millions resulting; we have surpluses of millions calculated for, and deficits of millions falling out. We know of nothing which would be so likely to be productive of good results in the present day as the issuing of a commission for the entire revision of our financial system. If this were done, we might have some chance of getting

wise and just principles of finance determined on. At present the whole financial scheme is a congeries of guesses and experiments bolstered up by borrowings and constantly failing attempts to shift the burden which has pressed for a time on one party in the State to the shoulders of another, so that they may have their turn of being galled. Haphazard finance can neither be just nor wise; and finance not resting on fixed and well thought-out principles is never likely to be either.

I scarcely think that H. K. is justified in so jauntily setting out with the idea that an inquiry into the justice and wisdom of the financial policy of this country in the present century should be set down as one easily able to be treated of under the single head of the utility of free trade. What has free trade to do with a fact like this?—we pay seventy-nine vice-admirals, only four of whom are at sea; we keep one hundred and twenty-seven rear-admirals, only nine of whom “seem to be doing anything;” and we pay seven hundred and twenty-five captains, and have only sixty-one afloat! What are the rest doing? Simply drawing their pay, and proving what fools we are to toil and strive and pay in this manner, simply because we are told year after year to do it. If H. K. had called this polite political freebooting he might have been near the mark, but free trade—! Yet this fact has a good deal to do with the financial policy of the country, as Mr. Lowe would readily tell him, for he must find that economy in the navy is not easily attainable while such claims are made on him. The army, it is well known, is nearly if not altogether as bad in the number of useless claimants of pay and preferment, while in many other departments of the public service there are faults to be amended and follies to be docked off—matters, these, which are quite wide of the free trade question, but most truly very closely connected with the financial policy of the country. The curse of our finance has been wasteful extravagance and a one-sided and oppressive burdening of the poorer tax-payers. I am glad to be able, as I write, to claim Mr. Lowe as an advocate of the negative side of this debate, in proof of which I quote from the peroration of his Budget speech:—

“I will now point out one moral. The secret of all this success is the simplest thing in the world. It is nothing on earth but economy, and I hope that the fact that our finances have got into an easier state will not be thought a reason why the House should not give us in the cause of economy the same support that they have given us hitherto. I see no reason for us to desist from the same operations, that have resulted so satisfactorily before. I am sure that we cannot better discharge the trust reposed in us than by lightening as far as possible the burdens of our fellow-subjects, and I hope, therefore, that the House will consider that it is not merely by talking of economy that these things are performed, but that there are some things required of them as well as from those who are entrusted with the public expenditure, namely, to lay down to yourselves clearly and distinctly what is the real and legitimate province of Govern-

ment, and make a rule never to force anything beyond that. By acting in that way you will give more strength and power to the Government, and reflect more honour upon the House, than by any of the most brilliant triumphs of oratory and legislation."

How well the opener of this debate on the negative side contrasts with H. K.'s narrow view! H. K. gives us a sort of *Vidimus*—useful enough in its way, and valuable, no doubt, for its matter, although nearly irrelevant to the debate—of free trade and its results; but "Samuel" arraigns the affirmatives on three counts. He certainly makes a good argument against the wisdom of the policy of our financiers. An eminent authority on finance once told the writer that a paper far more interesting than a novel could be written on "The Curiosities of Taxation." I am myself unable to supply this matter, but Mr. Lowe evidently agrees with my informant, for he got not a few cheers from the House of Commons when he was detailing the absurdities of the stamp laws, and what might be called in general the grievance finance which the wisdom of Parliament had invented—the stillmaker's licence, the card licence, soapmakers' licences, &c., most of which were foolish and many of them unjust as well as inexpedient, for they cost far too much to collect. They were not remunerative, but they were annoying. I complain that the financial policy of the country during the century has not been governed by any general, well-thought-out set of principles; that it has been oppressive to the poor; and that it has transgressed the true laws of equity.

F. M.

MODERN RESEARCH AND CREEDS.—What modern research has done is to extend vastly our knowledge of the personality of the scriptural writers, and of the circumstances under which they wrote. Let every iota of the knowledge thus acquired be applied to correct and improve our idea of Scripture as a whole, our conception of its unity, our estimate of what it denounces, what it enunciates, what it enjoins. To take a verse from a spiritual lyric, and fit it into your logical mosaic beside a verse from a doctrinal Epistle, without regarding the context in either case, is absurd and pernicious; but we cannot admit that the orchestral music of Scripture has no central harmony, no certain sound, no grand rhythmic unity. Away with this cant about intellectual formulas and systems. If the intellectual formulas are wrong, break them up and cast them away. If the systems are outworn or unsound, let their fragments be carted off, as men cart off the stones of ruins, to be built up into modern habitations which still keep out the rain. Calvin's "Institutio" appears to us as a systematisation of scriptural truth, on a level, viewed as an intellectual achievement, with Newton's systematisation of astronomical law; but in looking at Scripture we would be no more trammelled by the system of Calvin, than in contemplating the heavens we would be trammelled by the system of Newton.

Literature.

HAS THE AGE OF SATIRISTS PASSED AWAY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WIT is dying out from among us; sensationalism is getting the mastery over us. We are becoming as dull as ditchwater in company. Conversation is an accomplishment almost as little cultivated now as letter writing. We grind puns without pungency, merely to be grinned at. Nobody now jests at scars; everybody is scared if a jest be but attempted in the polite conventional society of our time. Slang has got the better of satire, and *singerie* or monkeyishness has taken the place formerly occupied by the lively railery of the wits. We hoard every peppercorn of seeming wit for the comic periodicals, magazines of the manufactured article, museums of contorted and distorted words and sounds, but sadly wanting in the fine flavoured acerbity of a genuine jest. Joe Millerisms spun into bab-y-ish millinery, old jokes done brown, and "Lemon" "Punch" down done to insipidity of spirit. Who will undertake to adjudicate on the worth of the wit of *Judy*? Taking all our comic periodicals together, I am afraid that they would scarcely afford "a groatsworth of wit" to any one, however Greene. Our plays when they intend to be comical are satirical, not satirical. "Formosa" and "Dundreary" can scarcely compete with "The Rehearsal" and "Hurlythrumbo," or "Box and Cox" with "She Stoops to Conquer." Our wit expends itself not in jests, but burlesques, travesties, or screaming farces, where the main incidents are vulgarly ludicrous and mere property incongruities. Actors now do not act, but transact, and writers of humorous poetry put very little of Juvenal's pithiness, Pope's serene but severe stinging, or even Byron's well-simulated rage and courage, into their verse. It was not so in the olden time; we had then wit that was terse and striking, and in our comedies and farces we had wit that was startling and sterling.

We have lost even the art of nicknaming, that art in which the ill-nature of man becomes linked to wit and induces it to condense hate into "the tersest compactness of the epigram," or roll up dislike along with humour. We are grown so civilized and so courteous that satirists cannot live among us, and even anonymous bitterness is disliked. It is true that some people have been able to write about the *Assinaum*, the *Saturday Reviler*, the *Chimes*, and *Mourning Post*, but these are not attractive or provocative of

"Sport that wrinkled care divides,
Or Laughter holding both her sides."

Ours is an age of co-admiration and limited liability praise. We form cliques with each other, but we more frequently ignore than sneer, and if we do sneer we do it very much on the sly.

Hazlitt was almost the last of our great prose satirists. Douglas Jerrold was perhaps our most distinguished modern dramatic *ensor morum*. I suppose even the most sceptical person in regard to modern wit would scarcely be worthy of capital punishment if he refused to regard Byron, Brough, and A' Becket as of higher grade than punsters. Do we admit Kennealy or Austin to be satirists? The former has coarseness and force, but has he the quirky essence of good spirits—wit? The latter has spleen but little splendour, and is he not rather given to whine about himself than to make others wince? The fibre of his verse is not strong enough to form the tissue of satire. Walter Savage Landor of course belongs to a past age, and does not come within the scope of our debate. Perhaps the affirmative may quote Disraeli; but are his sarcasm and his biting criticism satire or railery? Is combative arrogance not more observable in his writings and speeches than the keen causticity of severe truth? R. Fielding refers to *Punch*, but *Punch* is in his dotage and has of late shown strong signs of having reason on his side for his lampoons on the Permissive Bill. Indeed, the number of rivals rising up around the man of jokes shows that many think that it is weak punch.

It would surely require a great stretch of the meaning of the word satire to include Lord Lytton among the satirists. His "New Timon" contains some bitters and bile, but the old "Timon" was an embittered spirit, and no satire could be greater than the name given to the gin and ginger rhymes of the Bulwerian satire! Then to think of Tennyson being lugged in as a satirist! The silver-bell jingle of the Tennysonian verse could never be used for satire; it would not ring out at all. Oh, no! we cannot now speak in the splendid strain of the satire schools. Now and again one professing to be a plain speaker may chatter scandal, but there is too much politeness on the surface of society to permit of satire. We speak too often "with bated breath and whispering humbleness" to show the scornful its own image. We have too little honourable honesty, too little power of withstanding to the face the enemies of society and social order. We do not want material for satire, but we want the moral courage and the brilliancy of spirit to scathe with the shining fire of ridicule and satiric song the vileness and vice of our times. We think, on the whole—until our opponents furnish us with a list—we are justified in concluding that the age of satirists, like that of chivalry, is gone. A. C. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE age of satire is not likely to pass away so long as there are faults in man, moral condemnation felt in the mind; and the inclination exists in the human spirit to lash the vices and the follies of men. Satire is not a mere makeshift, like clothes, which are a sort of decent way of covering up defects. Quite the opposite. Satire rubs the gilding off, and strips away the finery in which man endeavours to hide the deformities of his moral nature. It makes short work with—

“Those troublesome disguises which we wear”

over our thoughts and around our hearts. The millinery of character possesses no privilege from its effacing if not defacing fingers. It wishes to get close to the soul, and to get at the truth; and it refuses to accept of appearance for the reality, or to associate—

“Wisdom with periwigs, cassocks with grace,
Courage with swords, gentility with lace.”

“Great is truth,” shouts satire, “and it will prevail;” and falsehood is weak, puny, worthless, and despicable, and it would be ill for the world should it acquire fertility or abundance, therefore we shall laugh it out of countenance, and scorn it into banishment. Place it on the pillory and raise the shout of derision around it, and blow the trumpet of despite wherever it is found, so that the base thing may vanish.

Satire is a good thing in the moral universe. It has an undying import and function. In its essence it is a contrast between right and wrong; so as to kindle anger against the latter, and awake reverence and admiration of the former. It is the product and issue of a high and holy hatred of the mean, the hypocritical and the dishonourable, and of a lively indignation against anything that violates the moral and the proper. We have been endowed by nature with the powers of praise and blame,—the ability “to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image;” and satire is the means by which we turn the edge of the tongue against the unseemly and the vile. When we can conceive a high principle and then perceive a dereliction from it, we feel inclined to shift the sunshine from shining on it, and to set the chill mist of freezing scorn to fasten on it and to bite its bitterness into it. The deformed and haggard actual which we see compels our thoughts to go upward to the high and true ideal, and when we look upon this picture and on that, disdain is inevitable. The age of satire cannot pass away till the age of moral distinctions palls and fades. But so long as man retains his place as a moral being, he cannot avoid desiring to sink the ignoble into contempt under the weight of ridicule—and this desire is the very begetter of satire.

Among the satirists of our day a first place must be accorded to the great hater and noble denouncer of shams and *simulacra* of puppets and poppets,—Thomas Carlyle, the finest of the sons of men for scourging villany and hooting off the hypocrite and the pretender. He it is who has brought the "clothes philosophy" of appearance into disrepute, and blighted to the very core the make-believe of our age. His is a satirical pen, which acts like the sword of Joachim II. of Brandenburg. In the days of this worthy, luxury had got so prevailing that the breeches of the fashionable sometimes contained as many as two hundreds yards of silk. Joachim II. disliked this show of bravery, this silken fulness and foolishness, and strove to abate its enormity. He clothed his hangman in this outrageous garb, as a satire, but that passed unheeded. One day, however, when one of the high solemnities of the Church was going on, and the mighty men of braggadocio, dressed in these bagged and baggaggy breeches, were met in the greatness of their paraphernalia in large numbers at the festival, Joachim marked out one of those flaunting wind-bags, and stretching over, sword in hand, he cut the girder which held the hated article up; and behold, in the face of the congregation, the wearer was inexpressibly untrussed, for they fell all down about his heels. Carlyle, in a similar manner, cuts sheer into the enormities of our age, and performs the duty of a satirist.

Robert Browning is another of our modern satirists. What is "The Ring and the Book" but a biting satire on the cloak of maliciousness so often worn in the world, and the delight in scandal which the age evinces. There is a most intense satirical dash in his late wife's "Aurora Leigh." Among the satirists of our time, too, are Richard H. Horne, Philip James Bailey, Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Lytton, Charles Mackay, Thomas Cooper the Chartist; and of those who have but recently passed away we may mention W. E. Aytoun and Thackeray. Yet Walter Sherington affirms that "not one of the rising *litterateurs* of the day has written satires"! (p. 53). If he knew anything about the writings of James Hannay he would not have represented him as one who "has never attempted to increase the literature of satire," and would have put the word *succeeded* in the sentence instead.

Besides, in a large number of our literary reviews satire has become an established weapon of attack upon men, fashions, aims, and books. We have satiric farces like "Dundreary," dramas like "Formosa," on both of which satire has been largely expended. Have we not even had satiric theology written by Whately, and sacred biography satirised by Renan. The age of satirists has not passed away; but the rage for satire increases; hence the spawn of so-called comic periodicals, and of a certain or uncertain kind of novel has such ready sale. It would be well for us if we would try to make satire impossible in our age.

M. R. N.

The Essayist.

JOHN HAMPDEN AND HIS TIMES.

No student of history can have failed to notice that in all great revolutions, in all important eras in a country's history, although it is the vast mass of the people which actually effect the change, there are certain guiding spirits, men possessing mental qualifications far superior to their fellows, and who, like the rudder of a vessel, guide the ship of State in the dangerous and stormy seas through which she is passing; men who, though they do not themselves supply the physical force which accomplishes the revolution, yet, like he who controls a mighty engine, they so regulate and direct the forces which effect the change as to bring about the desired result. Without such men revolutions would be futile, anarchy and confusion would render them ineffectual to accomplish that which they seek to bring about; but, with these men to take the helm of public affairs, revolutions often result in success, and the accomplishment of the people's desire. It is the life and character of John Hampden, one of such men, that we now propose to consider.

Hampden belonged to a very ancient family, whose pedigree could be traced back as far as the Saxon period, and the estate of Hampden itself, from which the family name is derived, was given to Hampden's ancestors by Edward the Confessor, and is mentioned in Domesday Book as belonging to one Baldwyn de Hampden.

The family was possessed of large landed estates not only in Buckinghamshire, but also in Essex, Berkshire, and Oxfordshire. At the accession of Edward IV. some of their estates were sequestered, as a punishment for espousing the Lancastrian cause. Edmund Hampden was a privy counsellor to Henry VII. Another ancestor, Griffith Hampden, was high sheriff of the county of Buckingham, and represented it in Parliament in 1586. The eldest son of Griffith, William Hampden, who was also a member of Parliament, married Elizabeth, daughter of Sir Henry Cromwell, and aunt to Oliver Cromwell. John Hampden was the eldest son of William, and thus was a cousin of the Protector.

John Hampden was born in London in 1594. His father dying, he succeeded to the family estates at an early age, and was placed at Thame Grammar School. In 1609 he went to Oxford, and was entered as a commoner at Magdalen College. There he soon distinguished himself by his abilities and industry, and, after four years of College life, he entered the Inner Temple as a law student.

Clarendon tells us that at this period he indulged in the dissipations of the age; we know however that he did not neglect his

legal duties, and that he was not entirely indifferent to general literature; and the fact that he married his wife Elizabeth in 1619 would seem to indicate that he never was of very depraved habits, or much given to the vices of his time.

Hampden first took his seat in the House of Commons in 1620, as representative of the borough of Grampound.

The relations of Hampden, as might perhaps have been expected from persons in their position, mixing with other landed gentry, and hence naturally imbued with aristocratic sentiments and prejudices, were not in any way inclined to favour the ideas of the popular party, and were desirous that Hampden should strive to advance himself by seeking favour at Court. His mother, in particular, seemed very anxious for her son to obtain a peerage. Hampden himself, however, did not desire this honour, nor did he share in the opinions or yield to the wishes of his relations; and notwithstanding the influence of his family, and against what some in his position would have considered as their own personal advantage, Hampden, from his first entrance into Parliament, attached himself to that opposition which was then gradually growing and becoming a well-defined party in the State.

Here we have an example of those principles which guided Hampden through the whole of his career. No mere self aggrandizement, but the public good, was the great object of his life. Had Hampden been less patriotic and more selfish, he would have preferred to attach himself to that party from which he might have expected title and influence, rather than to that which he thought more likely to promote the national welfare and the general good.

Hampden sat in Parliament throughout the remainder of the reign of James I., but did not take a prominent part in political affairs during that period. Although not by any means inclined to indolence, he saw that, for the present, his active services were not required, and he therefore contented himself by steadily voting in support of that side which he had already chosen, occupying his leisure time in examining the great political questions of the day and in diligent study, thus fitting himself for the more active political life he was subsequently to lead. Hampden gave considerable attention to the local interests of his country, and it was greatly owing to his exertions as a member of a committee of the House of Commons that Wendover and three other boroughs regained the right of representation in Parliament.

In 1625 James died, and Charles I. succeeded to that throne which had been so inefficiently filled by his father.

A critical period in English history was now fast approaching. For some time there had been a continual struggle between the Crown and the Parliament. Like the territories of nations which joined each other, and the boundaries of which were not well marked out, and are consequently constant subjects of dispute and contest, the King and people were continually disputing as to

their relative rights and privileges. This dispute may be clearly traced in the reign of Elizabeth; but she, although as fond of absolute power as her father, Henry VIII., had the sense to see that it was to her own advantage to concede that which the Parliament required. In the reign of James I. the struggle still continued. The Parliament, which was gradually becoming conscious of its power, was determined to obtain a larger amount both of freedom and authority than Elizabeth had allowed.

In vain James stormed and swore; in vain he sent for the journals of the House of Commons, and tore out the obnoxious page which declared the right of the members to freedom of speech and enumerated their various other privileges; in vain he imprisoned the leading members of the opposition. The Parliament was not to be intimidated by his threats, his passion, and his punishments. James was not the man to offer any effectual opposition to their measures; for, although he was at heart a tyrant, he had neither the strength of will of his son Charles, nor the sagacity of his cousin Elizabeth, and consequently during the reign of James I. the contest between the King and the Parliament was decidedly in favour of the latter, so far as results went.

This was the state of affairs when Charles I. became King. A monarch more unsuited for the position could scarcely have filled it. Charles had been educated in an atmosphere of despotism, he had been taught to believe in the divine right of kings and their absolute authority. Under the tuition of his father and of Buckingham, he had imbibed the despotic notions which James so dearly loved, but could not carry out. And to these he united a far larger strength of will, or, more properly speaking, amount of obstinacy, than his father possessed. Such was the character of the king who now commenced to rule over a people whose opinions and desires were of an exactly opposite character to his own; a people determined to be free; a people demanding more freedom than they had yet obtained, and who had enjoyed just sufficient liberty and power to make them long for more. Charles could not read the signs of the times; he failed to comprehend the nature of that spirit of liberty which was slowly infusing itself into the minds of the people. Not only did he not understand this desire for freedom, but—a frequent result of ignorance—he hated, and, unfortunately for himself and his race, resolved to oppose it. Hence a contest commenced between the King and the Parliament which was not to be easily settled or soon finished; a contest which deluged the country with blood, and indeed finally ended in the banishment of the Stuarts from the throne which they had so despotically and so unwisely filled. Revolution has been well defined as reform too long delayed, and never was it more so than in this case. To all who have carefully examined the history of the period, it must be apparent that the civil war and its consequences might at one time have been averted by reasonable concessions on the part of Charles. But his love for absolute power, his absurd notions

as to the extent of the kingly prerogative, and his natural obstinacy, made him deaf to the arguments of both prudence and justice, and regardless of the requirements of the times. The King would not yield to the popular will, and, like a mighty tree which will not bend to the gale and is consequently uprooted, he suffered severely for his obstinacy.

The whole history of the reign of Charles I., up to the time that he unfurled his standard at Nottingham, is a series of disputes between himself and the Parliament, of illegal taxation and imprisonment, of shameful tyranny on the one hand, and a firm, unyielding determination to withhold supplies until grievances were redressed, on the other. Happily for England, the King found more than a match in the sturdy burgesses and knights of the shire who met at Westminster.

The first Parliament of Charles met in 1625, and in it Hampden took his seat as a member for Wendover, one of the boroughs for which he had helped to re-secure the franchise. The King requested an immediate supply of money, but the House of Commons only voted him two subsidies, for they were very displeased with the favour which he had displayed towards the Roman Catholics, and also with his extravagance and partiality for Buckingham, whom they regarded, and not without reason, as one of the chief causes of their grievances. Charles, finding that in its present mood no further supplies were likely to be obtained from the House of Commons, and annoyed by the complaints and requests of that House, dissolved the Parliament after a very short session. To meet his immediate wants, the King raised money by writs, under his privy seal. This money, however, was insufficient, and Charles was therefore compelled to summon a second Parliament. In this second Parliament, which met in 1626, Hampden again represented Wendover.

Although Charles had called this Parliament in the hope of their satisfying his pecuniary wants, the House of Commons showed itself to be in no way more inclined to comply with the king's request for money than its predecessor had been, and the contest which accordingly ensued was far more serious than any that had previously occurred.

Previously to granting any further supplies to the King the House resolved to search into the grievances of the nation, and, as the result of this investigation, they impeached the Duke of Buckingham. This very much incensed the king, and, enraged by their conduct, he sent Eliot and Digges, two managers of the impeachment, to the Tower. The House of Commons, however, resolved not to proceed with any business until their imprisoned members were released, and Charles, being in want of money, was thus obliged to liberate them. Not intimidated by the king's conduct the House again proceeded with the impeachment of Buckingham, and then Charles, to save his favourite, suddenly dissolved the Parliament.

The time now drew nigh when John Hampden should first stand

forth as the champion of those constitutional rights and privileges of the nation which the king violated. The Parliament had been dissolved without any supplies having been voted, and consequently Charles was in urgent want of money. To meet his necessities he levied, on his own authority only, illegal duties on exports and imports; and these alone not raising sufficient money, he issued warrants under his Privy Seal commanding the nobility, gentry, and merchants to lend him still further sums. This unjust and illegal conduct on the part of the King excited much discontent and disturbance throughout the country, and the citizens of London cried out boldly, "A Parliament! A Parliament! No Parliament no money!" When Hampden was requested to furnish his portion of the loan he positively refused to comply, saying, when asked why he refused, that "he would be contented to lend as others, but feared to draw upon himself that curse in Magna Charta which should be read twice a year against those who infringed it." For this bold reply the Privy Council imprisoned him in the Gate House; and, as he still persisted in his refusal to lend the money, he was sent into a place of private detention in Hampshire. Nor was Hampden the only man who suffered for refusing to advance the required loan. Many other gentlemen were imprisoned, and the poorer people were forced to enter the army or navy as a punishment for their obstinacy.

For two years Charles continued this unwise and unjust conduct. Levying illegal taxes and extorting illegal loans, imprisoning people without trial, billeting soldiers on private individuals, and trying civil cases by martial law. But notwithstanding all his strong and tyrannical measures, the King could not obtain sufficient money to meet the expenses incurred by his own extravagance and folly, and he therefore reluctantly called another Parliament.

Before doing this he released Hampden and many others who had been imprisoned for refusing to contribute to the loan, in the vain hope of thus appeasing the popular indignation which his conduct had excited. Hampden sat for Wendover again in the Parliament which was opened on the 17th of March, 1628.

This Parliament, second only to the famous Long Parliament in importance, was of a very different temper to those which Charles had previously summoned. Provoked by his tyrannical conduct, by his illegal taxation and imprisonment, and the many other unconstitutional acts of his reign, the people had chosen representatives who were not inclined to be trifled with,—men who were pledged to oppose all invasions of the rights and privileges of the people, and who were resolved that they would spare no effort to obtain an immediate redress of the nation's grievances. The House of Commons immediately set itself to work to fulfil this wise resolution, and, after considerable difficulty and much disgraceful equivocation on the part of the King, they obtained his solemn assent to the famous Petition of Right. By this petition Charles did not bind himself to grant the people fresh privileges or to give

them increased power, but simply to respect their constitutional right not to be taxed without the consent of Parliament, imprisoned without a legal trial, or to have soldiers billeted upon them. The price of this concession, however, was five subsidies, and these the Commons had to vote the King, thus being obliged to pay him for doing that which, by the most ancient laws and charters, he was bound to do. Having granted this supply to the King, the House of Commons petitioned him to remove the Duke of Buckingham from his present position. This, however, produced an effect similar to that which resulted from the impeachment of Buckingham on a former occasion. Charles, enraged at what he considered an unwarrantable interference of Parliament, immediately progued it.

And now the people might reasonably expect that Charles would regard the solemn promises which he had made in the Petition of Right, and that they would enjoy an immunity from the unconstitutional and arbitrary proceedings which had hitherto characterized his reign. But history shows us that any who indulged in such expectations were grievously disappointed. For, regardless of the fact that he had been paid five subsidies on the understanding that he would respect the Petition of Right, Charles commenced again to impose taxes without the consent of Parliament, and to billet soldiers on private individuals in direct violation of that petition. When, therefore, Parliament again met, on the 20th of January, 1629, it was not inclined to accede to the King's request for an immediate supply of money, but first resolved to inquire into the grievances of the nation. The House of Commons having upon inquiry ascertained beyond a doubt that tonnage and poundage had been levied without their consent, that merchants had been forced to pay it by sale of their goods, and that troops had been once more billeted upon the people without their consent, Sir John Eliot proposed a resolution of remonstrance against this illegal procedure. The Speaker, who was a creature of the Court, refused to put the question, and there then ensued such a scene as the House of Commons had never before nor has ever since witnessed. The Speaker attempted to leave the chair, and thus put an end to the debate; but two members violently held him down in his seat until the proposition of Sir John Eliot was agreed to; and, disregarding the knocks of Black Rod, whom Charles had sent to summon them to the House of Lords, they passed three resolutions censuring the illegal practices which they had before investigated, and then adjourned to the 10th of March. On that day they again met, but Parliament was immediately dissolved by the King, and Sir John Eliot, Hollis, Selden, Valentine, and five other members, were committed to the Tower for their conduct in the House of Commons.

It does not appear that, throughout these two stormy sessions, Hampden took an active part in the debates, but he was by no means negligent of his duty, and was always to be found in his

place in Parliament. His conduct with regard to the forced loan had brought him prominently into view, and henceforward we find his name associated with those of Pym, Coke, and Selden on most of the important committees of the House of Commons which sat during these two sessions. He also took an active part in drawing up the Petition of Right.

After the dissolution of this third Parliament Hampden retired to his residence in Buckinghamshire, and there he spent several years, leading the quiet retired life of a country gentleman. He occupied much of his leisure in the study of literature. Davila's history of the civil wars of France was one of his favourite books: probably he saw some analogy between the history of France at that period and the events which were then happening in England, and hence his fondness for the book.

When Eliot was committed to the Tower, Hampden, out of love and respect for his friend, had undertaken to perform the office of guardian to his two sons, both young men. These appear to have been a source of considerable anxiety both to Hampden and to their father, and a large amount of correspondence passed between these worthy men relative to the conduct and future prospects of Eliot's sons. From amongst many letters we select the following. Eliot had written to Hampden stating that he had resolved that his younger son should enter the army and join an expedition under Sir Horace Vere to the Netherlands; and he desired that his elder son Richard, who himself wished to go to France, should remain at college until he had taken his degree. The following letter is Hampden's reply. Some of the remarks as to the future of Eliot's sons are characteristic of Hampden, displaying much thoughtfulness, and disclosing the state of his religious feelings. He concludes by expressing a determination to endeavour to improve the "noble purchase" of Eliot's friendship, a determination which was afterwards well fulfilled.

"SIR,—I am so perfectly acquainted with your clear insight into the dispositions of men, and ability to fitt them with courses suitable, that, had you bestowed sonnes of mine as you have done yo' owne, iudgment durst hardly have called it into question; especially when, in laying the design, you have prevented y^e objections to be made against it. For if Mr. Rich. Eliot will, in the intermissions of action, adde study to practise, and adorn that lovely spiritt with flowers of contemplation, he'll raise our expectations of another S^r Edw. Veere, that had this character, 'All summer in the field, all winter in his study;' in whose fall fame makes this kingdom a great looser: and, having taken this resolution from counsaile, with y^e highest wisdom, (as I doubt not you haue), I hope and praye y^e same power will crown it with a blessing answerable to our wish.

"The way you take with my other friend, declares you to be none of y^e b^e of Exeter's converts,* of whose mind neither am I superstitiously; but,

* The Bishop of Exeter was much opposed to young men travelling on the Continent.

had my opinion bine asked, I should (as vulgar conceits use to), have shewed my power rather to raise objections than to answer them. A temper between Fraunce and Oxford might have taken away his scruple, with more advantage to his years—to visit Cambridge as a free man for variety and delight, and there entertain himselfe till y^e next spring, when university studies and peace had bine better settled than I learn it is. . . . 'Tis a great hazard, methinkes, to see so sweete a disposition guarded with no more, amongst a people whereof many make it their religion to be superstitious in impiety, and their behaviour to be affected in ill manners. But God who ownly knows y^e periods of life, and opportunities to come, hath designed hime (I hope) for His owne service betime, and stirred up yo^r providence to husband hime so early for great affaires. Then shall hee be sure to finde hime in Fraunce, that Abraham did in Sichem, and Joseph in Egypt, under whose wing alone is perfect safety.

Concerning that lord,* who is now reported to be as deep in repentance as he was profound in sinne, the papers, &c., I shall take leave from your favour, and my streight of time, to be silent till the next weeke, when I hope for the happinesse to kisse your hands, and present you with my most humble thanks for yo^r letters w^{ch} confirm y^e observation I have made in the progresse of affections: that it is easier much to winne upon ingenuous natures than to meritt it. This, they tell mee, I have done of your's: and I account it a noble purchas, w^{ch} to improve with the best services you can command, and I performe, shall be y^e care of

"Your affectionate friend and servant,

"*Hampden, May 11th, 1631.*"

"JO. HAMPDEN.

The other letter which we give is illustrative of those literary tastes which, as we have already stated, Hampden possessed. Whilst in prison Eliot had written a treatise on the "*Monarchy of Man*," and in the following letter Hampden gives his opinion of it. We can but admire the exceedingly happy manner in which he words his criticism, and the delicate way in which he hints that the style of Eliot is too diffuse.

"SIR,—You shall receive y^e booke I promised, by this bearer's immediate hand; for y^e other papers I presume to take a little, and but a little, respitt. I have looked upon y^e rare piece ownly with a superficial view; as at first sight to take y^e aspect and proportion in y^e whole; after, with a more accurate eye, to take out y^e lineaments of every part. 'Twere rashnesse in mee, therefore, to discover any iudgment before I have ground to make one. This I discern, that 'tis as compleate an image of y^e patterne as can be drawne by lines; a lively character of a large minde; the subject, method, and expressions excellent and homogeniall; and, to say truth (sweete heart), somewhat exceeding my commendations. My words cannot render them to the life; yet (to show my ingenuity rather than witte) would not a lesse modell have given a full representation of that subject? not by diminution, but by contraction of parts? I desire to learn; I dare

* The lord here referred to was the notorious Lord Audley.

not say. The variations upon each particular seem many; all, I confesse, excellent. The fountaine was full; y^e channell narrow; y^e may be y^e cause; or that the author imitated Virgill, who made more verses by many than he intended to write. To extract a iust number, had I seen all this, I could easily have bidd him make fewer; but if hee had badd mee tell which he should have spared, I had bine apposed. So say I of these expressions; and that to satisfy you, not myselfe, but that by obeying you in a command so contrary to my own disposition, you may measure how large a power you have ouer

“JO. HAMPDEN.

“*Hampden, June 29th, 1631.*”

In 1634, whilst in his retirement, Hampden lost his wife, of whom he was very fond. This affliction for a time overwhelmed him with grief, but soon the duties of public life aroused him from his sorrow, and the stern necessities of the times compelled him to take an active part in political affairs.

From the time that Charles had dissolved Parliament in 1629, he had ruled as an absolute monarch, without Parliament or any other authority save his own despotic will. Aided at one time by Buckingham, and after he had met with a violent death, by Strafford and Laud, his tyranny grew worse and worse, his unconstitutional acts knew no bounds, his daring violation of laws, charters, rights, and privileges were such as few men then living could remember under any former sovereign.

Regardless of the Petition of Right, of the statutes of the realm, of his own solemn promise and declarations, and even of his security as king, Charles again levied taxes and duties on his own sole authority; and if any dared to resist these unconstitutional exactions they were brought before the Star-Chamber, a court which recognised no law but its own decisions, and severely punished. Many of the ancient incidents of feudal tenure, long since dropped into abeyance, were revived, and the nobility and gentry were forced to pay large sums of money on the most unreasonable pretences. Nor were these the only grievances the people had to complain of. Religious persecutions, worthy of the days of Henry VIII. or his daughters, were revived throughout the three kingdoms. Both Charles and Laud hated Nonconformists with a deadly hatred; in their eyes dissent was one of the greatest of crimes, and accordingly the Puritans were persecuted with fearful rigour. To express an aversion to the Ritualistic practices introduced by Laud, or to oppose Episcopacy or Arminianism, were regarded as enormous crimes. For such offences as these, men were fined, whipped, mutilated, and branded. They were placed in the pillory, and then consigned to dark and damp dungeons, not again to see the light of day until after a lapse of several years, when in premature old age, and ruined both in health and fortune, they were liberated by the Long Parliament. Nor was Strafford behind the Primate and his royal master. Sent by the king to Ireland, he there commenced a career of cruelty, tyranny,

and extortion, which even excelled that pursued by his sovereign in England. Money was voted by the Irish Parliament on the understanding that their grievances should be immediately redressed, but, having once got the money, neither Charles nor Strafford troubled themselves about the grievances of which the Parliament complained. But this was neither the conclusion nor the worst of Strafford's iniquitous conduct in Ireland. The money he had obtained, by a deception which would have disgraced a pedler, and much more a prince, was soon spent at court, and then the unfortunate Irish had to bear still further exactions. Money was extorted and lands confiscated on the most frivolous and illegal pretexts. Acts of Parliament, charters, and promises did not much trouble Strafford, for he ignored them all, and did not hesitate to do anything, however illegal or unjust, which would bring money into the royal coffers.

But, notwithstanding the efforts of Charles and his unscrupulous adherents, Laud and Strafford, the money obtained by their various devices did not satisfy the wants of the King, and therefore means were to be found of extorting more money from the people without resort to a Parliament. To meet this difficulty, Noy, the Attorney-General, came forward with a plan by which still further supplies could be raised. This scheme was none other than the notorious device of levying ship-money. By searching certain ancient records in the Tower, he discovered that in former times the ports and maritime counties had furnished ships for protecting the coast from pirates. In order to furnish a pretext for reviving this ancient custom, it was declared that certain Turkish Corsairs infested the seas, and injured and captured our shipping. Writs were then issued to the sheriffs, not only of the maritime, but of the inland counties also, requiring them to furnish certain amounts to pay for the ships said to be required. This was an unprecedented demand, for, even at a time of the greatest necessity and danger, when the Spanish Armada invaded England, ship-money had only been levied on the littoral counties.

The tax excited great dissatisfaction, and in many places was only paid after serious disturbance. Few, however, seemed inclined to actually contest by proper legal process the king's right to levy this imposition. Men naturally avoided an action at law, in which, with corrupt and partial judges, they had but little chance of success, were certain to incur enormous expense, and exposed themselves to the displeasure of a king who, regardless of law and justice, punished all who dared to oppose his will without mercy. But there was one man who, fearing neither the danger nor the expense of the contest, and animated by a high sense of public duty, resolved to make a bold stand for the undoubted right of the people not to be taxed without their consent. That man was John Hampden—of whom more anon.

SHAKSPERE'S BIRTHDAY.

THE birthday of Shakspeare is only traditionally known. *By tradition* it is assigned to 23rd April, 1564. The earliest manuscript authority for the statement is Oldys' "Notes on Langbaine." This must have been, we suppose, written subsequently to 1692, when Langbaine died, and before 1761, the date of the death of Oldys; but probably about 1709, when Rowe's "Life of Shakspeare" was published. A jotting of the traditionary date was made in a copy of the baptismal entry by Joseph Greene, who was master of the Grammar School of Stratford-upon-Avon from 1732—twenty-six years after the issue of Rowe's life—till 1772. This entry was probably made as a memorandum in consequence of the interest excited by Rowe's edition of the works of the poet; and the coincidence between this note and the note by Oldys, which could scarcely be known to Greene, is a considerable confirmation to the account commonly received—an account which was probably definitely fixed in the minds of his townsmen in 1600, when the registers of the parish of Stratford were transcribed with certification of their exactness by the vicar and four churchwardens. In 1600 Shakspeare, as the owner of New Place, was of sufficient consequence to excite talk about his birth and begetting; and we know from his plays that he seldom lets slip an opportunity of mentioning "Our great St. George's Feast," and ringing the changes as a war-cry on "Our ancient word of courage, fair St. George." If I calculate rightly, Easter Sunday fell, in 1564, on the 13th of April; Shakspeare would thus be born on Thursday, the 23rd, and be baptized on the 26th; that is, the second Sunday after Easter. It is to be remembered, in this connection, that the Prayer Book, authorized only six years before Shakspeare's birth, and therefore likely to be carefully attended to, expressly enjoined on parents, "that they defer not the baptism of their children longer than the *first* or second Sunday next after their birth, or other holiday falling between." In accordance with this *rule*, Edmund Alleyn, Shakspeare's contemporary and fellow player, founder of Dulwich College, was baptized the day after his birth; of Dr. Dee's children, Arthur and Katherine were baptized on the third, Theodore on the second, and Margaret on the thirteenth day after birth. Oliver Cromwell and Lord Clarendon were baptized on the fourth, and Milton on the eleventh day after birth; hence there is no antecedent improbability in the supposed early baptism of Shakspeare, but rather the reverse.

It has been argued by Mr. Bolton Corney, that if Shakspeare died in the fifty-third year of his age, he must have been born *before* the 23rd April, 1564, as on the former date he would only have completed his fifty-second year. But it is replied that legally a *ne-*

year commences with the recurrence of the birthday; and hence the objection fails. The same author asks, "Would Shakspeare's widow and daughters (who erected the monument) authorize a deceptive inscription?" We do not require to suppose deception at all. The statement made on the tomb (probably by Dr. John Hall) is legally accurate; and it might be noted that the method of statement adopted had the effect of seemingly lessening the disparity of years between the poet and his widow. Was not the strangeness of the event given emphasis to by fixing on Thursday (his birth day), also as his burial day? and would not this coincidence of dates of birth and death fix the tradition of the birth date all the more firmly in the memory of his kindred, friends, and neighbours?

"One only argument," says De Quincey, "has sometimes struck us for supposing that the 22nd might be the day, and not the 23rd; which is that Shakspeare's sole granddaughter, Lady Barnard, was married on 22nd April, 1626, ten years exactly from the poet's death; and the reason for choosing this day *might* have had a reference to her illustrious grandfather's birthday." If there is anything in this circumstance, it is all in favour of the traditionary date; because the 23rd, having been both a birth and a death day, would have been an ill-omened one for rejoicing in; and would therefore be avoided in itself, though kept as closely to as possible. "Still," as the opium-eater continues, "this choice may have been an accident, or governed merely by reason of convenience; and, on the whole, it is as well, perhaps, to acquiesce in the old belief that Shakspeare was born and died on the 23rd of April.—De Quincey's *Life of Shakspeare*, Works, vol. xv., p. 4.

The trustees of Shakspeare's birthplace now hold their annual meeting on what they regard as the equivalent day, viz. 3rd May, allowing *ten* days for difference of style; but this, we believe, is an error; for up till 1700 new style was *ten* days in advance of old style; but, as 1700 and 1800 were leap years, we are now *twelve* days in advance of old style. "The new and old styles now differ by *twelve* days, our first of January being equivalent to the 13th old style (Chambers' "Book of Days," vol. i., p. 4); and consequently the 23rd of April is what would now be called the 5th of May, as is stated in Neil's "Shakspeare, a Critical Biography," p. 9.

DEBATE.—Discussion is a pleasant and profitable thing, where you advance and defend your opinions as far as you can, and admit the truth of what is objected against them with equal impartiality; in short, where you do not pretend to set up for an oracle, but freely declare what you know about any question, or suggest what has struck you, as throwing a new light upon it, and let it pass for what it is worth.—*William Hazlitt*.

The Reviewer.

The Sonnets of Shakspeare Solved; and the Mystery of his Friendship, Love, and Rivalry Revealed. By HENRY BROWN.
London: John R. Smith.

MR. HENRY BROWN has written a book full of thought on the Sonnets of Shakspeare, and he has illustrated the Sonnets by "numerous extracts from the poet's works, contemporary writers, and other authors," with considerable aptness, ingenuity, and ability. The work is one which has a good claim on the notice of critics. Not only is it an original endeavour to settle the almost insoluble problem of Shakspeare's purpose in the writing and publication of his Sonnets, but it displays a good deal of reading of an observative kind; and it is the production of a working man, whose days have been full of labour and sorrow, and whose nights have been spent in converse with the great calm wondrous soul who was the heart-soother of the Elizabethan time.

In this result of his studies Mr. Brown has formed a theory not unworthy of the somewhat Socratic genius of Shakspeare, viz., that the Sonnets are a series of verses composed in quiet and subtle irony of the Sonnetteers of his age, that they are parodies on the love-sonnetting which Daniel, Davies, Donne, Sidney, &c., had made fashionable, cunningly incorporating with their sort of Italianate wit an allegorical "marriage of true minds."

We do not, while admiring the ingenuity of the hypothesis, admit its accuracy or likelihood, for the more we reflect on the life of Shakspeare the more truly human does he seem to us, and the less of mystery do we feel it necessary to import into our idea of his life. As we grow more intimate with what he was and did, we find him a man of good heart and of noble brain, of lofty spirit and kindly affections—a man of men—and we do not think that mystery magnifies "our Shakspeare."

It is a delightful thing to notice, as Mr. Brown does, that Thomas Thorpe, publisher of the Sonnets, was a Warwickshire man. So was Field, the publisher of his "*Venus and Adonis*," and his "*Lucrece*;" as were also Cuthbert Burbie and William Jaggard.

Many, too, of his fellow-players were men of Warwickshire, so that we know he kept up the fine genial English spirit of reverence for home ties, and the associations of youth and neighbourhood. All our knowledge of him as a man gives an impression of a fine, healthy, genuine soul, about as free from sentimental romanticism as possible—evidently a man who knew his own worth and revered the lyre, capable of conceiving heights and depths of passion, because able to comprehend the fountains of passionate power contained in his own soul, but not at all a mystic.

We think the key to be taken to unlock the secret of Shakspeare's
1870. 2 c

life is rather his manliness than his marvellousness ; and hence, although we see a possibility of a portion of the truth of Shakspeare's Sonnets being got at by the theory of Gerald Massey, and a portion of probability in the theory of Henry Brown, we think the true solution will be found much more nearly akin to the ordinary conditions of sonnet-writing, that they had various aims and various seasons for their birth.

We must, however, in order to do justice to our readers, to ourselves as critics, and to Mr. Brown, give a taste of his quality as an expositor of a fresh theory for the solution of the most enigmatical productions in our literature.

"The Sonnets have been objected to on account of their being filled with fantastical conceits. They are pictures for and of the age. In this burlesque Shakspeare has not only used the conceits, but also purposely imitated the style of others, and, while doing so, emulated to surpass them in their own sphere. As it was the custom for sonnetteers to use Biblical expressions, Shakspeare, in imitation of them, has also used them, so that it was not on account of his being fortunate enough to find that rarity, a true friend, that led him to lavish such excesses in his verse ; for the object of these excesses, as will be proved, was parody" (p. 29).

"The reader is requested never to lose sight of the poet's ultimate drift in his progress through the lengthened chain of conceits and hyperbolic metaphors with which these poems abound. It will be found there are three different sections or undercurrents of purpose :—

"First, that the whole set of Sonnets are satires upon mistress-sonnetting, and upon the sonnetteers of Shakspeare's day, and that Drayton first, but afterwards Davies, were more directly the subjects of his sportive musings and feignings.

"Second, and more important, that they are autobiographical, containing much that is valuable.

"Third, and which is of itself the key that unlocks the heart of the mystery, is the conceit of Shakspeare having united his muse to his friend by marriage of verse and mind ; by which means and for which favour his youth and beauty are immortalised, but which theme does not fully commence till the friend had declined the invitation to marriage, which refusal begets the mystic melody.

"The inference from the Sonnets and Dedication is, that they were written at the especial request of the friend who, in spite of all expostulation, was so self-willed as not to be denied. Hence Shakspeare poured his whole soul into the task of developing the romantic youth's fantastic caprice, and the whole turns upon this pivot. The youth sought and obtained Shakspeare's friendship ; for reasons before stated the poet persuades him to marry, but without effect. The comedy of "Much Ado about Nothing" was then (1599) written to show how such another military-minded, self-willed bachelor was trapped at last. Returning to the Sonnets, we find the youth declining the invitation to marry and preserve his youth and beauty by children. To effect this object Shakspeare marries the youth to his immortal verse, which binds them together in wedded friendship, so that the poet in his unadulterous love permits him to become "The onlie begetter of these insuing Sonnets," which perpetuate his youth and beauty and their loving friendship in ever-living verse. Finally, the poet viewed his lengthy

chain of Sonnet stanzas as his masterpiece, upon which to build his reputation and undying fame, exclaiming,—

“Not marble, nor the gilded monuments
Of princes shall outlive this powerful rhyme.”

Which he himself fully believed, though the vaunt was a strain beyond his usual humility, his object being to ape the bombast of the sonnetteers, and at the same time excel them” (pp. 35—37). “Shakspeare cared but little whether the sonnet writers of his day were offended. He knew the foremost wits of the time, Ben Jonson, Beaumont and Fletcher, and others, looked upon the mistress-sonnetteers with contempt, and would view his Sonnets as of a satirical tendency and delight in the scheme. They would at once see that the Sonnets were used in order and continuity, and with a mastery the halting sonnet-writers had never conceived and could never equal, in regard to whom Shakspeare looked upon himself as a nightingale among a choir of common song birds” (p. 194). . . . Some have spoken of Shakspeare's Sonnets as his greatest works. Without going to such a length it is true they are his masterpiece in a strictly poetical sense, being written in alternate rhyme; others view them in the opposite extreme, and speak of them as being unworthy of the poet, which they would be were they written merely for the sake of writing sonnets; had they but observed that Shakspeare devised to ridicule sonnet-mania, they would then read our poet's work—

‘In the same spirit that its author writ.’

“And though his Sonnets are but a species of parody, yet, coming from the hand of such lofty diction, that no other sonnets can be in any way compared with them, unless it be the few Milton penned with a like masterly vigour; in brief, Shakspeare's Sonnets are works of the highest art. But Shakspeare had a higher purpose than deriding sonnetting to fulfil; his destined ‘fine issue’ was to teach philosophy, justice, morality, virtue, and religion to thousands who would never listen to any other than the voice of an actor, for whom the poet has conceived acts and declamations that have ever, and ever will, receive rounds of applause” (pp. 241, 242.)

Mr. Brown, considering the nature of the subject and the generally sceptical character of those who have extensive experience in proposed Shaksperian novelties, has been favoured with a very gratifying body of subscribers. We would earnestly commend the case of the author to the consideration of our readers. The issue of such a work is a daring venture for a working man, and can scarcely, even at the best, repay the toil of brain expended on it, hardly even the cost of publication, advertisements, &c. Hence we suggest that such of our readers as are members of book clubs, or readers in libraries, should see to its purchase and perusal. They will thus be helpful to a man of ability, and bring themselves into contact with a considerable range of Elizabethan reading and Shakspeare illustration, and prove that the glory of Shakspeare is not like the varying glory of an April day, but a constant and continual brightness of renown.

The Topic.

COULD WE TO HAVE A RESPONSIBLE COURT OF LAST APPEAL IN CAPITAL CASES INSTEAD OF THE HOME SECRETARY'S DISCRETION?

AFFIRMATIVE.

A CONSIDERATION of the question in its various bearings seems to lead to the conclusion that such a court would be an advantage. At present the Royal prerogative of mercy in remitting, reducing, or varying the sentence in capital cases, is exercised by Her Majesty, under the advice of the Home Secretary, which is based upon representations made to him and upon the results of inquiries he may make. There are three classes of cases in which it may be rightly exercised. (1) In cases where it is found that the person convicted is innocent; (2) where the person convicted is guilty, but the sentence is considered unduly severe; and (3) where there is such an amount of reasonable doubt as to render the infliction of the extreme penalty of the law scarcely justifiable. In cases of the first class the prisoner is entitled to a remission of the sentence; in those of the second to a reduction; and in those of the third to a remission or reduction, as may be advisable. Testing our arguments by applying them to each of these classes of cases, we can readily obtain a practical view of the important question, whether, instead of the Home Secretary's discretion, we ought not, in the interests both of justice and mercy, to have a responsible Court of last appeal, with power to revise or remit sentences. Take first the case of an innocent man. He has been publicly tried, and on certain evidence publicly condemned. If his innocence be afterwards demonstrated, it is due to the man, to society, and to the law, that the demonstration should be equally as public as his condemnation was;

and it is also especially due to the man that after his innocence has been made clear he should receive, not a pardon, which implies that he is still guilty, but a complete remission of his sentence and a declaration of his innocence. In such a case as this a responsible public tribunal seems altogether preferable to the Home Secretary's discretion, exercised in the manner it now is. It would also be preferable in the second class of cases above mentioned. The public would then have the advantage of knowing the principles which guide decision, and of being able to judge both as to the impartiality of the inquiry as it regarded the prisoner on the one hand and the Crown on the other, and as to the soundness of the decision which in each case might be come to. The third class of cases consists of those in which doubt exists and re-consideration is desirable. The doubt may either exist at the time of the prisoner's trial, or arise after his conviction. If it exist at the time of trial, it receives consideration by both judge and jury, and the prisoner frequently has the benefit of it. A court of appeal is therefore not so strongly needed in these cases as in those where the doubt arises after the prisoner's condemnation. It is then important the whole case should be seriously re-considered and re-weighed, allowance being made for all doubts, and still more important that this shall be done by some thoroughly competent person or tribunal. In many instances not only would reconsideration be necessary, but also some degree of fresh inquiry or investigation. The advantage of a carefully and ably

constituted court seems, therefore, to be as apparent in cases where doubt has arisen as in those where the person convicted is supposed to be innocent, or where, being guilty, he has been too severely dealt with. The principal objection made against such a tribunal is that it would introduce an element of uncertainty into the results of criminal trials. A contrary effect may, however, be anticipated, and it should be borne in mind that where the penalty is death there can scarcely be too much care taken to guard against mistakes or injustice.—G. T. H.

Trial by jury is one of our great constitutional institutions, and should be the fundamental principle on which the present question is to be based. 1. It is unconstitutional that an answer to an appeal should rest in the hands of any one person, when the sentence of death has been unanimously passed by a jury of twelve men. 2. Our law theoretically maintains that the responsibility of passing a sentence of death should not rest on the shoulders of any *one* person. 3. When the answer to an appeal was invested, nominally in the person of the sovereign, it was more constitutional, inasmuch as the circumstances of the case were fully discussed in the Cabinet. 4. Both Sir George Grey and Mr. Walpole, who severally held the office of Home Secretary, expressed their desire that they might be relieved from performing so very solemn and responsible a duty; and it is also very evident that those sentiments are fully acquiesced in by Mr. Bruce. 5. The very unequal decisions of our Home Secretary *alone* demand a court of appeal.—GEORGIUS D. E.

The institution of such a court is highly desirable. The public would feel enlarged confidence in a properly constituted tribunal, with

which rested the duty of revising the sentence, instead of a minister whom *any* influences or representations may direct to a decision in a case, while there is no opportunity for challenging these; and often on the individual official a whole legion of other duties press, to the great danger of this important one being treated with deprecable haste. The present system has too often when at work found itself opposed to the decision of the national mind when there was no possibility of reasons being demanded. The fault-finding disposition of political party would be diminished by the change.—J. F. B.

We have not now to discuss the merits or demerits of capital punishments, but whether it is wise that the Home Secretary should hold the power without being responsible. 1st. We think that heaven has not blest any man with such wisdom as is needed for this very important task. 2nd. We find as a fact that before the Queen came to the throne it was customary for the members of the Administration to be summoned, the Sovereign to be present and the Lord Chief Justice, and then to consider the question. Well, when the youthful princess was crowned and swayed the sceptre it was thought unwise to carry on this principle on account of her youth; and no doubt many things would have to be discussed totally unfit for her ears. So we conclude it was never intended to rest with one man; and has been somewhat rudely thrust upon the Home Secretary. 3rd. It is too great a responsibility for any one man to have. Picture to yourself the power of life and death over a fellow-creature, however wicked and depraved he may have been; he consigns them (by not holding out the clemency of the Crown) to eternity, and we fear too often to future misery. 4th. The uncertainty of the law brings it into

contempt. How often have we been led to inquire what could have induced the Home Secretary to respite or reprieve such or such a criminal. And further, it is a secret trial; the prisoner has been tried, found guilty in an open court, condemned to death, and as soon as the sentence is pronounced all kinds of petitions, affidavits, &c., are sworn to and sent in. Well, this is strictly private, and hence the public are much dissatisfied because they know not why the sentence is not carried out. Another reason why something ought to be done is for the sake of the prisoner. I think oftentimes he, in hope of mercy from an earthly tribunal, thinks too much of that to be able to devote much time for making his peace with God, and up to the very last he holds hopes that he will be spared; and the all-absorbing thought is to save the temporary life, forgetting and neglecting altogether the future one. This would be greatly avoided by having more certainty in the remission of capital sentences.—A. S.

That there could be a negative to this question seems to my mind impossible. It is lamentable that the final issue of such life or death matter as remission of a capital sentence should be confined to the discretion of one individual. The judgment of one man's mind, be its reasoning powers ever so finely balanced, cannot be satisfactory to a large community; and that a state of things like this exists is one of the disgraceful absurdities of "enlightened England." It requires no argument to prove that a number of heads of equal calibre are better than one; and where one is liable to fail, causing discontent among the people, many are more certain of creating confidence and yielding satisfaction.—W. L.

NEGATIVE.

Nothing that would weaken or

lessen the sense of responsibility in the jury, the public confidence in the judge, the respect for the tribunals of the country by the people, should be adopted unless there is no avoiding such a scandal. The institution of such a court as is supposed here would very materially weaken the sense of responsibility in the jury and lessen the care they would take in coming to a decision; for they would in most cases find a verdict under the assumption that it would be reviewed. The judge in like manner, not being looked upon by the people as a final adjudicator, would gradually come to be thought only a secondary authority, and any capital sentence he might pass would be regarded as one to be traversed and brought under review. In this way the entire judgment of our courts would be brought into disrespect, and even the sentences passed in other cases would come to be acquiesced in grudgingly. Besides, the Supreme Court itself could not really be regarded as final, for the Sovereign has dispensing powers in the last and latest. Again, a rehearing of a case would grow to be a right, and great expense, delay, discomfort and passionate excitement would be occasioned. We require our present system improved, not destroyed, still less depraved; but we should have no such court.—S. A. S.

"The last appeal" is not one of right but of grace. To establish a court would convert a privilege into a right, and make the prerogative of mercy impossible; or if it did not would make it an absurdity. Impossible if the decisions of the court of last appeal were always carried out; and an absurdity if they were not.—F. M.

If a court of last appeal were instituted, would it be a court of justice or of mercy? If of justice, in what would it differ from the courts

now sitting? if of mercy, how could *that* be administered by law? We do not ask a re-trial because of miscarriage of justice in most cases, but because of some speciality in the extenuating circumstances of the crime committed. If we had a tribunal to re-try criminal cases, we should do more damage to the judgment of the country than we could do good to the criminals who would be brought before it. As things are there must be some plea capable of being decently used before the Home Secretary can be asked to interpose his personal forgiveness to the condemned one, and this acts as a restriction which could not be enforced if a court were established for the purpose of giving a second chance to those who had broken with violence into the house of life. Let us keep justice and mercy clearly apart.—W. G. J.

The general drift and tendency of legislation has been of late to constitute, as far as possible, the judgments of our law courts final. It has been thought that this greatly economizes expense and produces greater thoughtfulness, and thoroughness in getting at the right point of view, seeing that the question requires to be decided correctly "once for all." The constitution of our courts is such now that the most painstaking care may be exercised in each case, and the laws of evidence are now so well-known and clearly laid down that there can be little occasion for mistake or substantial injustice. Our judges are now, too, trained and tried. We ought to proceed as we are doing, and endeavour to get each special court to perform all the work entrusted to it earnestly, carefully, and well. Every opportunity of rehearing allowed is a temptation to remissness in the transaction of the whole business of the courts below the one final court, beyond which

no appeal is permissible. To unhinge and loosen the whole machinery of criminal procedure for the sake of taking this retrograde step would be most unadvisable. Besides, even then, could we do without an appeal to mercy,—for law always tends to fall into dull, technical courses, and to decide upon these? Keep the appeal to the Royal clemency intact.—R. R.

Certainty mingled with judicious leniency should rule in all our criminal courts. Any such court of review being instituted would probably lead to its being used as a means of procuring a temporary respite, greatly to the detriment of our criminal procedure. Juries would more hastily and rashly decide on the guilt of those who had committed capital offences if there were a supreme court in which the sentence could be revised; and the sentence given would be looked upon as uncertain. It would be much better to revise our Criminal Code in regard to capital punishment, and allow the jury to bring in a verdict with extenuating circumstances of different classes, and so enable them to give effect to their doubts, reserving capital punishments only for those in which extenuating circumstances did not appear.—J. S. S.

A tribunal whose duty it was to review capital sentences, if private would be as unsatisfactory as the decision of the Home Secretary, which is practically given as the result of a court of review, and if public would be very disadvantageous, as showing on what grounds mercy was granted, and so misleading those who were not capable of holding in one view the whole of the threads of evidence which, unitedly, led to remission—false analogies would be sure to prevail. Thus the tribunal would be unmerciful in its granting of mercy.—W. S. C.

Our Collegiate Course.

THE PROGRESS OF POESY.

A PINDARIC ODE.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

[The various sources of poetry, which gives life and lustre to all its touches, are here described; its quiet majestic progress enriching every subject (otherwise dry and barren) with a pomp of diction and luxuriant harmony of numbers; and its more rapid and irresistible course, when swollen and hurried away by the conflict of tumultuous passions.]

STROPHE I.*

AWAKE, Æolian lyre, awake,

And give to rapture all thy trembling strings :

Give forth thy richest sounds, O wind-harp, give them forth, and devote
to intense delight all thy resounding chords. From the musical sources of

(1) "Awake up, my glory; awake, psaltery and harp: I myself will awake early."—Psa. lviii. 8.

"The peculiar characteristics of Pindar are—the lofty beauty and musical softness of his language, and his fondness for considering every subject in the most dignified view of which it is susceptible."—*Schlegel's "Lectures on the History of Literature,"* i. "The Epinicia of Pindar are of three sorts, Doric, Æolian, and Lydian, which can be easily distinguished, although each admits of innumerable varieties. In respect of metre, every ode of Pindar has an individual character, no two odes having the same metrical structure. . . . The rhythms of the Æolian odes resemble those of the Lesbian poetry, in which light dactylic, trochaic, or logæædic metres prevailed; these rhythms, however, when applied to choral lyric poetry, were rendered far more various, and thus often acquired a character of greater volubility and liveliness. The poet's mind also moves with greater rapidity, and sometimes he stops himself in the midst of narrations which seem to him arrogant or impious. A larger scope is likewise given to his personal feelings; and in the addresses to the victor there is a gayer tone, which at times takes even a jocular turn. . . . The Æolian odes, from the

* The choral poems of the Greeks consisted of three chief portions, named respectively the strophe, the antistrophe, and the epode, recurring as frequently as the topic required in the same order; the chorus, while chanting or reciting the first, dancing with their faces turned to the right, the second while turned in the opposite direction, and the third in a group or tableau. In the more regular odes the strophe and antistrophe were, in general, of an equal length and measure, and consisted of a greater number of lines than the epode.

From Helicon's harmonious springs
A thousand rills their mazy progress take;
The laughing flowers that round them blow, 5

Castalian waters, a myriad of brooks pursue their course; the gladsome flowers which burst into blossom around them derive fertility and perfume-

rapidity and variety of their movement, have a less uniform character than the Doric odes. . . . The language of the Æolian Epinicia is also bolder, more difficult in its syntax, and marked by rarer dialectical forms."

—K. O. Müller's "*Literature of Ancient Greece*," chap. xv.

As the Greeks ascribed the origin of their lyric poetry to the Æolians, of Asia Minor, *Æolian* here signifies lyric, with Pindar as the model. Pindar, in his first Olympic ode, speaks of it as an "Æolian song."

(3) Helicon, a mountain in Bœotia, celebrated by the ancient poets as a favourite seat of the Muses. Two springs in it, Aganippe and Hippocrene, were supposed to be fountains of poetic inspiration.

"There shalt thou hear and learn the secret power
Of harmony, in tones and numbers fit,
By voice or hand, and various-measured verse,
Æolian charms and Dorian lyric odes."

Paradise Regained, iv., 257—260.

(5) The natives of Italy and the softer climates receive emotions from the view of their waters in the SPRING, not equally experienced in the British roughness of our skies. The fluency and softness of the water are thus described by Lucretius:—

"Tibi suavis Dædala tellus
Submittit flores; tibi Rident aquora ponti;"

inelegantly rendered by Creech,—

"The roughest sea puts on smooth looks, and smiles."

Dryden more happily,—

"The ocean smiles, and smooths her wavy breast."

But Metastasio has copied Lucretius:—

"A te fioriscono,
Gli erbosi prati:
E i flutti Ridono
Nel mar placati."

It merits observation that the northern poets could not exalt their imagination higher than that the water *smiled*, while the modern Italian, having before his eyes a *different spring*, found no difficulty in agreeing with the ancients that the waves *laughed*. Modern poetry has made a very free use of the animating epithet *laughing*. Gray has the *laughing flowers*, and Langhorne, in two beautiful lines, exquisitely personifies Flora:—

Drink life and fragrance as they flow ;
Now the rich stream of music winds along,

giving power from them in their progress. At one time we may notice the pleasing gush of melodious sounds go on in mazy curvings—impressive

"Where Tweed's soft banks in liberal beauty lie,
And Flora *laughs* beneath an azure sky."

Sir William Jones, with all the spirit of Oriental poetry, has "*the laughing air*." It is but justice, however, to Dryden, to acknowledge that he has employed this epithet very boldly in the following delightful lines, which are almost entirely borrowed from his original, Chaucer :—

"The morning lark, the messenger of day,
Saluted in her song the morning grey ;
And soon the sun arose, with beams so bright,
That all the horizon *laughed* to see the joyous sight."

"Palamon and Arcite," book ii.

—Disraeli's "*Curiosities of Literature*," p. 216.

To the examples above quoted by Disraeli we may here add,—

"Wilt thou fly
With *laughing* Autumn to the Atlantic isles?"
Akenside's "Pleasures of Imagination," i., 287-8.

"The *laughing* scenes
Of purple spring ; where all the wanton train
Of smiles and graces seem to lead the dance,
In sportive mood."—*Warton's "Pleasures of Melancholy,"* 21.

"Fair *laughs* the morn, and soft the zephyr blows."—*Gray's "Barð."*

Æschylus speaks of "the uncontrollable laughter of the waves."

(7) "The word *music* is here taken in its original and most extensive import, comprehending as well the pleasures we receive from the beauty or magnificence of natural objects as those which arise from poetry, painting, or music, or any other of the elegant and imaginative arts."—*Mark Akenside*. So it is used by W. Collins in his ode, "The Passions":—

"When Music, heavenly maid, was young,
While yet, in early Greece, she sung,
The Passions oft, to hear her shell,
Thronged around her magic cell—
Exulting, trembling, raging, fainting,
Possessed beyond the Muse's painting ;
By turns they felt the glowing mind
Disturbed, delighted, raised, refined," &c., 1-8.

(7-10) In the *Thebaid* of Statius, i., 365, we read of "*nubigenas montibus amnes*"—the cloud-descended mountain streams. Similarly :—

Deep, majestic, smooth and strong,
 Through verdant vales, and Ceres' golden reign :
 Now rolling down the steep amain, 10
 Headlong, impetuous see it pour ;
 The rocks and nodding groves, rebellow to the roar.

[The power of poetry to calm and soothe the stormier passions of the spirit.]

ANTISTROPHE I.

Oh! sovereign of the willing soul,
 Parent of sweet and solemn breathing airs,
 Enchanting shell! the sullen cares 15

grand, delicious, powerful—passing through, on the fruitful valleys, and fields yellow with corn; at another time they rush speedily down the cliff, abruptly and powerfully; the shelving sides and the groves waving their heads on high, re-echoing the sounds.

O mighty monarch of the submissive spirit, source of pleasing and serious music—magic lyre! the leaden anxieties and excited emotions of

"At last, the roused-up river pours along ;
 Resistless, roaring, dreadful, down it comes,
 From the rude mountain, and the mossy wild,
 Tumbling through rocks abrupt, and sounding far ;
 Then o'er the sanded valley floating spreads
 Calm, sluggish, silent ; till again constrained
 Between two meeting hills, it bursts away,
 Where rocks and woods o'erhang the turbid stream ;
 Where, gathering triple force, rapid and deep,
 It boils, and wheels, and foams, and thunders through."
Thomson's "Seasons," Winter, 96—105.

(9) *Ceres* is in Greek called *Demeter* (γῆ μήτηρ—mother-earth). Her festival (*Cerealia*) commenced on 12th April, and lasted several days.

"Prima Ceres homini ad meliora alimenta vocato
 Mutavit glandes utiliore cibo," &c.

Ovid's "Fasti," iv., 401-2.

See also Virgil's "*Georgics*," book i., 368, &c.

A periphrasis for cultured harvest-fields—*Ceres* is the goddess of agriculture and of corn. She is the daughter of Saturn and Ops; sister of Jupiter, Neptune, Pluto, and Juno; and mother of Proserpine. Cereals are grass crops whose seeds are used for food, as opposed to meadow-grasses on the one hand and leguminous plants and root-crops on the other.

(10—12) "Soft gliding now, as when o'er pebbles glancing,
 The silver wave goes dancing ;

And frantic passions, hear thy soft control;
 On Thracia's hills the lord of war
 Has curbed the fury of his car,
 And dropped his thirsty lance at thy command:
 Perching on the sceptred hand 20
 Of Jove, thy magic lulls the feathered king
 With ruffled plumes, and flagging wing,
 Quench'd in dark clouds of slumber lie

the soul listen to the gentle power thou exertest. The leader in the glorious fight, even on the ridges of Hæmus, restrained the rush of his war-chariot, and suffered his vengeful spear to decline at thy bidding. Thine enchantment softens the ire of the eagle while resting, with disturbed feather and with wearied wing, on the kingly wrist of Jupiter, and

Now with majestic swell, and strong,
 As thunder-peals in organ notes along;
 And now with stormy gush,
 As down the rock in foam the whirling torrents rush."
Schiller's "To Laura Playing" (Lytton).

- (16) "Music has charms to soothe the savage breast,
 To soften rocks, or bend a knotted oak;
 I've read that things inanimate have moved,
 And, as with living souls, have been informed
 By magic numbers and persuasive sounds."

Congreve's "Mourning Bride," i, 1.

"Timotheus, to his breathing flute
 And sounding lyre,
 Could swell the soul to rage, or kindle soft desire."
Dryden's "Alexander's Feast."

"Jackson, of Exeter, in reply to the question of Dryden 'What passion cannot music raise or quell?' sarcastically returns 'What passion can music raise or quell?' Would not a savage, who had never listened to a musical instrument, feel certain emotions at listening to one for the first time? But civilized man is, no doubt, particularly affected by *associations of ideas*, as all pieces of national music evidently prove."—*Disraeli's "Curiosities of Literature,"* p. 103.

(17) *Thracia* was anciently the name of that tract of land which lay south of the Danube, and north of the Propontis and the *Ægean*, and stretched from the river Strymon, on the west, to the Black Sea. The earliest poets—Orpheus, Linus, Musæus—are all represented as coming from Thrace. The inhabitants were cruel, rapacious, savage, delighting in war and bloodshed. Catullus, in his fourth ode, speaks of—

"Thrace, with rugged headlands crowned."

Homer calls Mars "the grizzly god of Thrace," book vii., 252, because he was the tutelary deity of that country, which derived its name from his son Thrax. The Muses, according to Hesiod, belonged to Pieria, which, till it became incorporated with the Macedonian kingdom, was regarded as a Thracian province.

(21) The eagle of Jupiter, which is usually represented as lying with expanded wings at his feet.

The terror of his beak, and lightning of his eye.
then the fearfulness of his bite, the brilliancy of his eye, are, soothed into the stillness of heavy-falling sleep.

(24) Imitated, as Gray himself notes, from Pindar, who sings,—

“Golden lyre, Apollo’s care,
Thy aid with violet tresses crown’d;
Their emblem thee, the Muses share;
The bounding Dance obeys, and Joy pursues the sound.
Thy signal wakes the vocal choir,
When with the sweet prelude’s lingering lay
Thy frame resumes its thrilling sway.
The lanced lightnings’ everlasting fire
Thou hast extinguished; while by thee,
On Jove’s own sceptre, lulled, the feathered king
Forgets his awful ministry,
And hangs from either flank the drooping wing.
Thou his beak’d crest around
Hast poured the cloud of darkness off,
And o’er his beaming eyeballs bound
The lock of thy sweet spell: slumbering he sits aloft,
With ruffling plumes and heaving spine,
Quelled by thy potent strain. The furious Mars
Aloof hath left the bristling spears,
And with thy soft mellifluous anodyne
Soothed his relentless heart; for even
The gods themselves thy searching shaft subdues
By skilled Latoides aimed in heaven,
Framed in the bosom of the swelling Muse.”

Pindar’s “Pythian Odes,” i., 1—25, Abr. Moore’s Version.

(24) The same passage has also thus been imitated by one of Gray’s contemporaries:—

“All the sounding choir,
And bright Apollo, leader of the song,
Their voices through the liquid air exalt,
And sweep their lofty strings, those powerful strings
That charm the mind of gods, that fill the courts
Of wide Olympus with oblivion sweet
Of evils, with immortal rest from cares,
Assuage the terrors of the throne of Jove,
And quench the formidable thunderbolt
Of unrelenting fire. With slackened wings,
While now the solemn concert breathes around,
Incumbent o’er the sceptre of his lord
Sleeps the stern eagle, by the numbered notes
Possessed, and satiate with the melting tone—
Sovereign of birds. The furious god of war,
His darts forgetting, and the winged wheels
That bear him, vengeful, o’er the embattled plain,
Relents, and soothes his own fierce heart to ease,
Most welcome ease. The sire of gods and men,
In that great moment of divine delight,
Looks down on all that live.”

Akenside’s “Hymn to the Naiads,” 258—278.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

889. Can any reader of the *Controversialist* recommend to me a cheap work on the Huguenots; and, secondly, is Mr. Smiles's work the best on the influence of that party on England?—J. F. B.

890. Which was the first periodical literary miscellany, and where shall I find an account of it?—J. F. B.

891. Can you or any reader of the *British Controversialist* tell me the present position of Reichenbach's science of odic force, and what are the best books on that subject, and mesmerism, clairvoyance, &c.?—J. W. F.

892. Is it true that there are two missing paintings by Sir Joshua Reynolds, for which large sums have been offered? and if so, what are the subjects?—J. W. F.

893. Can you or any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* inform me who is the author of the following line, and where it occurs?—

"Too wise to err, too good to be unkind."

G. D. H.

894. In Locke's "Conduct of the Understanding," Section viii.—Religion, this passage occurs, "And had but those that would enter them according to their several capacities in a right way to this knowledge." Can you tell me what it means?—G. D. H.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

823. In the first volume of the *British Controversialist* for 1869 a query is put regarding a manuscript magazine, in reply to which I send the following statement. At the half-yearly business meeting of the

"Excelsior Mutual Improvement Association," Hawick, N.B., it was proposed that a M.S. journal be started. The proposal was favourably received, and a set of rules were drawn up and submitted to the society for approval. Two editors were thereafter appointed to conduct the journal—a senior and junior. A packet of waterlined 8vo. notepaper was procured, and each member received a certain number of sheets; these sheets were sent in to the editors; at the end of the month the sheets were sewed together. Editorial remarks were made on the communications, and it was then sent round to the members for perusal. The following is a copy of the rules as they stand at present:—

1st. That every member be expected to contribute to the journal.

2nd. That no unfriendly criticism be allowed.

3rd. That on no account whatever the editors divulge the names of correspondents.

4th. That the editors have the power of rejecting contributions if they consider them calumnious.

5th. The editors would impress on contributors the necessity of sending in contributions early, to allow of editorial remarks being made and questions answered; also that contributions be handed in not later than the 27th of each month.

6th. It is imperative that contributions be original; but extracts will be allowed, providing the said extracts are acknowledged as such.

I shall be happy to give any further information, either privately or

through the medium of the *British Controversialist*.—W. E.

880. The best and cheapest edition of the poets is the Aldine Series, now in course of re-issue by Bell and Daldy, of London, in fifty-two monthly volumes at 1s. 6d. each, of which two are already published. This series, edited by eminent scholars (including Collier, Dyce, Mitford, Morris, &c.), are well printed, with initial letters and ornaments, and elegantly bound in cloth gilt. The contents of the series are, Akenside, Beattie, Burns, Butler, Chaucer, Churchill, Collins, Cowper, Dryden, Falconer, Goldsmith, Gray, Kirke White, Milton, Parnell, Pope, Prior, Shakspeare, Spenser, Surrey, Swift, Thomson, Wyatt, and Young. I may also add that the price of Crocker's "Mermaid" Series of dramatists is 5s. a volume instead of 3s., as stated in the March number.—C. C.

882. S. C. has quoted "Ah!" instead of "Lo." The line and a half he notes form the close of a beautiful sonnet on "The Poet's Solitude," which appeared in *The Literary Souvenir*. It is from the pen of Thomas Doubleday, author of *Babington*, a tragedy of great power and beauty; *The Italian Wife*, a drama of intense interest and romantic pathos; *Diocletian*, a dramatic, philosophical poem, of fine, bold tone; *Caius Marius*, a Roman play of great skill and power; "The Eve of St. Mark's," a novel, &c. He is also known as a philosopher by his "True Theory of Population"—against Malthus, Whately, &c.; a financier by his "Why is Money Scarce?" and his "Financial and Statistical History of England;" as a biographer by his "Life of Sir Robert Peel;" as an ethical writer by his "Mundane Moral Government;" as a politician by his "Touchstone," "The French Alliance," &c. As early as 1818 he had published "Sixty-five sonnets

and other poems." He was one of the early writers in Blackwood. He has contributed to *The Eclectic Review*, *The British Quarterly*, *Tait's Edinburgh Magazine*, *The British Controversialist*, *The Manchester Guardian*, *The Newcastle Chronicle*, &c. He is the author of some of the best angling songs in "The Coquetdale Songster;" the translator of the "Salisbury Hymnal," and a writer of frequent and graceful occasional poems. He was long the Secretary of the Northern Radical Union, and he was Secretary to the Statistical Section of the British Association when it met in Newcastle. He is a man of mark, and S. C. should read the sonnets of his quoted in "Housman's English Sonnets," and some of the above-named works.—R. M. A.

883. The threefold division of anger occurs, I think, in the works of John Flavell, an eminent non-conformist Calvinistic divine, born in Worcestershire 1627. He was one of the ejected of 1662. His writings are very voluminous and highly beneficial in their spirituality. I think the passage on "Anger" occurs in his tract "On Keeping the Heart." Natural anger he calls the letting loose of our irascible appetites. Holy anger is zeal, the dagger love draws in God's quarrel. Anger becomes sinful when it is careless or excessive. Flavell died in 1691.—B. D.

890. The earliest periodical is generally thought to have been "The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 1665. In it were published original papers and notices of books. *The Gentleman's Journal*, or *Monthly Miscellany*, appeared in 1692, and was the earliest English Magazine. Of the philosophical Transactions" an account will be found in "The History of the Royal Society." *The Gentleman's Journal*, is, I believe, to be seen in the British Museum.—R. M. A.

Literary Notes.

DEAN STANLEY has a work in the press, in which he gives an account of, and comments upon, the ecclesiastical events of the last twenty-five years.

Germany has lost her greatest political economist, Prof. Rau, of Heidelberg. Every student of the science was acquainted with his "Lehrbuch." He was born in 1792, and became a professor at Heidelberg in 1822.

It is said that Mr. Jefferson Davis is writing a novel. It relates to the Mexican war, but is not to touch on recent politics.

The *Western Morning News* informs us that the long-expected "Speaker's Commentary on the Bible" is coming out at last in octavo volumes. The Pentateuch will appear during the present year. Genesis has been done by the Bishop of Ely; the first nineteen chapters of Exodus, Job, and the Epistles of St. Peter and Jude, by Canon Cook; the remainder of Exodus and Leviticus, by the Rev. Samuel Clark; and Numbers, Deuteronomy, and Joshua, by the Rev. T. E. Espin, rector of Wallasey. The Bishop of Bath and Wells has done Judges, Ruth, and Samuel; Professor Rawlinson, Kings, Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah. The Psalms are done by the Dean of Wells; Proverbs, by Rev. H. E. Plumtre; Ecclesiastes, by the Rev. W. T. Bullock, Secretary to the "S.P.G.;" the Song of Solomon, by the Rev. T. L. Kingsbury; Isaiah, by Dr. Kay; Jeremiah, by Canon Payne Smith; Daniel, by Archdeacon Rose; Ezekiel, by Dr. Currie; the minor prophets, by the Bishop of St. David's, Prebendary Huxtable, Professor Gandell, Rev. F. Meyrick, and Rev. W. Drake. Matthew and Mark have been done by the Archbishop

of York and Dean Mansel jointly; Luke, by Archdeacon Jones; John, by Canon Westcott; the Acts, by the Bishop of Chester; the Romans, by Dr. Gifford; the Corinthians, by Professor Evans and the Rev. J. Waite; Galatians, by Dean Howson; Philippians, by Dean Jeremie; Ephesians, Colossians, Thessalonians, and Philemon, by Professor Lightfoot, Canon Westcott, and Dr. Benson jointly; the pastoral epistles, by the Bishop of London; the Hebrews, by Canon Kay; the Epistle of St. John, by the Bishop of Derry; St. James, by Dr. Scott; and the Revelation, by Archdeacon Lee. All parties are represented in this undertaking, but not the extreme of any party, except Canon Payne Smith be reckoned an extreme Low Churchman. Dean Stanley and Dr. Pusey, though both biblical scholars, have no part in the work. The editor is Canon Cook, but the plan of the work was settled by a committee consisting of the two English Archbishops and the Bishops of London, Llandaff, Gloucester and Bristol, and Chester, Lord Lyttleton, the Speaker, Mr. Walpole, and the Dean of Lincoln. During the progress of the work the editor consulted with the Archbishop of York and the Regius Professors of Divinity at Oxford and Cambridge. The authorised version of 1611 has been reprinted without alteration, but notes will give corrections and amended readings. The comment will be chiefly explanatory, presenting in a concise and readable form the results of learned investigations carried on in this and other countries during the last half century. When a fuller discussion of difficult passages or important subjects is necessary, it will be placed at the end of the chapter or the volume.

Modern Metaphysicians.

ARNOLD RUGE—THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM.

BY JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING, LL.D.,

Author of "The Secret of Hegel," "The Philosophy of Perception," &c.

PART II.

THE conclusion of the preceding paper on this subject brought us within sight of the "New Atalantis" of Hegel, in the form in which Ruge attempts to express it. We wish much we could give this form here; but, occupying as it does fully 260 pages, that is evidently impossible. We cannot, however, deny ourselves the pleasure, and our readers the profit, of following the course of its exposition, and of setting down in translation its more salient stages. In this exposition, as it appears to us, Ruge is exceedingly felicitous, and has accomplished a very satisfactory statement.

Ruge, as we have seen, is anti-Christian in religion, and a radical in politics; and in both respects he acknowledges himself to be anti-Hegelian. Nevertheless, he believes himself, even so, to have been truer to the principle of Hegel than Hegel himself was. In this, we think Ruge wrong. We believe radicalism to be, in the interest of the false formal freedom of subjectivity, only the destruction of all that has been realized in the interest of the true material freedom of objectivity, and without a thought of this latter, which, politically, is all we should aim at. And we believe the pantheism of Ruge and the other German critics to be unable to save itself from an absolute coalescence with ordinary materialism. But both considerations are utterly anti-Hegelian. The principle of Hegel—and of this we feel sure—can only lead, politically, to the reconstruction of organic or objective liberty, and, religiously, to a distinct, positive, and living Theism. To call Ruge wrong in these points, then, and yet to assert for him an understanding of Hegel both comprehensive and deep, may appear contradictory. The state of the case is, however, once for all so.

The manner in which Ruge accomplishes his exposition of Hegel is peculiar; he has little to say himself, he only sets down sentence after sentence of Hegel's own. This may appear easy, but it is not so, and in any hands but those of a master who, having been

everywhere and seen everything, can integrate the innumerable details into a single whole, would prove a signal failure. "Not to disturb the general impression of this philosophy," says Ruge, "we have to act by it, as much as possible, as by the Aristotelian; we must not overload the picture with its own inherent wealth, in order that its main features may all the more distinctly come out in relief." In the Aristotelian reference he had already said: "These brief bold features supply a sketch in which, probably, Aristotle is discernible in his own likeness, for it is he himself who speaks his leading thoughts; the brevity, indeed, makes but the picture clearer, which a crowd of learned particulars might have easily confused." How it is situated with us for difficulty, the reader will now understand; for the question left to us evidently is, How shall it be possible to make brevity briefer. A question that can only be answered by the counsel, Give parts, attempt not the whole; be content, as said, with the more salient stages. Ruge's first paragraph is this:—

"In the history of philosophy Hegel includes religion in part. He dwells with pleasure on the phantasies of the Neo-Platonists; *seeks to elevate the principle of Christianity, the God-man, into the principle of the absolute*; recognises, all the same, mediæval philosophy, which is precisely Christian philosophy, as unequal in rank, just because it is Christian philosophy; and at last lingers yet with love by Jacob Böhm. These are excrescences of his history of philosophy, excrescences to be relegated plainly to the history of religion and theology, as they represent not any development of *thought* and knowledge, but only of *fancy* and *phantasy*."

We get a clear view of Ruge's defect here. Ruge, after all, is only man in the abstract; he is not man in the concrete. He wants religious feeling, speculative wonder; and these are the richest elements of humanity,—these *are* humanity: it is by them that man is distinguished from the brute; they are thought—thought in its inmost essence. All Ruge's claims are to thought; thought is all he accentuates; yet *thought proper* must be denied Ruge, all thought but thought of the finite. The infinite has never occurred to him to be thought; enough for him are the interests of the day. Whence is this world? Had it a beginning? Will it have an end? What is it *for*? What is it? Why should existence exist—why should there be such a thing as existence? To question thus—this is what it is to think the infinite; this is the speculative—this is what to Hegel is the speculative; and these are the questions that constitute him,—these are the questions which, solved, lead to the solution of all others;—these are the questions in which alone all others possess any value. "Et laus illa," says Hegel, in his *Dissertatio* (pro licentia docendi, Jenæ, 1801), "quæ a Cicerone Socrati tribuitur, quod philosophiam de cælo detraxerit, et in vitam domosque hominum introduxerit, vel parvi habenda, velita interpretanda erit, ut philosophiam de vita et domibus hominum bene mereri non posse dicamus, nisi a cælo descendat, omnemque

operam in eo ponendam esse, ut in eolum evehatur."* This certainly is to put Hegel's very stamp on the words used by ourselves—a stamp which Ruge seems incapable of taking on. Metaphysic proper, indeed, Ruge has no taste for; and yet it is precisely metaphysic proper that Ruge claims for himself—claims for the German advance beyond the French *Aufklärung*. It is these very terms, however, that prove our position. It is only the French *Aufklärung*, irradiated though it be by the German idea, that constitutes metaphysic to Ruge—something still quite mundane, still quite finite; something that has no function, no worth, but to drive away, on the one hand, the priests, and, on the other, the aristocrats. That is the blood of Ruge, his life. He cares nothing for another world, it never enters his thoughts, he is absorbed in this one, and lives along every line of its web as if it were himself had made it, or could make it. God, existence as existence, a future life;—"pahaw," says Ruge, "I have no time for any of these things; these are precisely what I call Syrian fables—Orientalism; no, no, no; we have nothing to do but drive the drones away; that is work enough; that is all I have to think on." Accordingly, the metaphysic which he has carried into the *Aufklärung* is but formalism, a formalism wholly mundane and of *this side*. Ruge would see nature and humanity simply disposed on the logical idea, with this logical idea—to him a mere *this world* generalization—as principle, as absolute, and with an earth of working men in *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, as the result, as the only heaven.

It is perfectly characteristic of Ruge, then, that he opens with expressions of contempt for Neo-Platonism, Christianity, the Middle Ages, and Jacob Böhm. What concerns these in Hegel shall be to Ruge simply excrecences. Excrecences they were not to Hegel; this Ruge allows; and that they were not excrecences to Hegel is an earnest that he was speculative—that he made heaven the whole reference of earth; for neither to Neo-Platonism, nor to Christianity, nor to the Middle Ages, nor to Jacob Böhm, was there any question but of the *other side*. Leaving the rest, how characteristic is not the blindness of Ruge to Jacob Böhm? These cries of

* This sentence from Hegel's Latin dissertation for the licence of a *Docent* at Jena, we may as well translate for the benefit of the younger readers of our educational organ:—"The praise which Cicero gives Socrates, of having brought down philosophy from heaven, and introduced it into the lives and homes of men, is either to be held of small value, or to be interpreted to mean that we should say that philosophy cannot be worth anything to the lives and homes of men, unless it come down from heaven, and that we should regard it as the one duty left us to carry it up into heaven." Hegel's Latin, of which we have in this dissertation, and certain university discourses, ample specimens, is, if somewhat elaborate, as such things are apt to be, evidently good. In the sentence immediately preceding the above (two lines up), "*animali illi*" is surely a misprint for *animi illi*.

Böhm's about the necessity of straightness to width, of negativity to affirmation, in order that manifestation be—which are the first notes “of what is specially and peculiarly German philosophy,”—these, with whatever risk to his position of philosophical expert, Ruge will not hear, Ruge will ignore, for they concern what is called heaven, God! The abstract life of Ruge in the mere political heat of the day that now is, cannot escape from view in such lights as these.

Nevertheless, we are not to understand that Ruge's verbatim extracts from Hegel extend only to such ideas as the above. They are really such as to afford us very excellent insight into Hegel, in many of his essential features. He begins by telling us that the object of the Hegelian system is to realize the idea,—a proposition that, true as it stands for the Logic, requires *idea* to be replaced by *absolute spirit*, in order to be true for the system as a whole. By absolute spirit the reader requires simply to understand God, and by idea (in readiest aspect) the diamond net of logical categories, the plastic system of thoughts, that underlies, supports, and is the universe. This system of thoughts is considered in the logic, in which it dialectically evolves itself from a starting thought, and spontaneously issues in a single organic whole. Nature is then considered with the general object of dialectically raising it, through all its forms, from the most external element, space, to the most internal element that is found in nature, life. In the third place, spirit, or active, functioning intelligence, is developed, by virtue of the same dialectic law, from the natural soul in its lowest form of mere sensation, up to the absolute spirit. Ruge surveys all these three grand parts of the system completely, so far as his method is susceptible of completeness—except the last. There Ruge stops with its second division, objective spirit, or jurisprudence, morals, and politics, and disdains all traffic with the grand closing division on the absolute spirit, thereby denying himself any notice, even of Hegel's splendid contributions to æsthetics. To reject art and religion, then, is to reject much, and much of what is most important; still there remains more, and only of inferior importance, for Ruge's presentment of which we have good reason to be thankful.

In characterization of logic in general (Ruge says the absolute), we are presented with the words of Hegel, that it is the “methodical development of the categories, with the resolution of the antinomies, and the consequent transparency of the latter to him who thinks.” This is followed by certain general considerations, relating in the main to thought as thought:—

“With the term *Word*, and the term *Thought*,” says Ruge, “we pass from the sensible into the supersensible, from the natural into the supernatural world. . . . Thought is the supernatural process which rests free on its own self, and in its own element spontaneously proceeds. . . . The natural, the outward, the phenomenal, enters not here. . . . Here, and only here, are we among ourselves. We are absolutely one in the com-

munity of thought, while the sensuous, as such, is not admitted into this our sanctuary. Every word is universal . . . 'horse' means all horses, as 'this' applies to everything. . . . Thus the word signifies the genus; it would strive vainly to say the sensuous individual, for in language the singular is already universal. The word that brings together only things similar or in agreement gets no further than the imperfect universal, that is alone realized in nature; so situated also are space, time, light, which possess external universality, but not that universality that comprehends, holds its own self, like thought. . . . That transparent universality is the universal itself, the true, free, absolute form of the idea. . . . Its movement is of itself willed and accomplished for the attainment of self-cognition, for the grasping of self. Metaphysic it is that teaches man to think as man. True metaphysic knows that reason governs the world, that reason is the soul of the world, dwells in it, is its own inmost nature, its universal. Only man is the universal for the universal, nature cannot bring her reason to conscious reason. 'Nature and spirit are only special expressions of the forms of pure thought.' 'Nature is unable to express the logical forms purely; thus the magnet, which embraces its north and south pole, its extremes, in the middle point, is only an external expression of the syllogism.' 'The categories are the pure souls which have to give life to all the sciences.' 'They are pure thoughts, for they contain nought that belongs not to thought, that is not produced by thought.' "

From thought Ruge passes to the uncritical empiricism of the English, and the materialism into which, in the hands of the French, it was consistently developed. Ruge admits that the former, "as an abandonment of theology," was right enough; it was only wrong as an abandonment of logical thought. The latter, too, Ruge admits to be wrong for similar reasons; but materialism is too radical, too anti-theological, for Ruge not to have a warm side for it. "The conqueror of lost reality," "the founder of epoch-making systems," "the forerunner of the Revolution," &c., &c., "materialism," he says, "is again to-day the expression of that spirit that throws itself headforemost, with full power, into the actual world, and will rest not till it has completely and unexceptively won it for itself. But then," continues Ruge, with an air of very innocent conviction, "it will return from its wanderings to the truth of the universe, the pure thoughts that rest in themselves and comprehend themselves."

"These pure thoughts relate themselves to nature and spirit, as pure mathematics to inorganic nature; they are the all-supporting and the all-pervading, the eternal transparent frame of the eternally self-evolving, self-realising, self-productive idea, which manifests itself unconsciously in nature, consciously in spirit."

A general conception of the logical element may be obtained from these expressions. By notion is to be understood the triplicity in unity that is principle of creation and development to the whole system. This whole transparent system—the notion *and* its realisation—is the idea. The notion is the omnipresent threefold soul: every

new category that arises is but the notion, the notion in another form. In man the logical unit that acts is the triplicity in unity of simple apprehension, judgment, and reason. This is the notion in that form, and it is, so, a one faculty with three flexions. We say the same thing psychologically, when we say perception, emotion, will. Not logic only, but nature and mind, history, art, religion, are all developed into systems, and a system, in obedience to the same all-pervading, all-embracing principle. This principle, then, appears as the absolute and ultimate nerve of thought; it is thought reduced to its ultimate *one*, which *one* is seen to be its own necessity, to be that which could not not-be. Such principle being, the world, with all it contains, is once for all accounted for. Both revelations of God are so accounted for: the revelation in space, which is Pantheistic; the revelation in time (history), which is Theistic and Christian. Kant came up to the point when he resolved the act of mind into judgment, and, of judgment showed the functions to be categories, which categories appeared again as triplets generative the one of the other—triplets of an affirmative with its negative, and resolution or conciliation of both. If all things that are *can* be explained in this way, then plainly all things that are are but functions of judgment. This is what Fichte saw when he set his thesis, antithesis, synthesis in movement to produce all the furniture, inner and outer, of the pure *Ego*. Hegel's action was to perfect this merely abstract logical principle into the actual principle of life itself, and then evolve it into completed system. This is "*the secret of Hegel*," and, as an ideal, it can be said to succeed wonderfully often, but not always—not always even in Hegel's hands. Ruge rejects in great part what we have called the revelation in time, and he appears not to have studied Kant as completely and tenaciously as he has studied Fichte and Hegel; still Ruge has seen largely into the nature of the dialectic—what we call the flexions of the notion—of Hegel,—too largely, it may be, for he seems to abandon himself to it in absolute conviction, without the shadow of the shade of a fear. In point of fact, Ruge has no supersensible, no supernatural, but this "*Entwicklung*," this evolution. Hegel's dialectic is Ruge's god—a dialectic he rejects only when it would demonstrate God.

We see that this is the position of Ruge from his own words. He is incensed at Hegel's interest in the Neo-Platonists, in the Middle Ages, in Jacob Böhm—incensed above all at his interest in Christianity, and his belief that "the principle of Christianity, the God-man, is the principle also of the absolute." The only supersensible, the only supernatural, that exists for Ruge, is the logical element, thought as thought, the merely formal element that underlies the material concrete. To him, even materialism will have thoroughly rehabilitated itself when it sees and adopts for principle the self-generative and absolute system of thoughts—the idea.

Ruge proceeds now to defend Hegel in his transition from the

idea to nature, from the logical to the physical, from the formal to the material. The words of Hegel he quotes are these :

"The idea resolves (itself), free, to determine itself as simple being—as absolute externality of space and time individually existent, which simple being remains, all the same, perfectly transparent to it, and is, in this its particularisation, the notion that remains in and with itself. . . . The transition (of logic into nature) is therefore to be understood here so that the idea realises itself free, absolutely sure of itself and resting in itself."

And here Ruge is perfectly right ; accepting the Hegelian pre-suppositions, there are few things more grandiose in Hegel than the transition from the idea into nature. The notion, which is the Hegelian principle, has developed itself into its own system—the idea, the logos ; and it is only in obedience to the common law that the idea, the logos, *full*, bursts now asunder into the infinite particularisation and contingency of the material universe. *Particularisation*—a boundless out and out of infinitely different atoms,—infinite atomisation, and in the crossing streams of infinite contingency, infinite accident, could, *on the law*, be the only result. This is the grandest stroke in the realisation of a philosophy of nature that has ever been struck. With all his appreciation of it, however, Ruge can only draw his usual moral. He says :—

"Certainly the idea gives in nature the spirit up, but it (the idea) remains its (nature's) soul, and in nature and out of nature ever reproduces itself as spirit anew. Here, however, there is so little question of any Jewish or Popish conception of creation in the mason's way that Hegel's expression is rather Heraclitus's, and Plato's, and Aristotle's purified idealism. And this logic, despite the asseveration of Hegel, is so little 'pure theology' that it has rather been from the very first (the Eleatics) the purest and most absolute foe of all theology ; for its system of all-pervading and all-moving thought allows itself only to be *thought*, not seized by *phantasy*, not symbolically and nebulously conceived (as conception ordinarily or properly is) as the *theos*, whether unal as the personified All, or triple as the Pythagorean-Alexandrine Trias, whether man or beast. Only the philosopher it is that understands and sees through the object of theology, the god of any religion. The theologian has neither the *theos* nor the *logos*. He has only a *believe-so*, and external supposition ; it is so handed down to him ; and when he declares his ap^{is} for 'the true being of all being,' and his 'man,' on the contrary, for 'no man,' the entire object simply escapes him into the domain of dream and drivel. Whilst, then, he seeks to get possession of his *theos*, he discovers that the logos never was his ;—and it cannot be his, for, with his drivel and dotage, he is a foe to reason and thought, and the worst and bitterest foe to the truth that so or so underlies his god."

This is plain speaking, and, with such sentiments as these, it is no wonder that Ruge exclaims in continuation,—

"Hegel, then, perpetrated a sin to the spirit of logic, when he declar^{ed}

it (logic) *to be theology*, and maintained that 'thought has to give itself movement, free, within itself; whereby it is to be observed at the same time, that the result of thought, in its own free law, *coincides with the inherent purport of the Christian religion, INASMUCH AS THIS RELIGION IS THE REVELATION OF REASON ITSELF.*'"

It is really gratifying to be able to offer to Englishmen, to whom Hegel (absurd as it is) has hitherto been an ordinary German rationalist, a pantheist, an atheist, an infidel, a Tom Paine, these testimonies to his orthodox Christianity, on the part of one who is at once an Hegelian expert and an Hegelian opponent. Ruge proceeds somewhat further in the same strain, but presently enters into the *matter* of the logic. This "all-irradiating, pure thought-heaven," as Ruge calls it, begins, like the Eleatics, with being; "only being is, and nothing is not at all;" whereat Heraclitus rejoined, "Nothing *is*, as much as being; All, in that it *is*, at the same time *is not*, for all is a *becoming*." And Hegel, doubtless, had all that, and *much more*, in his mind when he began with being and nothing.

Ruge first points out the course of the three general stages (one for each of the three volumes),—being, essence, notion.

"The logic develops *being* into *essence*, and the *unity* of both into the *notion*. Being is immediacy [immediate is whatever bears to be independent and directly present at first hand]—the notion *in itself*. Essence is mediacy [the result of intervention], the notion *for itself*, the show (reflection) of the notion. The *notion* as such, then, has reached—passing through immediacy and *external* mediacy—*self*-mediation, self-development,—it is thus *in and for itself*; the mediation of the contraries here is no longer an *external* one, but it is in the notion in its own developed self-completeness, [*beisichsein*—a state of being entire, sufficient, independent, absolute, with and in self]. In the sphere of being, the connection of the contraries is not expressed, not explicit, but only present in point of fact; the notion *is*, and the contraries pass over into each other, as being into nothing. In the sphere of essence [the inner *what* of a thing], the connection of the contraries is *explicit*, as the negative in the positive; the contraries here shine or show into one another, are *reflected* into one another; and this is the show of the notion [what we see when we think we have got what we call the inner what of a thing, its principle, its essence, its true inner nature, is not the notion but the reflexion of the notion, its mere borrowed *appearance*, its *Schein*]. In essence the union of the contraries is their mutual reflection. In the notion itself, lastly, the thought sets itself of itself into its own opposed moments, and returns out of them again back into unity with itself, while in being and essence the object still stood independently before it."

The transition of being into nothing Ruge illustrates, as already said, by a reference to the *flux* of Heraclitus, as the truth of things. There is nothing that *is* only; everything is also *not*; and all *becomes*. Being and nothing, then, are both abstractions; becoming is the concrete, and it contains equally being and nothing; its unity

is the indissoluble, perfectly homogeneous fusion of both; and this whether the process be, as it were, towards the one or the other—whether it appear as being passing into nothing, or nothing into being. The arrest of this process is the development of Something, which, whatever it is, is still, as we know, no constant, but a variable that passes; it is still a becoming; nay, even when regarded as constant, as fixed, it is still as much as ever an indissoluble amalgam of being and nothing; for, as we have said, everything *is* and equally *is not*, or what it *is* depends upon negation quite as much as upon affirmation—a little piece of transcendentalism that even the sober Bain—very soberly unconscious of what it is—adopts. Here we have then before us the first five categories, being, nothing, becoming, so-being, something; and how it is that being and nothing are the same is not now a difficulty. Both are abstractions, that is, and both are the same abstraction. The word being, taken quite generally, means the abstraction from all particular beings whatever, chairs, horses, trees, seas, stones, hills (not one of these is being as being, being *generally*); but the word nothing, taken quite generally, likewise means the same abstraction from all particular beings. Their meaning, their matter of contents, then, being the same, *they* are the same. But this does not mean that to exist and not to exist, or to be and not to be in *that* sense, are the same thing. What is said is in a mere logical regard, that, when we say pure being and pure nothing, we use two expressions for the same widest generalization, the same widest abstraction; and evidently it cannot be wider, for it is obtained in both cases by abstracting from everything whatever. The wonderful Hegelian proposition, then, that has driven the whole world into opposition, and arrested thousands of readers, is the merest commonplace. This has of late been thoroughly demonstrated; yet we find gravest professors still grave over being and nothing as constituting the Hegelian philosophy somewhat in the same manner as water constituted the philosophy of Thales, or *esse-percipi* that of Berkeley. Hegel's philosophy is a philosophy of being! How often Hegel must have laughed at the mountains made of his mere convenient word-mice. And the convenience is plain, when we consider what the creative dialectic, which Hegel proposed to himself, was to be. It was to be an evolution of contraries all through. As we have seen, if there is any single word to be applied in expression of the philosophy of Hegel, it is the term notion. Each category of logic, each stage of nature, each evolution of spirit, is but the notion. The notion, and absolutely the same notion, though in innumerable forms, is the sole and single thing in Hegel. The universe before us is to be all explained to us, not by generalization from the concrete outer many to the abstract inner one, but by a sort of counter-generalization from utter abstraction to absolute concretion. Pure being is utter abstraction (and *therefore* nothing). The absolute spirit is absolute concretion. The notion now, in its three flexions, was to be the serpent of eternity, that, between these extremes, should wind itself into the

whole riches of nature and life, of history and science, and wind it self also into itself, with rounding of the extremes into each other, of the end into the beginning. This was the ideal at which Hegel aimed. This can also be said otherwise. We may call the mediating principle of production in the system *Gegensatz*, as well as *Begriff*, antithesis as well as notion, for the notion is an antithesis, and the antithesis. And very plainly, when we keep in view what Hegel's object was, it was an antithesis that was required. No identity could have ever served his purpose. We want to conceive this universe created from a single principle. In this principle, then, there must be the means of difference. But how can a single difference be ever extracted from blank identity? How much such considerations as these had entered into the mind of Hegel, we can easily understand from his interest in, almost amusement at, Jacobi's difficulties as to how synthesis is to be got into Kant's *Pures* (space, time, &c.), as to how the soundless, uninterrupted sounding of the pure vowel of the *ego*, is ever to edge itself into a consonant, or even an accent.

An antithesis, then, was as much the necessity of Hegel as of Jacob Böhm. To Böhm, as we have seen, there was in God himself a negative necessary, if affirmation itself were ever to be realized. This was his *contrarium*; this was the first word of *German* metaphysics; and Hegel alone it was that fairly and fully saw its import. Into the nature and necessity of a *contrarium* we can get a glimpse at once, if we consider that *action* implies *passion*. The moment you have the notion action, you have also that of passion; these, in fact, are not two notions, they are one notion, an indissoluble third in which there is a first and a second moment. Omnipotence would be impotence were it not *limited* by another, on which to manifest itself. The philosophical dictum, then, to which the word *contrarium* is tantamount, is this. Every notion for realization implies its own negative. And this we have here at once in the most general notion to which we can reach. Pure being is just as much pure nothing. To ask what a thing is in itself is really to ask what is it for another. Hence Hegel's two categories further on of *Ansichseyn* and *Seyn-füranderes*, being for self, and being for other.

Familiarized now with the main difficulties in constitution of the "secret" of Hegel, we shall have a better understanding of the communications of Ruge, who, in illustration of the dialectic, has this:—

"All movement, internal and external, is this to and fro *at once*. Revolution and counter-revolution are, in the turning of the wheel, both at once and together. While the one half turns forwards, the other half turns backwards; but this revolution and counter-revolution are the *one* swing round which sublates all the points of the road into those of the rolling wheel, or makes them ideal, and thereby vanquishes the road."

In illustration of the process of becoming, of what is at once a fluent Yes and No, but in indissoluble combination, Ruge instances

the river (ever the same and ever not the same), the present (the *was* into the *is*, that even as it is, no longer is), and motion (the *here* that is also *there*), and proceeds thus :—

“The becoming in the river, in the present, in motion, nay, in growth and in life (which, as evolution, however, are both more), is certainly a real becoming; but, even so, it is not yet *thought*, the moments of which are not being and nothing, but the general, the particular, and their unity, the singular. Growth and life are already, indeed, evolution of the notion, but still within nature, and unconscious. The result of becoming is so-being [mortal state, sensible definiteness]; what is so [the so-beant], something, becomes another, it *alters* itself. *Alteration* is the becoming of the finite; the becoming of the finite [the ended] ends another finite, and so on into the infinite [the unended]. As perpetual *alteration* of one finite with another, this infinite is the *external* infinite; there lies in it, however, that the finite, the ended, ends itself; the other, with the other, goes together with itself [other and other], and the true infinite is this return into itself, this negation of the negation, being-for-self [what is in, by, and for its own self]; as the infinite straight line remains ever by a would-be infinitude, and only the circle, that returns into itself, is the true infinite; and as not the individual separate thoughts themselves, but only the contraries which are taken back into the thinking *Ego*, and are therein set in unity, are the infinite notion. Veritably infinite being, and the highest form of infinitude, is not, therefore, the *external* infinite of space and time, but the being for self of the self-conscious, thinking *Ego*. This development of the categories of finitude and infinitude is one of the great deeds of our philosopher, the rescue of the spirit from the bondage of oppressive, unintelligent phantasies. Plato's ‘Philebus’ failed here, but now light is carried into the night of ordinary *conception* (*Vorstellung*), and become to many, though not to all, accessible even in pure logical form.”

The moral here we interpret as individual immortality; one would like to know if Ruge also sees that, or only the immortality of spirit as spirit, thought as thought.

Being passes into essence through its adumbration in the relations of quality and quantity in measure—a transition, however, which it is difficult to regard as more than *forced* by Hegel in accordance with his formula. It ought to be *internal*; but we, whatever Ruge may do, are apt to shake head at it as only *external*. On essence Ruge quotes these words of Hegel's own :—

“In essence the contraries are in correlation, connection. In being the connection is only *our* reflection; in essence, on the contrary, this is its own determination. In being it is only *in itself* (implicit); in essence *explicit*. When we say being and nothing, then being is *per se*, and nothing equally *per se*. It is quite otherwise situated with the positive and the negative. These have in them, indeed, the nature, the influence, of being and nothing; but the positive *per se* has no meaning; it has that only as connected with, as referred to, the negative. And it is the same thing with the negative. When in the sphere of being, something becomes an other, the something has thereby disappeared. In essence, on the contrary, the *different*, by transition into the *different*, *disappears not*; but

the differentes remain in connection, in relation. But here again the immediacy [direct independent separateness] has disappeared, and is set down into *appearance*, reflexion. [In essence being has become a shining, a showing—a reflexion into itself]."

Ruge, who has made some alteration on some of these words, adds:—

"In essence we have the mutual sublation of the contraries—and so the notion—*explicit*; and this is illustrated in nature by the magnet, and by all the categories in this sphere which are current with everybody, but often enough only thoughtlessly employed, as force and its manifestation, inner and outer. Hegel died before he had got to the revision of the theory of essence. We have to thank this circumstance for the pure, veritably classical form of these developments."

For our part, we regret the loss of this revision: Hegel, we know, would have liked to have revised his *Logic*, "not seven times, but seven and seventy." For importance, the two other parts are not inferior to essence; but of essence it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance. In Hegel's treatment of *identity*, *difference*, and *contradiction*, there is the most extraordinary human insight that has ever been witnessed, though such men as Hamilton have endeavoured to make the name of Hegel a name of reproach for it. Within our limits it is impossible for us to *state* these things. Ruge here quotes these words; which are, in effect, Hegel's:—

"The being that has become essence has passed into its identity, and even so has differentiated itself, or expressed difference. *Difference*, then, is itself and identity. All sublates itself. The ideality of all that is, the difference, is the whole and its own moment, just as identity is its whole and its moment.

"This contradiction is to be regarded as the essential nature of *reflexion*, and as precisely the primitive ground of all action and self-movement. . . . Only so far as something has in it a contradiction does it move itself, possess motive, spring, and action. It is the negative in its essential form, the principle in all spontaneity, for spontaneity only consists in the expression of the contradiction. . . . Anything moves, only in that it, at once, is and is not here. . . . Everything is, in its own self, a self-contradictory; but even so, it is the *resolved* contradiction. . . . Finite things are broken in themselves, and fall back into their *ground*, or to the ground."

Veritably Jacob Böhm's *contrarium* has come to unexpected glory. This also is striking, and in Hegel's own words:—

"The thing has qualities which constitute its consistence. These qualities are independent materials, and the thing consists of them. . . . These free matters stream incessantly out of and into the thing; it is thus as in their regard *absolute porosity*. They, again, are absolute porosity to each other; they thoroughly pervade each other mutually, and are therein indifferent to each other, penetrating each other without coming into contact with each other. . . . The whole has its existence in the parts, and the parts in the whole. In this identity they are externally

independent. This contradiction sublates itself, in that the immediacy present passes over into mediacy—into the relation of force and its manifestation. Force is only in that it manifests itself, and the manifestation is the entire force. In the same way the outer is the inner, the inner the outer."

Passing over actuality, possibility, necessity, &c., we come to the grand categories which constitute to Kant the categories of relation—substance, causality, reciprocity; and here we shall compress into a few quotations the whole course of the evolution through these and through formal logic up to objectivity.

"The substance is the power of being, and not merely transitory power, but the power that sets up the determinations, and in distinction from itself. It refers itself in its determinations only to itself; it is itself, then, that which it sets up as manifestation. What is only something manifested is the effect; but substance, as what is by and for itself, is cause. The effect, however, contains nothing which the cause contained not, and *vice versa*. The same thing is put now as cause and again as effect. The rain, which is the cause of the wet, is, as cause and effect, the self-same water. The relation of causality does not hold of what has life or intelligence: these allow not a cause to continue itself into them without further question; they interrupt and transform it. Cause and effect, as outer substances, possess matter beyond the relation in which this is cause and that effect; they are something else besides cause and effect; in another respect, then, the cause again has a cause, and the effect acts as cause to some other effect. In its extinction in the effect the cause becomes again cause, and *vice versa*. Each of these characters sublates itself in stating itself, and states itself in sublating itself. The cause which is at the same time effect, and the effect which is in the same relation also cause—this is a reciprocal cause, this is reciprocity, as the ways of a people are the cause of its constitution, and its constitution again the cause of its ways. Either member in a reciprocity, in going together with another, goes together with its own self. Instead of otherness, here is selfness; and instead of the power of another (necessity), the power of self (freedom, freewill). This is notion. Or this is the *notion*; that is, the *universal*, which in turn sets itself as *singular*, and in its *particular* determinations sets only *itself*. As existent by and for itself, this enfranchisement is *Ego*; as developed into its totality, free spirit; as feeling, love; as enjoyment, bliss. Spinoza's substance frees us only *implicitly* from finite form, but the notion is *explicitly* liberty and the power of necessity. The notion determines itself, but refers itself therein only to itself. This referring of the determinedness to itself, as a going together of the same with itself, is just as much the negation of the determinedness; and the notion, as this identity with itself, is the *universal*. But this identity implies equally the form of negativity; it is the negation of the determinedness which refers itself to itself; the notion is thus the *singular*. Each is the same totality, each contains in itself the form of the other. They are one with diremption into the show of two. This diremption appears, in the difference of singular and universal, complete contrariety, which, however, is so much the show and seeming of mere reflexion, that the one being seen into and expressed, therein the other also is directly seen into and expressed. *Ego* is this pure self to self-referent unity; it abstracts from all particularity, from all matter of contents, and retreats into

freedom of limitless equality with its own self. Thus it is *universality*, a unity which through said negative attitude, that appeared as abstraction, is unity with itself, and thereby contains all particularity resolved within itself. Ego, again, as the self to self-referent negation, is *singularity*, absolute determinedness, which places itself opposite to the other and excludes it: individual personality. The means of connection, of correlation, was, on the stage of being, alteration of the one into the other, and, on the stage of essence, reflexion of the one in the other; but now, on the stage of notion, it is the reciprocation of the one into the other as into its own self. The universal appears as the essence of its particular forms, as their own positive nature. In this way it is also the substance of its forms; but what in the relation of substance was contingent is here the notion's special production, its own immanent reflexion. The notion is not the abyss of formless substance, nor necessity, as the inner identity of things, or states mutually different and mutually limiting; but, as absolute negativity, it is what forms and creates. It is the soul of the concrete, in which it dwells, unobstructed and self-equal in the multiplicity and diversity. It is not carried away as with the stream into the mutation of things; but *continues* itself through it undisturbed, and has the power of immutable, eternal self-preservation. Of its unspiritual form—nature, as well as of its spiritual form—spirit itself, the notion, in its logical form, is independent. The logic stops with the elevation of the idea to that stage, from which onwards it becomes creatrix of nature, and passes into the form of concrete immediacy; the notion of which, however, breaks up again this form, in order to become for itself as concrete spirit. In the notion, identity has become universality, difference particularity, and the contra-position (contradiction) that returns to the ground has been developed into singularity. The diremption of the notion through its own self is the judgment [*ur-theil*, primitive partition that effects a sort of naming of Adam]: the individual is raised into the universal, the universal descends into the individual. The judgment is this explication, the evolution of the negativity that it already implicitly is. In the apodictic judgment the copula gets to be filled, and the judgment consequently passes into the syllogism [as a closing together]; such copula *shuts* by means of its matter subject and predicate together. Or the unity of notion and judgment is the syllogism. The notion, as such, holds its moments sublated in unity; in the judgment the moments are indeed referred to one another, but appear as self-dependent extremes; in the syllogism the moments of the notion are as the extremes of the judgment, but at the same time their unity is established. The syllogism is the fully explicit notion. All things are a syllogism, a universal through a particular shut together with the singular. All that is rational is a syllogism."

Like Ruge himself, we shall be found to have taken considerable liberties here and there in the above; which, besides, is all inadequate to convey any true idea of the work of Hegel. The rendering alive again of the Aristotelian logic, and the reconducting it into the concrete and actual, occupy the larger half of a volume, which, then, cannot possibly be represented by the half-dozen words above in that reference. Hegel views formal logic as subjectivity, and it passes, in his way of it, into objectivity, which again is constituted by the ideas of mechanism, chemism, and teleology. Subjectivity

and objectivity, then, unite into the absolute idea, the constituent ideas of which (the ideas proper) are life, knowledge, will. With these the logic is completed, and the idea, which, as such and as a whole, is properly the realisation, the realised system of the notion, prepares to pass into nature. Of this matter Ruge gives a few specimens, and of his few we shall select a few:—

“In mechanism, objectivity is in its immediacy—the objects subsist sundered from one another in self-dependent indifference, and stand under the subjective *unity* of the notion only *inwardly* or only *outwardly* (through gravitation). This is objectivity in the form of the notion: in chemism this *unity* manifests itself as immanent law of the different objects, and as a correlation in which their independent individuality ennobles itself. This is objectivity in the form of the judgment. In teleology, in the purpose, in the designful end and aim, the subjective notion appears as altogether referred to objectivity, and in that it realises itself in objectivity, it is idea. This is objectivity in the form of the syllogism. An object has the determinateness of its totality out of itself in other objects, which are again out of themselves, and so on *ad infinitum*. The return of this out-going into the infinite must indeed be equally assumed, and conceived as totality, as a *world*, which, however, is nothing but universality shut into itself through indefinite singularity—a *universe*. Objects act on each other. This mechanical process is the negative unity of a plurality of mutually repellent objects. The action of objects on one another implies an identity of connection between them. In it the form of universality is given to the particular action; it is communication. On communication follows particularisation of the communicated universality, on action re-action, and the reciprocal interaction is then *rest*, an arrangement of the objects, of which arrangement the precise nature is not self-given, but is an appointed one. This appointed rest finds its truth in the central body at rest in itself. The *communication*, which also bears to be appointed, becomes (here in the relation of the heavenly bodies to one another) *objective* universality, which is the pervading immanent principle of the objects (gravitation), and so it (the communication) makes its appointed, a self-appointed determination—self-determination: this is the absolute mechanism, or the free mechanism of the celestial spheres. The central body and the objects (members of the system), of which it is the principle, no longer impel or impinge on one another. Their identity is the *rest*, which is *being* in their centre, and their *striving* to the centre is their *absolute universality*. As the central body now is individual and the self-determining principle of the pervading universality, the other external objects, through return of the notion in this particularity, become *equally determined as individuals*. Through their own centrality they are out of the universal centre, and themselves centres for other objects, with which, however, through the absolute centre, they are shut together into the absolute mechanical system. The unity that re-conducts external objectivity into ideality, the principle of self-determination—and it is the difference of the notion itself—is the *law*. Because the law is the self-determining difference of the notion, it is the imperishable spring of movement, ever kindling itself again afresh, and is *free necessity*. In this stage, soul, however, is still immersed in its body; it is only concrete centrality as universality *immediately* (externally) extended into its objectivity. As correlation of objects reci-

roccally excited and negative, then, free mechanism is determined into chemism. In chemism the objects are no longer in indifferent externality to each other, and only bound together by the inner band of universality; but they are now so mutually roused to each other that they have the *impulse* [the tendency by very nature] to sublimate themselves in one another, and by inner necessity make themselves into a real whole, which, however, as a chemical object, does not remain indifferent base, but has the tendency to sublimate the particularity of its actual state, and continue the *process* in self-determination. The differently determined chemical objects and their self-determination into unity in a new object is the notion externally expressed. The liberation of the notion from its externality is then the teleological *end*, the proper free existence of the notion, over against which the notion itself still stands, however, as in mechanism and chemism, yet immersed in its objectivity. Self-end, the objectively true, the self-realising subjective notion, or the notion adequate to its own self in its reality,—is the idea. The idea in its immediacy, the existent idea, is *life*. Life is absolute universality. The objectivity of what lives is perfectly pervaded by the notion; the notion is in it omnipresent soul, which remains simple reference to self and *one* in the multiplicity which belongs to objective being. The soul is the notion with the body for its reality. The death of the body is the birth of spirit. The absolute idea, as the rational notion which, in its reality, goes together only with its own self, is because of this *immediacy*, return to *life*. But it has equally sublated this form of its immediacy and possesses in itself the extremest antithesis. The notion is not only soul, but free subjective notion, that is *per se*, and consequently possesses *personality*; it is the practical, absolutely determined, objective notion, which, as person, is impenetrable, atomic subjectivity; it is equally, however, not exclusive individuality (singularity), but is, for itself, universality and cognition, and has for object in its other its *own objectivity*. All else is error, darkness, idle fancy, striving and longing, self-will and perishableness; the absolute idea alone is *being*, imperishable life, self-cognitive truth, and is *all truth*. The absolute idea now in its *immediacy*—the idea as *being*, the *beint* idea—is, as the totality in this form, *nature*. Out of nature then the notion, as free existence, gone out of externality into itself, raises itself into *spirit*, when its full emancipation is self-completed. In the *logical* element as the self-cognising pure notion, it finds the highest *notion* of itself."

The reader must not take the above sentences as always continuous; they are on the whole but fragments, and cannot be expected to prove quite satisfactory. Some glimpses, however, they may serve to procure for the reader which may seem to him not altogether unwelcome. Ruge's own joy over the light which he claims to have derived from them is of the most exulting kind, and shouts itself aloud in such eulogies as the following:—

"This all-illuminating pure heaven of thought. . . . This glance into the deepest inner, this clearness of the self-transparent, this satisfaction of the last enfranchisement. . . . This masterly key of interpretation. . . . the most splendid thing that has ever been witnessed, and the deepest that has ever been revealed. . . . Hegel's exposition

of the notion in mechanism, where the notion, so far as conception is concerned, gets utterly lost, is one of the finest we possess—an all-penetrating spiritualisation of what is most external. . . . This grand and deep-thoughted transition. . . . And with this the veil of truth is lifted, and the idea revealed, the idea that eternally produces itself, that, in every process and in every existence of nature and the soul, actuates and actualises itself—for all free men an immortal joy, a splendid and imperishable monument of this great thinker. It is our happiness and our pride to have lived in his time, and experienced this enfranchisement, in which the whole future of our race becomes assured, and the greatest work of the ages, this self-emancipation of the human mind, consummated."

These praises, doubtless, are largely deserved. He who reads Hegel can read no contemporary; he has to go back and back generations before he reaches a man of the same depth of draught. Hume's boat, in comparison, is a skiff on the surface. We linger a little by the grim and perfectly real Swift, the biggest Englishman, perhaps, who ever wrote prose; but Hegel's peers are only the transcendently greatest—Shakespeare, Plato, Aristotle, Kant. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that we have considerable difficulty in taking for granted all that Ruge seems to take for granted. To this we cannot proceed at present, but must only hope to be able to return to it.

It may be right to add here that we have just learnt from a review by Professor Kapp of Düsseldorf, that the new romance, "*Bianca della Rocca*," is by Arnold Ruge. The review is able and eulogistic. We subjoin a sentence:—

"Whoever has learnt, in his own case or that of others, how the new spirit passed into the thinking substance of the nation,—whoever duly realizes to himself how, in genetic connection with the 'German Year-books,' things have shaped themselves since 1848,—whoever reflects on their manager's further multiplex activity as member of the Frankfort Parliament, as editor, as *chef* of bibliopolic enterprises,—whoever considers also his indefatigable literary industry during exile in France and England,—whoever does all this, will welcome this last new contribution as a work which, seen into in connection with that varied and busy life, is well worthy of the genius of Ruge, and, in its kind, alone."

National Education.

OUGHT EDUCATION TO BE SETTLED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LEAGUE OR THE UNION ?

THE UNION.—REPLY.

WHATEVER determination may be come to by Parliament in its wisdom and considerateness in regard to the education question which has been brought into such extreme prominence during the present year, there can be little doubt that the discussion which has been evoked, and which has excited every hamlet and village in the empire, will increase the interest taken in education everywhere. Among the readers of this magazine the subject of debate has been opportunely brought up for consideration, and we need have no hesitation in saying that many good observations, as well as some striking arguments, have been laid before those who have thought the matter deserving of study. The considerations laid down in the early part of this debate, before the subject had become hackneyed, were, we think, well put and felicitous—as arguments upon a topic which had very evidently two sides capable of being well argued upon, and even now, when the controversy has been written about so long, some of the later papers have shown that, in regard to the question in dispute, “Custom cannot stale its infinite variety.”

Of the interest taken in education during the more recent periods of our history, we had an able and profitable *résumé* presented to us in that thoughtful and informing essay on “Educational Reform,” which was appropriately brought before us as “A Word on the Question of the Day,” in December of last year.

With that article vividly before us we had some hesitation in proceeding to fulfil the engagement we had entered into with the conductors of this serial to open the debate on the education question in favour of the Union. This, however, I did in the best manner within my power at the time, and I think that I brought forward a very striking argument against the League, and in favour of the Union, when I spoke of the *motive* of the agitation begun by the League. It is not an interest in education itself, nor is it primarily an interest in the happiness of those who are to be educated; it is not even an interest in making them really better and nobler human creatures. It is to make them better workers, more intelligent in political action, and more amenable to the ordinary operations of political economy. “Georgius” thinks the argument of *motive* has no concern in the settlement of this question, and quotes a passage from an acknowledged instructor in

argumentation, which seems, at first sight, as if it were dead against us. But on turning to the context we find that the author is speaking of the motives of the *arguer*, not of the *agitator*. In every agitation the motive is the main thing, and if we see that a movement has originated in a wrong motive, however plausible its form may seem, we condemn it. In this way we justify the relevancy of our argument in opposition to "Georgius;" and we point the charge by asking—where are the schools which the main movers in the League have built and supported, undertaken the pecuniary and moral responsibilities of; and, more specifically, what has the sect of the Secularists, with whose views the League has identified itself, done for education, which has been so superlatively successful, beneficial, and self-denying, that the whole education of the country should be conformed to their model, and be brought into subjection to their views? Are the Secularists the men who have sown the land with schools, and given them support? are they the zealots who have given half a million annually to aid education? Are the men who advocate the leading principles of the League about local rates and bibleless schools those who have communicated of their wealth, their influence, and their effort to found, encourage, and manage schools where they had influence, interest, and opportunity? I am afraid these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, and therefore I think that the Union has a better claim to recognition in the settlement of the education question than the League has. The earnest co-operating man has greater right to be considered in the matter than the selfish in motive and the unhelping.

S. W. R. objects to the Union proposal "that it is one of compromise and not of principle;" but our readers know that the whole constitution of our country is a system of compromises, and that all our legislation is liable to the same objection. S. W. R. makes this the climax of his objections. I think I may start a far more serious objection against the proposals of the League than that it is a system of compromise. It is only a system of *promise*. It has no successful experiment of national secular education to appeal to in proof of the advisability of its proposal. It promises well, but proves nothing. It affirms of the Union education, "bad is the best of it," while its own proposal has no corporate existence on which testing can be exercised. It is a good deal easier to *find* faults than to *cure* them. Most inventors forget, in their fervent theoretic zeal, the friction which is to be got over in setting their proposed machines in operation—and political machinery is notoriously obnoxious to opposition. If compromise is fatal, promise merely is worse. S. W. R. will take little by his motion in this regard. Let "Georgius" look at the closing passage of S. W. R.'s paper, and he will see that on his side too there has been an imputing of motives; but in regard to the Unionists' resemblance to the daughters of the horseleech, we may at least say, if they have cried "Give! give!" they have themselves give

pretty liberally. Besides, they gave on specific terms fixed by Government—terms which the League desire unfairly to rescind.

The League wishes to inflict on this country legal infidelity. It seeks to enforce conformity in irreligion. It advocates and arranges for the blotting out of all distinction of sect by establishing the universal sway of secularism. It demands a public profession of *biblelessness*. It claims the right to sweep out of the catalogue of educative agencies that very book to which "the education of the world" has been due. The Bible is the book to which we owe our own civilization and advancement. It is the book to whose principles of justice we endeavour to conform our laws, our life, our dealings, and our ideas, and yet we seek to eliminate its influences from the formation of the mind and the information of the spirit. The Bible is the book which is interwoven with our whole history, from the days of the proclamation of Constantine at York to those of the Easter time which has so lately been observed in our churches, our schools, our workshops, our theatres, and our legislative assemblies; but now we are to change the warp of the web of history, and make it one pure warp and woof of worldliness. The Bible has been the ladder of our national progress, but we are now about to kick away in contempt the very ladder by which we have risen. The legal infidelity to which the League would condemn the children of England cannot be conceded. We protest against that education which directly oppugns the Bible form of training up a child in the way he should go, and compelling him to a training in the way in which he ought not to go; which, instead of bringing him up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, would hide the very word of God from his eyes. What can we think of a scheme which is proposed by men who would not even have a Permissive Bill granted in favour of the Bible, but would banish it, as if it were an evil and detestable thing, from the schools of our country? The League proposal for the abolition of sectarianism means in reality a proposal for the establishment of secularism; and, argue as our opponents will, there can be no doubt that secularism is not a religion for our age, and cannot tend to exalt a nation. A national secularisation of the education of the people would undermine the religious impressions of all, and destroy those of many. The school-room ought not to be made the battle-ground of political and ecclesiastical contention, but least of all should it be made the place of faithlessness and worldliness, of doubt, and the encircling of the spirit of childhood with the cold, dead, dull drill of merely earthly concerns, and of encompassing and compressing all belief beyond the present and the sensational; and this would be done should the League succeed in overcoming the Union.

It seems to us an exceedingly curious phenomenon to see a great central organization like the League setting up as one of its fundamental principles local rating and local government at a time when localism is failing in every possible institution. This point of the question has been touched by our able coadjutor, M. E., but

he has scarcely developed the idea sufficiently. It is notorious that the Poor Law, which was instituted in 1845, introduced local management and local rates for the support of the destitute. The Boards of Guardians constituted under this law have, in most parts of England, in less than a quarter of a century, sunk to the most woeful inefficiency—their management being decried as bungling and expensive. Is there any likelihood that School Boards would be of better material and of better spirit than the Poor Law Guardians? Then we have an agitation going on in almost every part of England for the extension of the rating area, and the de-localising, in fact, of taxation. Now the League takes up those two effete and failing institutions, and is desirous of solidifying them with new pressure, graver powers, and more direct compulsory functions. The man who builds his house upon a foundation which has been seen in another case to be unsafe is not generally considered to be wise; but the League, which “Georgius” regards as the *ne plus ultra* of wisdom, absolutely proposes to found its education of the nation on those two props which have been tested in regard to the Poor Law by experience, and have been found wanting, local rates and local management. The Union, more wisely, as we think, looks out for a centre of interest—for men of faith and energy, united by some distinct principle,—and having asked and obtained proof of their earnestness, activity, and devotion to the cause, proposes, under due regulation, to aid and encourage, to regulate and review the results of the labours of those who have undertaken the management, and to reward them according to their success in preparing those who are entrusted to their care for the proper performance of their duties in the State.

Have we not seen how under the Poor Law the poor have been compelled to relieve the poor, inasmuch as the aggregate rates of the poor do much exceed in amount those of the rich? Under the League scheme, would it not also come to be a fact, if free education were adopted, that the poor not only required in reality to teach the poor, but would in the long run actually be found contributing to pay for the schooling of the children of the rich? The wealthy would thus get a superior working-article, prepared for them to profit by, at a less cost, per individual, to themselves.

The Union is the advocate of the Christian education of the young. It holds every principle of the League except the “godless” one, that children should be taught that they have hope only in this life. The Union demands nothing less than the League; it is the advocate of local management and local funds, aided and supplemented by government inspection and grants; it asks the right to render school attendance compulsory when experience has proved that, a due and proper supply of education being provided, the people show their disregard of it. From their experience, however, they have little fear on that score. They know that the people value education—half-a-million of self-taxation for that purpose in school-pence proves that. But thev

not believe that the policeman is a good janitor, nor do they think that to transform the school into a semi-prison would tend to make it a delight. They believe that suasion and persuasion are superior pedagogues—or leaders of the feet schoolwards—than police and fines, and they are anxious to try that fully and fairly, and to induce a love of education. The levy of rates would not, on the Union plan, supersede voluntary effort, but quicken it, while under the League plan it would entirely destroy this source of educational revenue. The Union, by its greater freedom of action, and greater scope of Christian activity, would commend itself more than the unbending tyranny of the League.

I do not think anybody can have read the considerate papers which have been written on this subject in this magazine without feeling glad that an interest so widespread and intelligent is felt regarding education. No fewer than eight papers on each side of the question have now been contributed, and yet the topic does not appear staled. Ingenious argument and counter-argument have been employed, but all have been so wrapped up and interested in the topic of debate that the usual distemper of discussion has scarcely made itself felt. This is as it should be. The interest taken in the matters under debate should lift us far above the petty artifices of oral discussion, and bring us to give heed rather to the elucidation of truth than the manipulation of victory. I am perfectly satisfied that the perusal of the papers on the subject in this magazine will not only inform but gratify those who feel interested in education. I have perused the articles of our opponents with admiration of their skill and adroitness, their good faith and intellectual ability, even when most strongly convinced that they are wrong. Of my colleagues in this debate, I am confident that it may be said that each would have made a better leader than the one to whom the first place was assigned. I feel that they have spoken true words well, and I leave the question with the readers of the serial, with faith in the affirmative of the debate.

M. T.

THE LEAGUE.—REPLY.

"This one Bill, which lies yet unenacted, a right Educational Bill, is not this of itself the sure parent of innumerable wise Bills—wise regulations, practical methods and proposals, gradually ripening towards the state of Bills? To irradiate with intelligence, that is to say, with order, arrangement, and all blessedness, the Chaotic, Unintelligent; how, except by educating, *can* you accomplish this? That thought, reflection, articulate utterance, and understanding to be awakened in these individual million heads, which are the atoms of your Chaos; there is no other way of illuminating any Chaos! The sum total of intelligence that is found in it determines the extent of order that is possible for your Chaos—the feasibility and rationality of what your Chaos will dimly demand for you, and will gladly obey when proposed by you! It is an exact equation; the one accurately measures the other. If the whole English people, during these 'twenty years of respite,' be not educated with at least schoolmaster's

educating, a tremendous responsibility, before God and men, will rest somewhere! How dare any man, especially a man calling himself minister of God, stand up in any Parliament or place, under any pretext or delusion, and for a day or an hour forbid God's Light to come into the world, and bid the Devil's Darkness continue in it one hour more! For all light and science, under all shapes, in all degrees of perfection, is of God; all darkness, nescience, is of the enemy of God."—*Past and Present* (1848)—THOMAS CARLYLE.

These strong, pertinent words, published more than a quarter of a century ago, put, as we think, the education question on its proper basis. Education is the drawing out of the whole capacities of man to the proper accomplishment of their proper purposes, and hence any education is better than none. We know that if the faculties of man are not led out to their true ends they will be drawn out to improper ones. There is an education of the fields, the street, the workshop, the skittle alley, and the drunkery, which is constantly operative; and if we will not give the better development of mental culture, the active power of the other will take its place, and fulfil the function of education for us whether we will or no—and *all* that education will be towards evil. This brings out the grievous anomaly that so-called Christian zealotry is in reality officiating as Devil's lieutenants for the promotion of ignorance and the encouragement of evil. For, as Charles Dickens said, "Ignorance is power" as well as knowledge, and those who support the scheme of the Unionists are in truth proclaiming that they prefer the culture which ignorance necessitates to the culture in which knowledge results, rather than sacrifice the privilege of sectarianism, and the right of inculcating certain opinions called religious, but which surely cannot be so if religion is truth, and all truth harmonises with all other truth. What sort of idea of God's universe can the Unionists hold, if, as they seem to do, they hold the opinion that the more a man knows of the world, himself, society, and its relations, the less will he believe in the doctrines of the Truth of God? Can it be better that men should know nothing than that they should know only a little as the means of learning more? Is this not a remnant of the old mistaken notion that "the tree of knowledge is the tree of woe"—whereas it was the "forbidden tree" of the knowledge of good and evil which "brought death into our world, and all our woe—with loss of Eden." The great tree of knowledge is now, as it was then, cleft into two—knowledge of good and knowledge of evil—but, singularly enough, the advocates of sectarian teaching, while they squabble over the Bible and Catechism, permit the consumption of the fruit of that branch whereon grows the knowledge of evil to go on unabatedly, and really proclaim that this street training and field culture is preferable to any proper knowledge of God's ways gained through any other channels than those of catechetical exposition through some book of dogmas, interpreting the Bible and nature, not according to God's will and law, but the law and

will of the sects. There is a more outrageous practical infidelity in this distrust of the power of God's work to manifest itself to the soul as His work—unless looked upon through the spectacles of sect—than in the wildest words of the most daring secularist. It seems to us to be the very fanaticism of infidelity!

"Conservative" affirms that the plan of the Union "utilizes the existing schools" (p. 125), but it cannot do this more than the League would; for, in the first place, if the school was doing all it could and should, the League would let it go on and prosper; if it were not, it would make it do so, by removing the obstacles which prevent it from doing so—if sectarianism, by eliding it, and if carelessness in the inhabitants, compelling them to distinct and permanent attendance.

Again, he says, the League plan "supplements the denominational schools, where defective, by the building of free schools." A supplement is only a secondary and inferior part of, not an equal or a rival to, any thing, so that "Conservative" either confesses the all but complete adequacy of the denominational system, or he uses incomprehensible language, or he misstates the argument of the League *versus* the Union. In his Argument 3 he speaks of parents having "the option of sending their children either to denominational or free Government schools," which is inexplicit either intentionally or sophistically, for he means that parents will have the option of sending their children either to denominational schools charging school fees, or free (but unsectarian, *i.e.* secularist) Government schools—so bribing the parents to abjure and avoid the schools in which Christian doctrine was taught in favour of those devoted wholly to the world. Besides, the plan of "Conservative" contains a *double* file of scholastic agencies, *both* aided by Government grants, instead of a single set, and so is wasteful, extravagant, and unwise. The evil of this plan would be that we should have double competing agencies to do single work, and we should be paying *twice* for having the work *once* done.

M. E. does not "believe the police to be the best schoolmasters." In this we quite agree with him. But the League does not intend to make them schoolmasters. They constitute a good, or at least the best, it seems, we can get, preventive force. That is what the League wants them to be. They are to prevent the growth of ignorance, vagrancy, pauperism, and crime, by preventing the growth or practice of the habits in which these originate. They are to see, by the moral compulsion of their known duty to society, that children go to school, just as now they require to prevent crime, and see that children keep out of mischief and evil-doing. Police do not require to interfere with any who are not engaged in doing wrong, neither will they require to interfere with any who are doing right in going to school. Those who go to school willingly and readily will feel no hardship, and those who endeavour to evade the attainment of good are just the people who, sooner or later, by their want of education, would be likely to

require the aid of the policeman in a much less agreeable way than taking them to school.

The reasoning of S. H. E. is very feminine. It is considerably wide of the point, and returns in a circle to the point from which it sets out. The conclusions are proved by the premises just because the premises assume the conclusion. Nobody has proposed the abrogation of the moral law in schools; it is only the abolition of sectarian teaching which it has been proposed to enforce—so argument No. I. goes to the wall. Unless sectarian history is sacred; and the geography of the Holy Land is marred and marked by the molehills of sectarianism, No. II. goes off. No. III. has already received its quietus by the fact being that Christianity is not to be abolished by law, though sectarianism is to be warned off the school premises. S. H. E. is arguing against the Union scheme, not the League one, when in No. IV. S. H. E. argues that sectarianism would beget quarrellings and ill-feeling. The League would eliminate sectarianism, and so get rid of the ill-feeling it engenders. S. H. E. apparently believes in Church Christianity, while we believe in Bible Christianity. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the earth sheweth forth his handy-work." A knowledge of the world and of themselves, the constitution of society, and the duties and responsibilities of life, will not impair the likelihood of men adhering to the fellowship of the Church of Christ, but increase it.

P. O. S. thinks "it would not be wise for this great country to dechristianize our schools" (p. 192). The League never proposed such a thing. They propose to desectarianize the schools, and so bring them nearer to what they should be, and more like schools of the unsectarian Christ than those which the churches have yet set open. P. O. S. and almost all the advocates of the Union assume the infidelity and secularism of the advocates of the League, though without any ground. The League is an educational agitation agency, and not a religious one. They wish to keep clear of any cause of strife. They find that the strife of sects is the fiercest and most uncompromising that they know; they make for the things that make for peace. Let the warfare of church sects be waged among those who are capable of comprehending the differences between them, and of understanding the arguments used regarding them; but do not *force* those who have only, in the very words of Jesus, to have no impediment put in their way in regard to coming to Christ—"Suffer the little children to come unto me and forbid them not." That is precisely what the League does—they offer no prohibitory hindrance, but rather the reverse—they wish to guard against the forcing of the conscience of any one. The Union would inflict compulsory clauses on the children of the poor whom they could affect, but would not so much as touch the rich who refused to accept catechism and chronology, creed and chemistry, Bible and bills of parcels, faith and fractions, prayer and proportion, &c.

P. O. S. has quite rightly interpreted the spirit of the opinion of the League as to sectarian voluntarism (p. 181). We know the earnestness of the sects in all that belongs to sectarianism, and we can comprehend the strong competition of sects. We can therefore readily trust sectarianism to supply by voluntarism all that is demanded for the progress of the sect as a sect. But we do not think that the voluntarism of sects is likely to supply a national education. Nor do we think that a great nation like ours should receive from the charity of sects, or as a bribe to give them countenance, the education of the people. The State, as a state, ought to provide for the ability to read and know and obey the statutes of the realm; and if it gives nothing to the sects—it ought not to accept anything from them, except the obedience all should yield to the laws. While the State regarded it as a duty to give, and the Church considered it as a privilege to receive, aid for her ministrations and support for her ministers, it may have been right to expect as a return the management of the education of the people; but now, when churches are renouncing State endowments, and rejecting State trammels, the State should accept its own liabilities, and give the people the education which is required to enable every one to do his duty in the station allotted to him.

Our opponents have almost all wandered away from the great leading features of the discussion into the religious difficulty, and we have been compelled reluctantly to follow them. The religious difficulty is only one part of the education question. The League proposes to shelve it, and to give it no place in school. Let the sects agree among themselves or quarrel among themselves as they please, they say, concerning creeds, confessions, doctrines, and dogmas, but we are not to stand aside and leave the children to perish in the way while they quarrel and fight. It has been proved by the experience of centuries that among the sects education is a secondary matter, but we are determined it shall be so no longer. It shall be a national affair, recognised as of primary importance. It shall be proclaimed to be a national duty to put the power of using knowledge into the hands and heads of the children of the land, and we shall not have our country overlaid with waste intellect while "for forms of faith" our "zealous bigots fight." This is the glorious claim of the League. Let every child be considered as a human being with a human life to lead, and let it be placed in circumstances such as shall enable it to live that life. Let it be the duty of the State, therefore, to provide and enforce education as a duty by and for the State. The recognition of the duty of the State to see education universally diffused is the great commendation of the League. The League, too, while making national education the demand of the people, claims the interest of the people for and in education. Hence it demands local payments, and reserves local management. It seeks thus to secure the greatest effectiveness by a combination of local control and governmental inspection or supervision. We have the post-office as an illustra-

tion of a local unsectarian, governmental, educational institute. The school may be made as readily available, as trustworthy, as general, and as suitable to the wants of localities as the post-office, and be as thoroughly under the control of the Government. The League does not seek to abolish any good, tried, and successful educational centre. It wishes to secure and establish these, and to concentrate into a system, compact and workable, the whole of the primary education of the country. It claims that the means of education should be brought to the doors of the people, not as an eleemosynary dole, but as a right. A nation which has a work like this to do needs unity, and not division, requires neither sectionalism nor sectarianism; its primary object is secular, but its results are capable of being linked to all that is heavenly. The message of Christ to the soul must be able in general to come to the intellect and heart all the more effectively if it can be read and understood. But the Union proclaims a primary education for every child in the land without inculcation of creed impracticable. John Forster has already replied to this:—

“Impracticable!—and does the case come at last to be this, that from one cause and another, from the arrogance of the high and the untowardness of the low, the obstinacy of prejudice and the rashness of innovation, the dissensions among friends of a beneficent design and the discountenance of those who are no better than enemies, a mighty State, triumphantly boasting of every other kind of power, absolutely cannot execute a scheme for rescuing its people from being what a great authority on this subject has pronounced ‘The worst educated nation in Europe!’ Then let it submit, with all its pomp, pride, and grandeur, to stand in derision and proverb on the face of the earth.”

What has been in all times the practical difficulty in regard to national education? Has it not been the jealousy of the sects? How long has it been the motto of the Roman Church that “Ignorance is the mother of devotion,” and how long is it since Shakspeare, with a genuine Protestant perception of the facts of life, gave utterance to the opposing tenet—

“Ignorance is the curse of God,
Knowledge the wing wherewith we fly to heaven”?

But the sects have in this matter followed the maxim of the old Church, and not of the new doctrine. Contending sects have founded and maintained schools in connection with their churches indeed, but then this has been done in favour of their denominational interests and agencies. M. T. accuses the League of acting from “selfish motives.” Is not this accusation able also to be brought against the adherents of the Union? If not, how then is it that the efforts of the churches have been so fitful and transitory, so irregular and destitute of method, and so inadequate to supply the demands of the people? Had they really believed that education was essential and imperative to the proper comprehension of re-

ligious doctrine, and the right performance of the duty of life among the people, could they have so long withstood the endeavour to combine all the efforts of the nation so as to further and promote the instruction and training of the whole mass of the people in the elements of knowledge?

Either the earnestness which the sects now claim, according to M. T., has not distinguished them quite so much in the past as it might, or their faith in the value of education was less than it should have been. The Government has exhausted almost every means of encouraging the sects to overtake the duty which they affirm to be theirs peculiarly; but they have left untaught districts of which they had, in one or other form, a monopoly, while they have squandered vast sums in sectarian contests carried on by competing but unnecessary schools. The sectarian squabbles regarding education have kept back the training of the people for half a century; but, after having given them this length of trial, we are in earnest now, and must sweep the sects clean out of school, and have no more clerical cobwebbery retarding the intellectual and moral progress of the working-classes and the lower orders of the people.

M. T. conjures up "a world of worldliness," and imagines that this would be a devil's delight. The passage (p. 27) is eloquent perhaps, but it is not eloquent through its truth. M. T. refuses to take what can be gotten because he cannot get all he would like. It is an old story that "a little learning" (of the sort we do not like) "is a dangerous thing." We think a part better than none, and we believe that God has not so constructed the mind that if it be cultured it will doubt His being and despise His law—quite otherwise is it. Knowledge suggests God and godliness, ignorance is the fosterer of sensualism, immoralism, and devilishness.

Much as might be said on the subject, more cannot be said now. A most full and an emphatically impartial debate this surely has been. On both sides arguments of great force have been used. There has been no reticence in counter argument. The Unionists have been too restricted in their aim, but they supplied diversity in unity. On our side the arguments seem to us to have been more varied, less hackneyed, and more to the point than those of our opponents. Now it is for truth to prove its own greatness by prevailing.

S. W. R.

Philosophy.

CAN HIGH EDUCATION COUNTERACT THE EAGER- NESS OF THE SENSES?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"SENSE" is the term by which we express all the cravings of the body, and all the desires whose limits are the earth and the joys of the earth. "The things of time and sense" form a synonym for worldliness, and the expression has acquired currency in that meaning. The enjoyments of the senses, when indulged in without regard to moral consequences, degenerate into sensualism; and "the eagerness of the senses" is such as to give man a general tendency thereto. A man who resigns himself to the low and lowering pursuits of sensualism, has evidently fallen far beneath the sphere and place in life which he ought to occupy.

Corporeal pleasure, having its origin in animal sensation, has a great influence over the imagination of man's heart. It might almost be said, "that the original seat of sin lies in the flesh, inasmuch as the pleasure, which gives force to the fancy, is undoubtedly the result of a bodily emotion. It is felt somewhere in the body, and perhaps without the body there would be neither pleasure nor pain"—though there would still be delight and sorrow, for these are mental states.

Sensational pleasure, though our submission of ourselves may be greatly increased in power by indulgence and in the associations connected with indulgence, is not in reality much in our own power; for we cannot help feeling pain or pleasure, as the case may be, when our bodily condition or circumstances are such as to call the mind's attention to the bodily sensations. To prevent the joy of these states from taking us captive, and so bringing us into bondage to sin and death, is very difficult, for it requires us to set our thoughts, feelings, and determinations against a tendency inherent in our nature to seek pleasure and avoid pain. To lose ourselves gradually in the indulgences of sense is remarkably easy, because it requires no more than that we should yield ourselves to the stream of sensations that hurry men down to animality.

We cannot steel the body against the changes which take place in it on the presentation of objects which have the capacity of affecting it. It is only in the directing and management of the mind, of the intellect, and the thoughts, that we can, in any effective manner, oppose the inducements and seductions of the senses. By an exertion of the mind and a direction of the currents of associa-

tion in a course adverse to the sensational cravings or enjoyings, these may be coped with and be overcome. Sensational pleasure may in this way be reduced to a secondary, instead of being a primary, source of enjoyment; and the associations and emotions, affections and desires, may in this way be brought into subjection to the higher laws of holy life, and sensualism may be subdued by spirituality.

This is, as it seems to us, the plain gist of the question—"Can high education counteract the eagerness of the senses?" If G. P. would like the matter analyzed a little more it may be done, so as to bring it more plainly before the mind. (1) Can the eagerness of the senses be counteracted? and if that eagerness can be counteracted, what agent may be best employed? (2) Can high education efficaciously counteract this eagerness? A. B. C. has rightly said that this is a philosophical question, and perhaps a little obliviousness to this fact has led our opponents somewhat astray. We are making inquisition regarding a principle rather than a fact—although facts cannot be disregarded in the discussion. G. P. has perhaps most erred in this direction, and so has brought the debate into confusion.

It is confessed that the senses are endowed with an eagerness for enjoyment, that this eagerness induces a degeneracy into sensual indulgence. It is not desirable that men should so yield themselves to the merely bodily appetites and animal indulgences. But do these proclivities of sense hold the sway of fate over human life, and enforce compliance, or are they not only reprehensible, but manageable, so far as to be able to be somewhat subdued and counteracted?

We have a firm belief that they can, and we also hold the faith that education can accomplish this. Not the education of the senses, as G. P. seems to suppose, for that would not be the counteracting of them, but the education of the heart and the thoughts to interest them in higher things than those of time and sense. Education can so quicken, raise, elevate, and refine the nature that the associations of the senses may be made capable of imparting delights of a high and exquisite nature. To so educate the mind is to give it a high education—an education which ennobles sensation into thought, thought into poetry, and poetry into love and worship. This, we suppose, is the true function of education, to construct out of the sensations we feel the different sciences we can know, the various forms of poetry we can relish, and the maturer forms of aspirative praise on account of these blessings, which go to constitute worship. Had the question been debated throughout in regard to this matter, I think the result would have been a clearer view of the benefits of education, not only as a national question, but as a personal one, and would have greatly conduced to the extension of a desire for self-culture among the readers of this serial, for that is the true safeguard against sensualism and sin.—B. L. K.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE philosophy of life is a difficult topic to treat of; and to discuss the problems which arise out of the sensational philosophy in an adequate manner in a few pages is not within the power of many. It would appear, from the observations made by some of the writers on this subject, that we have misunderstood the whole affair. Of course, I have only to say that if they gave their interpretation to the terms, so did I, and I took the precaution of showing that it would be necessary to define the terms to be employed with some care, if we intended to have a discussion of any value. It can scarcely be laid to our charge with any fairness, that we did not carefully survey the meanings of the words employed, and endeavour to extract from them a sense which really gave them some importance and utility as a topic for debate. Nor was I mistaken in the controversial nature of the matter so suggested. It has frequently been asserted in connection with the temperance movement, for instance, that the only genuine course to be pursued for the extirpation or eradication of this vice is to educate the people. In a similar manner it has been argued, that so far as concerns the present popularity of burlesques, ballets, and things of that sort, the only way to drive them out of fashion was to heighten the education of the people, give them loftier notions, and then they would forsake ballets for "gorgeous tragedy," and Sothern for Shakspeare.

We are of quite a different opinion. We think that even in the matter of burlesques and ballets, there is good reason for inferring that the high education and the high-pressure life we now lead gives a justification to the enjoyment to be derived from them, which they would not otherwise have. We drink to soothe our minds by the variety it induces in the method of feeling and of thought; not, say these apologists, for the stimulation it affords but for the change it offers. We are too highly engrossed on single points, and we require some means of unbending the spirit and opening out the floodgates of other delights, so that they may flow into the mind. We go to the burlesque to unbend our thoughts, and unbind our ideas, embondaged by the terrible cares of competitive life. We do not want to think, but to be kept from thinking—a play would be a task on our intellect and our emotions; this is relaxation, it requires no thought, and puts no strain on the comprehension. Even when the jaded intellect cannot see the so-called point of the jokes put before it, it can yet enjoy the contagion of laughter, and the community of the social affections. The ballet has the charm of enabling us to dismiss thought, to live the life-gliding moments in passiveness of mind, and so it rests and refreshes the overwrought, business-occupied brain. Billiards, cards, dice, picture-galleries, &c., have similar effects, they give us sensations instead of thoughts. "We train the eye and the ear while training the pen and the tongue."

Those who contend that *high* education can counteract the eagerness of the senses, make a great mistake then, whatever "H. Scott" may think of the assertion; because they take no account of the inevitable reaction of mind consequent on the tension of thought required for the attainment of high education, the natural results of the overstrain of the intellect, and the uprising of the demands of the senses for their due share in the facts and acts of life. The higher the pitch and force of the mind attained by education, the greater the delight to be found in unslipping the harness and escaping the yoke; and on this very account it has passed into a proverb that "a little nonsense now and then is relished by the wisest men." "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy," and even in ancient days it was determined, "*dulce est desipere in loco*." It is a proper thing to play the fool on a fitting occasion. B. L. K., in his second last paragraph, p. 15, seems to admit these, and "Georgius D. E." has very effectively disposed his arguments so as to show that high education is no guarantee for moral character, and no criterion in regard to being free from slavery to sense. High education, as has been pointed out, is too much concerned with books which suggest evil rather than good, and, as W. A. proves from facts, inclines many men to grave sensual indulgences.

It is a mistake very commonly made that education can thus eradicate or control the eagerness of the senses; and education has been proclaimed as the universal heal-all for the moral ills of humanity. But it is not so. The senses cannot be counteracted; but the grace of the Spirit of God may be so imparted that sense loses its power to charm and delight the mind. It leads the soul to the only true, real, independent method of conquering the desires of the flesh. It raises the spirit of man to the contemplation of God as the only true good, "the source of lasting joy." It so influences the soul that the emotions and affections rise out of themselves, and aspire to the perfection of a new life. The moment the eye of faith is taught to look above to a higher and nobler object than sense can show, the charm of sensual indulgence is broken, the partnership of earthliness is dissolved, the reborn soul finds in all nature a new and fresher beauty and cause of joy, an unexpected and additional charm outshines from the commonest objects. Then to think on our own pleasure destroys all possibility of delight; for the notable delight of the regenerated spirit is to love, serve, obey, and contemplate God. This change, education, however high, cannot effect; and because of this we have affirmed that high education cannot counteract the eagerness of the senses, and we feel bound still to affirm the thesis with which we began, that the love of the things of time and sense are only to be subdued within us by a due knowledge of eternity and God.

G. P.

Religion.

ARE THE SACRAMENTS ESSENTIAL TO SALVATION?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"THE twofold nature of man, body and spirit, maketh it necessary that everything by which he is to be moved should have an outward form. While yet it lives in spiritual essence alone, it is to him as if it lived not, and its life hath over his life no influence or control. Hence the great Father of spirits hath given to all the attributes of His being an outward form and manifestation. . . . And every doctrine in revelation is a form to the intellect of some spiritual attribute of the Invisible. . . . And to the most noble and capital truths or doctrines He giveth not only a form for the intellect, but for the very sense of man. . . . The doctrine of our natural corruption and gracious purification by the blood of Christ hath the sensible form of baptism. And the doctrine of our continued sustenance by His word and Spirit hath the sensible form of the Supper. . . . And there is nothing in the being and purposes of God which it might benefit man to know, that hath not a form of expressing itself to the soul of man through the intellect, or through the sense." Thus it is that the great and good Edward Irving explains the necessity of religious forms for the proper culture of the human spirit, and shows that the sacraments are only a portion of that special mode of manifesting himself and the doctrines of the true faith which God has adopted with man. They are in their given forms God's testimony of fatherly provision for our spiritual necessities, and in their received forms, modes of showing our appropriating faith in the Lord of glory. The Sacraments are covenant-ordinances, sealing the relationship of reconciliation between the true and fervent receiver and the God whose promises are all yes and amen.

Few things astonished the writer of this paper more on opening the pages in which this discussion was commenced, pp. 94-104, than to find that he had for an opponent a contributor whose writings had given him so much satisfaction in general, of whom, though he personally knew nothing, he had learned to form a high opinion, as a sincere, fervent-minded, and zealous believer in the great mysteries of salvation. For a little we could not bring ourselves to think it possible, that on this vital question we could be found debating against S. S. But it was, nevertheless, however grievous, a reality—and this, too, after a *conspectus* of views quoted by himself, which shows that both the reformed and the unreformed churches hold the necessity of the observance of at least two of the sacraments to be essential to salvation; a fact which might be in-

creased in its signification, by adding that Lutheran and Greek Church alike consider sacramental communion as essential to membership in the Church militant, and as ordered means of fellowship, with the Church triumphant.

Has the entire Church, in its official character, in all ages and in all countries, been mistaken or deceiving?—and amid all the conflicts of doctrines and contentions of sects, have these errors or corruptions been allowed to stand unabolished? Surely the almost unanimous adhesion of all the great apostles of reform would not have been given to the sacramental forms of baptism and the Lord's Supper, had they not believed that Scripture warranted, nay, demanded, such observances. This is not a question like that of a special ministry; of an episcopate; of a celibate clergy; of a State Church; of a liturgy, &c., a question about non-essentials, in regard to which difference is possible and arguable; but surely the history of the Church in all time and throughout every state, bears evidence on its every page that the sacraments are essential to salvation. It is true that S. S. objects to have this question debated on historic grounds, but these surely form presumptive evidence as to how the Scriptures have been interpreted, and what they have been understood to mean and maintain. History is in this matter a commentary on Scripture, and we cannot cast it aside as useless and worthless. In connection with any other great principle, S. S. would probably grant that the verdict of history had an important bearing on a debate—at least in its interpretative capacity, and why should it be otherwise in this question?

S. S. affirms that "the design of the Bible is to show the way of salvation," but that "it gives no intimation of the necessity of the sacraments thereto," (p. 98). He farther insists that "belief in Christ is the only essential to salvation (p. 99). But is this really all? is there no obedience to God's law required—no repentance and reform—no seeking after newness of life—no endeavour after godliness—no necessity laid upon us to produce the fruits of righteousness? What does James, the Lord's brother, say, "Faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone" (James ii. 17); "Know, O vain man, that faith without works is dead" (ii. 20); "By works a man is justified, and not by faith only" (ii. 24). James, the apostle of Jesus Christ, certainly knew better than S. S. what is essential to salvation, and he knew that though the promise is, "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved," that is only the seed of the word," which must grow and produce fruit; that is only our engrafting into Christ, but we must, after that, bear fruit. The seed must be watered with the fruitful rain of baptism, the engrafted branch must be watered by "the dews of grace;" the seed must grow by the rays of the Sun of righteousness; the branch must be nourished by the Root of Jesse. It is by baptism, and by the eucharist, that the graces of the Spirit are conveyed and continued.

S. S. admits that Jesus commanded His disciples to baptize all

nations after they had been duly taught; "but," he adds, "we are not told that Christ commanded them to teach that baptism was essential to salvation" (p. 99). Can S. S. be serious? If all were to be baptized, were any to be omitted? And if none were to be omitted, can it be otherwise than essential that *each* should be baptized? Did Christ command to "teach all nations, baptizing them" (Matt. xxviii. 29); and promise that "he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved" (Mark xvi. 16); and can we forget that He has said "He that hath My commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth Me" (John xiv. 21); "If a man love Me, he will keep My words" (xiv. 23); "He that loveth Me not, keepeth not My sayings" (xiv. 24). "If ye keep My commandments ye shall abide in My love" (xv. 10)? S. S. admits a command of the Saviour, and yet he affirms that obedience to it is not essential to salvation. Is there in the above passages "not the obscurest intimation given" that the observance of the sacrament of baptism is essential to salvation? and will not the same reasoning apply to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper?

Without faith there can indeed be neither valid baptism nor communion; but there cannot be a true faith in that man who neglects the ordinances of God, who refuses to obey the law of God regarding them, and holds himself free from the doing of God's will.

S. S. again admits that baptism is "the evidence and public profession of faith and repentance," but he also asserts that baptism is not essential to salvation; that is, proper "evidence," such evidence as has been appointed by the Saviour, and a "public profession of faith and repentance" are not essential to salvation. But Jesus affirms that those who deny, *i. e.*, do not acknowledge, Him before men, He will deny, *i. e.*, refuse to acknowledge as His, before God; and promises that He will confess those to be His who have confessed Him before men. Is this not precisely the reverse of what S. S. affirms?

In a country in almost all the churches of which there are only *two* sacraments acknowledged, S. S. need scarcely have debated in regard to *seven*. On the *five* other sacraments on which he remarks, we shall not touch. But we must regret that S. S. should have passed over the sacrament of the eucharist—the Christians' feast of love, so slightly as to have devoted to it less than a dozen lines, while he expends nearly a page on "extreme unction." Surely the commemorative festival of the dying love of our Saviour might have received more reverential treatment from his hands, had it been only a beautiful superstition, instead of, as it is, a distinctly commanded duty—"Do this in remembrance of Me" (Luke xxii. 19). In this passage, as it appears to us, there is a fulness of emphasis which strikes into the soul. "*Do*" is an emphatic verb and implies serious activity; "*this*" act, ceremony, or communion in which we have been engaged; "*in remembrance*," not in recollection as of one forgotten, and thus brought back into thought and memory, but in loving and unforced recognition, as of an abiding

memory in the heart; "of *Me*," the Saviour of sinners, your Saviour and your friend, your master—yet your mediator, the Lamb of God, of priceless worth and stainless purity, who taketh away the sins of the world. If the sinner is to remember Jesus, and to give evidence of His loving remembrance as an essential towards salvation, how can he do so more endearingly and more enduringly than in the eucharist according to Christ's appointment; and if he abstains from the memorial festival, does he not do so at his peril? May we not seriously and earnestly exhort S. S. to consider whether that ceremony can be unessential to salvation, of which it is said "he that eateth and drinketh *unworthily*, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself"? Do not these same words, too, seem to imply that he who eateth and drinketh *worthily* shall eat and drink salvation to himself? We may not judge others in meats and drinks, but let each man examine himself.

A. T. H. very philosophically asserts that "Christianity is not a religion of types and shadows," p. 265; "Mosaism is abolished;" "the typical is displaced." Is Christianity the religion of the cross? and is not the cross a type? Is not the Church on earth only the type of the general assembly and church of the firstborn? Is not even faith, as A. T. H. himself quoting St. Paul allows, only "the evidence of things not seen"? This faith itself requires to be shown, that it may be known. The sacraments are the means by which we seek and retain an acknowledged share in and of the privileges of the children of God. We are not asked or told to rely on the partaking of the sacraments for salvation; but we are told that the communion of Christ is requisite. Baptism signifies and seals our engrafting into Christ by faith, and through faith; and the eucharist is the symbol of our being sustained by faith in Christ. We ought to be all that A. T. H. says we should be; but we ought to do what Jesus the Lord has commanded. He has commanded us to observe His precepts, and among these precepts are, Be baptized and keep the supper, as a sign of faith in and fellowship with Him; for the eucharist was given to believers "to the very end that they may know and most assuredly believe that His absence, the absence of His body, divideth Him not from their care, neither divideth Him from their presence."

"Hiawatha's" views on the saving efficacy of the sacraments are very peremptorily opposed to our own. He argues as if we on the affirmative maintained that the mere partaking of the ordinance of baptism and the sacrament of the eucharist carried in itself, and contained or conveyed, some saving efficacy independent of faith, and were means of spiritual regeneration and newness of life in themselves. This we have not argued. We look upon them as ordinances for the faithful, to be partaken of by them, and to be administered to them in testimony of their faith, and of their assurance that Jesus Christ has given himself as a ransom for many, even for all who believe in His name and obey His commandments as far as

in them lies. The sacraments, apart from and separated from the new birth, and all the holy influences which work upon and into the soul through them, are nullities. We have not "treated the question in relation to the outward ceremonies which pass under the name of sacraments in the churches of the present day" (p. 347); as "Hiawatha" asserts, we have spoken of them distinctly as institutions of Jesus the Lord, the means of initiating, nourishing and continuing within us the spiritual life of the redeemed—as outward means of bearing testimony to Christ, and feeding our souls on Him:

We do not ignore or undervalue the baptism of the spirit, though we advocate the essentiality of the ordinance of baptism with water, as the figure of spiritual regeneration. Neither do we diminish aught from the pure spirituality of the relationship between Christ and the members of His mystical body, the Church, though we maintain that the observance of the very forms by which He administers renewed natures to us, as seen symbolically in the bread and wine of the eucharist, is requisite as a means of grace. It is not a little remarkable that both S. S. and "Hiawatha" dwell most particularly on baptism, and pass over the Lord's Supper almost contemptuously. In our view, the latter is the most solemn of Christian ordinances; and we cannot comprehend the state of mind of those who despise the mercies of God in His ordinances in this way.

We have reviewed as fully as we have been able the papers of our opponents; while we admire the purity of their spiritual aspirations, and the devotional fervour with which they glow, we cannot convince ourselves that they have justified to our reason the negative they have sought to impress on us. In our view of the matter the affirmative writers have shown good grounds for the belief that "the sacraments are essential to salvation."

P. S. A.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

It has not been a frequent occurrence in connection with the debates in which we have been engaged in this magazine, for any of our opponents to admit the point for which we have been contending, and to refute which has been the aim of their arguments; still less frequently has it been the case that *all* who have written in opposition to us in any debate have conceded the point for which we have contended. Such, however, is the case with the debate in which we are now taking part. Each of our three opponents, while intending to argue against us, concedes the principle in defence of which we write.

That it may be seen that what we have now stated is not a mere assertion of our own, we will adduce the words of each of the affirmative writers.

P. S. A. writes as follows:—"This, of course, is not to be held as affirming that God cannot and will not save any one who has not

been baptized, and become a partaker of the Lord's Supper;" and again, "Those who have never had the opportunity will not of course be judged for not having partaken of these ordinances."

"Ecclesia" writes thus:—"We feel and are convinced in our inmost heart that the observance of the sacraments of the New Testament is incumbent on Christians and essential to salvation—unless there are exceptional circumstances in any special case which hinder the due and proper engagement in the rites and ceremonies, simple and solemn as they are, which each of the sacraments requires." And further, "I think it may safely be affirmed, then, that the tenor of the teaching of the gospel is to the effect that the sacraments are essential to salvation; and that, though those who, having faith, have not had opportunity to engage in them, may, and indeed we should say will, be saved."

The words of P. R. are these:—"It is true, as S. S. observes, that we have instances of people being saved without baptism."

P. S. A. wishes it to be understood that he does not affirm that God cannot and will not save any one who has not been baptized and become a partaker of the Lord's Supper. Now if, as P. S. A. implies, some may be saved without either baptism or the Lord's Supper, how can either of these sacraments be *essential* to salvation? This proposition—the sacraments are essential to salvation, is contradictory of the proposition—some may be saved without the sacraments. We have always understood that the word *essential* signifies necessary or indispensable; and we believe the word is universally so understood. Now, if baptism and the Lord's Supper are *indispensable* to salvation, how can any be saved without them? And if any are saved without these sacraments, they are, in the case of such, *dispensed with*; and therefore are not *indispensable*.

Nothing can be *indispensable*, and yet at the same time be *dispensed with*.

P. S. A. believes that those who have never had the opportunity of partaking of these ordinances will not be judged for neglecting them. But what constitutes an opportunity of attending to these sacraments? To whom shall we turn for information as to what does and what does not constitute an opportunity of attending to the sacraments? Shall it be to P. S. A., or to whom? And who is qualified, or who is an authority competent to direct us where to look for instruction on so important a point?

"Ecclesia" believes that the sacraments are essential to salvation, unless there are exceptional circumstances in any special case which hinder the proper attendance thereon. But what are these special cases and exceptional circumstances? Where are they defined? And if, as "Ecclesia" believes, God dispenses with an attendance to the sacraments in the case of some whom He saves, how can those sacraments be *indispensable* to salvation?

P. R. goes so far as to affirm that we have instances of people being saved without baptism; it follows, therefore, that baptism is

not essential to baptism. The argument is, as put by "Hiawatha," in a syllogistic form.

"If the sacraments were essential to salvation, they could not be dispensed with in any instance.

"The Scriptures furnish instances of persons having been saved without observing them. Ergo—they are not essential."

And we believe with "Hiawatha" that it will puzzle our opponents to disprove this syllogism. Our opponents having admitted the truth of that for which we contend, we might here bring our remarks to a conclusion. But, as the papers opposed to our views contain some show of argument, we will examine some of the reasonings comprised in them.

All that P. S. A. does is to show that Christ instituted the ordinances of baptism and the Supper, and that He commanded His followers to observe these ordinances. Having quoted scriptures to prove this, P. S. A. says, "In the above passages the necessity of baptism and of the partaking of the Lord's Supper are shown; and these passages, as we incline to think, fully prove that these sacraments are essential to salvation;" whereas, proving that an observance of baptism and the Lord's Supper is *incumbent* on the followers of Christ, is a very different thing from proving that an observance of these sacraments is *essential* to salvation. We willingly admit that it is obligatory on believers in Christ to observe His ordinances of baptism and the Supper; but because the Scriptures declare of him who keepeth not Christ's commandments that the truth is not in him, to affirm of all who have neglected the sacraments that they cannot be saved is, we believe, contrary to the word of God. Far be it from us to even appear to excuse libertinism or a neglect of Christ's precepts in any who profess to love Him; but is there no commandment of Christ that is neglected by any who are saved? Has every saved person given his coat to the man who took away his cloak? Has every saved person given to every man that asked of him, and sought not again his goods of the man who stole them? Yet these acts are commands of Christ equally with baptism and the Supper. But does the omission of such acts necessarily exclude from heaven all who omit them? Have not these acts been omitted by some who yet keep Christ's commands in general, and whom it would be wrong to brand as those who keep not Christ's commandments? And if salvation is possible for those who in these respects have not kept Christ's commandments, why is it not possible for those who have neglected the sacraments? If obedience to every one of Christ's precepts be essential to salvation, who of us will be saved?

"Ecclesia" writes as follows:—

"The opener on the negative of this question took an ingenious method of acquiring credit for liberality of sentiment, exhaustiveness of statement, and pertinence of debate, combined with ease of victory, when he took the word in its most comprehensive sense, and treated the discussion as one referring to sacraments of all sorts; for he thus secured that, among by fr-

the larger proportion of his readers, he would have five-sevenths of his case at least granted to him without any contention, however ineffective his arguing might be. We do not think this a fair way of putting the query. All Protestants—except, perhaps, the members of the Society of Friends—agree that the sacraments of the New Testament are two, and two only—baptism and the Lord's Supper; and though in the Church of England certain forms of ritual which are by Romanists regarded as sacramental are retained; they are retained by the large majority of its officiating ministers as religious observances, fit and convenient, by their solemnity, to impress and improve, but are deprived in their usage of them of their sacramental character. The Ritualists in the Church of England only go so far as to recommend, not to enforce, a belief in the Romanistic sacraments; and even the Church of Rome itself does not declare that the seven sacraments are, to all and each, essential to salvation. In this way it is easy to gain an apparent victory, but it cannot be a real conquest in argumentation. It sweeps a vast field, it is true, with the warfare of words; but it comes in contact only with the forces of the opposition at two points—those of the Lord's Supper and of Baptism."

Now so far were we from putting the query unfairly, that before we offered any argument in defence of our own views, we allowed both the Ritualistic section of the Church of England, and also the Church of Rome, to speak for themselves, giving the very words of each party as published by them, and in our quotations from their publications, they are represented as maintaining precisely that which "Ecclesia" speaks of them as maintaining. The light in which "Ecclesia" represents them is precisely that in which we ourselves had previously represented them. How, then, can "Ecclesia" view us as having been in this matter guilty of unfairness? The arguments employed by "Ecclesia" to show that the sacraments are essential to salvation are in substance the same as those of P. S. A., to them, therefore, our remarks already made in this paper in answer to P. S. A. are a sufficient reply.

P. R. asserts that we represent the sacraments as worthless and unimportant. But no such statement is contained in our paper, nor can the inference be fairly drawn from our remarks that we view the sacraments as either worthless or of no importance. We do not so view them. We believe them to be of great importance. Because we will not admit that a certain drug possesses sedative properties, it does not follow that we believe it to be worthless or unimportant. Neither does it follow, from our belief that the sacraments are not essential to salvation, that we view them as of no value.

It appears to us that P. R. mistakes the meaning of 1 Cor. xii. 13. We believe that baptism with water is not here intended, for not all who are baptized with water are baptized by the Spirit, as is shown by the case of Simon Magus and that of many others. But all those whom Paul is speaking of are declared to be baptized by the Spirit, which baptism by the Spirit is the same thing as the drinking into one Spirit which is mentioned at the close of the verse. But not all who are baptized with water drink into one Spirit, or partake of His graces; there is, therefore, no scriptural

ground for the remark of P. R., "It seems plain, then, that Paul regarded baptism as an essential to salvation, and attached a supreme importance to it."

With regard to the Lord's Supper we would remark that when Jesus said, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, ye have no life in you," He did not speak of eating bread, or of drinking wine, but of feeding on His sacrifice, in a spiritual manner by faith in Him.*

Our work now draws to a close. The affirmative and the negative writers in this debate are agreed that persons may be saved without an observance of the sacraments. Such is the force of truth, that those who commenced writing with the intention of doing battle with our arguments, have yielded to us the point for which we contended. *That* is equivalent to a confession that the victory is ours. The verdict is unanimous. The conviction that salvation is possible without an observance of the sacraments is felt by all engaged in this controversy, on whichever side they are ranged. Even our opponents have assisted in confirming our views. May we not then conclude—seeing such an unanimity of belief amongst the debaters—that the readers of *The British Controversialist* are with ourselves convinced that the sacraments are not essential to salvation? H. S.

* We greatly regret that pressure of space and the usual arrangements of our controversies prevent us from doing more than making the following quotations from papers in our hands:—

Christians are the household of faith. Faith is the one essential to salvation. Faith is the source of all Christian efficacy, of all holy hope, of every grace of the Spirit. The only genuine communion of saints is communion in faith. "By grace," said St. Paul to the Ephesian believers, "are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God" (Ephes. xi. 8). "The just shall live by faith" (Heb. x. 38). It is therefore the baptism and fellowship of faith that we require, and these are not attainable by outward observances and formal ceremonies; they are spiritual gifts. H. S.

In regard to the Lord's Supper, the Scriptures do not record *any one* instance with approbation and sanction, *except* when the communicants at the Lord's Supper are Christians; neither do they teach that it is essential to the salvation of *any one person* that he should first partake of the Holy Eucharist; thus indisputably affirming that the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is not essential to salvation; but it is the Christian's duty and privilege in this service to "keep in remembrance" Christ's sacrifice, and "show the Lord's death till He come."

GEORGE D. E.

"It is the spirit," saith Jesus, "that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." This proves that the mere eating of the bread and drinking of the wine in the communion "profiteth nothing," and that the sacrament as an ordinance is not essential to salvation. If the Lord's Supper were so important in the salvation of men, why do the Scriptures omit to include it in the gospel message? This silence concerning the Lord's Supper proves incontrovertibly that it was *not* essential to salvation. GEORGE D. E.

History.

HAS THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY BEEN, ON THE WHOLE, JUST AND WISE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

It is to be regretted that the quotation made at the head of the article by "Samuel" did not give the whole of the definition of "Finance" as stated in "Chambers' Encyclopædia." It is on this definition of finance that I maintain the correctness of the assertion I made in starting, and which I now repeat, that "*Free trade is the distinctive feature of the financial legislation of the present century.*"

The entire definition referred to is as follows:—

"Finance, a French word incorporated with our language, means the *art of managing money matters*, the person who professes this art being called a financier. Finances, in the plural, is often used for money itself, but still with a reference to the purpose to which it is to be applied, as where the finances of a country are said to have improved or fallen off, that is to say, have become abundant or scanty according to the expenditure of the country. Sometimes the word is applied to private wealth, but it is properly applicable to public funds. *We use it in this country rather in a political and economic sense* than officially, but in France there have been, from time to time, comptrollers-general of finance, councils of finance, bureaux of finance, &c. Many statesmen have been spoken of as great financiers, from the talent which they have shown for adjusting national revenue and expenditure, such as Colbert, Turgot, and Necker in France, and Godolphin and Peel in Britain. *As a branch of statesmanship*, finance is intimately connected with other branches. In questions of *national policy*—such as whether a State can go to war or not—the financier is the person who is expected to count the cost, and say how the necessary funds are to be obtained. In the question whether an *unpopular or oppressive tax* is to be abolished, the financier is an authority on the question, whether the Government can do without it. Hence there is a special connection between *finance and taxation*, which has become closer and stronger since the progress of political economy has shown that the taxes which are the most productive, and even the most easily collected, are not always the best, looking at the gain or loss of a nation *in the long run*. Turgot said that finance was the art of plucking the fowl without making it cry. On this notion the principle of indirect taxation achieved its popularity. For instance, customs duties seem to fall on no one. The importer and the retailer add them to the price of the article, and the ultimate purchaser only knows that the article is dear without experiencing the sense of hardship felt by one who pays out money directly in the shape of a tax. *But*

many indirect taxes have, on the other hand, been found to affect the trade and the wealth of communities to an extent which has made them very deleterious in comparison with direct taxes."

May I be allowed to add the following definition of "policy" extracted from the last edition of the "Imperial Dictionary," and then by putting the two together we shall gain some correct idea of what the term "financial policy" means:—

"Policy, in its primary signification, is the same as polity, comprehending the fundamental constitution or frame of civil government, in a state or kingdom. But by usage policy is now more generally used to denote what is included under legislation and administration, and may be defined the art or manner of governing a nation; or that system of measures which the sovereign of a country adopts and pursues, as the best adapted to the interests of the nation."

It must also be borne in mind that the question at present under discussion is, whether the financial policy of the present century has on the whole (and not in each of its numerous parts) been just and wise.

"Samuel" treats the question of finance as one of currency and banking only, and it would be worse than useless to follow him into the numerous details of that subject. I reject the narrow view of finance espoused by "Samuel" and his supporter, and looking at the question in a broad national view, we shall find that the tendency of the financial policy of this century has been beneficial.

"Samuel's" first and second sections relate solely to purely fiscal arrangements, and not to a national policy. It would therefore be as irrelevant to the present discussion to follow him into a disquisition on that subject, as it would be to discuss the fiscal arrangements of the London and Westminster Bank.

His third section is the only part of his article which at all bears upon the present subject. This is entitled *The preponderance of indirect over direct taxation*.

I heartily agree with him in his dislike of indirect taxation, and one of my reasons for being on the affirmative of the proposition at the head of this article is, that the present financial policy tends to the abolition of indirect taxation. What was the Corn Law Repeal? What is the Free Trade policy? What was the Repeal of the Paper Duties? What was the Commercial Treaty with France? What were the proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budgets of 1869 and 1870?

But what says "Samuel's" sole supporter, F. M., in his two articles? I commenced this discussion by stating (to which statement I adhere) "that the distinctive financial policy of the present century is that popularly known as free trade." This, F. M. very kindly converts into "jauntily setting out with the idea that an inquiry into the justice and wisdom of the financial policy of this country in the present century should be set down as one easily

able to be treated of under the single head of the utility of free trade," and my worthy friend then proceeds to make some extraordinary and amusing statements which I shall take leave to comment upon presently.

F. M. endeavours to draw a comparison between 1801 and 1869, disparaging to the latter. He says that in 1801 the taxation was at the rate of £2 7s. 6d. per head, and that in 1869 it was £2 10s. per head. Grant him that his facts are correct, where is his conclusion? I have looked through his article for it in vain. Does he wish us to imagine that because the taxation was greater per head in 1869 than in 1801, it is a necessary consequence that that taxation was the result of an unwise and unjust financial policy, and does he wish us to account for that increase by the assumption that the financial policy of the whole century has been unsound? He must either mean this or nothing, and by so doing he ignores the burdens caused by the wars that clouded the opening of this century; that useless, nay, criminal Russian War, into which the nation was plunged by Lord Palmerston, the only effects of which were to raise our national debt to the gigantic sum of £800,000,000, to murder thousands of men and pauperize the country. Has F. M. forgotten the commercial panics of this century, especially that of 1866, the consequences of which are being felt severely over the whole of the country even now? Has he forgotten the unnecessary Abyssinian war, which brought a further debt of some millions of pounds upon the people? Has he also forgotten the great American civil war, the effects of which also contributed largely to the increase of taxation? Surely F. M. must be a combination of innocence and simplicity personified, to have allowed all these matters to escape his mind when he was endeavouring to construct his syllogism.

Taking his stand upon these two insignificant facts, F. M. says with a vast amount of self-satisfaction, "On the general question, then, we conceive that we have fully made out our case—that the financial policy of our country during the present century has neither been just nor wise." Bearing in mind the numerous facts which he has omitted, I ask, is his position tenable even for a moment?

The local taxation to which he next adverts I apprehend has nothing to do with the financial policy of the country taken as a whole.

F. M. complains of the existence of the tax on spirits and malt, and indeed the gist of his complaint appears to be, that all taxes have not been abolished at once. But he must be content to have matters dealt with in their proper order, and the proper order to be preserved is, as I maintain, to abolish taxes on necessities first, and afterwards to deal with the imposts on luxuries. This, taking the financial legislation of the present century as a whole, has been its tendency. We have a recent exemplification of this in the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has reduced by one-half the duty on sugar, which is surely preferable to a reduction of the tax on spirits.

F. M. states that "change of Government, nay, even revolution

itself, might benefit, it could not materially alter for the worse, the condition of the poor." He should recollect that all changes beneficial to the poor, and especially the Repeal of the Corn Laws and the other measures of Free Trade Finance, have been carried notwithstanding and against the united opposition of the rich.

F. M. says "We believe that the taxation of the country has not been thus judiciously *levied*, and hence we are inclined to deny that the financial policy of the half century has been just and wise."

Even assuming for a moment that the taxes have not been judiciously *levied*, is this a sufficient reason for concluding that the whole policy from which the taxes have sprung is unjust and unwise? It seems to me to be more a complaint against detail than any objection to principle.

I assume also for the moment the correctness of F. M.'s assertion that in 1841-2 there was a deficit of 2½ millions, and that at that time "our financial policy had brought trade to a state of stagnation, and spread a distress which gave Chartism power, increased the hatefulness of the poor law bastilles to the poor, and the burden of the poor laws upon the struggling;" but I ask what was it that restored trade, and has hitherto been effectual in preventing a recurrence of the disasters of that period but the adoption of that policy which I still call the distinguishing financial policy of the present century, viz., Free Trade? It may, however, be said in passing, that before F. M. launches assertions about Chartism, it would be advisable for him to obtain correct ideas as to what Chartism really was.

F. M. has apparently conquered his aversion to indirect taxation, and now assails direct taxation in the shape of the income-tax, because, forsooth, of certain inequalities in its collection. Surely he cannot be serious in urging these as objections against the *principles* of the present financial policy.

But F. M. lashes himself into a perfect fury when he comes to think about the admirals, rear-admirals, &c. He forgets that these appendages of war are the bequests of our ancestors, who were fond of indulging in that luxury, and indignantly says "If H. K. had called this polite political freebooting, he might have been near the mark, but free trade—!" The present writer certainly never wrote anything connecting admirals and generals with free trade, for it is by the instrumentality of free trade principally that he hopes that these officers will, at a future period, be rendered almost, if not totally, unnecessary.

No doubt the army and navy are great drags upon the nation, but if you will have soldiers and sailors, they must of course be paid, and F. M. has in his wrath apparently forgotten the proposals of Mr. Childers and Mr. Cardwell, and has also overlooked the fact that the present Government has adopted and is pursuing economical principles in every department.

F. M. claims Mr. Lowe as a supporter of his views. I claim him as a supporter of mine, and would requote the passage cited b-

F. M. in support of my claim. I would also point to his last financial statement, as illustrative and demonstrative of the theory which I have ventured to maintain.

I say in conclusion, in addition to what I have already advanced, that the present financial policy is just and wise, because, if followed out, it will make war—that curse of all nations and benefit of none—almost impossible between countries whose commercial and material interests are so bound up together that it would be ruin to either to sever those ties, except upon the most vital considerations, and also because, by removing indirect taxation, it takes the burdens from the shoulders of those who are unable to bear them.

H. K.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

WE greatly regret that this subject, so comprehensive and so important, has not been more adequately discussed. But although the debate has called forth only a small number of contributions, and those not grappling with the various matters related to the debate so thoroughly as might have been desirable, we would nevertheless fain hope that the minds of many of the readers of this serial have been informed and beneficially influenced through having their thoughts directed to the consideration of such an important question. There are many points connected with this subject, concerning which there is a divergence of opinion, that have not been noticed in the course of the discussion; but for us to touch upon these fresh topics in a final reply would not be fair play towards our opponents; we will therefore proceed to refer to those points that have been previously mentioned during the currency of this debate.

The strictures upon our opening article are neither numerous nor severe, and they will not require any very lengthened consideration at our hands. The latter part of T. R. W.'s article is fairly argumentative, but the former part is strangely illogical. It will be observed that the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of his article are closely connected with each other, and that in them T. R. W. argues that our objection to the financial policy of the nineteenth century is mistaken, because "in this century there has been a larger amount of investigation, thought, and public inquiry expended on finance than in any former period." But to establish the validity of this argument T. R. W. must be able to prove that the investigations and public inquiries of the present century have been not only greater in amount, but also more free from prejudice, preconceived notions, party spirit, and individual partialities, engendered by the claims of self-interest. Thought, investigation, and public inquiry are truly valuable seeds, from which we may safely hope that, when sown broadcast over the land, the good crop of a just and wise policy will ultimately spring, but it does not necessarily follow, because the seed is sown, that therefore the crop is reaped. Are thought, investigation, and public inquiry trees that

unfailingly and immediately bear good fruit? Have they not often been, even in the present century, more like barren trees round which hang the mistletoe-like parasites of folly and injustice? These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the argument of T. R. W. quoted above is illogical, and proves nothing.

A. P. L. thinks that in part of our opening article we have mistaken banking for finance. But we maintain that banking, in so far as it is regulated by law, is a part of the financial policy of the nation. The quotation from "Chambers's Encyclopædia" at the head of our opening article says that finance "means the art of managing money matters;" and T. R. W., one of A. P. L.'s coadjutors, remarks that "Finance signifies the whole policy of a nation as concerns the management of money, or governmental action in regard to national wealth." We therefore feel justified in still maintaining that legal enactments concerning banking are a fundamental part of the financial policy of the nation.

A. P. L. refers to our omitting all mention of exchequer bonds, &c., but this omission will not really affect our argument unless it can be shown that the policy of Chancellors of the Exchequer is to issue these government securities just as they are needed to prevent an undue restriction of the currency, and to avert panics. With regard to A. P. L.'s first criticism upon our remarks on taxation, we quite agree with him that there should be some indirect taxation, and this point we maintained in our opening article. To A. P. L.'s second criticism on this subject we demur, for whilst the revenue from indirect taxation is more than double that from direct taxation, we cannot admit that direct taxation is being adopted "as far as possible in wisdom and with justice." The poor man pays a duty of about twenty-five per cent. upon the value of his coffee, about twenty-five per cent. upon his sugar, and about thirty per cent. on his tea, whilst the additional taxes levied upon the rich, with their greatly increased capacity for paying taxes, only amount to about seven per cent. In the Budget debate, April 12th, 1870, Mr. Candlish, M.P. for Sunderland, expressed his preference for an income tax of sixpence a pound, and Pollard-Urquhart, M.P. for the county of Westmeath, advocated the raising of the income tax to sevenpence in the pound. Mr. Lowe has admitted that indirect taxes fall with greater proportional severity on the poor, and we believe that the principle of direct taxation might be adopted still further both in wisdom and with justice. We think there is great weight in the following words of Mr. White, M.P. for Brighton, spoken by him in the debate just mentioned, "Only £17,000,000 of the whole sum required would be raised from the propertied classes. The luxuries of the rich were lightly taxed, while everything that contributed to the comfort and enjoyment of the poor continued to be heavily burdened." On the same occasion Mr. White also quoted the following words from a speech delivered by Mr. Bright since he became a cabinet minister, "Rely upon it that so long as Parliament exacts from the industry

of the people £70,000,000 a year, there is no power on earth can raise your poorer and suffering population from its present position."

H. K., in opening the affirmative side of this debate, has given us a lengthened article wholly devoted to a eulogizing of Free Trade. We believe that the principle of Free Trade is just and wise, but we do not look upon it as a fundamental principle of *financial* policy. It most certainly is the fundamental principle of the *commercial* policy of this country during the present century, and it also has an indirect bearing upon financial matters. We must, however, still look upon the Cash Payments Act of 1819, the Bank Charter Act of 1844, and the view taken of the income tax in the early part of the century as "exclusively a war tax,"* and not Free Trade, as being the foundations of the financial policy of the nineteenth century. We would also remind H. K. that Free Trade has not been an unmixed good, for, in connection with a restricted currency, it did undoubtedly operate most disastrously at the time of the Irish famine and monetary crisis of 1847.

The four points adduced by T. R. W. to prove the affirmative of this question we most cheerfully accept as correct statements, but they really prove nothing in this debate, for they refer to merely superficial matters, and do not touch the fundamental principles of our financial policy.

A. P. L. argues, because the taxation and the population of this country have increased in 1800 in about the same ratio, notwithstanding that various elements of expenditure have been added to the governmental outlay during that period, that therefore the financial policy of this country has on the whole tended to economy. But this comparison is not just, because the circumstances of the country widely differ at the two periods mentioned. The year 1800 was a time of financial difficulty and war, 1869-70 belongs to a long-continued period of profound peace. F. M. has pointed out to us that the taxation of 1801 was equal to about £2 7s. 6d. per head, on an average, and that of 1869 to about £2 10s. per head, on an average. The extra 2s. 6d. per head in 1869 would cover the elements of expenditure added to the Government outlay; and thus A. P. L.'s above-mentioned argument just amounts to this, that in the present time of peace the cost of the government and defence of this country has increased from what it was in 1800, a time when the country had for several years been engaged in a most harassing and expensive warfare, in the same ratio as the population has increased during the same period. The argument thus stated tends to prove that the management of governmental expenditure is *less* economical now than it was at the commencement of the century, and in support of this conclusion we may also adduce the consideration that the expenditure should not increase

* See Sir G. C. Lewis's "Administrations of Great Britain, 1783-1830," pp. 219, 394.

in the same ratio as the population, because there are many items of expenditure which are not increased by an increase of population.

We have now briefly noticed the arguments of our opponents, we believe that the arguments in our opening article have not been overthrown, nor their relevancy to the subject of debate disproved, and therefore we still continue to maintain that, on the whole, the financial policy of the nineteenth century has not been just and wise. We are, however, looking with hope to the efforts of the present Government, believing that they are likely to introduce gradually a more just and wise financial policy. SAMUEL.

Literature.

HAS THE AGE OF SATIRISTS PASSED AWAY?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

WE have had in our literary history a very distinct and well-known species of writing, called satire—wit excited by wrath, decency dunned into a dunce, politics pickled in poetry, punishment administered by pasquinades, evil assailed by epigrams, and sarcasms set to song. All along the course of our land's records there is a fringing of fun, frolic, scarifying satire, and libels done in the buffooning style. In the poetry of the past these are to be found as plentifully as blackberries in the September copses, or "like nettle flowers among the bluebells, and wild roses by the hill-side." Then it was deemed a right and proper thing to lash the failings of mankind generally with scornful energy, and to flagellate offenders against society with the scorpions of the intellectual forces. The satirist was as regularly engaged in looking out for a deserving subject as a vulture was ready to scent afar off the oncoming death in the desert; and such a poet as Pope could aver,—

"I own I'm proud to see,
Men not afraid of God afraid of me."

But these days are past, and the satire is as obsolete as the fool's cap and bells, which used to wag at the royal table, and excite amusement in the noble's hall. With Walter Savage Landor the last of the great satirical and satirical writers of our country was laid in the grave. We have no modern Aristophanes or Ben Jonson; no Horace and Juvenal, or Butler and Swift; no Erasmus and Buchanan, or Hall and Dunne; no Dryden and Pope, or Churchill

and Byron. It is not that we are free from foul social vices, or that there are no corruptions in the State or in society; it is not because religious hypocrisy has departed and cant is unknown, that political dereliction is less prevalent, or literary pretension less absurd, that no weapon of swingeing might is brought across the base part of the social circle; it is because the very foundations of moral energy are sapped, and nobleness of soul is too rare among us. We can vituperate, but we do it on the sly; we can vilify, but we do it with discreet evasiveness. We cannot now speak to the very soul of the criminal in high places, we can only fawn and flatter—and defame. The heroism of the satirist is lost as well as the keenness; the high moral tone of the frowner on sin, and the reformer of the ages, has been exchanged for the trite moralizing of the essayist, and the semi-maudering of the sermonizer. The patiently prepared and pithy pungency of the poetical satirist has disappeared from among us, and even the caricatures of the novelist have ceased to be graced with a moral purpose, or painted by the hand of an author strong to detest sin.

I have read the papers prepared by the writers on the negative of the question, and have compared them with those composed on the affirmative, and I cannot see that there is any possibility of hesitation concerning this question. If our opponents would only supply us with a list of the satirists of the present day, we might be at once put to silence. When a list is attempted it is a most complete failure. What name among the old satirists does not hold the first rank in letters? What names among the so-called satirists of modern times do occupy a foremost place among authors, and are acknowledged as the *arbitri morum* of the period? Douglas Jerrold was a jester, not a satirist. His were the smallest of possible punctures in the great body of the world's sins. Thackeray was a cynic in his writings, and dissected the weaknesses of men, not to cure them, but to show his clinical observations regarding the diseases to which that hideous thing, an unregenerate heart, was subject. He was an anatomist, not a surgeon, and his scarifications were performed on carrion. James Hannay—heaven save the mark!—is also named; but who that knows Hall or Dunne, or Swift or Barnes, would read Hannay?

We can scarcely believe that M. R. N. and "R. Fielding" can be serious in maintaining that the authors whose names they quote are really satirists in the good old sense of stern rebukers of social sins, moral misdoings, political profligacy, commercial cozenry, religious hypocrisy, and the chastisers of those who, being above or beyond the law, required to be made amenable to the pure moral code of God.

We are quite conscious that we bring a very serious charge against our age when we assert that it is not an age of satirists. We charge it with deficiency of moral heroism, and with submissiveness to shams; we charge it with conventional hypocrisies so hollow that they will not bear even the chipping of the small stones

flung from the slings of the wits; we charge it with being so cankered in the core that no surgeon can venture to use the scarifying knife without its being also a sacrificial one. We want serious, earnest convictions, and our great authors only tickle the surface of the social sores with the soft fibres of their goosequills. In sober earnestness may we not doubt that our moral sense is becoming thoroughly depraved, when there is not among us conscientiousness enough to keep up the witnessing for God's truth and God's law which the satirists gave? Is the soul of the whole nation seared as if with a hot iron? Or are we shortly to see a new school of satirists arise, who shall slip off the masks from our lives and make us condemn ourselves?

A. C. S.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

As a mere matter of fact this question seems at a first glance to be trivial and uninteresting; and judging from the slight quantity of argumentation which it has induced, it has been deemed so by the contributors in general, if not by the readers also. But both as a fact in criticism and a fact in morals the question is of great moment. As regards criticism, for instance, the debate involves the falling out of our literature of one of its richest, ripest, most pungent and most powerful characteristics,—characteristics which flash into our mind at the mention of Chaucer, Shakspeare, Donne, Hall, Jonson, Dryden, Pope, Swift, Burns, Cowper, Byron, Disraeli, Bulwer, Bailey, Browning, &c. While in regard to morals, the debate, if affirmed in the mind as a fact, would involve the belief that the power to chastise successful vice, to cause the glow of shame to suffuse the cheek and touch the heart, to stir the conscience to quiver and tremble, had been lost by our thinkers, or that the very sense of shame and ridicule had left the spirit. Has human life got so shut up in the strongholds of commonplace that nothing is possible to touch its dull uniformity and self-sameness, or stir the deep stagnation of the souls of men? We cannot believe that it is so, and that the whole age is tainted with that Gallio-like impassivity which “cares for none of these things” which satiric wit brings under the lash.

Can it be possible, for instance, that a section of society is able to hear with blushless and unheeding stolidity of the query attributed to one of its drawing-room *habitués*,—“Friends!—has the word a plural?—has it aught else than an associative signification?” This is a sarcastic satire on the unfriendly friendships of the *beau monde*.

Is it true that “Nemesis can seldom forge a sword for herself out of our consciences, out of the suffering we feel, in the suffering we may have caused? Our moral sense learns the manners of good society, and smiles when others smile. But when some rough person gives rough names to our actions, she is apt to take part against us” (Adam Bede, vol. ii. p. 266). If it is not, and man is nature?

inclined to see with ire and hate his own wrongheadedness and to condemn himself, sorrying in dust and ashes; then it may be of little consequence that the age of satire, which gives rough names to disgraceful actions, has passed away. But if it is, and man is naturally inclined to the use of "all-screening-self-excuse," unless some strong hand remove the pleasing falsity from before us by some keen satiric touch, then it would be a matter of moral grief and social sorrow if we should be forced to conclude that the age of satire has passed away.

All that our opponents have been able to prove is that satire is more diffused in our age, that it occupies a wider field of activity, and yet does not get concentrated into single works in the same mode as formerly. They have been compelled to admit that in poems and plays, in dramas and histories, in newspapers and in magazines, in parliamentary speeches and in drawing-room conversation, in street slang and in concert-hall jargon, in club epigram and church epistolary productions, in novels and in sermons, in sculpture and painting, in comic journals and in blue books, satire is to be found; having acquired in immensity what it has lost in intensity, and having been compelled to lose its ribaldry by the prevailing might of a sensibly administered law of libel. Satire in our age requires to restrain itself within the true and the provable, and must not, as in the days of old, outstep the bounds of the correct and approvable. Men have become at once more keen in their sense of the ridiculous, and more clean in the use of ridicule. The witchery of wit is now more in demand than the switchery of it; the multitude of the impressions of it produced intensifies the impression it produces; and satire now depends more for its efficacy on its truthfulness than its cleverness. It may have lost some of its Byronry, but it has certainly not lost any of its irony.

The rough and ready, brusque, and rude satire of Fielding has been exchanged for the keen causticity and pure vivacity of Thackeray; Richardson's acute and minute tracery and trickery of incident has been replaced by the good humour and nice observation of Dickens; Smollett's dash and splash has been succeeded by Trollope's not less robust but more modest impersonations; and Cruickshank etches his sketches with a power and appositeness not less effective than the pencil of Hogarth. We may not be able to match the virulent rancour and absolute asperity of Churchill, but Walter Savage Landor could quicken the spleen and excite the ire of the most cool and collected when he gathered into the neat little pellets of verse the concentrated essence of a heart's hatred. We have now neither professed nor confessed satirists, but if satire has ever been written in encaustic, some of Robert Browning's bits are among them, while the rare glare of a heart-whole hate of sin issues from the floodgates of the molten irony of Thomas Carlyle. Wilson and Aytoun and Lockhart belong to this age, though they have personally passed away; so also did à Beckett and Douglas Jerrold, Sterling Coyne, and Mark Lemon; as do the Mayhews, Tom Hood

the younger, James Hannay, and Walter Thornbury. Are not John Bright and Robert Lowe masters of statesmanly satire? Is not Huxley famous for the satire of science? and does not G. H. Lewes occupy the place of the satirist of the psychologists?

"Walter Sherrington" has a very correct appreciation of satire, and his paper, though issued in the affirmative, is in great measure on the negative. He admits the existence of satire in a diffused state, but denies that this is an age of satirists. We cannot comprehend how this can be. If satire exists and is issued, then this must be an age of satirists. If we were asked, Has the age of poetry passed away? would it be a reply to this to say we have now no Homer, Virgil, Dante, Chaucer, Spenser, Shakspeare, Milton, &c.? Neither is it any proof that the age of satirists has passed away that we have no Dryden, no Pope, no Byron. These were satirists, but those others who purvey the satires of our magazines, newspapers, &c., are not the less so. I may adduce the names of Dickens, of Cornelius O'Dowd (Charles Lever), Disraeli, Huxley, &c., to show that even in our day satire is not extinct.

It must be admitted that there is less ground for satire in our day than in some former times, because we have settled down into a more uniform style of life, and have got more thoroughly veneered over with a sort of Chesterfieldian varnish. On this account the salient points are not so readily caught, and are not so easily brought out in the form of words; but surely the denunciations of hollowness and meanness and shame are not less vigorous in our times than in those of old.

I would ask "Walter Sherrington" if he ever reads the *Saturday Review*, in which there is usually a sort of paper which is known as a *snarler*? Has he any acquaintance with the growth of comic literature on the model of *Punch*; for example, *Fun*, *Judy*, *Will o' the Wisp*, the *Tomahawk*, *Vanity Fair*, the *Echo*, the *Plain Speaker*, *Free Lance*, *Porcupine*, the *Town Crier*, &c.? Do these not all prove that there is a large amount not only of appreciation of satire, but a large supply of it? Do not the clubs and unions of London and the university cities supply a constant round of epigrams? and is not fashionable life kept in hilarity by the keen satiric sayings which are usually meant by such phrases as "treading on one's toes," "touching one to the quick," &c.?

As we believe that satire is the keen caustic whip for lashing those who commit breaches of the minor morals, for castigating those who offend against society in a way not easily reachable by the ordinary operation of the law; as we believe it to be the expression of the outraged moral sense against infringers of its canons, we do not believe that it can pass away until men have either ceased to transgress or have lost a perception of the evil of transgressing. On both these grounds we are compelled to consider that the age of satirists has not passed away.

R. FIELDING.

The Essayist.

JOHN HAMPDEN AND HIS TIMES.

(Continued from p. 382).

IN the autumn of 1635, ship-money writs were sent into Buckinghamshire requiring £4,600. After consulting Sir John Whitelocke and other legal friends, Hampden determined to contest the point, and accordingly refused to pay the sum at which he was assessed, not because of its amount—for it was only twenty shillings—but, as his counsel said at the trial, on account of the very important principle involved. Clarendon says, that “until this time he [Hampden] was rather of reputation in his own county than of public discourse or fame in the kingdom; but then he grew the argument of all tongues, every man inquiring who and what was he that durst at his own charge support the liberty and prosperity of the kingdom.” The case was argued before twelve judges in the Court of Exchequer, and lasted from the 6th to the 18th of December, 1637. The counsel on behalf of Hampden pleaded that by Magna Charta, by several ancient statutes, and lastly by the Petition of Right to which Charles himself had given his solemn assent, such taxes were illegal, being levied without consent of Parliament. But it was useless arguing before judges who were mere creatures of the King, removable at his pleasure, and who unblushingly affirmed “that Acts of Parliament are void to bind the King not to command the subjects, their persons and goods, and . . . their money too, for no Acts of Parliament make any difference.” Of course, as was anticipated, judgment was given against Hampden, but the illegality of the tax was so glaring, the law was so clearly on Hampden’s side, that, notwithstanding the servile position of the judges, seven only of them gave judgment for the Crown, and the remaining five held the tax to be illegal, and decided in favour of Hampden. Speaking of Hampden’s behaviour throughout this memorable trial, Clarendon says, “His carriage throughout this agitation was with that rare temper and modesty, that they who watched him most narrowly to find some advantage against his person, to make him less resolute in his cause, were compelled to give him a just testimony; and the judgment that was given against him infinitely more advanced him than the service for which it was given.”

Hampden, feeling that neither his person nor his property was safe in England, now resolved to quit his native land; and, in company with Oliver Cromwell and some other friends, to seek a home

On the other side of the Atlantic, amongst those of the Puritans who had already gone there to avoid the persecution which their sect suffered in England.

Hampden and Cromwell had embarked, and the ship was about to set sail, when, fortunately for the nation, but unfortunately for the King, an Order of Council was sent in haste for them, forbidding the departure of the ship.

And now the time drew nigh when Charles, after a lapse of eleven years, would again have to face that which he with good reason dreaded, an English Parliament. The necessity for this resulted from his own tyrannical conduct. For, not content with treating English Nonconformists with the greatest intolerance, Charles and his chief spiritual adviser, Laud, had resolved to extend Episcopacy to Scotland. And, notwithstanding the deeply-rooted aversion of the Scots to Episcopacy, and regardless of their protests, Charles actually endeavoured to force it upon them. The natural consequence was, that a rebellion ensued, the Scotch rose in arms against the tyranny of Charles. The King marched against them with an army, and, after some fighting, one campaign concluded with a treaty. The Scots, however, being still dissatisfied with the King's conduct, refused to lay down their arms, and Charles would have again marched his troops across the Tweed had not an empty exchequer prevented him from raising an army. Under ordinary circumstances, he would have obtained the money which he now so urgently required by the same illegal expedients as he had already resorted to on many previous occasions; but now, with a large part of the island in open rebellion, despot as he was, he dared not attempt to force money from the people as he had formerly done. Under these circumstances Charles reluctantly called another Parliament, hoping thus to be relieved from his difficult position.

Hampden had now become very popular. His bold stand against the forced loans, his consistent support of the opposition, his wise and temperate conduct generally, and above all, his refusal to pay the ship-money, had brought him prominently before the nation. "When this Parliament began," says Clarendon, "the eyes of all men were fixed on him as their *patria pater*, and the pilot that must steer the vessel through the tempests and rocks which threatened it . . . His power and interest, at that time, were greater to do good or hurt than any man's in the kingdom. . . for his reputation of honesty was universal, and his affections seemed so publicly guided, that no corrupt or private ends could bias them." The electors of Buckinghamshire sent Hampden to represent them in this Parliament, and from that day until the time of his death he gave himself up entirely to the duties of the State, rarely visiting his country seat.

Parliament met on the 13th of April, 1640, and considering the illegal and intolerant conduct of the King, it was a far more moderate Parliament than might have been expected. It contained fewer

men of violent and extreme opinions, and even Clarendon admits that "it could never be hoped that more sober or dispassionate men would ever meet together in that place."

As on previous occasions, Charles solicited immediate supplies, promising that the grievances of the nation should be afterwards considered. But the Commons, although disposed to give a reasonable supply, had learnt from long and dearly-bought experience that the word of the King was not to be trusted; that, if once supplies were voted before grievances were redressed, they would never be even listened to afterwards. Accordingly they proceeded to investigate the many violations of the rights and liberties of the subject, which had taken place during the eleven years of arbitrary rule which had elapsed since a Parliament last sat. Amongst other things, they appointed a committee to inquire into the action against Hampden for ship-money. Hampden himself was an active member of this Parliament, and sat on five committees.

Charles sent down to the House of Commons, offering to abolish ship-money if they would grant him twelve subsidies. But the House at once saw that if they agreed to this bargain, they would acknowledge the King's previous conduct in levying ship-money without their consent, which they had from the first held to be unconstitutional, to be legal. The Commons discussed the King's offer on the 4th of May, and adjourned the debate until the 5th. On that day, however, the King came down to the House of Lords, dismissed the Parliament, and afterwards imprisoned several members of the House of Commons. Thus Charles rejected the only safe and constitutional mode of extricating himself from his difficult position.

The moderate men of all parties deplored this conduct of the King. They saw that he had now, by his own act, destroyed that spirit of conciliation which had pervaded both the nation and the Parliament, when the latter first met; that instead of the meeting of Parliament tending to heal the breach between the nation and the King, the manner in which Charles had treated that Parliament had intended to widen it.

Unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain a supply from Parliament, Charles was compelled to resort to the same illegal means of filling his coffers as he had previously used. Accordingly ship-money, forced loans, and illegal duties were again levied. To such a beggared condition was the King reduced, that to obtain money, goods on change, horses, forage, and much other private property, were seized. Even the bullion of foreign merchants was taken from the Mint by the King, and only given up for a ransom of £40,000.

By such means as these Charles contrived once more to raise an army and to march against the Scots, but only to sustain an ignominious defeat. His soldiers ran away immediately they saw the Scotch troops, and the latter actually marched as far south as Durham, the King's army retreating before them.

With an empty exchequer, a defeated army, and a discontented people, Charles was now in a most awkward position. He called a council of Peers at York, in the vain hope of thus extricating himself from his difficulty. This council, however, afforded him no material assistance, but advised him to summons another Parliament. The Scotch army, the citizens of London, and the gentry of York, all implored him to adopt a similar course, and petitions were sent to him from all parts of the country to the same effect. Thus pressed on all sides, without any other prospect of settling the disputes which had arisen, or supplying his want of money, Charles reluctantly consented to hold another Parliament, the last which he ever summoned.

During this year, Hampden married his second wife, Letitia Vachell, the daughter of a gentleman residing near Reading.

When the King's intention to summon another Parliament became known, the members of the opposition exerted themselves to the utmost to secure a majority in the House of Commons. Hampden himself, according to contemporary writers, rode through every county in England, exhorting the people to send men to Parliament who would fearlessly uphold their constitutional rights and privileges. Hampden was elected for both Buckinghamshire and Wendover, but he chose to sit for the former.

This famous Parliament, familiar to us all as the Long Parliament, destined to play an important part in the annals of our country, and to which we are indebted for many of the rights and much of the liberty which we now enjoy, met on the 3rd of November, 1640. As the result of the King's conduct, and of the efforts of Hampden and the other popular leaders, the opposition had a very large majority. Exasperated by a continued course of the most unconstitutional and unjustifiable conduct on the part of Charles, disgusted by the utter disregard with which he treated his own solemn promises, vexed by the manner in which he had dismissed his last Parliament, the members of the Long Parliament came to Westminster in a very different disposition to those who had been dismissed in the preceding May. As Clarendon says, "the same men who but six months before were observed to be of very moderate tempers, and to wish that gentle remedies might be applied . . . talked now in another dialect both of things and persons, and said they must now be of another temper than they were the last Parliament."

In most of the important acts of the first session of the Long Parliament—the impeachment of Strafford and Laud, the abolition of the Star-Chamber and the High-Commission Courts, the liberation of the victims of Episcopal bigotry, and many wise and just reforms—Hampden took an active part.

Hampden's political opinions had now undergone considerable change. When he first entered Parliament he was a man of very moderate views, always leaning to well-established precedent and usage. In the twenty years, however, which had elapsed since

that period, Hampden had received a political education of no ordinary character. Experience had taught him, in common with many other moderate men, that with such a king as Charles, who regarded neither truth, justice, nor reason, blinded by his foolish ideas of the kingly prerogative, and aiming at absolute power, moderation would be useless, wrong, and even criminal. Accordingly we find that in the future, Hampden, although still anxious for harmony between king and people, was more willing to depart from well-established rule, and to adopt extraordinary and even extreme measures—measures which under ordinary circumstances would have been unjustifiable, but which the very extraordinary circumstances of the time seem to have justified.

This is notably the case in the support which Hampden gave to the attainder of Strafford. A short time before, and under ordinary circumstances, he probably would not have supported this measure. But now he considered that times had changed, the opportunity for any less severe measure had passed, the execution of Strafford was rendered absolutely necessary by the course of events. Some have severely condemned this execution, and, viewed in the light of the present day, when there is a strong tendency to treat all evil doers lightly, it may seem too severe. In studying history, however, we are often guilty of converting "the after experience of facts into a subtle process of reasoning which would have enabled us to foresee those facts, and we infer . . . the superiority of modern intelligence." Hence the reason why we often condemn the actions of men who hold a prominent place in history, forgetting the difference of our position. "The remedy . . . is to look through the eyes of contemporaries from whom the future was concealed." Now this is precisely the rule we ought to apply to the question of Strafford's execution.

To decide this matter aright, we must place ourselves in the position of those men who condemned Strafford. Imagine that we lived in their time, were surrounded by the same influences and dangers, placed in the same circumstances, and with only the same information which they possessed. If we do this, we shall then see that the public safety, the peace of the kingdom, and the many other extraordinary circumstances of the case fully justified those who passed a bill of attainder against Strafford, in their conduct.

During this year, and towards the close of the session, Hampden and five other commissioners were sent by the House of Commons to Scotland, professedly to make arrangements as to debt contracted by the Scots during the late rebellion, but really to watch the movements of the King, who was at this time in Edinburgh settling the dispute which had led to the invasion of England by the Scots; and also to prevent, if possible, any arrangement between the King and the Scotch which might prove injurious to England.

Whilst the King was in Scotland, the terrible rebellion which deluged Ireland with blood broke out in full fury; and it was during the same period that another event, far more important in its influ-

ence and results on this kingdom, took place. This was the passing of the famous "Remonstrance on the state of the kingdom." This Remonstrance was a review of the whole course of the King's misgovernment from the commencement of his reign. It was in fact, as Clarendon describes it, "A very bitter representation of all the illegal things that had been done from the first hour of the King's coming to the Crown to that minute." About nine in the morning of the twenty-second of November, 1641, Pym introduced this memorable remonstrance into the House of Commons. The debate which ensued was long and stormy, and affords another proof of the temperate character of Hampden. So violent was the debate that bloodshed was likely to have ensued. Sir Philip Warwick, who was present, says, "We had caught our swords in each other's bowels, had not the sagacity and great calmness of Mr. Hampden, by a short speech, prevented it." It was nearly two the next morning before the division took place; many members had retired from exhaustion; about three hundred voted, but the Remonstrance was only carried by a majority of nine.

On the twenty-fifth of November the King arrived in London, "brooding in secret over his proposed vengeance on the popular leaders." On the first of the following month the Remonstrance was presented to him. Affairs continued to grow worse. Throughout the month of December, 1641, continual disputes occurred between the King and the Commons; and on the third of January, 1642, Charles took a step which exceeded in tyranny and illegality all the former acts of his reign. On that day he sent the Attorney-General to the House of Lords to accuse Lord Kimbolton, Hampden, Pym, and three other members of the House of Commons of high treason. Nothing could be more unconstitutional, nothing could be more tyrannical, than this. The only legal mode of trial would have been by a petty jury on a bill found by a grand jury. The Attorney-General had no right to impeach these five members, and the House of Lords had no right to try them.

This, however, was but the prelude to a still greater violation of the rights and liberties of the subject. The Commons, of course, refused to give up their members, and the King resolved to go himself to the House and seize them. Fortunately, Lady Carlisle informed Pym of the King's intention; and, to prevent a fearful disturbance—probably bloodshed—the five members withdrew. Scarcely had they left the House when Charles, escorted by a large number of soldiers, entered; but found that the birds had flown, as he expressed it. The King then stuttered forth a few words as to his respect for their privileges; and, having requested that the members might be sent to him when they came to the house, he walked out with the word "Privilege!" sounding in his ears from all parts of the House. This gross violation of the liberty of the subject and the privilege of Parliament greatly incensed the Commons. They immediately passed a resolution declaring the King's "warlike entrance" a gross breach of privilege.

They then adjourned to the eleventh of January, 1642, ordering the accused members to be in their places on that day, and appointed a committee to sit in the city of London in the meantime, to examine into the circumstances of Charles's last and greatest violation of law and justice.

Hampden and the other members fled to the City for refuge. There the indignation caused by the King's conduct was scarcely less than in the House of Commons itself. The citizens immediately armed themselves, the shops were closed, and large crowds of people assembled in the streets. And when, on the following day, Charles entered the City on a fruitless search for the five members, loud cries of "Privilege! Privilege of Parliament!" were heard throughout the whole course of his journey to Guildhall and back.

Hampden was much beloved and respected in his own county; and when the report of the King's attempt to imprison him reached Buckinghamshire, it caused almost as much excitement as it had in London. Within seven days four thousand freeholders of that county, each with a copy of the protest of the Commons in his hat, rode up to London to show their attachment to their representative; if necessary, to defend him from personal violence, and to support the House of Commons, "or in their just defence to live and die."

On the tenth of January Charles left London, never again to return, until, as a prisoner of Parliament, he was brought there for execution. On the eleventh, in obedience to the order of the House, the five members returned to their seats. They were accompanied to Westminster by a grand procession of boats and barges. The sheriffs and trainbands formed their escort; and when Hampden and the four other members had landed, they walked up to the house amidst the mingled roar of cannon and shouts of the immense multitude assembled to welcome them. The Sheriffs received a unanimous vote of thanks from the House, and a portion of the trainbands was appointed to attend daily and watch over the safety of Parliament.

The Commons now proceeded to take measures for their own safety; and one of their first actions in this direction was to demand of the King that the command of the militia should be placed in their hands. This was an unprecedented demand; but one which, for their own protection and the national welfare, they were fully justified in making. The conduct of Charles had proved that his most solemn promises were not to be relied upon; that neither the liberties of the Parliament nor the people were safe whilst he had the power to destroy them. Hence, although it had always been customary for the power of the sword to be vested in the Crown, the imminent danger in which the rights of the nation would have been placed by observing this rule fully justified a departure from it. To have allowed Charles to control the militia would have been a suicidal policy on the part of the House of Commons. By so doing they would have practically assisted in their own destruction,

and the establishment of an absolute monarchy in this country. Surely, then, no one can blame them for making this demand; no one can say it was unreasonable. The previous conduct of the King, the extraordinary position of affairs, the public welfare—all justified them in demanding that, for the national safety, the command of the militia should be vested in them. Charles emphatically refused to comply with their demand. "No, by God, not for an hour," he said, when requested to grant the control of the militia, if only for a time.

It was now evident that the dispute between Charles and the Parliament had reached such a point that war alone could settle it; the breach was too wide to heal; the contest had gone too far to be decided by any other means than the sword. Both parties knew this, and began to prepare for that war which was now inevitable. On the twelfth of July, 1642, the Commons resolved to raise an army to be commanded by the Earl of Essex; and on the twenty-ninth of August Charles erected his standard at Nottingham.

One of the greatest evils of civil war is that it tends to raise the most bitter feuds and fearful animosity between those who are closely related to each other. Thus it was in Hampden's case. Most of his relations espoused the King's cause in the war; and consequently he was cut off from all intercourse with them. Some men would have shrunk from a course which would produce such an unhappy result as this. But not so Hampden. Probably it caused him much sorrow; but he was too patriotic, he had too strong a sense of duty, to allow him to forsake the Parliament at this critical period; and therefore he nobly chose to relinquish all private relationships for the sake of that cause which he held so dear. Nor did he do this alone; for he was one of the first to take active measures on the side of the Parliament. Both his purse and his person he willingly devoted to that object for which he had sacrificed so much. The Parliament being in want of money, Hampden subscribed two thousand pounds to assist them; and about the same time he received a colonel's commission in the army. He went down into Buckinghamshire, and there quickly raised a regiment of foot. Hampden's banner bore on one side the motto of the Parliament, "God with us;" and on the other his own motto, "*Vestigia nulla retrorsum*;" words which all who study his life and character must admit were very suitable. Although not previously used to military life, Hampden by diligence soon became thoroughly acquainted with the duties of his new position, and bid fair to distinguish himself in the field as he had already done in the senate.

Our limits will not allow us to trace Hampden throughout the course of the war. If the Earl of Essex had adopted his advice, there can be no doubt that at Edgehill, Brentford, Reading, and other places the army of the Parliament would have been far more successful than it was. But Essex was too timid to take that prompt and vigorous action which Hampden would have adopted

had he been in command; and, so generally is this admitted, that by many writers it is thought that, if Hampden had lived a little longer, the control of the army would have been vested in him instead of Essex.

We now draw near to the closing scenes of Hampden's eventful life. Rupert, whose troops were at this time occupying Oxford, was in the habit of making sudden and fierce attacks with cavalry on exposed points of the Parliamentary army. On the seventeenth of June, 1643, starting on one of these expeditions, he attacked and defeated a regiment at Postcombe, and another at Chinnor, and then retreated towards Oxford. Information of this movement was brought to Hampden; and he immediately sent a messenger to Essex, requesting him to cut off Rupert's retreat at Chiselhampton Bridge, the only place at which he could cross the river. Hampden then collected such cavalry as volunteered to follow him, amounting in all to about three hundred, and started after Rupert in order to harass and impede his retreat. On Chalgrove Field Hampden overtook the Prince, who had twelve hundred horse, besides infantry, and a fierce encounter ensued. In the first charge, Hampden was wounded in the shoulder by two carbine balls, which, breaking the bone, rendered his arm powerless, and compelled him to ride out of the battle. Lord Nugent, in his Memorials, says that "Hampden was seen first moving in the direction of his father-in-law's house at Pyxton. There he had in youth married the first wife of his love, and thither he would have gone to die. But Rupert's cavalry were covering the plain between." Hampden therefore rode back to Thame, where he arrived in a very weak condition. The surgeons at first gave him hopes of recovery; but, from the time that he received the wound, Hampden believed it to be mortal.

He suffered excruciating agony from his wounds; but, notwithstanding this, and animated by that sense of duty and love for his country which he displayed throughout the whole of his career, he wrote letters to Parliament strongly advising them to concentrate the army on the London Road, in order to protect the metropolis. For six days Hampden lay in fearful pain; and then exhausted nature gave way, and he began rapidly to sink. Shortly before his death he received the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, and stated that he believed in the doctrine, but not in the episcopal form of government, of the Church of England. He then spent a short time in prayer for his country and himself. "Lord Jesus, receive my soul! O Lord, save my country! O Lord, be merciful to —;" uttering these words he fell back in his bed, and his noble spirit immediately departed.

Amongst the hills and woods of the Chilterns Hampden's mortal remains found a last resting-place. There, in the presence of a large number of troops, his body was deposited in the grave. Hampden's death caused much sorrow amongst his friends; and, a still greater proof of his value to the cause he had so wisely and

consistently supported, much joy amongst his enemies. "His death," says the royalist Clarendon, "seemed to be a great deliverance to the nation." We cannot better illustrate the state of public feeling than by the following extract from the *Weekly Intelligencer*, a Parliamentary newspaper:—

"The losses of Colonell Hampden goeth near the heart of every man that loves the good of his king and country. . . . The memory of this deceased colonell is such, that in no age to come but it will more and more be had in honour and esteeme: a man so religious, and of that prudence, judgment, temper, valour, and integrity, that he hath left few his like behind him. His bitterest enemies could never fasten any action of disrepute upon him, but one which I conceive was for his eternall honour,—that he was too zealous a Christian."

The death of Hampden was truly a great loss to the Parliamentary cause. Probably no man amongst the many leaders of the people was actuated by purer motives than he. No private ambition, no mean revenge, no selfish motive, prompted him in his actions. Rarely indeed do we see such pure and lofty patriotism as Hampden displayed. The welfare of his country was the great object of his life; for this he suffered imprisonment, fines, and separation from his relations; for this he risked both person and property; for this he lived, and praying for this he died.

To the noblest moral qualities Hampden united great intellectual gifts. He did not possess the same flow of eloquent language as Pym; but no one was a more successful speaker than Hampden. The great object of public speaking is persuasion; and this object Hampden attained to a remarkable degree. The speeches of none who took part in the Parliamentary debates carried more weight with them than did those of Hampden. His language was such as is everywhere appreciated and admired; and is always effective, plain, pointed, terse, and vigorous. Clarendon, speaking on this subject, says, "He was of that rare affability and temper in debate, and of that seeming humility and submission of judgment, as if he brought no opinion of his own with him, but a desire of information and instruction; yet he had so subtle a way of interrogating; and, under the notion of doubts, insinuating his objections, that he left his opinions with those from whom he pretended to learn and receive them. And, even with them who were able to preserve themselves from his infusions, and discerned those opinions to be fixed in him with which they could not comply, he always left the character of an ingenuous and conscientious person." Nor was it on account of his talent as a senator only that his death was so great a loss to the Parliament. To his skill in debate Hampden added unflagging energy and industry. "He was," says Clarendon, "of an industry and vigilance not to be tired out or wearied by the most laborious." With his other qualities Hampden blended a large amount of prudence and caution. Avoiding all hasty and violent action; entertaining, as his whole life proved, a great dislike to extreme measures until¹

other means had failed, and weighing every thought and suggestion carefully in his mind before proceeding to carry it into effect. Unlike Essex, however, he never shrank from prompt and vigorous action, when, after careful consideration, he had decided that it was necessary. When circumstances really demanded strong measures, when anything else would have been useless, Hampden neither feared nor neglected to resort to them. He never permitted his prudence and his caution to fetter his perseverance and energy, so as to render him timid and inactive; but he so balanced prudence with energy as to constitute true wisdom and real courage.

Hampden united in himself many of the admirable qualities of both of the two great parties, whilst he did not strictly belong to either. He possessed the Puritan's resolute will, coupled with the generosity of the Royalists. To the hatred of kingly tyranny and love of free institutions which the former displayed, Hampden united the elegant tastes and the gentlemanly bearing of the latter. But the sullen gloom, the austere manners, the violent hatred of Episcopacy which characterized the one, and the blind worship of crowned heads, mis-called loyalty, the belief in the Divine right of kings, and strong dislike of Dissenters which characterized the other, he equally avoided. But, while Hampden displayed many of the better traits of character of both Puritans and Royalists, he also evinced other qualities which were very uncommon in those days of religious bigotry and intolerance. Amidst the aversion, and even hatred, with which the different religious sects regarded one another, Hampden alone seemed to arrive at a correct understanding of that "perfect law of liberty" which is characteristic of true Christianity. He alone seemed to grasp that grand, that glorious idea which should animate all Christians—Christian unity—the possibility of men who differ as to the form of Church government, who dissent on certain minor doctrines, believing in the same great principles, and being saved by the same simple faith. He alone seemed to enjoy that spirit of Christian charity, generosity, and love which enlarges the mind of those who possess it, and causes them to regard all Christians, of whatever denomination, as brethren. A professed believer in the main doctrines of the Church of England, Hampden at the same time declared that he would immediately renounce that Church "if it obliged him to believe that any other Christians should be damned;" and he entertained an amount of respect for the religious opinions of those who differed from him, a sincere dislike to any religious intolerance; to any laws which attempted—

"To stretch the conscience and to bind
The native freedom of the mind;"

that was indeed rare in his day, when different sects of men, all calling themselves Christians, regarded each other with bitter opposition and dislike; when Episcopalians ridiculed and perse-

cuted Puritans, and Puritans preached against prelacy, and foretold everlasting punishment to those who believed in its doctrines.

Such is a brief sketch of the character of Hampden. None can say that he is not deserving of the highest respect and admiration; and all must regret that Hampden died at a time when men, whose minds were cast in the same mould as his, were far too precious to be spared; when England greatly needed that calm and wise judgment, that resolute and fearless conduct, that patriotism, and that truly Christian liberality of mind which Hampden displayed throughout the whole of his career.

GEORGIUS.

The Topic.

SHOULD THE ARRESTMENT OF WAGES BILL PASS INTO LAW?

AFFIRMATIVE.

OUR opinion in regard to the Arrestment of Wages Limitation Bill has not been arrived at by little or hasty consideration. When the measure was first introduced into Parliament we at once felt anxious to form a correct judgment on its wisdom or unwisdom, and since then, with that object in view, we have continued to study all the speeches, newspaper articles, letters, evidence and opinions bearing on the subject that have come within our observation. The result then is that we agree with the promoters of the bill. Not that in the form in which it has left the Commons House of Parliament it suits itself to our idea of the measure that is desirable; but though we take exception to details, which may be set right by the Upper House, we sufficiently assent to its spirit and principle to take our stand among its supporters. The following are recommendations of the bill which have swayed our mind to an affirmative decision:—1. The bill will have the effect of promoting a ready-money connection between

the merchants and the working classes. 2. This will be a very great benefit to the merchants, in as far as it will keep them advantageously provided with money at all times; 3, and will save them all the trouble, and often unrefunded expense, necessary to get a writ of arrestment out. 4. By immediate payment, as is well known, the purchaser will effect a considerable saving of money, the shopkeeper not requiring to charge interest upon lying-out money, and to cover risks. 5. Habits of economical saving—the laying up for the rainy days—will be encouraged among the people. 6. The pernicious truck system will be rendered impracticable. 7. Clothing and similar clubs, so palpably productive of mischief, will find their security vanished, and will cease to exist. Such are arguments which to our mind, outweigh all that we have seen advanced against Mr. George Anderson's bill, the early admission of which to our Statute Book we earnestly desire.—J. F. B.

To protect poor men who are ignorant against themselves—against their own worst enemies—

1870.

2 H

come very necessary; the extermination of those club-harpies and Scotch-trade travellers who infest the houses of poor men and inveigle their wives into making purchases which they are unable to afford, and often, in opposition to their own ideas of propriety, induce them to conceal their having done so from their husbands, would be a great gain to the working-classes. The destruction of the infamous truck system and the closing of the drink-bills of the working-classes are other matters that require the adoption of active measures. The Arrestment of Wages Bill, as it would abolish the power of those who mislead and delude the poor, would confer a great benefit upon them; while it would vastly improve the general ready-money-trade of the country, and be a great means of enabling the working man to buy the best goods at the lowest price. Hitherto the working man has had no protection granted him from those who make a tyrannous use of the law; this would be a help—a step in the right direction.—F. P.

The working man's wages is, in general, fixed at a *minimum*; he has therefore nothing to spare on law and arrests, and there ought to be no encouragement given to those who seek to tempt him to extravagance by offering credit. Let justice be done, but do not allow justice to be wrested into injustice.—M. G.

NEGATIVE.

The Arrestment of Wages Abolition Bill will most injuriously affect the very class whom it is, I believe, honestly intended to benefit. Credit is a sort of loan-fund of which the working classes get the benefit now, but as this bill would withdraw the security on which these small loans, as they may be called, are granted by tradesmen, credit would be re-

fused; and in the day of difficulty a working man would have no help to tide him over the dull day of slack trade or want of employment. Poor trades-folks, when removing from old places to new ones, would have no means of being provided with the necessaries of life were this bill to be passed. Often the husband requires to try how he can get on in the new place, and must leave his wife and children behind him, trusting to their grocer's kindness and their landlord's good feeling to supply their wants on his credit till he can get them removed, his payments being afterwards made in small sums. But if the security those who grant credit have hitherto been protected by is withdrawn, the credit must cease too. The knowledge that wages can be arrested hinders many from running into debt, and the fact that they can be so is a safeguard to the trader who has to live on the profit, wages, and interest he may gain by the use of a small capital.—W. S. S.

In most cases where wages are arrested, such a course, if not imperative, is needful. 1. Where a wife, separated from her husband through his misconduct, claims maintenance for herself and children; also for the support of an illegitimate child. 2. For a debt contracted by a workman, not a householder; also repayment of a loan. 3. Where an employer demands damages for work spoiled, lost, or stolen, from the person held responsible. In no case where the claim proceeds solely from the claimant, without the sanction of the defaulter, is an arrestment legal. Where sanction is withheld a warrant must be issued by (1) the parochial authorities, (2) or a court of law, or (3) be legalized by an acknowledgment of the employer's responsibility, and in the latter, should the employer consider the

demand unjust, he can appeal to law. No measure could be adopted more effective and just than this; its abolition would allow dishonesty a wider scope for action, and so defeat the ends of justice.—W. L.

The poor have very often to help the poor, when they have nothing

else to give in pledge for the aid they require than the wages of the future. Why prevent that, lawful need being shown, and due proof being given of goods having been supplied? These act as working men's bills, and they ought to be met honourably.—H. N.

The Societies' Section.

THE CENTENARY CELEBRATION OF THE COLLEGE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, DUBLIN.

THE Centenary celebration of the College Historical Society was held on the evening of May 4th within the walls of Trinity College, Dublin. A distinguished party of members of the Judicial Bench, the Bar, the University, and of the professions in general, who had been in their earlier years connected with this, the most renowned of the self-culture associations of Ireland, sat down to dinner under the chairmanship of the Right Hon. Sir Joseph Napier, Bart., President of the Society. We are indebted to the columns of the *Dublin Daily Express* for the main materials of the following sketch of the Society, and to the *Dublin Evening Standard* for such portions of the Report as we quote; both papers having been kindly forwarded to us by a contributor resident in Dublin, to whom we are indebted for many similar and other favours, and a most lively interest in our progress.

The College Historical Society came into existence in 1770; but it can trace its pedigree to an earlier date. It was the successor of a *Literary Club*, among the founders of which was Edmund Burke; and of which Grattan, Hussey, Burgh, and Yelverton were the most distinguished members. It was succeeded by an *Historical Club*, which

in 1770 gave way to the *College Historical Society*. The history of this distinguished society is closely interwoven with that of the National University, and the great men whom it produced played an important part in Ireland's history. Irishmen do not think of the Historical Society merely as a useful and flourishing school of oratory, or a valuable supplement to the severer studies of the University. To most of them it suggests not so much the serious events of the present as the glories of the past. It was the school in which those great orators were trained who gained for "Irish eloquence" a separate page in the history of the intellectual progress of mankind. It is a significant fact, and illustrative of the liberality and comprehensive spirit which distinguished the Dublin University, that it possessed a school of oratory at a much earlier date than either of the English Universities. The Cambridge Union was founded in 1815, and the Oxford Union not until 1826. The Speculative Society, which holds a similar position in the University of Edinburgh, was, likewise in succession to several preceding associations, established in 1764. To enumerate the distinguished members of the old Historical Society would be to re-¹¹

the great names which have illuminated Irish history during the past century. It was there that Grattan heard Bushe speak "with the lips of an angel." Plunket, Magee, Emmet, Saurin, Thomas Moore, Charles Wolfe, are only a few among the historic names which adorn its annals and add lustre to Ireland.

The most remarkable event in the history of the society was its exile for more than a quarter of a century from the walls of the College. By the contemplation of events like this, within the memory of many who are still living, we are enabled to estimate our progress in enlightenment and toleration. Party spirit runs quite as high now as it did at the date of the banishment of the Historical Society. The great social and political questions which engage the attention of mankind excite feelings quite as warm as any which prevailed half a century ago. And yet young men of all creeds are now able to discuss contemporary political questions in perfect harmony and good fellowship. It was, we believe, the discussion of the justifiableness of the assassination of Cæsar which excited the alarm of the Provost of the day, and led to the expulsion of the society from College. But the extern society could boast of several distinguished members, among whom Wm. Archer Butler holds the foremost place—poet, metaphysician, and clergyman—of whom a biographical sketch appeared in the *British Controversialist*, April, 1868. On the list of its officers we find the names of many who have achieved high distinction at the Bar. The late Master of the Rolls, the Vice-Chancellor, Judge Keogh, Judge Lawson, Mr. Isaac Butt, and Dr. Ball, all held high office in the society. The first auditor of the revived Historical Society, after its re-admission within the walls of Trinity College, was

William Magee, now Bishop of Peterborough; and amongst its most distinguished auditors of recent years was Mr. Plunket, the junior member for the University of Dublin.

The College Historical Society has a history upon which Irishmen of all classes and creeds may look back with pride. As Mr. Butt has well said:—"There were glorious recollections in connection with it; but the most glorious of all, that which tends to the union of Irishmen. They had no recollection of the society at the old period—they would never have a prouder event to record in connection with it than that Wm. Magee (afterwards Archbishop of Dublin) had moved a vote of thanks to Wolfe Tone, as auditor, for his efforts on behalf of the society. There is a something in this common love of country above all else." Its traditions are the common heritage of the nation. The illustrious names it boasts, a few of which we have mentioned, include members of all creeds and of all political parties. There are three ex-auditors of the society now in Parliament. Two of them represent the University. The third is Mr. Denis Caulfield Heron, member for Tipperary. Numbers of its members have exchanged the mimic contests of its debates for the stern realities of life. The benefits of united education are exemplified most strongly in societies like the Historical. In the class-rooms political and religious questions do not interfere very much with the solution of a mathematical problem or the translation of a Greek chorus. At the commons' tables and in their private intercourse it might be supposed that young men of different creeds would separate into so many cliques. But debating societies like the Historical, and its younger sister the Philosophical, bring to a crucial test at once the possibility and the advantages of united education.

Those who are best acquainted with these societies will endorse our assertion that the composition of these societies is even more mixed than that of the ordinary classrooms, and that, notwithstanding this fact, their proceedings are characterised with unbroken harmony. A practical proof of this latter proposition is the gradual relaxation of the rule which prohibited the discussion of questions of modern politics. This restriction has now become one of the most shadowy kind; and debates about Charles the First and Oliver Cromwell have now been consigned to the repose in which those concerning Cæsar and Brutus have long been buried. Thus the youth of Ireland are trained, not only in science and literature, but in the more valuable art of "writing out in common the history of their common country. In a country like Ireland the importance of such institutions cannot be over-estimated, and their preservation is worth any sacrifice. The purely intellectual value of these societies is great if they are used as a supplement to the severer studies of the University, not as a substitute for them. The mere acquisition of knowledge is but an imperfect preparation for life, if the arts of communicating ideas clearly and intelligibly and of persuasive reasoning are neglected. These arts are valuable for all; but in public life and at the professions of the Church and the Bar they are all-important. How much better, at least, to lay the foundation of proficiency in the friendly interests of a College Debating Society, and thus to prove the armour that must be used in the battle of life.

On the right of the Chairman were the Provost of Trinity College, the Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, Mr. Justice Keogh, Mr. Justice Fitzgerald, Judge Lynch, Judge Harrison. On his left were

Master Brooke, the Vice-Chancellor, Mr. Justice Morris, Judge Warren, Mr. Butt, Q.C.; Mr. Hemphill, Q.C.

The usual loyal toasts having been duly honoured,

The CHAIRMAN proposed the toast of the evening,—"The Representatives of the College Historical Society," highly eulogising this society, alluding to the historic names it has sent forth, and the many and enduring friendships formed in connection with it.

These reminiscences will readily suggest to the sympathetic reader that the *reunion* was an occasion of great interest. We subjoin the following excerpt from the report:—

Mr. Justice KEOGH, in responding on behalf of the extern Historical Society, said he was under this difficulty—that he could not speak of its earlier days, because, fortunately or unfortunately for himself, he was not then in existence. He could therefore say nothing about those palmy days when the College Historical Society held its meetings within these walls, and when the echoes of eloquence from the neighbouring walls were vibrating through the courts of the College. He became connected with the Society under humbler auspices, when, for one reason or another, this society, unfortunately as he thought, was dissociated from the University—when it was compelled to hold its meetings outside its walls, and apart from the fostering care of the head of the University. His recollection of the society dated from that period, and from a time not far distant from it, when, by the exertions of some of the most distinguished members of it, the society was again restored to the bosom of the University. The only merit he could claim for those with whom he was associated—and many of whom he saw present that evening—was that they endeavoured, in their humble sphere, to pre-

the trust confided to them untainted, so as to restore it to becoming hands when the heads of the University expressed a wish to receive into their arms the exiled offspring (hear, hear). The company would pardon him, he hoped, if he exhibited some vanity in proving that those associated with him in these efforts were not unworthy of their predecessors or successors (applause). In making this attempt he was aware that they would be beholden to the captious criticisms of many sagacious persons who, perhaps, might say that the efforts of young men were not deserving of the consideration of those distinguished persons who had favoured them with their presence that evening; but in his judgment that was a most short-sighted and captious criticism. It had been too much the habit of his countrymen always to try back on the past for the purpose of recalling those unhappy moments of mingled pride and misfortune, which had been the bane and destruction of the country. He recollected reading an eloquent speech of a well-known member of the old society, in which he spoke of the enemies of the peace of the country grovelling among the tombs of the dead in order to evoke from the sepulchres a ghastly spectre to affright and appal the living. Was it to be said that they should only be allowed to revert to the past for that purpose, when they recalled these youthful emulations, generous conflicts, and lasting friendships, which, without bating a single jot of creed, or faith in God, he had known to have sprung from conflicts in the society? (Applause.) When he first joined it, as he had stated, it had its existence outside the walls, but its connection with the University was entirely unbroken. It had amongst its members no one who was not also a member of the University, and on that they spe-

cially prided themselves. (Hear.) They had amongst them men of all creeds—Catholic, Protestant, Presbyterian—he cared not to enter into a further enumeration; they had among them men of all professions—the medical, and, he believed, the military; they had among them men who were in the Church, and men who were preparing for the Church; men who were at the bar, and men who were preparing for the bar. He believed they had among them many whose young hearts were throbbing with the desire of testing their powers on the floor of the House of Commons. (Applause.) He could recal no ignoble list of young men who at the time sustained the debates of the society, and who, in his humble judgment, had held no mean competition with some of the best men he had seen at the bar or had listened to in the House of Commons. (Renewed applause.) Among the many—for they were numerous, and rich in talent and in learning—he should wish to recall a few who rose prominently before his mind, and whose names several present could remember almost as household words. They had among them, in the extern Historical Society, a man of a big and generous heart, and one who was well known in politics and poetry—need he say he referred to Thomas Osborne Davis (applause). They had also a talented and eloquent friend of his own, a man too soon lost to his country, Thomas McNevin (applause). They had also one whose loss all deplored, and the productions of whose genius were conspicuous ornaments of the University, and a great honour to his native country—a man of genius, eloquence, and rare philosophy—William Archer Butler (applause). These men had all passed away. He saw present others, whose names he would wish to mention, but that

their presence forbade him—men who were easily recognised, not merely by their presence, but by the testimonials they bore on their persons (hear, hear). Among the absent there were some, too, whom he would name. They had to guide their councils in these earlier days of the College Historical Society one whose philosophic tendencies, whose historic knowledge, whose classic criticism and tastes were justly valued—he meant their most distinguished friend, Professor Jellett (applause). They had also the learning of his right hon. friend and colleague with whom he was associated on the judicial bench. He had been called on to speak for the extern College Historical Society, and, in doing so, he did not wish to pass over those who rose before his eyes conspicuously. They had the LeFauns, rich in brilliant talent and varied wit—the joy of every society in which they mixed; and who, if he had been as fortunate as others, to get a seat in the House of Commons, would have there obtained triumphs not unworthy of his great ability—the worthy rival of the wondrous three whose words were sparks of immortality (great applause). He almost hesitated to refer to his more immediate time in speaking of those with whom he was personally associated. He could not, however, even at the risk of trespassing on the patience of the company, fail to recall that he was from the first opposed to one who, if he were to mention his name, would be an ample guarantee for the credit of the epoch of the society to which he was called on to speak. He could not describe the exultant pleasure with which his eyes fell on the columns of what was styled the leading journal in England, when he saw there, speaking of a debate on the results of which the highest interests depended, the three great

speeches that had done so much honour to the House of Commons. Who were the speakers on that occasion? One was that wondrous orator who now was absent from the councils of the nation, weighed down by the hand of illness, which every generous heart must deplore. Who were the other two? One of them was a person with whom he had engaged in his earliest encounters in the society—conflicts, he had the happiness of thinking, which ended in the closest, the most unbroken, and the most lasting friendship—he meant the senior Member for the University (applause again and again renewed). The other was a gentleman who had taken the most active part in restoring the society to the protection of the University, and who, after achieving in the House of Commons the greatest distinction ever won in so short a space of time, now occupied a position worthy of his talents—he alluded to Edward Sullivan (great cheering). There was then the Bishop of Peterborough (renewed cheering). Thus it was that, without respect of creed or party, three men, springing from the old Irish school, were sustaining on the British platform the honour and distinction of their fellow-countrymen; and this was one of the lessons he found in the society. If he did not refer at any great length to the last great triumph of that lesson which has been poured forth by one destined to add fresh lustre to the name of Plunket (great applause), it was because he did not wish to transgress the limits which had confined his attention to the extern Historical Society. He hoped he had said enough to show that both branches of the society were very nearly akin. He trusted that the present members of it would cultivate the charms of eloquence and the powers of oratory, and that, being united to the pr-

University, which all hoped to see develop itself on a broad, comprehensive, tolerant, and national basis (renewed applause), it would teach the young men of this country those maxims without which eloquence and oratory were merely as vain things that passed away (hear, hear)—universal toleration in the first instance, the supremacy of the law, peace preserved at all hazards within their shores, the inviolability and sanctity of human life, and, above all things for them, who had the great honour, distinction, and benefit of forming part of an empire of which

it might be truly said that the sun could never set on its frontiers—the maintenance of the national honour (cheers). If the young men of the country kept their eyes fixed on these objects, he had no fear that, when another centenary came, any one would have again to speak of the epoch of the College Historical Society in its exile from the University. The learned judge returned thanks for the kind manner in which he had been received, and resumed his seat amid prolonged cheering.

Mr. E. B. HAMILTON, auditor of the Society, also returned thanks.

TOPICS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Is Social Life as completely under the Dominion of Natural Law as Bodily Growth is?

Is the Life of a Nation analogous to the Life of an Individual?

Is the Gospel adapted to Modern Life?

Can the Reasoning Faculties be Cultivated?

Has Christianity improved the Morals of Nations?

Is a Science of Theology possible?

Are the Bases of Human Life Physical?

Is it desirable in the Christian Church to have a body of Clergy?

Is it morally right to Buy in the Cheapest and Sell in the Dearest Market?

Is Faith attainable through Reason?

Has the Life of Mazzini been usefully spent?

Do the Scriptures warrant the conclusion that the whole Human Race shall be Saved?

Which is the greater Statesman—John Bright or W. E. Gladstone?

Are Permanent Armies requisite in our times?

Is Truth attainable by man?

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

880. The best and cheapest edition of the poets is the Aldine series, now in course of re-issue by Bell & Daldy, of London, in fifty-two monthly volumes at 1s. 6d. each, of which two are already published. This series, edited by eminent scholars (including Collier, Dyce, Mitford, Morris, &c.), are

well printed with initial letters and ornaments, and elegantly bound in cloth gilt. The contents of the series are, Akenside, Beattie, Burns, Butler, Chaucer, Churchill, Collins, Cowper, Dryden, Falconer, Goldsmith, Gray, Kirke White, Milton, Parnell, Pope, Prior, Shakspeare, Spenser, Surrey, Swift, Thomson, Wyatt, and Young.

I may also add that the price of

Crocker's "Mermaid" series of dramatists is 5s. a volume instead of 3s. 6d., as stated in the March number of *British Controversialist*.—C. C.

885. "Ben Jonson died on the 6th of August, 1637, and was buried on the 9th in Westminster Abbey. A subscription was set on foot for the erection of a monument, but the political troubles of the time interfered with the execution of the design. Meanwhile a gentleman of Oxfordshire, Sir John Young, familiarly called Jack Young, happening to pass through the abbey, gave one of the masons eighteenpence to cut upon the common pavement stone which covered the grave the brief epitaph, 'O rare Ben Jonson!' The smallness of the surface occupied by the gravestone is explained by the fact that the coffin was deposited in an upright position; possibly, as has been surmised, to diminish the fee by economy of space. The tradition that Jonson had been interred in this manner was generally discredited until the grave was opened a few years ago, when the remains of the poet were discovered in an erect position." (*Poetical Works of Ben Jonson*, edited by Robert Bell; *Memoir*, p. 22.)—M. F.

886. Walter Harte, born probably at St. Mary's, Taunton, about 1700; educated at Marlborough School, and St. Mary Hall, Oxford; wrote in 1785 an "Essay on Reason," a poem to which Pope contributed several of the best lines. It contains little that is original, and is not now easily procured, though issued in a superb folio. We have seen but not read it. He was a man of considerable ability, was tutor to the son of Lord Chesterfield; and by the influence of that pink of perfection in manners was made Canon of Windsor. He was Vice-Principal of St. Mary Hall, Oxford, and has some reputa-

tion as an historian and a political economist.—J. H. M.

893. The line, "Too wise to err, too good to be unkind," occurs in a hymn written by the late Samuel Medley, formerly Baptist minister at Liverpool, and previously a sailor. The verse which contains the line is as follows:—

"Hereafter he will make me know,
And I shall surely find,
He was too wise to err; and O,
Too good to be unkind;"

and the hymn of which this verse is a part commences thus:—

"God shall alone the refuge be."

Medley's hymns, of which several editions appeared between 1789 and 1800, may still be met with. They are very much characterized by the feature of the last line of each verse being entirely or nearly the same; that of every verse of the hymn here referred to being,

"Too good to be unkind."

They form parts of various selections; as Rippon's, Gadsby's, and Denham's. The well-known hymn commencing

"Awake, my soul, in joyful lays," is by Medley.—S. S.

894. The phrase is now-a-days somewhat hard to understand, and it is, as often occurs in Locke's writings, rather awkwardly expressed. "Enter them in" is a synonym for teach, initiate, as—

"They of Rome are entered in our counsels,

And know how we proceed."

Coriolanus i. 2.

Let the passage be read thus:—
"Had those that would, according to their several capacities, enter them in, a right way to this knowledge?" and the meaning becomes clear.—R. M. A.

Literary Notes.

E. B. TYLOR, author of "Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of Civilization," has in preparation a work on "Primitive Culture, treating of the mythology, philosophy, religion, arts, customs, &c. of early times.

Sir H. Bulwer's "Life of Lord Palmerston" is nearly ready.

A handy edition of "Sir Edward Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World" has been issued.

Professor Seeley's lectures to ladies "On Roman History" delivered at the Kensington Museum are to be published.

J. W. Cole, author of the dramatic papers which gave almost a speciality to the *Dublin University Magazine* of late, died 17th Feb.

"The Palæontology of Asia Minor" forming the eighth and last volume of a complete work on that district by the Russian naturalist, Peter Tehihatchef (born 1812), will shortly be published in Paris.

The American *Publishers' Circular* states that the second volume of Dr. Allibone's "Dictionary of British and American Authors" will be issued forthwith; and the third volume, completing the work, will probably be published before the close of the present year. The first volume contained notices of 17,444 authors, A to J, in 1005 pages; the second, K to S, will chronicle 18,150 authors, in about 1350 pages; the third, T to Z, will have notices of 7550. There will also be 40 indexes of subjects, from Agriculture to Voyages. The whole will contain about 3300 pages. The manuscript, as copied by Mrs. Allibone for the press, occupied 19,044 foolscap pages, with a few pages in large quarto. Dr. Allibone has placed 700 Smiths in his Dictionary, 95 of them John Smiths.

"The Logical Method of Political Economy" is the title of a volume—suggestive of De Quincey's "Logic of Political Economy"—which Mr. J. E. Cairnes has in the press.

The articles by Alfred Austin, author of "The Season: a satire," which appeared in *Temple Bar Magazine*, are re-published under the title of "The Poetry of the Period."

The Observatory of Sir Isaac Newton is offered for sale for £500. It is proposed to raise that sum by public subscription, and to present it to the nation.

A complete and accurate Concordance to Spenser is in process of production.

Charles Bonar, author of "Transylvania," died at Munich May 9th.

M. Rordy's French translation of Mottley's "History of the Netherlands" has reached the third volume.

J. M. Gartner has issued at Amsterdam "The Bible and Geology."

"Stone-edge" and "Lettice Lisle" in *Cornhill* were written by Miss Nightingale's sister.

It has been proposed to institute a library and museum—similar to that at Stratford-upon-Avon—in the cottage of Burns' birth at Allo-way, near Ayr.

W. A. Mackinnon, author of a "History of Civilization," "Thoughts on the Currency," &c., died 1st May, aged 81.

An elaborate and well-sustained work on "The Philosophy of Plato" has just been added to French literature by M. Alfred Feuillee.

Mr. James Bryce, son of the mathematical master of the High School of Glasgow, is the first Presbyterian who has yet held the Chair of Civil History in Oxford. He is author of "The Holy Roman Empire," and one of the contributors to "Essays on Reform."

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